Skip to content

Plato, Laws (tr. R. G. Bury, 1926) · Book 9, Stephanus 862

Text display

Font size: 19px

Go to a reference
Same place in another edition

Anchor: Pl.Lg.862a

Side by side

Tap a number or a passage to select it.

but consider whether in saying what I am now going to say I am speaking sense or absolute nonsense. For what I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that, if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing it, he acts unjustly though involuntarily, nor shall I legislate in this way, pronouncing this to be an involuntary act of injustice, but I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether it be a greater injury or a less. And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice;
for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one to term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another,—that is what the lawgiver must look at; he must consider these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury inflicted he must make good so far as possible by legal means; he must conserve what is lost, restore what has been broken down, make whole
what is wounded or dead; and when the several injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must endeavor always by means of the laws to convert the parties who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord to a state of amity. He will be right in doing that. As regards unjust injuries and gains, in case one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly towards him, all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should affirm that our cure for injustice lies in this direction— What direction?
In this,—that whenever any man commits any unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him for the future either never willingly to dare to do such a deed, or else to do it ever so much less often, in addition to paying for the injury. To effect this, whether by action or speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money-fines and money-gifts, and in general by whatsoever means one can employ to make men hate injustice and love (or at any rate not hate) justice,—this is precisely the task of laws most noble.
But for all those whom he perceives to be incurable in respect of these matters, what penalty shall the lawgiver enact, and what law? The lawgiver will realize that in all such cases not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also that they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life—since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid

Source and terms: Plato, Laws (tr. R. G. Bury, 1926) · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Plato, tr. R. G. Bury, Plato in Twelve Volumes (Loeb Classical Library, 1926). TEI encoding: Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University (PerseusDL/canonical-greekLit), commit 0189b9c, file data/tlg0059/tlg034/tlg0059.tlg034.perseus-eng2.xml; licensed CC BY-SA 4.0. · terms

Bookmarks, notes and the reading position are stored only in this browser.