Skip to content

Plato, Meno (tr. B. Jowett) · Stephanus 87

Text display

Font size: 19px

Go to a reference
Same place in another edition

Anchor: Pl.Men.87

Side by side

Tap a number or a passage to select it.

hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle, will reply: ‘I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced, then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle:’—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, ‘remembered’? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught? Men. I agree. Soc. Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? Men. Certainly. Soc. Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? Men. Certainly. Soc. The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? Men. Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. Men. Certainly. Soc. Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? Men. True. Soc. And virtue makes us good? Men. Yes. Soc. And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable? Men. Yes. Soc. Then virtue is profitable? Men. That is the only inference. Soc. Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable? Men. True.
Notes in the source · 6
  • Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.
  • Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.
  • Or, when you apply it to the given line, i. e. the diameter of the circle (αὐτοῦ).
  • Or, when you apply it to the given line, i. e. the diameter of the circle (αὐτοῦ).
  • Or, similar to the area so applied.
  • Or, similar to the area so applied.

Source and terms: Plato, Meno (tr. B. Jowett) · public domain · Plato, Meno, tr. Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd ed., vol. II (Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1892); Project Gutenberg eBook #76464. · terms

Bookmarks, notes and the reading position are stored only in this browser.