Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.
Soc. But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
Men. I did say so.
Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?
Men. Certainly not.
Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
Men. True.
Soc. And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?
Men. They cannot.
Soc. They must be temperate and just?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues?
Men. Such is the inference.
Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?
Men. They would not.
Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
Men. Will you have one definition of them all?
Soc. That is what I am seeking.
Men. If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?
Men. I think not, Socrates.
Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is ‘the power of governing;’ but do you not add ‘justly and not unjustly’?
Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
Soc. Would you say ‘virtue,’ Meno, or ‘a virtue’?
Men. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is ‘a figure’ and not simply ‘figure,’ and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.
Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that there are other virtues as well as justice.
Plato, Meno (tr. B. Jowett) · Stephanus 73
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Source and terms: Plato, Meno (tr. B. Jowett) · public domain · Plato, Meno, tr. Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd ed., vol. II (Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1892); Project Gutenberg eBook #76464. · terms
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