with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.
Cal. I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.
Soc. And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
Cal. Equally true of two or more.
Soc. Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
Cal. I assent.
Soc. And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
Cal. Yes.
Soc. And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what
Платон. Горгий (англ. пер. Б. Джоуэтта) · Stephanus 501
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Источник и условия: Платон. Горгий (англ. пер. Б. Джоуэтта) · общественное достояние · Plato, Gorgias, tr. Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd ed., vol. II (Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1892); Project Gutenberg eBook #76464. · условия
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