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Plato, Gorgias (tr. B. Jowett) · Stephanus 497

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Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? Cal. Clearly. Soc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? Cal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. Soc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. Cal. Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. Soc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time? Cal. I do not understand what you are saying. Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out. Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion. Cal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? Cal. True. Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? Cal. Very true. Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? Cal. Yes. Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you still adhere to what you said? Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference? Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? Cal. Yes. Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so? Cal. Certainly. Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? Cal. Yes, I have. Soc. And a foolish man too? Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

Source and terms: Plato, Gorgias (tr. B. Jowett) · public domain · Plato, Gorgias, tr. Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 3rd ed., vol. II (Oxford University Press, American Branch, New York, 1892); Project Gutenberg eBook #76464. · terms

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