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Эннеадыведущееанглийский
Открыть в читалке1.1.1To what part of our nature do pleasure and grief, fear and boldness desire and aversion, and, last, pain, belong? Is it to the soul (herself), or to the soul when she uses the body as an instrument, or to some third (combination) of both? Even the latter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either the simple mixture of the soul and the body, or some different product resulting therefrom. The same uncertainty obtains about the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely, passions, actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether ratiocination and opinion both, belong to the same principle as the passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the other would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire concerning the nature and classification of thought. Last we should study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes to some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who feels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of feeling, or at least they do not exist without it.
1.1.2Let us first examine the soul (herself). Is there any difference between the soul and the soul-essence? If there be a difference, the soul must be a composite aggregate: and it should no longer be a matter of surprise that both she and her essence, at least so far as she admits thereof, together experience the above mentioned passions, and in general the habits, and better or worse dispositions. But, on the contrary, if, soul and soul-essence be identical, then the soul should be a form which would be unreceptive for all these energies of essence, which on the contrary she imparts to other things, possessing in herself a connate energy which our reason reveals in her. In this case we must acknowledge that she is immortal, inasmuch as the immortal and undecaying must be impassible, giving to others without receiving anything in return from them; or at least, deriving nothing but from the superior (or anterior) principles, from which she is not cut off, inasmuch as they are better. A being that were so unreceptive to anything external would have no ground for fear of anything external. Fear might indeed be natural to something. Neither would she be bold, for this sentiment, implies shelter from what is terrifying. As to such desires which are satisfied by the emptying or filling of the body, they belong only to some nature foreign enough to be emptied or filled. How could she participate in a mixture, inasmuch as the essential is unmingled? Further she would not wish to have anything introduced (in herself), for this would imply striving to become something foreign to herself. She would also be far from suffering, for how could she grieve, and about what? For that which is of simple being is self-sufficient, in that she remains in her own being. Neither will she rejoice at any increase, as not even the good could happen to her. What she is, she ever will be. Nor could we attribute to the pure soul sensation, ratiocination or opinion; for sensation is the perception, of a form or of an impassible body; and besides ratiocination and opinion (depend) on sensation. We shall, however, have to examine whether or no we should attribute to the soul thought; also, whether pure pleasure can affect a soul while she remains alone.
1.1.3Whether the soul, according to her being, be located in the body, above or within this latter, the soul forms with the body an entity called (a "living being" or) organism. In this case, the soul using the body as a tool is not forced to participate in its passions, any more than workmen participate in the experiences of their tools. As to sensations, of course, the soul must perceive them, since in order to use her instrument, the soul must, by means of sensation, cognize the modifications that this instrument may receive from without. Thus seeing consists of using the eyes; and the soul at the same time feels the evils which may affect the sight. Similar is the case with griefs, pains and any corporeal exigency; also with the desires which arise from the soul's need to take recourse to the ministry of the body. But how do passions from the body penetrate into the soul? For a body could communicate her own properties to some other body; but how could she do so to a soul? Such a process would imply that one individual suffers when an entirely different individual is affected. There must be a distinction between them so long as we consider the former the user, and the latter the used; and it is philosophy, that produces this separation by giving to the soul the power of using the body as a tool. But what was the condition of the soul before her separation from the body by philosophy? Was she mingled with the body? If she were mingled with it, she must either have been formed by mixing; or she was spread all over the body; or she was a form interwoven with the body; or she was a form governing the body as a pilot governs the ship; or was partly mingled with, and partly separated from, the body. (In the latter case) I would call the independent part that which uses the body as a tool, while the mingled part is that which lowers itself to the classification or rank of instrument. Now philosophy raises the latter to the rank of the former; and the detached part turns her away, as far as our needs allow, from the body she uses, so that she may not always have to use the body.
1.1.4Now let us suppose the soul is mingled with the body. In this mixture, the worse part, or body, will gain, while the soul will lose. The body will improve by participation with the soul; and the soul will deteriorate by association with death and irrationality. Well, does the soul, in somewhat losing life, gain the accession of sensation? On the other hand, would not the body, by participation in life, gain sensation and its derived passions? It is the latter, then, which will desire, inasmuch as it will enjoy the desired objects, and will feel fear about them. It is the latter which may be exposed to the escape of the objects of its desire, and to decay. We will set aside as impossible the mixture of two incommensurables, such as a line and the color called white. A mixture of the soul and body, which must imply their commensurability, would demand explanation. Even if the soul interpenetrate the body, the soul need not share the body's passions, for the interpenetrating medium may remain impassible; as light, which remains such in spite of its diffusion. Thus the soul might remain a stranger to the body's passions, though diffused through it, and need not necessarily undergo its passions. Should we say that the soul is in the body, as form in matter? In this case, she is "being," and she would be a separable form. If then she be in the body as, in the case of the axe, the schematic figure is in the iron, so as by her own proper virtue, to form the power of doing what iron thus formed accomplishes, we will have all the more reason to attribute the common passions to the body, which is an organized physical tool possessing potential life. For if as (Plato) says it be absurd to suppose that it is the soul that weaves, it is not any more reasonable to attribute the desires and griefs to the soul; rather, by far, to the living organism.
1.1.5The "living organism" must mean either the thus organized body, or the common mixture of soul and body, or some third thing which proceeds from the two first. In either of these three cases the soul will have to be considered impassible, while the power of experiencing passions will inhere in something else; or the soul will have to share the body's passions, in which case the soul will have to experience passions either identical or analogous to those of the body, so that to a desire of the animal there will correspond an act or a passion of the concupiscible appetite. We shall later on consider the organized body; here we must find how the conjunction of soul and body could experience suffering. The theory that the affection of the body modifies it so as to produce a sensation which itself would end in the soul, leaves unexplained the origin of sensation. To the theory that suffering has its principle in this opinion or judgment, that a misfortune is happening to ourselves or some one related to us, whence results disagreeable emotion first in the body, and then in the whole living organism, there is this objection, that it is yet uncertain to which opinion belongs; to the soul, or to the conjunction of soul and body. Besides, the opinion of the presence of an evil does not always entail suffering; it is possible that, in spite of such an opinion, one feels no affliction; as, for instance, one may not become irritated at believing oneself scorned; or in experiencing no desire even in the expectation of some good. How then arise these affections common to the soul and the body? Shall we then say that desire derives from the desire-appetite, anger from the anger-appetite, or in short, every emotion or affliction from the corresponding appetite? But even so, they will not be common, and they will belong exclusively to the soul, or to the body. There are some whose origin needs the excitation of blood and bile, and that the body be in some certain state which excites desire, as in physical love. On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common affection; it is an affection peculiar to the soul, as are several others. Reason, therefore, does not allow us to consider all affections as common to soul and body. Is it possible, however, that for example, in physical love, the man may experience a desire simultaneously with the corresponding appetite? This is impossible, for two reasons. If we say that the man begins to experience the desire, while the corresponding appetite continues it, it is plain the man cannot experience a desire without the activity of the appetite. If on the other hand it be the appetite that begins, it is clear that it cannot begin being excited unless the body first find itself in suitable circumstances, which is unreasonable.
1.1.6It would, however, probably be better to put the matter thus: by their presence, the faculties of the soul cause reaction in the organs which possess them, so that while they themselves remain unmoved, they give them the power to enter into movement. In this case, however, when the living organism experiences suffering, the life-imparting cause must itself remain impassible, while the passions and energies belong wholly to that which receives life. In this case, therefore, the life will not belong exclusively to the soul, but to the conjunction of the soul and body; or, at least, the latter's life will not be identical with the soul's, nor will it be the faculty of sensation, which will feel, but the being in whom that faculty inheres. If, however, sensation, which is no more than a corporeal emotion, finds its term in the soul, the soul must surely feel sensation; therefore it does not occur as an effect of the presence of the faculty of sensation, for this ignores the feeling agent back of it. Nor is it the conjunction of soul and body, for unless the faculty of sensation operate, that aggregate could not feel, and it would then no longer include as elements either the soul, or the faculty of sensation.
1.1.7The aggregate results from the presence of the soul, not indeed that the soul enters into the aggregate, or constitutes one of its elements. Out of this organized body, and of a kind of light furnished by herself, the soul forms the animal nature, which differs both from soul and body, and to which belongs sensation, as well as all the passions attributed to the animal. If now we should be asked how it happened that "we" feel, we answer: We are not separated from the organism, although within us exist principles of a higher kind which concur in forming the manifold complex of human nature. As to the faculty of sensation which is peculiar to the soul, it cannot be the power of perceiving the sense-objects themselves, but only their typical forms, impressed on the animal by sensation. These have already somewhat of the intelligible nature; the exterior sensation peculiar to the animal is only the image of the sensation peculiar to the soul; which, by its very essence is truer and more real, since it consists only in contemplating images while remaining impassible. Ratiocination, opinion and thought, which principally constitute us, deal exclusively with these images, by which the soul has the power of directing the organism. No doubt these faculties are "ours," but "we" are the superior principle which, from above, directs the organising but in this whole we shall have to distinguish an inferior part, mingled with the body, and a superior part, which is the true man. The former (irrational soul) constitutes the beast, as for instance, the lion; the latter is the rational soul, which constitutes man. In every ratiocination, it is "we" who reason, because ratiocination is the peculiar activity (or, energy) of the soul.
1.1.8What is our relation with the Intelligence? I mean not the habit imparted to the soul by the intellect, but the absolute Intelligence; which, though above us, is also common to all men, or peculiar to each of them; in other words, is simultaneously common and individual. Common because it is indivisible, one and everywhere the same; particular because each soul possesses it entirely in the first or rational soul. Likewise, we possess the ideas in a double manner; in the soul they appear developed and separate; in the intelligence they exist all together. What is our relation with God? He hovers over the intelligible nature, and real being; while we, being on the third rank as counted from thence, are of the undivided universal Soul, which is indivisible because she forms part of the upper world, while she is divisible in regard to the bodies. She is indeed divisible in regard to the bodies, since she permeates each of them as far as they live; but at the same time she is indivisible because she is one in the universe. She seems to be present in the bodies, and illuminates them, making living beings out of them. This occurs not as a mixture of herself and bodies, but by remaining individual, giving out images of herself, just as a single face in several mirrors. Of these, the first is sensation, which resides in the common part, the organism; then come all the other forms of the soul--forms which successively derive each from the other, down to the faculties of generation and increase, and generally, the power of producing and fashioning that which is different from self--which indeed the soul does as soon as she turns towards the object she fashions.
1.1.9In this conception of the soul, she will be foreign to the cause of the evils which the man does and suffers. These refer to the organism, that common part, understood as above. Although opinion be deceptive, and makes us commit much evil, and although opinion and ratiocination both belong to the soul, yet the soul may be sinless, inasmuch as we are only mastered by the worse part of our nature. Often, indeed, we yield to appetite, to anger, and we are the dupes of some imperfect image. The conception of false things, the imagination does not await the judgment of discursive reason. There are still other cases where we yield to the lower part of ourselves; in sensation, for instance, we see things that do not exist, because we rely on the common sensation of soul and body, before having discerned its objects by discursive reason. In this case did the intellect grasp the object itself? Certainly not; and, therefore, it is not the intellect that is responsible for the error. We say as much for the "we," according as we will or will not have perceived the object, either in the intellect, or in ourselves;--for it is possible to possess an object without having it actually present. We have distinguished from things common to soul and body, those peculiar to the soul. The former are corporeal, and cannot be produced without the organs, while the latter's occurrence is independent of the body. Ratiocination is the essential and constitutive faculty of the real soul, because it determines the typical forms derived from sensation, it looks, it somehow feels the images, and really is the dominating part of the soul. The conception of true things is the act of intuitive thoughts. There is often a resemblance and community between exterior and interior things; in this case the soul will not any the less exercise herself on herself, will not any the less remain within herself, without feeling any passive modification. As to the modifications and troubles which may arise in us, they derive from foreign elements, attached to the soul, as well as from passions experienced by the above described common part.
1.1.10But if "we" are the "soul," we must admit that when we experience passions, the soul experiences them also; that when we act, the soul acts. We may even say that the common part is also "ours," especially before philosophy separated the soul from the body; in fact, we even say "we" suffer, when our body suffers. "We" is, therefore, taken in a double sense: either the soul with the animal part, or living body; or simply the upper part; while the vivified body is a wild beast. The real Man differs from the body; pure from every passion, he possesses the intellectual virtues, virtues which reside in the soul, either when she is separated from the body, or when she is--as usually here below--only separable by philosophy; for even when she seems to us entirely separated, the soul is, in this life, ever accompanied by a lower sensitive part, or part of growth, which she illuminates. As to the virtues which consist not in wisdom, but in ethical habits and austerities, they belong to the common part. To it alone, also, are vices to be imputed, inasmuch as it exclusively experiences envy, jealousy and cowardly pity. Friendships, however, should be referred some to the common part, and others to the pure Soul or inner Man. In childhood, the faculties of the composite common part are exercised, but rarely is it illuminated from above. When this superior principle seems inactive in relation to us, it is actively engaged towards the upper intelligible world; and it only begins to be active towards us when it advances as far as (fancy or representation), the middle part of our being. But is the superior principle not "ours" also? Surely, but only when we are conscious thereof; for we do not always utilize our possessions. This utilization, however, takes place when we direct this middle part of our being towards either the upper or lower worlds, and when we actualize into energies what before was only an (Aristotelian) "potentiality" or a (Stoic) "habit." We might define the animating principle of animals. If it be true, according to common opinion, that animal bodies contain human souls that have sinned, the separable part of these souls does not properly belong to these bodies; although these souls assist these bodies, the souls are not actually present to them. In them the sensation is common to the image of the soul and to the body;--but to the latter only in so far as it is organized and fashioned by the image of the soul. As to the animals into whose bodies no human soul entered, they are produced by an illumination of the universal Soul.
1.1.11
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1.1.12There is a contradiction between our own former opinion that the soul cannot sin, and the universally admitted belief that the soul commits sins, expiates them, undergoes punishments in Hades, and that she passes into new bodies. Although we seem to be in a dilemma, forcing us to choose between them, it might be possible to show they are not incompatible. When we attribute infallibility to the soul, we are supposing her to be one and simple, identifying the soul with soul essence. When, however, we consider her capable of sin, we are looking at her as a complex, of her essence and of another kind of soul which can experience brutal passions. The soul, thus, is a combination of various elements; and it is not the pure soul, but this combination, which experiences passions, commits sins, and undergoes punishments. It was this conception of the soul Plato was referring to when he said: "We see the soul as we see Glaucus, the marine deity," and he adds, "He who would know the nature of the soul herself should, after stripping her of all that is foreign to her, in her, especially consider her philosophic love for truth; and see to what things she attaches herself, and by virtue of whose affinities she is what she is." We must, therefore, differentiate the soul's life acts from that which is punished, and when we speak of philosophy's separation of the soul, we mean a detaching not only from the body, but also from what has been added to the soul. This addition occurs during her generation, or rather in the generation of another ideal form of soul, the "animal nature." Elsewhere this generation has been explained thus. When the soul descends, at the very moment when she inclines towards the body, she produces an image of herself. The soul, however, must not be blamed for sending this image into the body. For the soul to incline towards the body is for the soul to shed light on what is below her; and this is no more sinful than to produce a shadow. That which is blamable is the illuminated object; for if it did not exist, there would be nothing to illuminate. The descent of the soul, or her inclination to the body, means only that she communicates life to what she illuminates. She drives away her image, or lets it vanish, if nothing receptive is in its vicinity; the soul lets the image vanish, not because she is separated--for to speak accurately, she is not separated from the body--but because she is no longer here below; and she is no longer below when she is entirely occupied in contemplating the intelligible world. (Homer) seems to admit this distinction in speaking of Hercules, when he sends the image of this hero into Hades, and still he locates him within the abode of the deities;--it is at least the idea implied in this double assertion that Hercules is in Hades and that he is in Olympus. The poet, therefore, distinguished in him two elements. We might perhaps expound the passage as follows: Hercules had an active virtue, and because of his great qualities was judged worthy of being classified with the deities, but as he possessed only the active virtue, and not the contemplative virtue, he could not be admitted into Heaven entirely; while he is in heaven, there is something of him in Hades.
1.1.13Is it "we" or the "soul" which makes these researches? It is we, by means of the soul. The cause of this is, not we who consider the soul because we possess her, but that the soul considers herself. This need not imply motion, as it is generally understood, but a motion entirely different from that of the bodies, and which is its own life. Intelligence also is ours, but only in the sense that the soul is intelligent; for us, the (higher) life consists in a better thinking. The soul enjoys this life either when she thinks intelligible objects, or when the intellect is both a part of ourselves, and something superior towards which we ascend.
2:1.2.1Man must flee from (this world) here below (for two reasons): because it is the nature of the soul to flee from evil, and because inevitable evil prevails and dominates this world here below. What is this flight (and how can we accomplish it)? (Plato), tells us it consists in "being assimilated to divinity." This then can be accomplished by judiciously conforming to justice, and holiness; in short, by virtue. If then it be by virtue that we are assimilated (to divinity), does this divinity to whom we are trying to achieve assimilation, Himself possess virtue? Besides, what divinity is this? Surely it must be He who must most seem to possess virtue, the world-Soul, together with the principle predominating in her, whose wisdom is most admirable (supreme Intelligence)--for it is quite reasonable that we should be assimilated to Him. Nevertheless, one might, unreflectingly, question whether all virtues might suit this divinity; whether, for instance, moderation in his desires, or courage could be predicated of Him; for, as to courage, nothing can really harm Him, and He therefore has nothing to fear; and as to moderation, no pleasant object whose presence would excite His desires, or whose absence would in Him awaken regrets, could possibly exist. But inasmuch as the divinity, just as we ourselves, aspires to intelligible things, He is evidently the source of our gracious sanity and virtues. So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Does the divinity possess these virtues?" It would not be proper to attribute to Him the homely (or, civil) virtues, such as prudence, which "relates to the rational part of our nature"; courage, which "relates to our irascible part"; temperance, which consists of the harmonious consonance of our desires and our reason; last, of justice, which "consists in the accomplishment by all these faculties of the function proper to each of them," "whether to command, or to obey," (as said Plato). But if we cannot become assimilated to the divinity by these homely virtues, that process must demand similarly named virtues of a superior order. However, these homely virtues would not be entirely useless to achieve that result, for one cannot say that while practising them one does not at all resemble the divinity as they who practise them are reputed to be godlike. These lower virtues do therefore yield some resemblance to the divinity, but complete assimilation can result only from virtues of a higher order. Virtues, even if they be not homely, are therefore ultimately ascribed (to the divinity). Granting that the divinity does not possess the homely virtues, we may still become assimilated to Him by other virtues for with virtues of another order the case might differ. Therefore, without assimilating ourselves to the divinity by homely virtues we might nevertheless by means of virtues which still are ours, become assimilated to the Being which does not possess virtue. This may be explained by an illustration. When a body is warmed by the presence of fire, the fire itself need not be heated by the presence of another fire. It might be argued that there was heat in the fire, but a heat that is innate. Reasoning by analogy, the virtue, which in the soul is only adventitious, is innate in Him from whom the soul derives it by imitation; (in other words, the cause need not necessarily possess the same qualities as the effect). Our argument from heat might however be questioned, inasmuch as the divinity really does possess virtue, though it be of a higher nature. This observation would be correct, if the virtue in which the soul participates were identical with the principle from which she derives it. But there is a complete opposition; for when we see a house, the sense-house is not identical with the intelligible House, though possessing resemblance thereto. Indeed, the sense-house participates in order and proportion, though neither order, proportion, nor symmetry could be attributed to the idea of the House. Likewise, we derived from the divinity order, proportion and harmony, which, here below, are conditions of virtue, without thereby implying that the divinity Himself need possess order, proportion, or harmony. Similarly, it is not necessary that He possess virtue, although we become assimilated to Him thereby. Such is our demonstration that human assimilation to the divine Intelligence by virtue does not (necessarily imply) (in the divine Intelligence itself) possession of virtue. Mere logical demonstration thereof is not, however, sufficient; we must also convince.
2:1.2.2Let us first examine the virtues by which we are assimilated to the divinity, and let us study the identity between our soul-image which constitutes virtue, and supreme Intelligence's principle which, without being virtue, is its archetype. There are two kinds of resemblance: the first entails such identity of nature as exists when both similar things proceed from a same principle; the second is that of one thing to another which precedes it, as its principle. In the latter case, there is no reciprocity, and the principle does not resemble that which is inferior to it; or rather, the resemblance must be conceived entirely differently. It does not necessitate that the similar objects be of the same kind; it rather implies that they are of different kinds, inasmuch as they resemble each other differently. (It is difficult to define) what is virtue, in general or in particular. To clear up the matter, let us consider one particular kind of virtue: then it will be easy to determine the common essence underlying them all. The above-mentioned homely virtues really render our souls gracious, and improve them, regulating and moderating our appetites, tempering our passions, delivering us from false opinions, limiting us within just bounds, and they themselves must be determined by some kind of measure. This measure given to our souls resembles the form given to matter, and the proportion of intelligible things; it is as it were a trace of what is most perfect above. What is unmeasured, being no more than formless matter, cannot in any way resemble divinity. The greater the participation in form, the greater the assimilation to the formless; and the closer we get to form, the greater the participation therein. Thus our soul, whose nature is nearer to divinity and more kindred to it than the body is, thereby participates the more in the divine, and increases that resemblance enough to make it seem that the divinity is all that she herself is. Thus arises the deception, which represents her as the divine divinity, as if her quality constituted that of the divinity. Thus are men of homely virtues assimilated to the divinity.
2:1.2.3We will now, following (Plato), speak of another kind of assimilation as the privilege of a higher virtue. We will thus better understand the nature of homely virtues, and the higher virtues, and the difference between them. Plato is evidently distinguishing two kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation to the divinity consists in fleeing from (the world) here below; when he adds the qualification "homely" to the virtues relating to social life; and when in another place he asserts that all virtues are processes of purification; and it is not to the homely virtues that he attributes the power of assimilating us to the divinity. How then do the virtues purify? How does this process of purification bring us as near as possible to the divinity? So long as the soul is mingled with the body, sharing its passions and opinions, she is evil. She becomes better, that is, she acquires virtues, only when, instead of agreeing with the body, she thinks by herself (this is true thought, and constitutes prudence); when she ceases to share its passions (in other words, temperance); when she no longer fears separation from the body (a state called courage); and last, when reason and intelligence can enforce their command (or justice). We may therefore unhesitatingly state that the resemblance to the divinity lies in such regulation, in remaining impassible while thinking intelligible things; for what is pure is divine and the nature of the divine action is such that whatever imitates it thereby possesses wisdom. But it is not the divinity that possesses such a disposition, for dispositions are the property of souls only. Besides, the soul does not think intelligible objects in the same manner as the divinity; what is contained in the divinity is contained within us in a manner entirely different, or even perhaps is not at all contained. For instance, the divinity's thought is not at all identical with ours; the divinity's thought is a primary principle from which our thought is derived and differs. As the vocal word is only the image of the interior reason of the soul, so also is the word of the soul only the image of the Word of a superior principle; and as the exterior word, when compared to the interior reason of the soul, seems discrete, or divided, so the reason of the soul, which is no more than the interpreter of the intelligible word, is discrete, in comparison with the latter. Thus does virtue belong to the soul without belonging either to absolute Intelligence, nor to the Principle superior to Intelligence.
2:1.2.4Purification may be either identical with the above-defined virtue, or virtue may be the result of purification. In this case, does virtue consist of the actual process of purification, or in the already purified condition? This is our problem here. The process of purification is inferior to the already purified condition; for purity is the soul's destined goal. (Negative) purity is mere separation from extraneous things; it is not yet (positive) possession of its prize. If the soul had possessed goodness before losing her purity, mere purification would be sufficient; and even in this case the residuum of the purification would be the goodness, and not the purification. What is the residuum? Not goodness; otherwise, the soul would not have fallen into evil. The soul therefore possesses the form of goodness, without however being able to remain solidly attached thereto, because her nature permits her to turn either to the good, or the evil. The good of the soul is to remain united to her sister intelligence; her evil, is to abandon herself to the contrary things. After purifying the soul, therefore, she must be united to the divinity; but this implies turning her towards Him. Now this conversion does not begin to occur after the purification, but is its very result. The virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her conversion, but in that which she thereby obtains. This is the intuition of her intelligible object; its image produced and realized within herself; an image similar to that in the eye, an image which represents the things seen. It is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess this image, nor had any reminiscence thereof; she no doubt possessed it, but inactively, latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her possessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness. As, however, the soul possesses only the images of the intelligibles, without possessing the intelligibles themselves, she will be compelled to compare with them her own image of them. Easily does the soul contemplate the intelligibles, because the intelligence is not foreign to her; when the soul wishes to enter in relations with them, all the soul needs to do is to turn her glance towards them. Otherwise, the intelligence, though present in the soul, will remain foreign to her. This explains how all our acquisitions of knowledge are foreign to us (as if non-existent), while we fail to recall them.
2:1.2.5The limit of purification decides to which (of the three hypostases of) divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself; therefore we shall have to consider that limit. To decide that would be to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress anger, appetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph over pain and similar feelings--in short, to separate her from the body. This occurs when, recollecting herself from the various localities over which she had, as it were, spread herself, she retires within herself; when she estranges herself entirely from the passions, when she allows the body only such pleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate from its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming importunate; when she becomes insensible to sufferings; or, if that be beyond her power, in supporting them patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share them; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even suppressing it entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be impossible, not participating therein; abandoning to the animal nature all unthinking impulses, and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements; when she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing left to risk; and when she represses all sudden movements, except nature's warning of dangers. Evidently, the purified soul will have to desire nothing shameful. In eating and drinking, she will seek only the satisfaction of a need, while remaining foreign to it; nor will she seek the pleasures of love; or, if she does, she will not go beyond the exactions of nature, resisting every unconsidered tendency, or even in remaining within the involuntary flights of fancy. In short, the soul will be pure from all these passions, and will even desire to purify our being's irrational part so as to preserve it from emotions, or at least to moderate their number and intensity, and to appease them promptly by her presence. So would a man, in the neighborhood of some sage, profit thereby, either by growing similar to him, or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might disapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason will exert itself without any struggle; its mere presence will suffice. The inferior principle will respect it to the point of growing resentful against itself, and reproaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any agitation which might disturb its master's repose.
2:1.2.6A man who has achieved such a state no longer commits such faults; for he has become corrected. But his desired goal is not to cease failing, but to be divine. In case he still allows within himself the occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflecting impulses, he will be simultaneously divinity and guardian, a double being; or rather, he will contain a principle of another nature (Intelligence), whose virtue will likewise differ from his. If, however, he be not troubled by any of those motions, he will be wholly divine; he will be one of those divinities "who (as Plato said) form the attending escort of the First." It is a divinity of such a nature that has come down from above to dwell in us. To become again what one was originally, is to live in this superior world. He who has achieved that height dwells with pure Intelligence, and assimilates himself thereto as far as possible. Consequently, he feels none of those emotions, nor does he any more commit any actions, which would be disapproved of by the superior principle who henceforth is his only master. For such a being the separate virtues merge. For him, wisdom consists in contemplating the (essences) possessed by Intelligence, and with which Intelligence is in contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one being proper to intelligence, the other to the soul; only in the latter may we speak of virtue. In the Intelligence exists only the energy (of thought), and its essence. The image of this essence, seen here below in a being of another nature, is the virtue which emanates from it. In Intelligence, indeed, resides neither absolute justice, nor any of those genuinely so-called virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its derivative in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an individual being. On the contrary, the intelligible belongs to itself only, and is the attribute of no particular being. Must justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in fulfilling its proper function? Surely, as long as it inheres in a principle with several parts (such as a human soul, in which several functions may be distinguished); but its essence lies in the accomplishment of the function proper to every being, even when inhering in a unitary principle (such as Intelligence). Absolute and veritable Justice consists in the self-directed action of an unitary Principle, in which no parts can be distinguished. In this higher realm, justice consists in directing the action of the soul towards intelligence; temperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards intelligence; courage is the (suggestive fascination) or impassibility, by which the soul becomes similar to that which it contemplates; since it is natural for intelligence to be impassible. Now the soul derives this impassibility from the virtue which hinders her from sharing the passions of the lower principle with which she is associated.
2:1.2.7Within the soul the virtues have the same interconnection obtaining within Intelligence between the types superior to virtue. For Intelligence, it is thought that constitutes wisdom and prudence; conversion towards oneself is temperance; the fulfillment of one's proper function is justice, and the intelligence's perseverance in remaining within itself, in maintaining itself pure and separated from matter, is analogous to courage. To contemplate intelligence will therefore, for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which then become virtues, and no longer remain mere intellectual types. For the soul is not identical with the essences she thinks, as is intelligence. Similarly, the other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior types. It is not otherwise with purification, for since every virtue is a purification, virtue exacts preliminary purification; otherwise, it would not be perfect. The possessor of the higher virtues necessarily possesses the potentiality for the inferior virtues; but the possessor of the lower does not, conversely, possess the higher. Such are the characteristics of the virtuous man. (Many interesting questions remain). Is it possible for a man to possess the higher or lower virtues in accomplished reality, or otherwise (merely theoretically)? To decide that, we would have individually to examine each, as, for example, prudence. How could such a virtue exist merely potentially, borrowing its principles from elsewhere? What would happen if one virtue advanced naturally to a certain degree, and another virtue to another? What would you think of a temperance which would moderate certain (impulses), while entirely suppressing others? Similar questions might be raised about other virtues, and the arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have attained would have to be prudence. No doubt, under certain circumstances, the virtuous man, in his actions, will make use of some of the lower, or homely virtues; but even so he will supplement them by standards or ideas derived from higher virtues. For instance, he will not be satisfied with a temperance which would consist in mere moderation, but he will gradually seek to separate himself more and more from matter. Again, he will supplement the life of a respectable man, exacted by common-sense homely virtues; he will be continually aspiring higher, to the life of the divinities; for our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere respectability, but to the gods themselves. To seek no more than to become assimilated to respectable individuals would be like trying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image, itself modelled after another image (but not copying the original). The assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a superior being.
3:1.3.1What method, art or study will lead us to the goal we are to attain, namely, the Good, the first Principle, the Divinity, by a demonstration which itself can serve to raise the soul to the superior world? He who is to be promoted to that world should know everything, or at least, as says (Plato), he should be as learned as possible. In his first generation he should have descended here below to form a philosopher, a musician, a lover. That is the kind of men whose nature makes them most suitable to be raised to the intelligible world. But how are we going to raise them? Does a single method suffice for all? Does not each of them need a special method? Doubtless. There are two methods to follow: the one for those who rise to the intelligible world from here below, and the other for those who have already reached there. We shall start by the first of these two methods; then comes that of the men who have already achieved access to the intelligible world, and who have, so to speak, already taken root there. Even these must ceaselessly progress till they have reached the summit; for one must stop only when one has reached the supreme term. The latter road of progress must here be left aside (to be taken up later), to discuss here fully the first, explaining the operation of the return of the soul to the intelligible world. Three kinds of men offer themselves to our examination: the philosopher, the musician, and the lover. These three must clearly be distinguished, beginning by determining the nature and character of the musician. The musician allows himself to be easily moved by beauty, and admires it greatly; but he is not able by himself to achieve the intuition of the beautiful. He needs the stimulation of external impressions. Just as some timorous being is awakened by the least noise, the musician is sensitive to the beauty of the voice and of harmonies. He avoids all that seems contrary to the laws of harmony and of unity, and enjoys rhythm and melodies in instrumental and vocal music. After these purely sensual intonations, rhythm and tunes, he will surely in them come to distinguish form from matter, and to contemplate the beauty existing in their proportions and relations. He will have to be taught that what excites his admiration in these things, is their intelligible harmony, the beauty it contains, and, in short, beauty absolute, and not particular. He will have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments that will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored, though he possessed them instinctively. Such arguments will be specified elsewhere.
3:1.3.2The musician can rise to the rank of the lover, and either remain there, or rise still higher. But the lover has some reminiscence of the beautiful; but as here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable of clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beautiful objects that meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy. He must therefore be taught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body, but, by reason, to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him what is identical in all, informing him that it is something alien to the bodies, which comes from elsewhere, and which exists even in a higher degree in the objects of another nature; citing, as examples, noble occupations, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty is found in the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of which are suitable means of familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things. He will then be made to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the element which, in every object, constitutes beauty. From virtues he will be led to progress to intelligence and essence, while from there he will have nothing else to do but to progress towards the supreme goal.
3:1.3.3The philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to the intelligible world. Borne on by light wings, he rushes thither without needing to learn to disengage himself from sense-objects, as do the preceding men. His only uncertainty will concern the road to be followed, all he will need will be a guide. He must therefore be shown the road; he must be helped to detach himself entirely from sense-objects, himself already possessing, as he does, the desire, being since a long while already detached therefrom by his nature. For this purpose he will be invited to apply himself to mathematics, so as to accustom him to think of incorporeal things, to believe in their existence. Being desirous of instruction, he will learn them easily; as, by his nature, he is already virtuous, he will need no more than promotion to the perfection of virtue. After mathematics, he will be taught dialectics, which will perfect him.
3:1.3.4What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which must be added to mathematics? It is a science which makes us capable of reasoning about each thing, to say what it is, in what it differs from the others, in what it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of the beings, to determine how many veritable beings there are, and which are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable essence. This science treats also of good and evil; of everything that is subordinated to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the nature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of each matter scientifically, and not according to mere opinion. Instead of wandering around the sense-world, it establishes itself in the intelligible world; it concentrates its whole attention on this world, and after having saved our soul from deceit, dialectics "pastures our soul in the meadow of truth," (as thought Plato). Then it makes use of the Platonic method of division to discern ideas, to define each object, to rise to the several kinds of essences (as thought Plato); then, by thought concatenating all that is thence derived, dialectics continues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain of the intelligible. Then, by reversing, dialectics returns to the very Principle from which first it had started out. Resting there, because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find rest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects, because it has arrived at unity, dialectics considers its logic, which treats of propositions and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate to dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In logic, dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary, and others as constituting preparatory exercises. Then, along with everything else, subjecting these principles to its criticism, it declares some of them useful, and others superfluous, or merely technical.
3:1.3.5Whence does this science derive its proper principles? Intelligence furnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of receiving. Having discovered and achieved these principles, dialectics puts their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and divides, till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things; for according to (Plato), dialectics is the purest application of intelligence and wisdom. In this case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of our faculties, it must exercise itself with essence and the highest objects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies that which is still beyond existence (the One, or the Good). But is not philosophy also that which is most eminent? Surely. But there is no confusion between philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the highest part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought) merely an instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus thought) made up of pure speculations and abstract rules. It studies things themselves, and its matter is the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a method which yields reality as well as the idea. Only accidentally does dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms. Dialectics considers them alien to its mission, and as produced by a foreign principle. Whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced, dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains. Dialectics, however, does not care for propositions, which, to it, seem only mere groupings of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows the truth, dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general, the operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is to affirm, to deny, and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions. Further, dialectics distinguishes differences from identities, grasping the truth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the senses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that enjoys those details, the care of treating them with exactness.
3:1.3.6Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philosophy, but the most important. Indeed, philosophy has other branches. First, it studies nature (in physics), therein employing dialectics, as the other arts employ arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dialectics. Then philosophy treats of morals, and here again it is dialectics that ascertains the principles; ethics limits itself to building good habits thereon, and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good habits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to dialectics the principles which seem to be their characteristics; for they chiefly deal with material things (because they moderate the passions). The other virtues also imply the application of reason to the passions and actions which are characteristic of each of them. However, prudence applies reason to them in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather with the universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate, and whether an action should be done now, or be deferred, or be superseded by another (as thought Aristotle). Now it is dialectics, or its resultant science of wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form, furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs. Could the lower knowledge not be possessed without dialectics or wisdom? They would, at least, be imperfect and mutilated. On the other hand, though the dialectician, that is, the true sage, no longer need these inferior things, he never would have become such without them; they must precede, and they increase with the progress made in dialectics. Virtues are in the same case. The possessor of natural virtues may, with the assistance of wisdom, rise to perfect virtues. Wisdom, therefore, only follows natural virtues. Then wisdom perfects the morals. Rather, the already existing natural virtues increase and grow perfect along with wisdom. Whichever of these two things precedes, complements the other. Natural virtues, however, yield only imperfect views and morals; and the best way to perfect them, is philosophic knowledge of the principles from which they depend.
4:1.4.1The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are (practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their life is filled from beginning to end. There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants lack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the strength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live well or badly; and in this way we could say that they possess or lack well-being, and bear, or do not bear fruits. If (as Aristippus thought), pleasure is the goal of man, and if to live well is constituted by enjoying it, it would be absurd to claim that no living beings other than man could live well. The same argument applies if we define happiness as (a state of imperturbable tranquility, by Epicurus called) ataraxy; or as (the Stoic ideal, of) living conformably to nature.
4:1.4.2Those who deny the privilege of living well to plants, because these lack sensation, are not on that account obliged to grant it to all animals. For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced affection, this affection must already be good before the occurrence of the knowledge. For instance, the being must be in a state conformable to nature even though ignorant thereof. He must fulfil his proper function even when he does not know it. He must possess pleasure before perceiving it. Thus if, by the possession of this pleasure, the being already possesses the Good, he thereby possesses even well-being. What need then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being be defined as sensation and knowledge (of an affection or state of the soul) rather than in the latter affection and state of the soul itself? The Good would thus be reduced to no more than sensation, or the actualization of the sense-life. In this case, to possess it, it is sufficient to perceive irrespective of the content of that perception. Other persons might assert that goodness results from the union of these two things: of the state of the soul, and of the knowledge the soul has of it. If then the Good consist in the perception of some particular state, we shall have to ask how elements which, by themselves, are indifferent could, by their union, constitute the good. Other theories are that the Good consists in some particular state, or in possession of some particular disposition, and conscious enjoyment of the presence of the Good. These would, however, still have to answer the question whether, for good living, it be sufficient that the being knows he possesses this state; or must he know not only that this state is pleasant, but also that it is the Good? If then it be necessary to realize that it is the Good, the matter is one no longer of the function of sensation, but of a faculty higher than the senses. To live well, in this case, it will no longer be sufficient to possess pleasure, but we shall have to know that pleasure is the Good. The cause of happiness will not be the presence of pleasure itself, but the power of judging that pleasure is a good. Now judgment is superior to affection; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an affection, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. How would reason forget itself to recognize as superior what is posited in a genus opposed to it? These men who deny happiness to plants, who explain it as some form of sensation, seems to us, in spite of themselves, to be really seeking happiness of a higher nature, and to consider it as this better thing which is found only in a completer life. There is a greater chance of being right in the opinion that happiness consists in the reasonable life, instead of mere life, even though united to sensation. Still even this theory must explain why happiness should be the privilege of the reasonable animal. Should we add to the idea of an animal the quality of being reasonable, because reason is more sagacious, more skilful in discovering, and in procuring the objects necessary to satisfy the first needs of nature? Would you esteem reason just as highly if it were incapable of discovering, or procuring these objects? If we value reason only for the objects it aids us in getting, happiness might very well belong to the very irrational beings, if they are, without reason, able to procure themselves the things necessary to the satisfaction of the first needs of their nature. In this case, reason will be nothing more than an instrument. It will not be worth seeking out for itself, and its perfection, in which virtue has been shown to consist, will be of little importance. The opposite theory would be that reason does not owe its value to its ability to procure for us objects necessary to the satisfaction of the first needs of nature, but that it deserves to be sought out for itself. But even here we would have to explain its function, its nature, and set forth how it becomes perfect. If it were to be improvable, it must not be defined as the contemplation of sense-objects, for its perfection and essence (being) consist in a different (and higher) function. It is not among the first needs of nature, nor among the objects necessary to the satisfaction of its needs; it has nothing to do with them, being far superior. Otherwise, these philosophers would be hard pressed to explain its value. Until they discover some nature far superior to the class of objects with which they at present remain, they will have to remain where it suits them to be, ignorant of what good living is, and both how to reach that goal, and to what beings it is possible.
4:1.4.3Dismissing these theories, we return to our own definition of happiness. We do not necessarily make life synonymous with happiness by attributing happiness to a living being. Otherwise, we would be implying that all living beings can achieve it, and we would be admitting to real complete enjoyment thereof all those who possessed that union and identity which all living beings are naturally capable of possessing. Finally, it would be difficult to grant this privilege to the reasonable being, while refusing it to the brute; for both equally possess life. They should, therefore, be capable of achieving happiness--for, on this hypothesis, happiness could be no more than a kind of life. Consequently, the philosophers who make it consist in the rational life, not in the life common to all beings, do not perceive that they implicitly suppose that happiness is something different from life. They are then obliged to say that happiness resides in a pure quality, in the rational faculty. But the subject (to which they should refer happiness) is the rational life, since happiness can belong only to the totality (of life joined to reason). They therefore, really limit the life they speak of to a certain kind of life; not that they have the right to consider these two kinds of life (life in general, and rational life) as being ranked alike, as both members of a single division would be, but another kind of distinction might be established between them, such as when we say that one thing is prior, and the other posterior. Since "life" may be understood in different senses, and as it possesses different degrees, and since by mere verbal similarity life may be equally predicated of plants and of irrational animals, and since its differences consist in being more or less complete, analogy demands a similar treatment of "living well." If, by its life, a being be the image of some other being, by its happiness it will also be the image of the happiness of this other being. If happiness be the privilege of complete life, the being that possesses a complete life will also alone possess happiness; for it possesses what is best since, in the order of these existences, the best is possession of the essence (being) and perfection of life. Consequently, the Good is not anything incidental, for no subject could owe its good to a quality that would be derived from elsewhere. What indeed could be added to complete life, to render it excellent? Our own definition of the Good, interested as we are not in its cause, but in its essence, is that the perfect life, that is genuine and real, consists in intelligence. The other kinds of life are imperfect. They offer no more than the image of life. They are not Life in its fulness and purity. As we have often said they are not life, rather than its contrary. In one word, since all living beings are derived from one and the same Principle, and since they do not possess an equal degree of life, this principle must necessarily be the primary Life, and perfectness.
4:1.4.4If man be capable of possessing perfect Life, he is happy as soon as he possesses it. If it were otherwise, if the perfect life pertained to the divinities alone, to them alone also would happiness belong. But since we attribute happiness to men, we shall have to set forth in what that which procures it consists. I repeat, what results from our former considerations, namely, that man has perfect Life when, besides the sense-life, he possesses reason and true intelligence. But is man as such stranger to the perfect Life, and does he possess it as something alien (to his essential being)? No, for no man lacks happiness entirely, either actually or even potentially. But shall we consider happiness as a part of the man, and that he in himself is the perfect form of life? We had better think that he who is a stranger to the perfect Life possesses only a part of happiness, as he possesses happiness only potentially; but that he who possesses the perfect Life in actuality, and he who has succeeded in identifying himself with it, alone is happy. All the other things, no more than envelope him (as the Stoics would say), and could not be considered as parts of him, since they surround him in spite of himself. They would belong to him as parts of himself, if they were joined to him by the result of his will. What is the Good for a man who finds himself in this condition? By the perfect life which he possesses, he himself is his own good. The principle (the Good in itself) which is superior (to the perfect Life) is the cause of the good which is in him; for we must not confuse the Good in itself--and the good in man. That the man who has achieved perfect Life possesses happiness is proved by his no longer desiring anything. What more could he desire? He could not desire anything inferior; he is united to the best; he, therefore, has fulness of life. If he be virtuous he is fully happy, and fully possesses the Good, for no good thing escapes him. What he seeks is sought only by necessity, less for him than for some of the things which belong to him. He seeks it for the body that is united to him; and though this body be endowed with life, what relates to his needs is not characteristic of the real man. The latter knows it, and what he grants to his body, he grants without in any way departing from his own characteristic life. His happiness will, therefore, not be diminished in adversity, because he continues to possess veritable life. If he lose relatives or friends, he knows the nature of death, and besides those whom it strikes down know it also if they were virtuous. Though he may allow himself to be afflicted by the fate of these relatives or friends, the affliction will not reach the intimate part of his nature; the affliction will be felt only by that part of the soul which lacks reason, and whose suffering the man will not share.
4:1.4.5It has often been objected that we should reckon with the bodily pains, the diseases, the obstacles which may hinder action, cases of unconsciousness, which might result from certain philtres and diseases (as the Peripatetics objected). Under these conditions, they say, the sage could not live well, and be happy--without either mentioning poverty and lack of recognition. All these evils, not forgetting the famous misfortunes of Priam, justify serious objections. Indeed, even if the sage endured all these evils (as indeed he easily does), they would none the less be contrary to his will; and happy life must necessarily be one that conforms to our will. The sage is not only a soul endowed with particular dispositions; the body also must be comprised within his personality (as also thought the Pythagorean Archytas). This assertion seems reasonable so far as the passions of the body are felt by the man himself, and as they suggest desires and aversions to him. If then pleasure be an element of happiness, how could the man afflicted by the blows of fate and by pains still be happy, even if he were virtuous? To be happy, the divinities need only to enjoy perfect life; but men, having their soul united to a lower part, must seek their happiness in the life of each of these two parts that compose him, and not exclusively in one of the two, even though it were the higher. Indeed, as soon as one of them suffers, the other one, in spite of its superiority, finds its actions hindered. Otherwise we shall have to regard neither the body, nor the sensations that flow from it; and to seek only what by itself could suffice to procure happiness, independently of the body.
4:1.4.6If our exposition of the subject had defined happiness as exemption from pain, sickness, reverses, and great misfortunes, (we would have implied that) it would be impossible for us to taste happiness while exposed to one of those evils. But if happiness consist in the possession of the real good, why should we forget this good to consider its accessories? Why, in the appreciation of this good, should we seek things which are not among the number of its elements? If it consisted in a union of the true goods with those things which alone are necessary to our needs, or which are so called, even without being such, we should have to strive to possess the latter also. But as the goal of man must be single and not manifold--for otherwise it would be usual to say that he seeks his ends, rather than the more common expression, his end--we shall have to seek only what is most high and precious, what the soul somehow wishes to include. Her inclination and will cannot aspire to anything which is not the sovereign good. Reason only avoids certain evils, and seeks certain advantages, because it is provoked by their presence; but it is not so led by nature. The principal tendency of the soul is directed towards what is best; when she possesses it, she is satisfied, and stops; only then does she enjoy a life really conformable to her will. Speaking of will strictly, and not with unjustifiable license, the task of the will is not to procure things necessary to our needs (?) Of course we judge that it is suitable to procure things that are necessary, as we in general avoid evils. But the avoiding of them is no aim desirable in itself; such would rather be not to need to avoid them. This, for instance, occurs when one possesses health and is exempt from suffering. Which of these advantages most attracts us? So long as we enjoy health, so long as we do not suffer, it is little valued. Now advantages which, when present, have no attraction for the soul, and add nothing to her happiness, and which, when absent, are sought as causes of the suffering arising from the presence of their contraries, should reasonably be called necessity rather than goods, and not be reckoned among the elements of our goal. When they are absent and replaced by their contraries, our goal remains just what it was.
4:1.4.7Why then does the happy man desire to enjoy the presence of these advantages, and the absence of their contraries? It must be because they contribute, not to his happiness, but to his existence; because their contraries tend to make him lose existence, hindering the enjoyment of the good, without however removing it. Besides, he who possesses what is best wishes to possess it purely, without any mixture. Nevertheless, when a foreign obstacle occurs, the good still persists even in spite of this obstacle. In short, if some accident happen to the happy man against his will, his happiness is in no way affected thereby. Otherwise, he would change and lose his happiness daily; as if, for instance, he had to mourn a son, or if he lost some of his possessions. Many events may occur against his wish without disturbing him in the enjoyment of the good he has attained. It may be objected that it is the great misfortunes, and not trifling accidents (which can disturb the happiness of the wise man). Nevertheless, in human things, is there any great enough not to be scorned by him who has climbed to a principle superior to all, and who no longer depends on lower things? Such a man will not be able to see anything great in the favors of fortune, whatever they be, as in being king, in commanding towns, or peoples; in founding or building cities, even though he himself should receive that glory; he will attach no importance to the loss of his power, or even to the ruin of his fatherland. If he consider all that as a great evil, or even only as an evil, he will have a ridiculous opinion. He will no longer be a virtuous man; for, as Jupiter is my witness, he would be highly valuing mere wood, or stones, birth, or death; while he should insist on the incontestable truth that death is better than the corporeal life (as held by Herodotus). Even though he were sacrificed, he would not consider death any worse merely because it occurred at the feet of the altars. Being buried is really of small importance, for his body will rot as well above as below ground (as thought Theodorus of Cyrene). Neither will he grieve at being buried without pomp and vulgar ostentation, and to have seemed unworthy of being placed in a magnificent tomb. That would be smallness of mind. If he were carried off as a captive, he would still have a road open to leave life, in the case that he should no longer be allowed to hope for happiness. (Nor would he be troubled if the members of his family, such as sons (?) and daughters (and female relatives?) were carried off into captivity. If he had arrived to the end of his life without seeing such occurrences (we would indeed be surprised). Would he leave this world supposing that such things cannot happen? Such an opinion would be absurd. Would he not have realized that his own kindred were exposed to such dangers? The opinion that such things could happen will not make him any less happy. No, he will be happy even with that belief. He would still be so even should that occur; he will indeed reflect that such is the nature of this world, that one must undergo such accidents, and submit. Often perhaps men dragged into captivity will live better (than in liberty); and besides, if their captivity be insupportable, it is in their power to release themselves. If they remain, it is either because their reason so induces them--and then their lot cannot be too hard; or it is against the dictates of their reason, in which case they have none but themselves to blame. The wise man, therefore, will not be unhappy because of the folly of his own people; he will not allow his lot to depend on the happiness or misfortunes of other people.
4:1.4.8If the griefs that he himself undergoes are great, he will support them as well as he can; if they exceed his power of endurance, they will carry him off (as thought Seneca). In either case, he will not, in the midst of his sufferings, excite any pity: (ever master of his reason) he will not allow his own characteristic light to be extinguished. Thus the flame in the lighthouse continues to shine, in spite of the raging of the tempest, in spite of the violent blowing of the winds. (He should not be upset) even by loss of consciousness, or even if pain becomes so strong that its violence could almost annihilate him. If pain become more intense, he will decide as to what to do; for, under these circumstances, freedom of will is not necessarily lost (for suicide remains possible, as thought Seneca). Besides, we must realize that these sufferings do not present themselves to the wise man, under the same light as to the common man; that all these need not penetrate to the sanctuary of the man's life; which indeed happens with the greater part of pains, griefs and evils that we see being suffered by others; it would be proof of weakness to be affected thereby. A no less manifest mark of weakness is to consider it an advantage to ignore all these evils, and to esteem ourselves happy that they happen only after death, without sympathizing with the fate of others, and thinking only to spare ourselves some grief. This would be a weakness that we should eliminate in ourselves, not allowing ourselves to be frightened by the fear of what might happen. The objection that it is natural to be afflicted at the misfortunes of those who surround us, meets the answer that, to begin with, it is not so with every person; then, that it is part of the duty of virtue to ameliorate the common condition of human nature, and to raise it to what is more beautiful, rising above the opinions of the common people. It is indeed beautiful not to yield to what the common people usually consider to be evils. We should struggle against the blows of fortune not by affected ignoring (of difficulties, like an ostrich), but as a skilful athlete who knows that the dangers he is incurring are feared by certain natures, though a nature such as his bears them easily, seeing in them nothing terrible, or at least considering them terrifying only to children. Certainly, the wise man would not have invited these evils; but on being overtaken by them he opposes to them the virtue which renders the soul unshakable and impassible.
4:1.4.9It may further be objected that the wise man might lose consciousness, if overwhelmed by disease, or the malice of magic. Would he still remain happy? Either he will remain virtuous, being only fallen asleep; in which case he might continue to be happy, since no one claims he must lose happiness because of sleep, inasmuch as no reckoning of the time spent in this condition is kept, and as he is none the less considered happy for life. On the other hand, if unconsciousness be held to terminate virtue, the question at issue is given up; for, supposing that he continues to be virtuous, the question at issue was, whether he remain happy so long as he remains virtuous. It might indeed still be objected that he cannot be happy if he remain virtuous without feeling it, without acting in conformity with virtue. Our answer is that a man would not be any less handsome or healthy for being so unconsciously. Likewise, he would not be any less wise merely for lack of consciousness thereof. Once more it may be objected that it is essential to wisdom to be self-conscious, for happiness resides only in actualized wisdom. This objection would hold if reason and wisdom were incidentals. But if the hypostatic substance of wisdom consist in an essence (being), or rather, in being itself, and if this being do not perish during sleep, nor during unconsciousness, if consequently the activity of being continue to subsist in him; if by its very nature this (being) ceaselessly watch, then the virtuous man must even in this state (of sleep or unconsciousness), continue to exercise his activity. Besides, this activity is ignored only by one part of himself, and not by himself entirely. Thus during the operation of the actualization of growth, the perception of its activity is not by his sensibility transmitted to the rest of the man. If our personality were constituted by this actualization of growth, we would act simultaneously with it; but we are not this actualization, but that of the intellectual principle, and that is why we are active simultaneously with this (divine intellectual activity).
4:1.4.10The reason that intelligence remains hidden is just because it is not felt; only by the means of this feeling can this activity be felt; but why should intelligence cease to act (merely because it was not felt)? On the other hand, why could the soul not have turned her activity towards intelligence before having felt or perceived it? Since (for intelligence) thinking and existence are identical, perception must have been preceded by some actualization. It seems impossible for perception to arise except when thought reflects upon itself, and when the principle whose activity constitutes the life of the soul, so to speak, turns backwards, and reflects, as the image of an object placed before a brilliant polished mirror reflects itself therein. Likewise, if the mirror be placed opposite the object, there is no more image; and if the mirror be withdrawn or badly adjusted, there is no more image, though the luminous object continue to act. Likewise, when that faculty of the soul which represents to us the images of discursive reason and of intelligence is in a suitable condition of calm, we get an intuition--that is, a somewhat sensual perception thereof--with the prior knowledge of the activity of the intelligence, and of discursive reason. When, however, this image is troubled by an agitation in the mutual harmony of the organs, the discursive reason, and the intelligence continue to act without any image, and the thought does not reflect in the imagination. Therefore we shall have to insist that thought is accompanied by an image without, nevertheless, being one itself. While we are awake, it often happens to us to perform praiseworthy things, to meditate and to act, without being conscious of these operations at the moment that we produce them. When for instance we read something, we are not necessarily self-conscious that we are reading, especially if our attention be fully centered on what we read. Neither is a brave man who is performing a courageous deed, self-conscious of his bravery. There are many other such cases. It would therefore seem that the consciousness of any deed weakens its energy, and that when the action is alone (without that consciousness) it is in a purer, livelier and more vital condition. When virtuous men are in that condition (of absence of self-consciousness), their life is more intense because it concentrates in itself instead of mingling with feeling.
4:1.4.11It has sometimes been said that a man in such a condition does not really live. (If such be their honest opinion), they must be told that he does live, even if they be incapable of understanding his happiness and his life. If this seem to them incredible, they should reflect whether their own admission that such a man lives and is virtuous, does not imply that under those circumstances he is happy. Neither should they begin by supposing that he is annihilated, only later to consider whether he be happy. Neither should they confine themselves to externalities after having admitted that he turns his whole attention on things that he bears within himself; in short, not to believe that the goal of his will inheres in external objects. Indeed, such considering of external objects as the goal of the will of the virtuous man, would be tantamount to a denial of the very essence (being) of happiness; likewise, insisting that those are the objects he desires. His wish would undoubtedly be that all men should be happy, and that none of them should suffer any evil; but, nevertheless, he is none the less happy when that does not happen. Other people, again, would say that it was unreasonable for the virtuous man to form such an (impossible) wish, since elimination of evils here below is out of the question. This, however, would constitute an admission of our belief that the only goal of the virtuous man's will is the conversion of the soul towards herself.
4:1.4.12We grant, however, that the pleasures claimed for the virtuous man are neither those sought by debauchees, nor those enjoyed by the body. Those pleasures could not be predicated of him without degrading his felicity. Nor can we claim for him raptures of delight--for what would be their use? It is sufficient to suppose that the virtuous man tastes the pleasures attached to the presence of goods, pleasures which must consist neither in motions, nor be accidental. He enjoys the presence of those (higher) goods because he is present to himself; from that time on he lingers in a state of sweet serenity. The virtuous man, therefore, is always serene, calm, and satisfied. If he be really virtuous, his state cannot be troubled by any of the things that we call evils. Those who in the virtuous life are seeking for pleasures of another kind are actually seeking something else than the virtuous life.
4:1.4.13The actions of the virtuous man could not be hindered by fortune, but they may vary with the fluctuations of fortune. All will be equally beautiful, and, perhaps, so much the more beautiful as the virtuous man will find himself placed amidst more critical circumstances. Any acts that concern contemplation, which relate to particular things, will be such that the wise man will be able to produce them, after having carefully sought and considered what he is to do. Within himself he finds the most infallible of the rules of conduct, a rule that will never fail him, even were he within the oft-discussed bull of Phalaris. It is useless for the vulgar man to repeat, even twice or thrice, that such a fate is sweet; for if a man were to utter those words, they are uttered by that very (animal) part that undergoes those tortures. On the contrary, in the virtuous man, the part that suffers is different from that which dwells within itself, and which, while necessarily residing within itself, is never deprived of the contemplation of the universal Good.
4:1.4.14Man, and specially the virtuous man, is constituted not by the composite of soul and body, as is proved by the soul's power to separate herself from the body, and to scorn what usually are called "goods." It would be ridiculous to relate happiness to the animal part of man, since happiness consists in living well, and living well, being an actualization, belongs to the soul, exclusively. Not even does it extend to the entire soul, for happiness does not extend to that part of the soul concerned with growth, having nothing in common with the body, neither as to its size, nor its possible good condition. Nor does it depend on the perfection of the senses, because their development, as well as that of the organs, weights man down, and makes him earthy. Doing good will be made easier by establishing a sort of counter-weight, weakening the body, and taming its motions, so as to show how much the real man differs from the foreign things that (to speak as do the Stoics), surround him. However much the (earthy) common man enjoy beauty, greatness, wealth, command over other men, and earthly luxuries, he should not be envied for the deceptive pleasure he takes in all these advantages. To begin with, the wise man will probably not possess them; but if he do possess them, he will voluntarily diminish them, if he take due care of himself. By voluntary negligence he will weaken and disfigure the advantages of his body. He will abdicate from dignities. While preserving the health of his body, he will not desire to be entirely exempt from disease and sufferings. If he never experienced these evils, he will wish to make a trial of them during his youth. But when he has arrived at old age, he will no longer wish to be troubled either by pains, or pleasures, or anything sad or agreeable that relates to the body; so as not to be forced to give it his attention. He will oppose the sufferings he will have to undergo with a firmness that will never forsake him. He will not believe that his happiness is increased by pleasures, health or rest, nor destroyed nor diminished by their contraries. As the former advantages do not augment his felicity, how could their loss diminish it?
4:1.4.15Let us now imagine two wise men, the first of whom possesses everything that heart can wish for, while the other is in a contrary position. Shall they be said to be equally happy? Yes, if they be equally wise. Even if the one possessed physical beauty, and all the other advantages that do not relate either to wisdom, virtue, contemplation of the good, or perfect life; what would be the use of all that since he who possesses all these advantages is not considered as really being happier than he who lacks them? Such wealth would not even help a flute-player to accomplish his object! We, however, consider the happy man only from the standpoint of the weakness of our mind, considering as serious and frightful what the really happy man considers indifferent. For the man could not be wise, nor consequently happy, so long as he has not succeeded in getting rid of all these vain ideas, so long as he has not entirely transformed himself, so long as he does not within himself contain the confidence that he is sheltered from all evil. Only then will he live without being troubled by any fear. The only thing that should affect him, would be the fear that he is not an expert in wisdom, that he is only partly wise. As to unforeseen fears that might get the better of him before he had had the time to reflect, during a moment of abstraction of attention, the wise man will hasten to turn them away, treating that which within himself becomes agitated as a child that has lost its way through pain. He will tranquilize it either by reason, or even by a threat, though uttered without passion. Thus the mere sight of a worthy person suffices to calm a child. Besides, the wise man will not hold aloof either from friendship nor gratitude. He will treat his own people as he treats himself; giving to his friends as much as to his own person; and he will give himself up to friendship, without ceasing to exercise intelligence therein.
4:1.4.16If the virtuous man were not located in this elevated life of intelligence; if on the contrary he were supposed to be subject to the blows of fate, and if we feared that they would overtake him, our ideal would no longer be that of the virtuous man such as we outline it; we would be considering a vulgar man, mingled with good and evil, of whom a life equally mingled with good and evil would be predicated. Even such a man might not easily be met with, and besides, if we did meet him, he would not deserve to be called a wise man; for there would be nothing great about him, neither the dignity of wisdom, nor the purity of good. Happiness, therefore, is not located in the life of the common man. Plato rightly says that you have to leave the earth to ascend to the good, and that to become wise and happy, one should turn one's look towards the only Good, trying to acquire resemblance to Him, and to live a life conformable to Him. That indeed must suffice the wise man to reach his goal. To the remainder he should attach no more value than to changes of location, none of which can add to his happiness. If indeed he pay any attention to external things scattered here and there around him, it is to satisfy the needs of his body so far as he can. But as he is something entirely different from the body, he is never disturbed at having to leave it; and he will abandon it whenever nature will have indicated the time. Besides, he always reserves to himself the right to deliberate about this (time to leave the world by suicide). Achievement of happiness will indeed be his chief goal; nevertheless, he will also act, not only in view of his ultimate goal, or himself, but on the body to which he is united. He will care for this body, and will sustain it as long as possible. Thus a musician uses his lyre so long as he can; but as soon as it is beyond using, he repairs it, or abandons playing the lyre, because he now can do without it. Leaving it on the ground, he will look at it almost with scorn, and will sing without its accompaniment. Nevertheless it will not have been in vain that this lyre will have been originally given to him; for he will often have profited by its use.
5:1.5.1Does happiness increase with duration of time? No: for the feeling of happiness exists only in the present. The memory of past happiness could not add anything to happiness itself. Happiness is not a word, but a state of soul. But a state of soul is a present (experience), such as, for instance, the actualization of life.
5:1.5.2Might happiness not be the satisfaction of the desire of living and activity, inasmuch as this desire is ever present with us? (Hardly). First, according to this hypothesis, the happiness of to-morrow would ever be greater than that of to-day, and that of the following day than that of the day before, and so on to infinity. In this case, the measure of happiness would no longer be virtue (but duration). Then, the beatitude of the divinities will also have to become greater from day to day; it would no longer be perfect, and could never become so. Besides, desire finds its satisfaction in the possession of what is present, both now, and in the future. So long as these present circumstances exist, their possession constitutes happiness. Further, as the desire of living can be no more than the desire to exist, the latter desire can refer to the present only, inasmuch as real existence (essence) inheres only in the present. Desire for a future time, or for some later event, means no more than a desire to preserve what one already possesses. Desire refers neither to the future nor the past, but to what exists at present. What is sought is not a perpetual progression in the future, but the enjoyment of what exists from the present moment onward.
5:1.5.3What shall be said of him who lived happily during a longer period, who has longer contemplated the same spectacle? If such longer contemplation resulted in a clearer idea thereof, the length of time has served some useful purpose; but if the agent contemplated it in the same manner for the whole extent of time, he possesses no advantage over him who contemplated it only once.
5:1.5.4It might be objected that the former of these men enjoyed pleasure longer than the other. This consideration has nothing to do with happiness. If by this (enjoyed) pleasure we mean the free exercise (of intelligence), the pleasure referred to is then identical with the happiness here meant. This higher pleasure referred to is only to possess what is here ever present; what of it is past is of no further value.
5:1.5.5Would equal happiness be predicated of three men, one who had been happy from his life's beginning to its end, the other only at its end, and the third, who had been happy, but who ceased being such. This comparison is not between three men who are happy, but between one man who is happy, with two who are deprived of happiness, and that at the (present moment) when happiness (counts most). If then one of them have any advantage, he possesses it as a man actually happy compared with such as are not; he therefore surpasses the two others by the actual possession of happiness.
5:1.5.6(It is generally agreed that) all calamities, sufferings, griefs and similar evils are aggravated in proportion to their duration. If then, in all these cases, evil be increased with time, why should not the same circumstance obtain in the contrary case? Why should happiness also not be increased? Referring to griefs and sufferings, it might reasonably be said that they are increased by duration. When, for example, sickness is prolonged, and becomes a habitual condition, the body suffers more and more profoundly as time goes on. If, however, evil ever remain at the same degree, it does not grow worse, and there is no need of complaining but of the present. Consideration of the past evil amounts to considering the traces left by evil, the morbid disposition whose intensity is increased by time, because its seriousness is proportionate to its duration. In this case it is not the length of time, but the aggravation of the evil which adds to the misfortune. But the new degree (of intensity) does not subsist simultaneously with the old, and it is unreasonable to predicate an increase as summation of what is no more to what now is. On the contrary, it is the fixed characteristic of happiness to have a fixed term, to remain ever the same. Here also the only increase possibly due to duration of time depends on the relation between an increase in virtue and one in happiness; and the element to be reckoned with here is not the number of years of happiness, but the degree of virtue finally acquired.
5:1.5.7It might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present only, exclusive of the past (as in the case of happiness), when we do not do so in respect of time. For the addition of past to present unquestionably lengthens time. If then we may properly say that time becomes longer, why may we not say the same of happiness?--Were we to do so, we would be applying happiness to divisions of time, while it is precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is considered to be measured by the present exclusively. While considering time, in respect of things that have vanished, such as, for instance, the dead, it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past; but it would be unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness in respect to duration, because it would be treating happiness as something accidental and temporary. Whatever might be the length of time that preceded the present, all that can be said of it is, that it is no more. To regard duration while considering happiness is to try to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible, something that exists only in the present. That is why time is called an image of eternity, inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's permanence through its own dispersion. By abstracting permanence from eternity, and appropriating it, time destroys eternity; for a short period, permanence may survive in association with time; but as soon as it becomes fused with it, eternity perishes. Now as happiness consists in the enjoyment of a life that is good, namely in that which is proper to Essence (in itself), because none better exists, it must, instead of time, have, as a measure, eternity itself, a principle which admits neither increase nor diminution, which cannot be compared to any length, whose nature it is to be indivisible, and superior to time. No comparison, therefore, should be instituted between essence and non-essence, eternity and time, the perpetual and the eternal; nor should extension be predicated of the indivisible. If we regard existence of Essence in itself, it will be necessary to regard it entire; to consider it, not as the perpetuity of time, but as the very life of eternity, a life which instead of consisting of a series of centuries, exists entire since all centuries.
5:1.5.8Somebody might object that by subsisting till the present, the memory of the past adds something more to him who has long lived happily. In this case it will be necessary to examine what is meant by this memory. If it mean the memory of former wisdom, and if it mean that he who would possess this memory would become wiser on account of it, then this memory differs from our question (which studies happiness, and not wisdom). If it mean the memory of pleasure, it would imply that the happy man has need of much pleasure, and cannot remain satisfied with what is present. Besides, there is no proof that the memory of a past pleasure is at all pleasant; on the contrary, it would be entirely ridiculous to remember with delight having tasted a delicious dish the day before, and still more ridiculous remembering such an enjoyment ten years ago. It would be just as ridiculous to pride one self on having been a wise man last year.
5:1.5.9Could not the memory of virtuous actions contribute to happiness? No: for such a memory cannot exist in a man who has no virtue at present, and who thereby is driven to seek out the memory of past virtues.
5:1.5.10Another objection is that length of time would give opportunity for doing many beautiful deeds; while this opportunity is denied him who lives happily only a short period. This may be answered by denying happiness to a man on the grounds of having done many beautiful deeds. If several parts of time and several actions are to constitute happiness, then it would be constituted by things that are no more, that are past, and by present things; whereas our definition of happiness limits it exclusively to the present. Then we considered whether length of time add to happiness. There remains only to examine whether happiness of long duration be superior because of yielding opportunities of doing more beautiful deeds. To begin with, the man who is inactive may be just as happy, if not more happy than he who is active. Besides, it is not actions themselves which yield happiness; (the sources of happiness) are states of mind, which are the principles of beautiful actions. The wise man enjoys welfare while active, but not because of this activity; he derives (this welfare) not from contingent things, but from what he possesses in himself. For it might happen even to a vicious man to save his fatherland, or to feel pleasure in seeing it saved by some other. It is not then these activities which are the causes of the enjoyment of happiness. True beatitude and the joys it yields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul. To predicate it of activity, would be to make it depend on things alien to virtue and the soul. The soul's actualization consists in being wise, and in exercising her self-activity; this is true happiness.
6:1.6.1Beauty chiefly affects the sense of sight. Still, the ear perceives it also, both in the harmony of words, and in the different kinds of music; for songs and verses are equally beautiful. On rising from the domain of the senses to a superior region, we also discover beauty in occupations, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. Whether there exists a type of beauty still higher, will have to be ascertained by discussion. What is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful, that our ears listen with pleasure to rhythms judged beautiful, and that we love the purely moral beauties? Does the beauty of all these objects derive from some unique, immutable principle, or will we recognize some one principle of beauty for the body, and some other for something else? What then are these principles, if there are several? Or which is this principle, if there is but one? First, there are certain objects, such as bodies, whose beauty exists only by participation, instead of being inherent in the very essence of the subject. Such are beautiful in themselves, as is, for example, virtue. Indeed, the same bodies seem beautiful at one time, while at another they lack beauty; consequently, there is a great difference between being a body and being beautiful. What then is the principle whose presence in a body produces beauty therein? What is that element in the bodies which moves the spectator, and which attracts, fixes and charms his glances? This is the first problem to solve; for, on finding this principle, we shall use it as a means to resolve other questions. (The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will possess no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation with the totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beautiful, it would seem also necessary that the parts be beautiful; for indeed beauty could never result from the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore be spread among all the parts. According to the same doctrine, the colors which, like sunlight, are beautiful, are beautiful but simple, and those whose beauty is not derived from proportion, will also be excluded from the domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how will gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the night, even the stars, would not be beautiful to contemplate. In the sphere of sounds, also, it would be necessary to insist that what is simple possesses no beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even when isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the same proportions, the same countenance seems at one time beautiful, and at another ugly. Evidently, there is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is not beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some superior principle. (This will appear more clearly from further examples). Let us examine occupations and utterances. If also their beauty depended on proportion, what would be the function of proportion when considering occupations, laws, studies and sciences? Relations of proportion could not obtain in scientific speculations; no, nor even in the mutual agreement of these speculations. On the other hand, even bad things may show a certain mutual agreement and harmony; as, for instance, were we to assert that wisdom is softening of the brain, and that justice is a generous folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd statements, which agree perfectly, and harmonize mutually. Further, every virtue is a soul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined; yet it could not admit of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number. Again, granting that the soul is divided into several faculties, who will undertake to decide which combination of these faculties, or of the speculations to which the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty? Moreover (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could be predicated of pure intelligence?
6:1.6.2Returning to our first consideration, we shall examine the nature of the element of beauty in bodies. It is something perceivable at the very first glance, something which the soul recognizes as kindred, and sympathetic to her own nature, which she welcomes and assimilates. But as soon as she meets an ugly object, she recoils, repudiates it, and rejects it as something foreign, towards which her real nature feels antipathy. That is the reason why the soul, being such as it is, namely, of an essence superior to all other beings, when she perceives an object kindred to her own nature, or which reveals only some traces of it, rejoices, is transported, compares this object with her own nature, thinks of herself, and of her intimate being as it would be impossible to fail to perceive this resemblance. How can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful? Because, as we said, sensible objects participate in a form. While a shapeless object, by nature capable of receiving shape (physical) and form (intelligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly. That which remains completely foreign to all divine reason (a reason proceeding from the universal Soul), is absolute ugliness. Any object should be considered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason, the matter, not being able to receive perfectly the form (which the Soul gives it). On joining matter, form co-ordinates the different parts which are to compose unity, combines them, and by their harmony produces something which is a unit. Since (form) is one, that which it fashions will also have to be one, as far as a composite object can be one. When such an object has arrived at unity, beauty resides in it, and it communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole. When it meets a whole, the parts of which are perfectly similar, it interpenetrates it evenly. Thus it would show itself now in an entire building, then in a single stone, later in art-products as well as in the works of nature. Thus bodies become beautiful by communion with (or, participation in) a reason descending upon it from the divine (universal Soul).
6:1.6.3The soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even when the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul makes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the beautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which to judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what is incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building placed before him as beautiful, by comparing it with the Idea which he has within himself? The only explanation can be that, on abstracting the stones, the exterior object is nothing but the interior form, no doubt divided within the extent of the matter, but still one, though manifested in the manifold? When the senses perceive in an object the form which combines, unites and dominates a substance which lacks shape, and therefore is of a contrary nature; and if they also perceive a shape which distinguishes itself from the other shapes by its elegance, then the soul, uniting these multiple elements, fuses them, comparing them to the indivisible form which she bears within herself, then she pronounces their agreement, kinship and harmony with that interior type. Thus a worthy man, perceiving in a youth the character of virtue, is agreeably impressed, because he observes that the youth harmonizes with the true type of virtue which he bears within himself. Thus also the beauty of color, though simple in form, reduces under its sway that obscurity of matter, by the presence of the light, which is something incorporeal, a reason, and a form. Likewise, fire surpasses all other bodies in beauty, because it stands to all other elements in the relation of a form; it occupies the highest regions; it is the subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the incorporeal beings; without permitting itself to be penetrated by other bodies, it penetrates them all; without itself cooling, it communicates to them its heat; by its own essence it possesses color, and communicates it to others; it shines and coruscates, because it is a form. The body in which it does not dominate, shows but a discolored hue, and ceases being beautiful, merely because it does not participate in the whole form of color. Once more, thus do the hidden harmonies of sound produce audible harmonies, and also yield to the soul the idea of beauty, though showing it in another order of things. Audible harmonies can be expressed in numbers; not indeed in any kind of numbers, but only in such as can serve to produce form, and to make it dominate. So much then for sense-beauties which, descending on matter like images and shadows, beautify it and thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we shall leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise to the contemplation of the beauties of a superior order, of which the senses have no intuition, but which the soul perceives and expresses. Just as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties if we had never seen them, nor recognized them as such, if, in respect to them, we had been similar to persons born blind, likewise we would not know enough to say anything about the beauty either of the arts or sciences, or of anything of the kind, if we were not already in possession of this kind of beauty; nor of the splendor of virtue, if we had not contemplated the ("golden) face of Justice," and of temperance, before whose splendor the morning and evening stars grow pale. To see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall experience far more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation of the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable beauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle charm, desire, love, and a pleasurable impulse. Such are the sentiments for invisible beauties which should be felt, and indeed are experienced by all souls, but especially by the most loving. In the presence of beautiful bodies, all indeed see them; but not all are equally moved. Those who are most moved are designated "lovers."
1.6.4
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6:1.6.5Let us now propound a question about experiences to these men who feel love for incorporeal beauties. What do you feel in presence of the noble occupations, the good morals, the habits of temperance, and in general of virtuous acts and sentiments, and of all that constitutes the beauty of souls? What do you feel when you contemplate your inner beauty? What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusiasms? Whence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves, and to refresh yourselves by retirement from your bodies? Such indeed are the experiences of those who love genuinely. What then is the object which causes these, your emotions? It is neither a figure, nor a color, nor any size; it is that (colorless) invisible soul, which possesses a wisdom equally invisible; this soul in which may be seen shining the splendor of all the virtues, when one discovers in oneself, or contemplates in others, the greatness of character, the justice of the heart, the pure temperance, the imposing countenance of valor, dignity and modesty, proceeding alone firmly, calmly, and imperturbably; and above all, intelligence, resembling the divinity, by its brilliant light. What is the reason that we declare these objects to be beautiful, when we are transported with admiration and love for them? They exist, they manifest themselves, and whoever beholds them will never be able to restrain himself from confessing them to be veritable beings. Now what are these genuine beings? They are beautiful. But reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why these veritable beings give the soul which experiences them the property of exciting love, from which proceeds this halo of light which, so to speak, crowns all virtues. Consider the things contrary to these beautiful objects, and with them compare what may be ugly in the soul. If we can discover of what ugliness consists, and what is its cause, we shall have achieved an important element of the solution we are seeking. Let us picture to ourselves an ugly soul; she will be given up to intemperance; and be unjust, abandoned to a host of passions, troubled, full of fears caused by her cowardliness, and of envy by her degradation; she will be longing only for vile and perishable things; she will be entirely depraved, will love nothing but impure wishes, will have no life but the sensual, and will take pleasure in her turpitude. Would we not explain such a state by saying that under the very mask of beauty turpitude had invaded this soul, brutalized her, soiled her with all kinds of vices, rendering her incapable of a pure life, and pure sentiments, and had reduced her to an existence obscure, infected with evil, poisoned by lethal germs; that it had hindered her from contemplating anything she should, forcing her to remain solitary, because it misled her out from herself towards inferior and gloomy regions? The soul fallen into this state of impurity, seized with an irresistible inclination towards the things of sense, absorbed by her intercourse with the body, sunk into matter, and having even received it within herself, has changed form by her admixture with an inferior nature. Not otherwise would be a man fallen into slimy mud, who no longer would present to view his primitive beauty, and would exhibit only the appearance of the mud that had defiled him; his ugliness would be derived from something foreign; and to recover his pristine beauty he would have to wash off his defilement, and by purification be restored to what he once was. We have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly by mingling with the body, confusing herself with it, by inclining herself towards it. For a soul, ugliness consists in being impure, no longer unmingled, like gold tarnished by particles of earth. As soon as this dross is removed, and nothing but gold remains, then again it is beautiful, because separated from every foreign body, and is restored to its unique nature. Likewise the soul, released from the passions begotten by her intercourse with the body when she yields herself too much to it, delivered from exterior impressions, purified from the blemishes contracted from her alliance with the body--that is, reduced to herself, she lays aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature foreign to her.
6:1.6.6Thus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Empedoclean) maxim, "courage, temperance, all the virtues, nay, even prudence, are but purifications." The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the man who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at the bottom of a swamp; for everything that is not pure, because of its very perversity, delights in mud, just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud with delight. And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if it be not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of the body, and to flee from them as impure, and as only proper for an impure being? What else is courage, unless no longer to fear death, which is mere separation of the soul from the body? Whoever therefore is willing to withdraw from the body could surely not fear death. Magnanimity is nothing but scorn of things here below. Last, prudence is the thought which, detached from the earth, raises the soul to the intelligible world. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form, a reason, an incorporeal and intellectual essence; she belongs entirely to the divinity, in whom resides the source of the beautiful, and of all the qualities which have affinity with it. Restored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty increase; indeed, her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas; only when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all the remainder. That is the reason that it is right to say that "the soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity," because it is the principle of beauty and of the essences; or rather, being is beauty, while the other nature (non-being, matter), is ugliness. This is the First Evil, evil in itself, just as that one (the First Principle) is the good and the beautiful; for good and beauty are identical. Consequently, beauty or good, and evil or ugliness, are to be studied by the same methods. The first rank is to be assigned to beauty, which is identical with the good, and from which is derived the intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The soul is beautiful by intelligence, then, the other things, like actions, and studies, are beautiful by the soul which gives them a form. It is still the soul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection; being a divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she seizes an object, or subjects it to her dominion, she gives to it the beauty that the nature of this object enables it to receive. We must still ascend to the Good to which every soul aspires. Whoever has seen it knows what I still have to say, and knows the beauty of the Good. Indeed, the Good is desirable for its own sake; it is the goal of our desires. To attain it, we have to ascend to the higher regions, turn towards them, and lay aside the garment which we put on when descending here below; just as, in the (Eleusynian, or Isiac) mysteries, those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses of the sanctuary, after having purified themselves, lay aside every garment, and advance stark naked.
6:1.6.7Thus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws its existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; those who have, admire Him as sovereign beauty, struck simultaneously with stupor and pleasure, thrilling in a painless orgasm, loving with a genuine emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all other affections, and disdaining those things which formerly they characterized as beautiful. This is the experience of those to whom divinities and guardians have appeared; they reck no longer of the beauty of other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of those who behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which, because of its very purity, is fleshless and bodiless, outside of earth and heaven. All these things, indeed are contingent and composite, they are not principles, they are derived from Him. What beauty could one still wish to see after having arrived at vision of Him who gives perfection to all beings, though himself remains unmoved, without receiving anything; after finding rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by becoming assimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty, and the first beauty, He beautifies those who love Him, and thereby they become worthy of love. This is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal which arouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to be disinherited of that sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness, and privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Real misfortune is not to lack beautiful colors, nor beautiful bodies, nor power, nor domination, nor royalty. It is quite sufficient to see oneself excluded from no more than possession of beauty. This possession is precious enough to render worthless domination of a kingdom, if not of the whole earth, of the sea, or even of the heavens--if indeed it were possible, while abandoning and scorning all that (natural beauty), to succeed in contemplating beauty face to face.
6:1.6.8How shall we start, and later arrive at the contemplation of this ineffable beauty which, like the divinity in the mysteries, remains hidden in the recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself outside, where it might be perceived by the profane? We must advance into this sanctuary, penetrating into it, if we have the strength to do so, closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things, without throwing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed us. If we do still see corporeal beauties, we must no longer rush at them, but, knowing that they are only images, traces and adumbrations of a superior principle, we will flee from them, to approach Him of whom they are merely the reflections. Whoever would let himself be misled by the pursuit of those vain shadows, mistaking them for realities, would grasp only an image as fugitive as the fluctuating form reflected by the waters, and would resemble that senseless (Narcissus) who, wishing to grasp that image himself, according to the fable, disappeared, carried away by the current. Likewise he would wish to embrace corporeal beauties, and not release them, would plunge, not his body, but his soul into the gloomy abysses, so repugnant to intelligence; he would be condemned to total blindness; and on this earth, as well as in hell, he would see naught but mendacious shades. This indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer) with peculiar force, "Let us fly unto our dear fatherland!" But how shall we fly? How escape from here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that allegory which represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of Circe or Calypso, where neither the pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of fleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our fatherland is the region whence we descend here below. It is there that dwells our Father. But how shall we return thither? What means shall be employed to return us thither? Not our feet, indeed; all they could do would be to move us from one place of the earth to another. Neither is it a chariot, nor ship which need be prepared. All these vain helps must be left aside, and not even considered. We must close the eyes of the body, to open another vision, which indeed all possess, but very few employ.
6:1.6.9But how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their excellent soul possesses? Withdraw within yourself, and examine yourself. If you do not yet therein discover beauty, do as the artist, who cuts off, polishes, purifies until he has adorned his statue with all the marks of beauty. Remove from your soul, therefore, all that is superfluous, straighten out all that is crooked, purify and illuminate what is obscure, and do not cease perfecting your statue until the divine resplendence of virtue shines forth upon your sight, until you see temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast. When you shall have acquired this perfection; when you will see it in yourself; when you will purely dwell within yourself; when you will cease to meet within yourself any obstacle to unity; when nothing foreign will any more, by its admixture, alter the simplicity of your interior essence; when within your whole being you will be a veritable light, immeasurable in size, uncircumscribed by any figure within narrow boundaries, unincreasable because reaching out to infinity, and entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and quantity; when you shall have become such, then, having become sight itself, you may have confidence in yourself, for you will no longer need any guide. Then must you observe carefully, for it is only by the eye that then will open itself within you that you will be able to perceive supreme Beauty. But if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by vice, an eye that is impure, or weak, so as not to be able to support the splendor of so brilliant an object, that eye will see nothing, not even if it were shown a sight easy to grasp. The organ of vision will first have to be rendered analogous and similar to the object it is to contemplate. Never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it had assumed its form; likewise, the soul could never see beauty, unless she herself first became beautiful. To obtain the view of the beautiful, and of the divinity, every man must begin by rendering himself beautiful and divine. Thus he will first rise to intelligence, and he will there contemplate beauty, and declare that all this beauty resides in the Ideas. Indeed, in them everything is beautiful, because they are the daughters and the very essence of Intelligence. Above intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call the nature of the Good, and who causes beauty to radiate around Him; so that, to repeat, the first thing that is met is beauty. If a distinction is to be established among the intelligibles, we might say that intelligible beauty is the locus of ideas, and that the Good, which is located above the Beautiful, is its source and principle. If, however, we desire to locate the Good and the Beautiful within one single principle, we might regard this one principle first as Good, and only afterwards, as Beauty.
7:1.7.1Could any one say that there was, for any being, any good but the activity of "living according to nature?" For a being composed of several parts, however, the good will consist in the activity of its best part, an action which is peculiar, natural, and unfailing. Further: as the soul is an excellent being, and directs her activity towards something excellent, this excellent aim is not merely excellent relatively to the soul, but is the absolute Good. If then there be a principle which does not direct its action towards any other thing, because it is the best of beings, being above them all, it can be this only because all other beings trend towards it. This then, evidently, is the absolute Good by virtue of which all other beings participate therein. Now there are two methods of participation in the Good: the first, is to become similar to it; the second is to direct one's activity towards it. If then the direction of one's desire and one's action towards the better principle be a good, then can the absolute good itself neither regard nor desire any other thing, remaining in abiding rest, being the source and principle of all actions conforming to nature, giving to other things the form of the Good, without acting on them, as they, on the contrary, direct their actions thereto. Only by permanence--not by action, nor even by thought--is this principle the Good. For if it be super-Being, it must also be super-Activity, super-Intelligence, and Thought. The principle from which everything depends, while itself depending on nothing else, must, therefore, be recognized as the Good. (This divinity) must, therefore, persist in His condition, while everything turns towards Him, just as, in a circle, all the radii meet in the centre. An example of this is the sun, which is a centre of the light that is, as it were, suspended from that planet. The light accompanies the sun everywhere, and never parts from it; and even if you wished to separate it on one side, it would not any the less remain concentrated around it.
7:1.7.2Let us study the dependence of everything on the Good. The inanimate trends toward the Soul, while the animate Soul trends towards the Good through Intelligence. As far as anything possesses unity, essence or form, it participates in the Good. By its participation in unity, essence and form each being participates in the Good, even though the latter be only an image, for the things in which it participates are only images of unity, essence, and form. For the (first) Soul as she approaches Intelligence, she acquires a life which approaches closer to truth; and she owes this to Intelligence; thus (by virtue of Intelligence) she possesses the form of the Good. To possess the latter, all she needs to do is to turn her looks towards it; for Intelligence is the next after the Good. Therefore, to those to whom it is granted to live, life is the good. Likewise, for those who participate in intelligence, Intelligence is the good. Consequently, such (a being as) joins intelligence to life possesses a double good.
7:1.7.3Though life be a good, it does not belong to all beings. Life is incomplete for the evil person, as for an eye that does not see distinctly; neither accomplish their purpose. If, for us, life, though mingled as it is, be a good, even if an imperfect one, how shall we continue to assert that death is not an evil? But for whom would it be an evil? This we must ask because evil must necessarily be an attribute of somebody. Now there is no more evil for a being which, though even existing, is deprived of life, any more than for a stone (as they say). But if, after death, the being still live, if it be still animate, it will possess good, and so much the more as it exercises its faculties without the body. If it be united to the universal Soul, evidently there can be no evil for it, any more than for the gods who possess good unmingled with evil. Similar is the case of the soul which preserves her purity, inasmuch as he who loses her finds that life, and not death, is the real Evil. If there be chastisements in Hades, again is life an evil for the soul, because she is not pure. If, further, we define life as the union of the soul with the body, and death as their separation, the soul can pass through both these conditions (without, on that account, being unhappy, or losing her hold on the Good). How is death not an evil, if life be a good? Certainly life is a good for such as possess the Good, (it is a good) not because the soul is united to the body, but because she repels evil by virtue. (Without the latter) death would rather be a good (because it delivers us from the body). To resume: by itself, life in a body is evil; but, by virtue, the soul locates herself in the good, not by perpetuating the existing corporeal union, but by separating herself from the body. The order of Bouillet has been left, because the other orders differ anyway, and because this is the one that Porphyry introduced into the works of Plotinos. It must, therefore, have been of most significance to him. Of Virtues. I.--There is a difference between the virtues of the citizen, those of the man who essays to rise to contemplation, and who, on this account, is said to possess a contemplative mind; those of him who contemplates intelligence; and finally those of pure Intelligence, which is completely separated from the soul. 1. The civil virtues consist of moderation in passions, and in letting one's actions follow the rational laws of duty. The object of these virtues being to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, they are called civil virtues because they mutually unite citizens. "Prudence refers to the rational part of our soul; courage, to that part of the soul subject to anger; temperance consists in the agreement and harmony of appetite and reason; finally justice, consists in the accomplishment, by all these faculties, of the function proper to each of them, either to command, or to obey." 2. The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in detaching oneself from things here below; that is why they are called "purifications." They command us to abstain from activities which innervate the organs, and which excite the affections that relate to the body. The object of these virtues is to raise the soul to genuine existence. While the civil virtues are the ornament of mortal life, and prepare the soul for the purificatory virtues, the latter direct the man whom they adorn to abstain from activities in which the body predominates. Thus, in the purificatory virtues, "prudence consists in not forming opinions in harmony with the body, but in acting by oneself, which is the work of pure thought. Temperance consists in not sharing the passions of the body; courage, in not fearing separation therefrom, as if death drove man into emptiness and annihilation; while justice exacts that reason and intelligence command and be obeyed." The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. The contemplative virtues obliterate the passions from the soul; their object is to assimilate man to the divinity. There is a difference between purifying oneself, and being pure. Consequently the purificatory virtues may, like purification itself, be considered in two lights; they purify the soul, and they adorn the purified soul, because the object of purification is purity. But "since purification and purity consist in being separated from every foreign entity, the good is something different from the soul that purifies itself. If the soul that purifies herself had possessed the good before losing her purity, it would be sufficient for the soul to purify herself; but in this very case, what would remain to her after the purification would be the good, but not the purification. But the soul is not the good; she can only participate therein, and have its form; otherwise the soul would not have fallen into evil. For the soul, good consists in being united to her author, and her evil is to unite with lower things." Of evil, there are two kinds; the one, is to unite with lower things; the other is to abandon oneself to the passions. The civil virtues owe their name of virtues and their value to their releasing the soul from one of these two kinds of evil (of the passions). The purificatory virtues are superior to the former, in that they free the soul from her characteristic form of evil (that is, union with lower things). Therefore, when the soul is pure, she must be united to her author; her virtue, after her "conversion," consists in her knowledge and science of veritable existence; not that the soul lacks this knowledge, but because without her superior principle, without intelligence, she does not see what she possesses. 3. There is a third kind of virtues, which are superior to the civil and purificatory virtues, the "virtues of the soul that contemplates intelligence." "Here prudence and wisdom consist in contemplating the "beings" or essences contained by intelligence; justice consists in the soul's fulfilling of her characteristic function; that is, in attaching herself to intelligence and to direct her activity thither. Temperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards Intelligence, while courage is the impassibility by which the soul becomes assimilated to what she contemplates, since the soul's nature is to be impassible. These virtues are as intimately concatenated as the other (lower forms)."
7:1.7.4There is a fourth kind of virtues, the "exemplary virtues," which reside within intelligence. Their superiority to the virtues of the soul is the same as that of the type to the image; for intelligence contains simultaneously all the "beings" or essences which are the types of lower things. "Within intelligence, prudence is the science; wisdom is the thought, temperance is the conversion towards oneself; justice is the accomplishment of one's characteristic function; courage is the identity of intelligence, its perseverance in purity, concentrated within itself, in virtue of its superiority." We thus have four kinds of virtues: 1, the exemplary virtues, characteristic of intelligence, and of the "being" or nature to which they belong; 2, the virtues of the soul turned towards intelligence, and filled with her contemplation; 3, the virtues of the soul that purifies herself, or which has purified herself from the brutal passions characteristic of the body; 4, the virtues that adorn the man by restraining within narrow limits the action of the irrational part, and by moderating the passions. "He who possesses the virtues of the superior order necessarily (potentially) possesses the inferior virtues. But the converse does not occur." "He who possesses the superior virtues will not prefer to practice the lower virtues because of the mere possession thereof; he will practice them only when circumstances will invite (it). The objects, indeed, differ with the kind of virtues. The object of the civil virtues is to moderate our passions so as to conform our conduct to the laws of human nature. That of the purificatory virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions. That of the contemplative virtues is to apply the soul to intellectual operations, even to the extent of no longer having to think of the need of freeing oneself from the passions. Last, that of the exemplary virtues is similar to that of the other virtues. Thus the practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine, or make of the good man, a protecting deity; the contemplative virtues deify; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities. We should specially apply ourselves to purificatory virtues believing that we can acquire them even in this life; and that possession of them leads to superior virtues. We must push purification as far as possible, as it consists in separating (the soul) from the body, and in freeing oneself from any passional movement of the irrational part. But how can one purify the soul? To what limit may purification be pushed? These are two questions that demand examination. To begin with, the foundation of purification is to know oneself, to realize that he is a soul bound to a foreign being, of a different nature (or, "being"). Further, when one is convinced of this truth, one should gather oneself together within himself, detaching himself from the body, and freeing himself entirely from the passions. He who makes use of his senses too often, though it be done without devotion or pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the care of the body, and is chained thereto by sensation. The pains and the pleasures produced by sense-objects exercise a great influence on the soul, and inspire the soul with an inclination for the body. It is important to remove such a disposition from the soul. "To achieve this purpose, the soul will allow the body only necessary pleasures, that serve to cure her of her sufferings, to refresh her from her exhaustions, to hinder her from being importunate. The soul will free herself from pains; if this be beyond her powers, the soul will support them patiently, and will diminish them, while refusing to share them. The soul will appease anger so far as possible; she will even try to suppress them entirely; at least, if that be impossible, she will not voluntarily participate therein, leaving the non-reflective excitement to another (animal) nature, reducing the involuntary motions as far as possible. The soul will be inaccessible to fear--having nothing further to risk; even so, she will restrain every sudden movement; she will pay attention to fear only insofar as it may be nature's warning at the approach of danger. Absolutely nothing shameful will be desired; in eating and drinking, she will seek only the satisfaction of a need, while remaining essentially alien thereto. The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the flights of fancy that occur in dreams. In the purified man, the intellectual part of the soul will be pure of all these passions. She will even desire that the part that experiences the irrational passions of the body should take notice of them without being agitated thereby, and without yielding to them. In this way, if the irrational part should itself happen to experience emotions, the latter will be promptly calmed by the presence of reason. Struggles will have been left behind before any headway will have been made to purification. The presence of reason will suffice; the inferior principle, indeed, will respect the higher one to the extent of being angry with itself, and reproaching itself for weakness, in case it feels any agitation that disturbs its master's rest." So long as the soul experiences even moderate passions, the soul's progress towards impassibility remains in need of improvement. The soul is impassible only when she has entirely ceased to participate in the passions of the body. Indeed, that which permitted the passions to rule was that reason relaxed the reins as a result of her own inclination.
8:1.8.1Studying the origin of evils that might affect all beings in general, or some one class in particular, it is reasonable to begin by defining evil, from a consideration of its nature. That would be the best way to discover whence it arises, where it resides, to whom it may happen, and in general to decide if it be something real. Which one of our faculties then can inform us of the nature of evil? This question is not easy to solve, because there must be an analogy between the knower and the known. The Intelligence and the Soul may indeed cognize forms and fix their desires on them, because they themselves are forms; but evil, which consists in the absence of all goods, could not be described as a form. But inasmuch as there can be but one single science, to embrace even contraries, and as the evil is the contrary of the good, knowledge of the good implies that of evil. Therefore, to determine the nature of evil, we shall first have to determine that of good, for the higher things must precede the lower, as some are forms and others are not, being rather a privation of the good. Just in what sense evil is the contrary of the good must also be determined; as for instance, if the One be the first, and matter the last; or whether the One be form, and matter be its absence. Of this further.
8:1.8.2Let us now determine the nature of the Good, at least so far as is demanded by the present discussion. The Good is the principle on which all depends, to which everything aspires, from which everything issues, and of which everything has need. As to Him, He suffices to himself, being complete, so He stands in need of nothing; He is the measure and the end of all things; and from Him spring intelligence, being, soul, life, and intellectual contemplation. All these beautiful things exist as far as He does; but He is the one Principle that possesses supreme beauty, a principle that is superior to the things that are best. He reigns royally, in the intelligible world, being Intelligence itself, very differently from what we call human intelligences. The latter indeed are all occupied with propositions, discussions about the meanings of words, reasonings, examinations of the validity of conclusions, observing the concatenation of causes, being incapable of possessing truth "a priori," and though they be intelligences, being devoid of all ideas before having been instructed by experience; though they, nevertheless, were intelligences. Such is not the primary Intelligence. On the contrary, it possesses all things. Though remaining within itself, it is all things; it possesses all things, without possessing them (in the usual acceptation of that term); the things that subsist in it not differing from it, and not being separated from each other. Each one of them is all the others, is everything and everywhere, although not confounded with other things, and remaining distinct therefrom. The power which participates in Intelligence (the universal Soul) does not participate in it in a manner such as to be equal to it, but only in the measure of her ability to participate therein. She is the first actualization of Intelligence, the first being that Intelligence, though remaining within itself, begets. She directs her whole activity towards supreme Intelligence, and lives exclusively thereby. Moving from outside Intelligence, and around it, according to the laws of harmony, the universal Soul fixes her glance upon it. By contemplation penetrating into its inmost depths, through Intelligence she sees the divinity Himself. Such is the nature of the serene and blissful existence of the divinities, a life where evil has no place. If everything stopped there (and if there were nothing beyond the three principles here described), evil would not exist (and there would be nothing but goods). But there are goods of the first, second and third ranks. Though all relate to the King of all things, who is their author, and from whom they derive their goodness, yet the goods of the second rank relate more specially to the second principle; and to the third principle, the goods of the third rank.
8:1.8.3As these are real beings, and as the first Principle is their superior, evil could not exist in such beings, and still less in Him, who is superior to them; for all these things are good. Evil then must be located in non-being, and must, so to speak, be its form, referring to the things that mingle with it, or have some community with it. This "non-being," however, is not absolute non-being. Its difference from being resembles the difference between being and movement or rest; but only as its image, or something still more distant from reality. Within this non-being are comprised all sense-objects, and all their passive modifications; or, evil may be something still more inferior, like their accident or principle, or one of the things that contribute to its constitution. To gain some conception of evil it may be represented by the contrast between measure and incommensurability; between indetermination and its goal; between lack of form and the creating principle of form; between lack and self-sufficiency; as the perpetual unlimited and changeableness; as passivity, insatiableness, and absolute poverty. Those are not the mere accidents of evil, but its very essence; all of that can be discovered when any part of evil is examined. The other objects, when they participate in the evil and resemble it, become evil without however being absolute Evil. All these things participate in a being; they do not differ from it, they are identical with it, and constitute it. For if evil be an accident in something, then evil, though not being a real being, must be something by itself. Just as, for the good, there is the Good in itself, and the good considered as an attribute of a foreign subject, likewise, for evil, one may distinguish Evil in itself, and evil as accident. It might be objected that it is impossible to conceive of indetermination outside of the indeterminate, any more than determination outside of the determinate; or measure outside of the measured. (We shall have to answer that) just as determination does not reside in the determined (or measure in the measured), so indetermination cannot exist within the indeterminate. If it can exist in something other than itself, it will be either in the indeterminate, or in the determinate. If in the indeterminate, it is evident that it itself is indeterminate, and needs no indetermination to become such. If, on the other hand (it be claimed that indetermination exist), in the determinate, (it is evident that) the determinate cannot admit indetermination. This, therefore, demands the existence of something infinite in itself, and formless in itself, which would combine all the characteristics mentioned above as the characteristics of evil. As to evil things, they are such because evil is mingled with them, either because they contemplate evil, or because they fulfil it. Reason, therefore, forces us to recognize as the primary evil, Evil in itself. (This is matter which is) the subject of figure, form, determination, and limitation; which owes its ornaments to others, which has nothing good in itself, which is but a vain image by comparison with the real beings--in other word, the essence of evil, if such an essence can exist.
8:1.8.4So far as the nature of bodies participates in matter, it is an evil; yet it could not be the primary Evil, for it has a certain form. Nevertheless, this form possesses no reality, and is, besides, deprived of life (?); for bodies corrupt each other mutually. Being agitated by an unregulated movement, they hinder the soul from carrying out her proper movement. They are in a perpetual flux, contrary to the immutable nature of essences; therefore, they constitute the secondary evil. By herself, the soul is not evil, and not every soul is evil. What soul deserves to be so considered? That of the man who, according to the expression of Plato, is a slave to the body. In this man it is natural for the soul to be evil. It is indeed the irrational part of the soul which harbors all that constitutes evil: indetermination, excess, and need, from which are derived intemperance, cowardliness, and all the vices of the soul, the involuntary passions, mothers of false opinions, which lead us to consider the things we seek or avoid as goods or evils. But what produces this evil? How shall we make a cause or a principle of it? To begin with, the soul is neither independent of matter, nor, by herself, perverse. By virtue of her union with the body, which is material, she is mingled with indetermination, and so, to a certain point, deprived of the form which embellishes and which supplies measure. Further, that reason should be hindered in its operations, and cannot see well, must be due to the soul's being hindered by passions, and obscured by the darkness with which matter surrounds her. The soul inclines towards matter. Thus the soul fixes her glance, not on what is essence, but on what is simple generation. Now the principle of generation is matter, whose nature is so bad that matter communicates it to the beings which, even without being united thereto, merely look at it. Being the privation of good, matter contains none of it, and assimilates to itself all that touches it. Therefore, the perfect Soul, being turned towards ever pure Intelligence, repels matter, indeterminateness, the lack of measure, and in short, evil. The perfect Soul does not approach to it, does not lower her looks; she remains pure and determined by Intelligence. The soul which does not remain in this state, and which issues from herself (to unite with the body), not being determined by the First, the Perfect, is no more than an image of the perfect Soul because she lacks (good), and is filled with indetermination. The soul sees nothing but darkness. The soul already contains matter because she looks at what she cannot see; or, in the every-day expression, because the soul looks at darkness.
8:1.8.5Since the lack of good is the cause that the soul looks at darkness, and mingles therewith, the lack of good and darkness is primary Evil for the soul. The secondary evil will be the darkness, and the nature of evil, considered not in matter, but before matter. Evil consists not in the lack of any particular thing, but of everything in general. Nothing is evil merely because it lacks a little of being good; its nature might still be perfect. But what, like matter, lacks good entirely, is essentially evil, and possesses nothing good? Nature, indeed, does not possess essence, or it would participate in the good; only by verbal similarity can we say that matter "is," while we can truly say that matter "is" absolute "nonentity." A mere lack (of good) therefore, may be characterized as not being good; but complete lack is evil; while a lack of medium intensity consists in the possibility of falling into evil, and is already an evil. Evil, therefore, is not any particular evil, as injustice, or any special vice; evil is that which is not yet anything of that, being nothing definite. Injustice and the other vices must be considered as kinds of evil, distinguished from each other by mere accidents; as for instance, what occurs by malice. Besides, the different kinds of evil differ among each other either by the matter in which evil resides, or by the parts of the soul to which it refers, as sight, desire, and passion. If we grant the existence of evils external to the soul, we shall be forced to decide about their relation to sickness, ugliness, or poverty. Sickness has been explained as a lack or excess of material bodies which fail to support order or measure. The cause of ugliness, also, has been given as deficient adjustment of matter to form. Poverty has been described as the need or lack of objects necessary to life as a result of our union with matter, whose nature is (the Heraclitian and Stoic) "indigence." From such definitions it would follow that we are not the principle of evil, and are not evil in ourselves, for these evils existed before us. Only in spite of themselves would men yield to vice. The evils of the soul are avoidable, but not all men possess the necessary firmness. Evil, therefore, is caused by the presence of matter in sense-objects, and is not identical with the wickedness of men. For wickedness does not exist in all men; some triumph over wickedness, while they who do not even need to triumph over it, are still better. In all cases men triumph over evil by those of their faculties that are not engaged in matter.
8:1.8.6Let us examine the significance of the doctrine that evils cannot be destroyed, that they are necessary, that they do not exist among the divinities, but that they ever besiege our mortal nature, and the place in which we dwell. Surely heaven is free from all evil because it moves eternally with regularity, in perfect order; because in the stars is neither injustice nor any other kind of evil, because they do not conflict with each other in their courses; and because their revolutions are presided over by the most beautiful harmony. On the contrary, the earth reveals injustice and disorder, (chiefly) because our nature is mortal, and we dwell in a lower place. But when Plato, says, that we must flee from here below, he does not mean that we should leave the earth, but, while remaining therein, practice justice, piety, and wisdom. It is wickedness that must be fled from, because wickedness and its consequences are the evil of man. When (Theodor) tells (Socrates) that evils would be annihilated if men practised (Socrates') teachings, the latter answers that that is impossible, for evil is necessary even if only as the contrary of good. But how then can wickedness, which is the evil of man, be the contrary of good? Because it is the contrary of virtue. Now virtue, without being Good in itself, is still a good, a good which makes us dominate matter. But how can Good in itself, which is not a quality, have a contrary? Besides, why need the existence of one thing imply its contrary? Though we may grant that there is a possibility of the existence of the contrary of some things--as for instance, that a man in good health might become sick--there is no such necessity. Nor does Plato assert that the existence of each thing of this kind necessarily implies that of its contrary; he makes this statement exclusively of the Good. But how can there be a contrary to good, if the good be "being," let alone "above being"? Evidently, in reference to particular beings, there can be nothing contrary to "being." This is proved by induction; but the proposition has not been demonstrated as regards universal Being. What then is the contrary of universal Being, and first principles in general? The contrary of "being" must be nonentity; the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature and principle of Evil. These two natures are indeed respectively the principles of goods and of evils. All their elements are mutually opposed, so that both these natures, considered in their totality, are still more opposed than the other contraries. The latter, indeed, belong to the same form, to the same kind, and they have something in common in whatever subjects they may be. As to the Contraries that are essentially distinguished from each other, whose nature is constituted of elements opposed to the constitutive elements of the other, those Contraries are absolutely opposed to each other, since the connotation of that word implies things as opposite to each other as possible. Measure, determination, and the other characteristics of the divine nature are the opposites of incommensurability, indefiniteness, and the other contrary things that constitute the nature of evil. Each one of these wholes, therefore, is the contrary of the other. The being of the one is that which is essentially and absolutely false; that of the other is genuine Being; the falseness of the one is, therefore, the contrary of the truth of the other. Likewise what pertains to the being of the one is the contrary of what belongs to the being of the other. We also see that it is not always true to say that there is no contrary to "being," for we acknowledge that water and fire are contraries, even if they did not contain the common element of matter, of which heat and cold, humidity and dryness, are accidents. If they existed alone by themselves, if their being were complete without any common subject, there would still be an opposition, and an opposition of "being." Therefore the things that are completely separate, which have nothing in common, which are as distant as possible, are by nature contrary. This is not an opposition of quality, nor of any kinds of beings; it is an opposition resulting from extreme distance, and from being composed of contraries, thereby communicating this characteristic to their elements.
8:1.8.7Why is the existence of both good and evil necessary? Because matter is necessary to the existence of the world. The latter is necessarily composed of contraries, and, consequently, it could not exist without matter. In this case the nature of this world is a mixture of intelligence and necessity. What it receives from divinity are goods; its evils derive from the primordial nature, the term used (by Plato) to designate matter as a simple substance yet unadorned by a divinity. But what does he mean by "mortal nature?" When he says that "evils besiege this region here below," he means the universe, as appears from the following quotations: "Since you are born, you are not immortal, but by my help you shall not perish." In this case it is right to say that evils cannot be annihilated. How then can one flee from them? Not by changing one's locality, (as Plato) says, but by acquiring virtue, and by separating from the body, which, simultaneously, is separation from matter; for being attached to the body is also attachment to matter. It is in the same sense that (Plato) explains being separated from the body, or not being separated from it. By dwelling with the divinities he means being united to the intelligible objects; for it is in them that inheres immortality. Here follows still another demonstration of the necessity of evil. Since good does not remain alone, evil must necessarily exist by issuing from the good. We might express this differently, as the degradation and exhaustion (of the divine power, which, in the whole hierarchic series of successive emanations weakens from degree to degree). There must, therefore, be a last degree of being, beyond which nothing further can be begotten, and that is evil. Just as the existence of something after a first (Good) is necessary, so must also a last degree (of being) be necessary. Now the last degree is matter, and contains nothing more of the First; (and, as matter and evil are identical,) the existence of evil is necessary.
8:1.8.8It may still be objected that it is not matter that makes us wicked; for it is not matter that produces ignorance and perverted appetites. If, indeed, these appetites mislead us to evil as a result of the perversity of the body, we must seek its cause, not in matter, but in form (in the qualities of the bodies). These, for instance, are heat, cold, bitterness, pungency, and the other qualities of the bodily secretions; or, the atonic condition or inflammation of certain organs; or, certain dispositions which produce the difference of appetites; and, if you please, false opinions. Evil, therefore, is form rather than matter. Even under this (mistaken) hypothesis we are none the less driven to acknowledge that matter is the evil. A quality does not always produce the same results within or outside of matter; thus the form of the axe without iron does not cut. The forms that inhere in matter are not always what they would be if they were outside of it. The ("seminal) reasons" when inhering in matter are by it corrupted and filled with its nature. As fire, when separate from matter, does not burn; so form, when remaining by itself, effects what it would if it were in matter. Matter dominates any principle that appears within it, alters it, and corrupts it by imparting thereto its own nature, which is contrary to the Good. It does not indeed substitute cold for heat, but it adds to the form--as, for instance, to the form of fire--its formless substance; to figure adding its shapelessness; to measure, its excess and lack, proceeding thus until it has degraded things, transubstantiating them into its own nature. That is the reason that, in the nutrition of animals, what has been ingested does not remain what it was before. The foods that enter into the body of a dog, for instance, are by assimilation transformed into blood and canine secretions, and, in general, are transformed according to the animal that receives them. Thus even under the hypothesis that evils are referred to the body, matter is the cause of evils. It may be objected that one ought to master these dispositions of the body. But the principle that could triumph over them is pure only if it flee from here below. The appetites which exercise the greatest force come from a certain complexion of the body, and differ according to its nature. Consequently, it is not easy to master them. There are men who have no judgment, because they are cold and heavy on account of their bad constitution. On the contrary, there are others who, because of their temperament, are light and inconstant. This is proved by the difference of our own successive dispositions. When we are gorged, we have appetites and thoughts that differ from those we experience when starved; and our dispositions vary even according to the degrees of satiety. In short, the primary Evil is that which by itself lacks measure. The secondary evil is that which accidentally becomes formless, either by assimilation or participation. In the front rank is the darkness; in the second that which has become obscured. Thus vice, being in the soul the result of ignorance and formlessness, is of secondary rank. It is not absolute Evil, because, on its side, virtue is not absolute Good; it is good only by its assimilation and participation with the Good.
8:1.8.9How do we get to know vice and virtue? As to virtue, we know it by the very intelligence and by wisdom; for wisdom knows itself. But how can we know vice? Just as we observe that an object is not in itself straight, by applying a rule, so we discern vice by this characteristic, that it does not comport itself with virtue. But do we, or do we not have direct intuition thereof? We do not have the intuition of absolute vice, because it is indeterminate. We know it, therefore, by a kind of abstraction, observing that virtue is entirely lacking. We cognize relative vice by noticing that it lacks some part of virtue. We see a part of virtue, and, by this part, judging what is lacking in order completely to constitute the form (of virtue), we call vice what is lacking to it; defining as the indeterminate (evil) what is deprived of virtue. Similarly with matter. If, for instance, we notice a figure that is ugly because its ("seminal) reason," being unable to dominate matter, has been unable to hide its deformity, we notice ugliness by what is lacking to form. But how do we know that which is absolutely formless (matter)? We make abstraction of all kinds of form, and what remains we call matter. We allow ourselves to be penetrated by a kind of shapelessness by the mere fact that we make abstraction of all shape in order to be able to represent matter (by a "bastard reasoning"). Consequently, intelligence becomes altered, and ceases to be genuine intelligence when it dares in this way to look at what does not belong to its domain. It resembles the eye, which withdraws from light to see darkness, and which on that very account does not see. Thus, in not seeing, the eye sees darkness so far as it is naturally capable of seeing it. Thus intelligence which hides light within itself, and which, so to speak, issues from itself, by advancing towards things alien to its nature, without bringing along its own light, places itself in a state contrary to its being to cognize a nature contrary to its own. But enough of this.
8:1.8.10It may well be asked (by Stoics) how matter can be evil, as it is without quality? That matter possesses no qualities can be said in the sense that by itself it has none of the qualities it is to receive, or to which matter is to serve as substrate; but cannot be said in the sense that it will possess no nature. Now, if it have a nature, what hinders this nature from being bad, without this being bad being a quality? Nothing indeed is a quality but what serves to qualify something different from itself; a quality is, therefore, an accident; a quality is that which can be mentioned as the attribute of a subject other than itself. But matter is not the attribute of something alien; it is the subject to which accidents are related. Therefore, since every quality is an accident, matter, whose nature is not to be an accident, is without quality. If, besides, quality (taken in general), itself be without quality, how could one say of matter, so far as it has not yet received any quality, that it is in some manner qualified? It is, therefore, possible to assert of matter that, it both has no quality, and yet is evil. Matter is not evil because it has a quality, but just because it has none. If, indeed, matter possessed a form, it might indeed be bad; but it would not be a nature contrary to all form.
8:1.8.11It may be further objected that nature, independent of all form, is deprivation. Now deprivation is always the attribute of some hypostatic substance, instead of itself being substance. If then evil consist in privation, it is the attribute of the substrate deprived of form; and on that account it could not exist by itself. If it be in the soul that we consider evil, privation in the soul will constitute vice and wickedness, and there will be no need to have recourse to anything external to explain it. Elsewhere it is objected that matter does not exist; here the attempt is to show that matter is not evil in so far as it exists. (If this were the case), we should not seek the origin of evil outside of the soul, but it would be located within the soul herself; there evil consists in the absence of good. But, evidently, the soul would have nothing good on the hypothesis that privation of form is an accident of the being, which desires to receive form; that, consequently, the privation of good is an accident of the soul; and that the latter produces within herself wickedness by her ("seminal) reason." Another result would be that the soul would have no life, and be inanimate; which would lead to the absurdity that the soul is no soul. We are thus forced to assert, that the soul possesses life by virtue of her ("seminal) reason," so that she does not, by herself, possess privation of good. Then she must from intelligence derive a trace of good, and have the form of good. The soul, therefore, cannot by herself be evil. Consequently, she is not the first Evil, nor does she contain it as an accident, since she is not absolutely deprived of good.
8:1.8.12To the objection that in the soul wickedness and evil are not an absolute privation, but only a relative privation of good, it may be answered that in this case, if the soul simultaneously, contain possession and privation of the good, she will have possessed a feeling mingled of good and evil, and not of unmingled evil. We will still not have found the first evil, the absolute Evil. The good of the soul will reside in her essence (being); evil will only be an accident thereof.
8:1.8.13Another hypothesis is that evil owes its character only to its being an obstacle for the soul, as certain objects are bad for the eye, because they hinder it from seeing. In this case, the evil of the soul would be the cause that produces the evil, and it would produce it without being absolute Evil. If, then, vice be an obstacle for the soul, it will not be absolute Evil, but the cause of evil, as virtue is not the good, and only contributes to acquiring it. If virtue be not good, and vice be not evil, the result is that since virtue is neither absolute beauty nor goodness, vice is neither absolute ugliness nor evil. We hold that virtue is neither absolute beauty, nor absolute goodness, because above and before it is absolute Beauty and Goodness. Only because the soul participates in these, is virtue or beauty considered a good. Now as the soul, by rising above virtue, meets absolute Beauty and Goodness, thus in descending below wickedness the soul discovers absolute Evil. To arrive at the intuition of evil the soul, therefore, starts from wickedness, if indeed an intuition of evil be at all possible. Finally, when the soul descends, she participates in evil. She rushes completely into the region of diversity, and, plunging downwards she falls into a murky mire. If she fell into absolute wickedness, her characteristic would no longer be wickedness, and she would exchange it for a still lower nature. Even though mingled with a contrary nature, wickedness, indeed, still retains something human. The vicious man, therefore, dies so far as a soul can die. Now when, in connection with the soul, we speak of dying, we mean that while she is engaged in the body, she penetrates (further) into matter, and becomes saturated with it. Then, when the soul has left the body, she once more falls into the same mud until she have managed to return into the intelligible world, and weaned her glance from this mire. So long as she remains therein, she may be said to have descended into hell, and to be slumbering there.
8:1.8.14Wickedness is by some explained as weakness of the soul, because the wicked soul is impressionable, mobile, easy to lead to evil, disposed to listen to her passions, and equally likely to become angry, and to be reconciled; she yields inconsiderately to vain ideas, like the weakest works of art and of nature, which are easily destroyed by winds and storms. This theory (is attractive, but implies a totally new conception, that of "weakness" of soul, and it would have) to explain this "weakness," and whence it is derived; for weakness in a soul is very different from weakness in a body, but just as in the body weakness consists in inability to fulfil a function, in being too impressionable, the same fault in the soul might, by analogy, be called by the same name, unless matter be equally the cause of both weaknesses. Reason, however, will have to explore the problem further, and seek the cause of the soul-fault here called weakness. In the soul weakness does not derive from an excess of density or rarefaction of leanness or stoutness, nor of any sickness such as fever. It must be met in souls which are either entirely separated from matter, or in those joined to matter, or in both simultaneously. Now, as it does not occur in souls separated from matter, which are entirely pure, and "winged," and which, as perfect, carry out their functions without any obstacle; it remains, that this weakness occurs in fallen souls, which are neither pure nor purified. For them weakness consists not in the privation of anything, but in the presence of something alien, just as, for instance, weakness of the body consists in the presence of slime or bile. We shall, therefore, be able to understand clearly the weakness of the soul by ferreting out the cause of the "fall" of the soul. Just as much as the soul, matter is included within the order of beings. For both, so to speak, there is but a single locality; for it would be an error to imagine two different localities, one for matter, and the other for the soul; such as, for instance, earth might be for matter, and air for the soul. The expression that "soul occupies a locality different from matter" means only that the soul is not in matter; that is, that the soul is not united to matter; that the soul does not together with matter constitute something unitary; and that for the soul matter is not a substrate that could contain the soul. That is how the soul is separated from matter. But the soul possesses several powers, since she contains the principle (intelligence), the medium (the discursive reason), and the goal (the power of sensation) (united to the generative and growing powers). Now, just like the beggar who presents himself at the door of the banquet-hall, and with importunity asks to be admitted, matter tries to penetrate into the place occupied by the soul. But every place is sacred, because nothing in it is deprived of the presence of the soul. Matter, on exposing itself to its rays is illuminated by it, but it cannot harbor the principle that illuminates her (the soul). The latter indeed, does not sustain matter, although she be present, and does not even see it, because it is evil. Matter obscures, weakens the light that shines down upon her, by mingling its darkness with her. To the soul, matter affords the opportunity of producing generation, by clearing free access towards matter; for if matter were not present, the soul would not approach it. The fall of the soul is, therefore, a descent into matter; hence comes her "weakness," which means, that not all of the soul's faculties are exercised; because matter hinders their action, intruding on the place occupied by the soul and forcing her, so to speak, to retrench. Until the soul can manage to accomplish her return into the intelligible world, matter degrades what it has succeeded in abstracting from the soul. For the soul, therefore, matter is a cause of weakness and vice. Therefore, by herself, the soul is primitively evil, and is the first evil. By its presence, matter is the cause of the soul's exerting her generative powers, and being thus led to suffering; it is matter that causes the soul to enter into dealings with matter, and thus to become evil. The soul, indeed, would never have approached matter unless the latter's presence had not afforded the soul an opportunity to produce generation.
8:1.8.15Those who claim that matter does not exist, will have to be referred to our extended discussion where we have demonstrated the necessity of its hypostatic existence. Those who would assert that evil does not belong among beings would, if logical, thereby also deny the existence of the good, and of anything that was desirable; thereby annihilating desire, as well as aversion, and even thought; for everybody shares desire for the good, and aversion for the evil. Thought and knowledge, simultaneously, apply to good and evil; thought itself is a good. We must, therefore, acknowledge the existence first of Good, unmixed, and then the nature mingled of good and evil; but what most participates in evil thereby trends towards absolute Evil; and what participates in it to a less degree thereby trends towards good. For what is evil to soul? It is being in contact with inferior nature; otherwise the soul would not have any appetite, pain, or fear. Indeed fear is felt by us only for the composite (of soul and body), fearing its dissolution, which thus is the cause of our pains and sufferings. The end of every appetite is to put aside what troubles it, or to forestall what might do so. As to sense-representations (fancy), it is the impression made by an exterior object on the irrational part of the soul, a part which can receive this impression only because it is not indivisible. False opinion rises within the soul because it is no longer within truth, and this occurs because the soul is no longer pure. On the contrary, the desire of the intelligible leads the soul to unite intimately with intelligence, as she should, and there remain solidly entrenched, without declining towards anything inferior. It is only because of the nature and power of the Good that evil does not remain pure Evil. (Matter, which is synonymous with evil) is like a captive which beauty covers with golden chains, so that the divinities might not see its nakedness, and that men might not be intruded on by it; or that men, if they must see it, shall be reminded of beauty on observing an even weakened image thereof.
9:1.9.1(As says pseudo-Zoroaster, in his Magic Oracles), "The soul should not be expelled from the body by violence, lest she go out (dragging along with her something foreign," that is, corporeal). In this case, she will be burdened with this foreign element whithersoever she may emigrate. By "emigrating," I mean passing into the Beyond. On the contrary, one should wait until the entire body naturally detaches itself from the soul; in which case she no longer needs to pass into any other residence, being completely unburdened of the body. How will the body naturally detach itself from the soul? By the complete rupture of the bonds which keep the soul attached to the body, by the body's impotence to fetter the soul, on account of the complete destruction of the harmony which conferred this power on it. One may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the fetters of the body. When violence is employed, it is not the body which disengages itself from the soul, it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself from the body, and that by an action which accomplishes itself not in the state of impassibility (which suits a sage), but as the result of grief, or suffering, or of anger. Now such an action is forbidden, or unworthy. May one not forestall delirium or insanity, if one become aware of their approach? To begin with, insanity does not happen to a sage, and if it does, this accident should be considered one of those inevitable things which depend from fatality, and in which case one should direct one's path less according to his intrinsic quality than according to circumstances; for perhaps the poison one might select to eject the soul from the body might do nothing but injure the soul. If there be an appointed time for the life of each of us, it is not well to forestall the decree of Providence, unless, as we have said, under absolute compulsion. Last, if rank obtained above depend on the state obtaining at the time of exit from the body, no man should separate himself from it so long as he might still achieve progress.
2.1.1Nothing will be explained by the perfectly true (Stoic) statement that the world, as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever exist, is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition of the divinity. We might find an analogy between the change of the elements, and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of the species here below, and the universe above, whose body is subject to a perpetual flux and flow. Thus the divine volition could preserve for it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations, so that, without perpetually retaining numerical unity, it would ever preserve the specific unity of form. It would indeed be a remarkable discrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the form alone should be perpetual, while in the heaven and the stars their individuality should be considered as perpetual as their form. The incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing within its breast all things, and to the non-existence of any other thing into which it could change, as well as to the impossibility of its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it. These theories would indeed, in a reasonable manner, explain the incorruptibility of heaven considered as totality, and universe; but would fail to explain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are parts of heaven, instead of being the whole universe, as is the heaven. It would seem more reasonable that, just like the fire and similar things, the stars, and the world considered as universe would possess a perpetuity chiefly of form. It is quite possible that the heaven, without meeting any destructive exterior thing, should be subjected to a perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical but the form, from the mere mutual destruction of its parts. In this case its substrate, being in a perpetual flux, would receive its form from some other principle; and we would be driven to recognize in the universal living Organism what occurs in man, in the horse, and in other animals; namely, that the man or horse (considered as species) lasts forever, while the individual changes. (According to this view, then) the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent part, the heaven, and another ceaselessly changing one, composed of terrestrial things. All these things will then be subject to the same condition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration, since celestial bodies are more durable. Such a conception of the perpetuity characteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity (than the popular notion), and would be freed from all doubt if we were to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the universe in this manner. The theory that the world contains something perpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration that the divine volition can produce such an effect, but also an explanation why certain things (according to that theory) are always identical (in form and individuality), while other things are identical only by their form. If the parts of the heaven alone remained identical (by their individuality), all other things also should logically remain (individually) identical.
2.1.2An admission that the heaven and the stars are perpetual in their individuality, while sublunary things are perpetual only in their form, would demand demonstration that a corporeal being can preserve its individuality as well as its form, even though the nature of bodies were a continual fluctuation. Such is the nature that the physical philosophers, and even Plato himself, attribute not only to sublunar bodies, but even to celestial ones. "For," asks (Plato), "how could corporeal and visible objects subsist ever immutable and identical with themselves?" (Plato) therefore admits the opinion of Heraclitus that "the sun itself is in a state of perpetual becoming (or, growth)." On the contrary, in the system of Aristotle, the immutability of the stars is easily explained, but only after accepting his theory of a fifth element (the quintessence). If, however, it be rejected, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven, let alone its parts, the sun and the stars, do not perish, while (as Aristotle does) we regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements as terrestrial animals. As every animal is composed of soul and body, the heaven must owe the permanence of its individuality to the nature either of its soul, or of its body; or again, to that of both. On the hypothesis that its incorruptibility is due to the nature of its body, the Soul's only function will be to animate it (by uniting with the body of the world). On the contrary hypothesis that the body, by nature corruptible, owes its incorruptibility exclusively to the Soul, there is need of demonstration that the state of the body does not naturally oppose this constitution and permanence (for, naturally constituted objects admit of no disharmony); but that, on the contrary, here matter, by its predisposition, contributes to the accomplishment of the divine volition.
2.1.3(It might however be objected) that the body of the world could not contribute to the immortality of the world, since the body itself fluctuates perpetually. But this fluctuation does not take place in an outward direction, while the body (of the world) remains ever the same because this fluctuation occurs so entirely within the world that nothing issues therefrom. The world therefore could neither increase nor diminish, nor further grow old. (As proof of this we may) consider how, from all eternity, the earth constantly preserves the same shape and mass; similarly, the air never diminishes, any more than the water. The changes within them do not affect the universal living Organism. Even we human beings subsist a long while, in spite of the perpetual change of our constituent parts, and though some of these parts even issue from the body. So much the more will the world's nature, from which nothing issues, sufficiently harmonize with the nature of the universal Soul to form along with her an organism which ever remains the same, and subsists for ever. For example, fire (as the principal element of the heaven), is both lively and swift, and cannot remain in the inferior regions, any more than the earth can abide in the superior regions. When it has reached these regions where it is to remain, it becomes established in the most suitable place. But even so, like all other bodies, it still seeks to extend in all directions. However, it cannot ascend, since there is no place higher than the one it occupies; nor can it descend, because of the opposition of its own nature. The only thing left for it to do is to yield to the guidance and natural impulsion of the life-imparting universal Soul, that is, to move into the most beautiful place, in the universal Soul. Its falling from here is prevented by the universal Soul's circular movement which dominates and supports it, as well as by its innate indisposition to descend, so that its continuance in the higher regions is unopposed. (The fire has no similarity with) the constitutive parts of our body which are forced to derive their suitable form from elsewhere. If unaided, they are not even capable of preserving their organization. Merely to subsist, they are forced to borrow parts from other objects. The case is entirely different with the fire of the heaven, which needs no food because it loses nothing. If indeed it allowed anything to escape, we might indeed be forced to state that when in the heaven a fire is extinguished, a substitute must be lit. But in such a case the universal living Organism would no more remain identical.
2.1.4Apart from the exigencies of our argument, it may be interesting to consider whether there be any wastage off from heaven, so as to create a need of being (replenished or) fed, so to speak; or whether all its contents, being once for all established, subsist there naturally, without allowing any of their substance to escape. In the latter case we would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed of fire exclusively or principally; and whether, while dominating the other elements, the fire engages them in its course. Were we to associate (with fire) the Soul, which is the most powerful of all causes, so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent (just as, in other animals, the soul chooses the best parts of the body as dwelling-place), we would have produced a solid argument for the immortality of the heaven. Aristotle indeed says that the flame surges, and that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity; but he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire, for the celestial fire is calm, immovable, and in harmony with the nature of the stars. A still more important reason for the immortality of the heaven is that the universal Soul, moving with remarkable spontaneity, immediately succeeds the most perfect principles (such as the Good, and Intelligence). She could not therefore allow the annihilation of anything which had once been posited within her. Ignorance of the cause that contains the universe could alone permit denial that the universal Soul which emanates from the divinity excels all other bonds in strength. It is absurd to believe that after having contained something during a certain period, she could ever cease doing so. This would imply that she had done so till now by some violence; which would again infer the existence of some plan more natural than the actual state, and actual admirable disposition of beings within the very constitution of the universe; which would lastly suggest a force capable of destroying the organization of the universe, and of undermining the sovereignty of the governing Soul. We have elsewhere shown that it would be absurd to suppose that the world ever had a beginning. This however implies that it will never cease to exist. Why indeed should it not continue to do so? Its component elements are not, like wood, and similar things, exposed to wastage. Their continued subsistence, however, implies that the universe that they form must also ever subsist. On the other hand, even if they were subject to a perpetual change, the universe must still subsist because the principle of this change subsists continually. Moreover, it has elsewhere been shown that the universal Soul is not subject to repentance, because she governs the universe without difficulties or fatigue, and that even in the impossible case that the body of the universe should happen to perish, she would not thereby be altered.
2.1.5The reason why celestial things endure beyond terrestrial animals and elements has been thus stated by Plato: "Divine animals were formed by the divinity Himself, while the animals here below were formed by the divinities, His offspring." What the divinity (Himself) does could not possibly perish. This implies the existence, below the demiurge (Intelligence), of the celestial Soul, with our souls. From the celestial Soul derives and flows an apparent-form-of-an-image, which forms terrestrial animals. This inferior soul imitates her intelligible principle (the celestial Soul), without, however, being able to resemble her completely--because she employs elements which are less good (than the celestial elements); because the place where she operates with them is less good (than heaven)--and because the materials that she organizes could not remain united. Consequently, terrestrial animals could not last for ever. For the same reason this soul does not dominate terrestrial bodies with as much power (as the celestial Soul dominates celestial things), because each of them is governed by another (human) soul. If we be right in attributing immortality to the heaven, we shall have to extend that conception to the stars it contains; for unless its parts endured, neither could the heaven. However, the things beneath the heaven do not form part of it. The region which constitutes the heaven does not extend further down than the moon. As to us, having our organs formed by the (vegetative) soul which was given us by the celestial divinities (the stars), and even the heaven itself, we are united to the body by that soul. Indeed, the other soul (the reasonable soul), which constitutes our person, our "me," is not the cause of our being, but of our well-being (which consists in our intellectual life). She comes to join our body when it is already formed (by the vegetative soul), and contributes to our being only by one part, by giving us reason (in making of us reasonable beings, and men).
2.1.6Is the heaven composed exclusively of fire? Does the fire allow any of its substance to flow off, or escape? Does it, therefore, need being fed? (Plato) thinks the body of the universe is composed of earth and fire; fire to explain its being visible, and earth to explain its being tangible. This would lead us to suppose that the stars are composed of fire not exclusively, but predominatingly, since they seem to possess a tangible element. This opinion is plausible because Plato supports it with reasonable grounds. Sense, sight and touch would lead us to believe that the greater part, if not the whole, of the heaven, is fire. But reason suggests that the heaven also contains earth, because without earth it could not be tangible. This however does not imply that it contains also air and water. It would seem absurd to think that water could subsist in so great a fire; nor could air survive therein without immediately being transformed to steam. It might be objected that two solids which play the parts of extremes in a proportion, cannot be united without two means. This objection, however, might have no cogency, for this mathematical relation might not apply to natural things, as indeed we are led to surmise by the possibility of mingling earth and water without any intermediary. To this it may be answered that earth and water already contain the other elements. Some persons might think that the latter could not effectually unite earth and water; but this would not disturb our contention that the earth and water are related because each of these two elements contains all the others. Besides, we shall have to examine whether the earth be invisible without fire, and the fire intangible without the earth. Were this the case, nothing would possess its own proper being. All things would be mixed; each would reclaim its name only by the element preponderating in it; for it has been claimed that the earth could not exist without the humidity of water, which alone keeps all its parts united. Even were this granted, it would, none the less, remain absurd to say that each of these elements is something, while claiming that it does not possess any characteristically individual constitution, except by its union with the other elements, which, nevertheless, would not, any the more, exist individually, each in itself. What reality, indeed, would inhere in the nature or being of the earth, if none of its parts were earth except because the water that operated as a bond? Besides, with what could water unite without the preliminary existence of an extension whose parts were to be bound together for the formation of a continuous whole? The existence of an extension, however small it be, will imply the self-existence of earth, without the assistance of water; otherwise, there would be nothing for water to bind together. Nor would the earth have any need of air, since the air exists before the observation of any change within it. Nor is fire any more necessary to the constitution of the earth; fire only serves in making it visible, like all other objects. It is indeed reasonable to assert that it is fire which renders objects visible, and it is a mistake to state that "one sees darkness," which cannot be seen any more than silence can be heard. Besides, there is no necessity for fire to be in earth; light suffices (to make it visible). Snow, and many other very cold substances are, without any fire, very brilliant--that is, unless we say that the fire approached them, and colored them before leaving them. As to the other elements, could not water exist without participating in the earth? Air could certainly not be said to participate in earth, because of its penetrability. It is very doubtful that the fire contains any earth, because it does not seem continuous, and does not, by itself, seem to be tri-dimensional. True, fire does seem to contain solidity, but not of a tri-dimensional kind; it seems rather to be a sort of resistance corporeal nature). Only of earth may hardness be predicated; indeed, gold, in liquid state, is dense; not because it is earth, but because it possesses density, and is solidified. It would therefore not be unreasonable that fire, apart by itself, could subsist by the power of the Soul which sustains it by her presence. The bodies of (certain among) the guardian spirits consist of fire. It is unlikely that the universal Organism is composed of universal elements. That terrestrial animals are thus composed is certain; but to introduce the terrestrial element into the composition of the heaven would be to admit something contrary to nature, and to the order thereby established. (Epicurus's opinion that) the stars carry terrestrial bodies along in their rapid flight is undemonstrable. Besides, the presence of the earth would be an obstacle to the shine and splendor of the celestial fire.
2.1.7Plato's view is to be accepted. The universe must contain something solid, impenetrable, so that the earth, when established in the middle of the universe, might offer a firm foundation for all the animals that walk on it, and that these animals might possess a certain solidity by the very fact of their terrestriality; so that the earth might, by itself, possess the property of continuousness; that it might be illuminated by fire, might also participate in water, so as not to be desiccated, and so that its parts might unite, and that the air might somewhat lighten its mass. The earth was mingled with the upper fire not to produce the stars, but because fire has something terrestrial, as earth has something igneous, as a result of all the bodies being contained within the body of the universe. In short, every one of the elements includes mixture of itself and of the other with which it participates. This results from the interrelating community existing within the universe (the "sympathy"). So each element, without combining with any other, borrows some of its properties. For example, water participates in the fluidity of the air, without however mingling therewith; so the earth does not possess the fire, but derives its brightness from it. On the other hand, a mixture would render all properties common to both elements, confounding them together, and would not limit itself to merely approximating earth and fire, that is, a certain solidity with a certain density. On this subject we can invoke the authority of (Plato), "The divinity lit this light in the second circle above the earth," thereby referring to the sun, which he elsewhere calls "the most brilliant star." By these words he hinders us from admitting that the sun is anything else than fire. He also indicates that fire has no quality other than light, which he considers as distinct from flame, and as possessing only a gentle heat. This light is a body. From it emanates another being that we, by verbal similarity, also call light, and which we acknowledge to be incorporeal. This second kind of light derives from the former, being its flower and brightness, and constitutes the essentially white (that is, brilliant) body (of lightning, or comets). (Unfortunately, however), the word "terrestrial" (which designates the element allied to the fire, as we have said above), we are wont to regard unfavorably because Plato makes the earth consist of solidity, while we speak of the earth as a unity, though (Plato) distinguishes several qualities within this element. The fire of which we speak above emits the purest light, and resides in the highest region, by virtue of its nature. These celestial flames are entirely distinct from the earthly flame, which after ascending to a certain height, and meeting a greater quantity of air, becomes extinguished. After ascending, it falls back on to the earth, because (as a comet) it cannot rise any further; it stops in the sublunar regions, though rendering the ambient air lighter. In those cases in which it continues to subsist in higher regions, it becomes weaker, gentler, and acquires a heatless glow, which is but a reflection of the celestial light. The latter, on the other hand, is divided partly among the stars in which it reveals great contrasts of magnitude and color, and partly in the atmosphere. Its invisibility to our eyes is caused both by its tenuity, and transparence, which causes it to become as tangible as pure air, and also because of its distance from the earth.
2.1.8Since this light subsists in elevated regions, because the purity of its nature forces it to remain in pure regions, it cannot be subject to any wastage (or, leakage). Such a nature could not allow any escape either downwards or upwards, nor could it meet anything that would force it to descend. Moreover, it will be remembered that there is a great difference of condition in a body united to, or separated from a soul; and in this case the body of the heaven is everywhere united to the (universal) Soul. Besides, all that approaches the heaven is either air or fire. What of it is air cannot affect the heaven. What of it is fire can neither influence the heaven, nor touch it, to act on it. Before acting on the heaven, it would have to assume its nature; besides, fire is less great or powerful than the heaven. Moreover, the action of fire consists in heating; whereas, 1, that which is to be heated cannot have been hot by itself; and as, 2, that which is to be dissolved by fire must first be heated, inasmuch as it is this heating which causes a change of nature. No other body is needed for either the subsistence of the heaven, or for the functioning of its natural revolutions. Moreover, the heaven does not move in a straight line, because it is in the nature of celestial things to remain immovable, or to move in a circular orbit, and not to assume any other kind of movement without compulsion by some superior force. Stars, therefore, stand in need of no feeding, and we should not judge them according to our own circumstances. Indeed, our (human) soul, which contains our bodies, is not identical with the Soul that contains the heaven; our soul does not reside in the same place, while the world-Soul does not, like our composite bodies lose (excreta). Not as our bodies do the stars need continual metabolic replacing food. From our conception of celestial bodies we should remove all ideas of a change that could modify their constitution. Terrestrial bodies are animated by an entirely different nature; which though because of its weakness is incapable of insuring them a durable existence, nevertheless imitates the superior nature (of the celestial Soul) by birth and generation. Elsewhere we have shown that even this very celestial Soul cannot partake of the perfect immutability of intelligible things.
2.2.1Why do the heavens move in a circle? Because they imitate Intelligence. But to what does this movement belong? To the Soul, or to the body? Does it occur because the Soul is within the celestial sphere, which tends to revolve about her? Is the Soul within this sphere without being touched thereby? Does she cause this sphere to move by her own motion? Perhaps the Soul which moves this sphere should not move it in the future, although she did so in the past; that is, the soul made it remain immovable, instead of ceaselessly imparting to it a circular movement. Perhaps the Soul herself might remain immovable; or, if she move at all, it will at least not be a local movement. How can the Soul impart to the heavens a local movement, herself possessing a different kind of motion? Perhaps the circular movement, when considered by itself, may not seem a local movement. If then it be a local movement only by accident, what is its own nature, by itself? It is the reflection upon itself, the movement of consciousness, of reflection, of life; it withdraws nothing from the world, it changes the location of nothing, while embracing all. Indeed, the power which governs the universal Animal (or world) embraces everything, and unifies everything. If then it remained immovable, it would not embrace everything either vitally or locally; it would not preserve the life of the interior parts of the body it possesses, because the bodily life implies movement. On the contrary, if it be a local movement, the Soul will possess a movement only such as it admits of. She will move, not only as soul, but as an animated body, and as an animal; her movement will partake both of the movement proper to the soul, and proper to the body. Now the movement proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight line; the movement proper to the Soul, is to contain; while both of these movements result in a third, the circular movement which includes both transportation and permanence. To the assertion that the circular movement is a corporeal movement, it might be objected that one can see that every body, even fire, moves in a straight line. However, the fire moves in a straight line only till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal order (it constitutes the heavens, which are its proper place). By virtue of this order its nature is permanent, and it moves towards its assigned location. Why then does the fire as soon as it has arrived there, not abide there quiescently? Because its very nature is constant movement; if it went in a straight line, it would dissipate; consequently, it necessarily possesses a circular motion. That is surely a providential arrangement. Providence placed fire within itself (because it constitutes the heavens, which are its location); so that, as soon as it finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously move in a circle. We might further say that, if the fire tended to move in a straight line, it must effect a return upon itself in the only place where it is possible (in the heavens), inasmuch as there is no place outside of the world where it could go. In fact there is no further place, beyond the celestial fire, for itself constitutes the last place in the universe; it therefore moves in a circle in the place at its disposal; it is its own place, but not to remain immovable, but to move. In a circle, the centre is naturally immovable; and were the circumference the same, it would be only an immense centre. It is therefore better that the fire should turn around the centre in this living and naturally organized body. Thus the fire will tend towards the centre, not in stopping, for it would lose its circular form, but in moving itself around it; thus only will it be able to satisfy its tendency (towards the universal Soul). However, if this power effect the movement of the body of the universe, it does not drag it like a burden, nor give it an impulsion contrary to its nature. For nature is constituted by nothing else than the order established by the universal Soul. Besides, as the whole Soul is everywhere, and is not divided into parts, it endows the sky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate, which can occur only by traversing all of it. If the Soul remained immovable in one place, she would remain immovable as soon as the heavens reached this place; but as the Soul is everywhere, they would seek to reach her everywhere. Can the heavens never reach the Soul? On the contrary, they reach her ceaselessly; for the Soul, in ceaselessly attracting them to herself, endues them with a continual motion by which she carries them, not towards some other place, but towards herself, and in the same place, not in a straight line, but in a circle, and thus permits them to possess her in all the places which she traverses. The heavens would be immovable if the Soul rested, that is, if she remained only in the intelligible world, where everything remains immovable. But because the Soul is in no one determinate place, and because the whole of her is everywhere, the heavens move through the whole of space; and as they cannot go out of themselves, they must move in a circle.
2.2.2How do the other beings move? As none of them is the whole, but only a part, consequently, each finds itself situated in a particular place. On the contrary, the heavens are the whole; they constitute the place which excludes nothing, because it is the universe. As to the law according to which men move, each of them, considered in his dependence towards the universe, is a part of all; considered in himself, he is a whole. Now, if the heavens possess the Soul, wherever they are, what urges them to move in a circle? Surely because the Soul is not exclusively in a determinate place (and the world does not exclusively in one place desire to possess her). Besides, if the power of the Soul revolve around the centre, it is once more evident that the heavens would move in a circle. Besides, when we speak of the Soul, we must not understand the term "centre" in the same sense as when it is used of the body. For the Soul, the centre is the focus of (the intelligence) whence radiates a second life (that is, the Soul); as to the body, it is a locality (the centre of the world). Since, however, both soul and body need a centre, we are forced to use this word in an analogous meaning which may suit both of them. Speaking strictly, however, a centre can exist only for a spherical body, and the analogy consists in this, that the latter, like the Soul, effects a reflection upon itself. In this case, the Soul moves around the divinity, embraces Him, and clings to Him with all her might; for everything depends from Him. But, as she cannot unite herself to Him, she moves around Him. Why do not all souls act like the universal Soul? They do act like her, but do so only in the place where they are. Why do our bodies not move in a circle, like the heavens? Because they include an element whose natural motion is rectilinear; because they trend towards other objects, because the spherical element in us can no longer easily move in a circle, because it has become terrestrial, while in the celestial region is was light and movable enough. How indeed could it remain at rest, while the Soul was in motion, whatever this movement was? This spirit(ual body) which, within us, is spread around the soul, does the same thing as do the heavens. Indeed, if the divinity be in everything, the Soul, which desires to unite herself to Him, must move around Him, since He resides in no determinate place. Consequently, Plato attributes to the stars, besides the revolution which they perform in common with the universe, a particular movement of rotation around their own centre. Indeed, every star, in whatever place it may be, is transported with joy while embracing the divinity; and this occurs not by reason, but by a natural necessity.
2.2.3One more subject remains to be considered. The lowest power of the universal Soul (the inferior soul), rests on the earth, and thence radiates abroad throughout the universe. The (higher, or celestial) power (of the world-Soul) which, by nature, possesses sensation, opinion, and reasoning, resides in the celestial spheres, whence it dominates the inferior power, and communicates life to it. It thereby moves the inferior power, embracing it in a circle; and it presides over the universe as it returns (from the earth) to the celestial spheres. The inferior power, being circularly embraced by the superior power, reflects upon itself, and thus operates on itself a conversion by which it imparts a movement of rotation to the body within which it reacts. (This is how motion starts) in a sphere that is at rest: as soon as a part moves, the movement spreads to the rest of it, and the sphere begins to revolve. Not otherwise is our body; when our soul begins to move, as in joy, or in the expectation of welfare, although this movement be of a kind very different from that natural to a body, this soul-movement produces local motion in the body. Likewise the universal Soul, on high, while approaching the Good, and becoming more sensitive (to its proximity), thereby impresses the body with the motion proper to it, namely, the local movement. (Our own human) sense-(faculty), while receiving its good from above, and while enjoying the pleasures proper to its nature, pursues the Good, and, inasmuch as the Good is everywhere present, it is borne everywhere. The intelligence is moved likewise; it is simultaneously at rest and in motion, reflecting upon itself. Similarly the universe moves in a circle, though simultaneously standing still.
2.3.1It has been said that the course of the stars indicates what is to happen to each being; though, it does not, as many persons think, cause every event. To the supporting proofs hereof we are to add now more precise demonstrations, and new considerations, for the opinion held about this matter is no trifle. Some people hold that, by their movements, the planets produce not only poverty and wealth, health and sickness, but even beauty and ugliness; and, what is more, vices and virtues. At every moment the stars, as if they were irritated against men, (are said to) force them to commit actions concerning which no blame attaches to the men who commit them, since they are compelled thereto by the influence of the planets. It is even believed that the cause of the planets' doing us evil or good is not that they love or hate us; but that their dispositions towards us is good or evil according to the localities through which they travel. Towards us they change their disposition according as they are on the cardinal points or in declination therefrom. It is even held that while certain stars are maleficent, others are beneficent, and that, nevertheless, the former frequently grant us benefits, while the latter often become harmful. Their effects differ according to their being in opposition, just as if they were not self-sufficient, and as if their quality depended on whether or not they looked at each other. Thus a star's (influence) may be good so long as it regards another, and evil when it does so no longer. A star may even consider another in different manners, when it is in such or such an aspect. Moreover, the totality of the stars exercises a mingled influence which differs from the individual influences, just as several liquors may form a compound possessing qualities differing from either of the component elements. As these and similar assertions are freely made, it becomes important to examine each one separately. This would form a proper beginning for our investigation.
2.3.2Should we consider the stars to be animated, or not? If they be inanimate, they will be able to communicate only cold and heat; that is, if we grant the existence of cold influences. In this case, they will limit themselves to modifying the nature of our body, exercising on us a merely corporeal influence. They will not produce a great diversity among the bodies, since each of them exercises the same influence, and since, on the earth, their diverse actions are blended into a single one, which varies only by the diversity of locality, or by the proximity or distance of the objects. The same argument would hold on the hypothesis that the stars spread cold. But I could not understand how they could render some learned, others ignorant, making of some grammarians, others orators, musicians or experts in various arts. How could they exercise an action which would have no relation to the constitution of the bodies, such as giving us a father, a brother, a son, or a wife of such or such characteristics, or to make us successful, or make of us generals or kings? On the contrary hypothesis, that the stars are animated, and act with reflection, what have we done to them that they should desire to harm us? Are they not dwellers of a divine region? Are they not themselves divine? Nor are they subjected to the influences that make men good or evil, nor could they experience good or evil as a result of our prosperity or our misfortunes.
2.3.3In case, however, that the stars injure us only involuntarily, they are constrained thereunto by the aspects, and their localities. If so, they should, all of them, produce the same effects when they find themselves in the same localities or aspects. But what difference can occur in a planet according to its location in the zodiac? What does the zodiac itself experience? In fact, the planets are not located in the zodiac itself, but above or below it, at great distances. Besides, in whatever location they are, they all are ever in the heaven. Now it would be ridiculous to pretend that their effects differed according to their location in the heaven, and that they have an action differing according as they rise, culminate, or decline. It would be incredible that such a planet would feel joy when it culminates, sadness or feebleness when declining, anger at the rising of some other planet, or satisfaction at the latter's setting. Can a star be better when it declines? Now a star culminates for some simultaneously with its declination for others; and it could not at the same time experience joy and sadness, anger and benevolence. It is sheer absurdity to assert that a star feels joy at its rising, while another feels the same at its setting; for this would really mean that the stars felt simultaneous joy and sadness. Besides, why should their sadness injure us? Nor can we admit that they are in turn joyous and sad, for they ever remain tranquil, content with the goods they enjoy, and the objects of their contemplation. Each of them lives for itself, finding its welfare in its own activity, without entering into relations with us. As they have no dealing with us, the stars exert their influence on us only incidentally, not as their chief purpose; rather, they bear no relation whatever to us; they announce the future only by coincidence, as birds announce it to the augurs.
2.3.4Nor is it any more reasonable to assert that the aspect of one planet makes one joyous, or the other sad. What animosity could obtain betwixt the stars? What could be its reason? Why should their condition be different when they are in trine aspect, or in opposition, or in quadrature? What reason have we to suppose that one star regards the other when it is in some particular aspect to it, or that it no more regards it when it is in the next zodiacal sign, though thus really closer to it? Besides, what is the manner in which the planets exert the influence attributed to them? How does each exercise its own particular influence? How do they all, in combination, exert an influence that differs from this (particular influence)? In fact, they do not hold deliberations to carry out their decisions on us, each of them yielding a little of its individual influence. The one does not violently hinder the action of the other, nor does it condescendingly make concessions to it. To say that the one is joyous when it is in the "house" of the other, and that the latter is sad when it is in "house" of the former, amounts to saying that two men are united by mutual friendship, though the former love the latter, while the latter hate the former.
2.3.5The cold planet (Saturn) is said to be more beneficent for us when it is distant, because the evil that it produces on us is said to consist of its cold effluence; in which case our good should consist in the zodiacal signs opposite to us. It is also asserted that when the cold planet (Saturn) is in opposition to the warm planet (Mars), both become harmful; yet it would seem that their influences should neutralize each other. Besides, it is held that (Saturn) likes the day, whose heat renders it favorable to men, while (Mars) likes the night, because it is fiery, as if in heaven there did not reign a perpetual day, that is, a continual light; or as if a star could be plunged into the shadow (projected by the earth) when it is very distant from the earth. It is said that the moon, in conjunction with (Saturn) is favorable when full, but harmful when otherwise. The opposite, however, ought to be the truth if the moon possess any influence. In fact, when it presents a full face, it presents its dark face to the planet above it (Saturn or Mars); when its disk decreases on our side, it increases on the other; therefore, it ought to exert a contrary influence when it decreases on our side, and when it increases on the side of the planet above it. These phases are of no importance for the moon, inasmuch as one of its sides is always lit. Nothing can result from it but for the planet which receives heat from it (Saturn); now this one will be heated whenever the moon turns towards us its dark side. Therefore, the moon is good for this planet when it is full towards it, but dark towards us. Besides, this obscurity of the moon for us can be of importance only for terrestrial things, not for the celestial ... (?) ... but if, because of its distance, it does not support the moon, then it must be in a worse predicament; when the moon is full, it is sufficient for terrestrial things, even when the moon is distant.... Finally, when the moon presents its obscure side to the fiery planet (Mars), it seems beneficent towards us; for the power of this planet, more fiery than (Saturn), is then sufficient by itself. Besides, the bodies of the animated beings which move in the heaven may be of different degrees of heat; none of them is cold, as is witnessed to by their location. The planet named Jupiter is a suitable mixture of fire; likewise with Venus. That is why they seem to move harmoniously. As to the fiery planet Mars, it contributes its share to the mixture (of the general action of the stars). As to Saturn, its case is different, because of its distance. Mercury is indifferent, because it assimilates itself easily to all. All these planets contribute to the Whole. Their mutual relation, therefore, is one suitable to the universe, just as the organs of an animal are shaped to take part in the organism they constitute. Take, for instance, a part of the body, such as the bile, which serves both the whole animal that contains it, and its special organ, inasmuch as it was necessary to arouse courage, and to oppose the injury of both the whole body, and its special organ. There had to be something similar (to bile) in the universe; that something sweet should soften it, that there be parts that would play the role of eyes, and that all things should possess mutual sympathy by their irrational life. Thus only is the universe one, and thus only is it constituted by a single harmony. How then could it be denied that all these things might be signs, resulting from the laws of analogy?
2.3.6Is it not unreasonable to assert that Mars, or Venus, in a certain position, should produce adulteries? Such a statement attributes to them incontinence such as occurs only among man, and human passion to satisfy unworthy impulses. Or again, how could we believe that the aspects of planets is favorable when they regard each other in a certain manner? How can we avoid believing that their nature is determinate? What sort of an existence would be led by the planets if they occupied themselves with each single one of the innumerable ever-arising and passing beings, giving them each glory, wealth, poverty, or incontinence, and impelling all their actions? How could the single planets effect so many simultaneous results? Nor is it any more rational to suppose that the planets' actions await the ascensions of the signs, nor to say that the ascension of a sign contains as many years as there are degrees of ascension in it. Absurd also is the theory that the planets calculate, as it were on their fingers, the period of time when they are to accomplish something, which before was forbidden. Besides, it is an error not to trace to a single principle the government of the universe, attributing everything to the stars, as if there were not a single Chief from which depends the universe, and who distributes to every being a part and functions suitable to its nature. To fail to recognize Him, is to destroy the order of which we form a part, it is to ignore the nature of the world, which presupposes a primary cause, a principle by whose activity everything is interpenetrated.
2.3.7In fact, we would still have to ask ourselves for the cause of the events (in our world) even if the stars, like many other things, really prognosticated future events. We would still have to wonder at the maintenance of the order without which no events could be prefigured. We might, therefore, liken the stars to letters, at every moment flung along the heavens, and which, after having been displayed, continued in ceaseless motion, so that, while exercising another function in the universe, they would still possess significance. Thus in a being animated by a single principle it is possible to judge one part by another; as it is possible, by the study of the eyes or some other organ of an individual, to conclude as to his characters, to the dangers to which he is exposed, and how he may escape them. Just as our members are parts of our bodies, so are we ourselves parts of the universe. Things, therefore, are made for each other. Everything is significant, and the wise man can conclude from one thing to another. Indeed many habitual occurrences are foreseen by men generally. In the universe everything is reduced to a single system. To this co-ordination is due the possibility of birds furnishing us with omens, and other animals furnishing us with presages. All things mutually depend from each other. Everything conspires to a single purpose, not only in each individual, whose parts are perfectly related; but also in the universe, and that in a higher degree, and far earlier. This multiple being could be turned into a single universal Living organism only by a single principle. As in the human body every organ has its individual function, likewise in the universe each being plays its individual part; so much the more that they not only form part of the universe, but that they themselves also form universes not without importance. All things, therefore, proceed from a single principle, each plays its individual part, and lends each other mutual assistance. Neither are they separate from the universe, but they act and react on each other, each assisting or hindering the other. But their progress is not fortuitous, nor is it the result of chance. They form a series, where each, by a natural bond, is the effect of the preceding one, and the cause of the following one.
2.3.8When the soul applies herself to carry out her proper function--for the soul effects everything, as far as she plays the part of a principle--she follows the straight road; when she loses her way the divine justice subjugates her to the physical order which reigns in the universe, unless the soul succeed in liberating herself. The divine justice reigns ever, because the universe is directed by the order and power of the dominating principle (the universal Soul). To this is joined the co-operation of the planets which are important parts of the heaven, either by embellishing it, or by serving as signs. Now they serve as signs for all things that occur in the sense-world. As to their potency, they should be credited only with what they effect indisputably. As to us, we fill the functions of the soul in accordance with nature when we do not stray into the multiplicity contained in the universe. When we do stray therein, we are punished for it both by the straying itself, and by a less happy fate thereafter. Wealth and poverty, therefore, happen to us as effects of the operation of exterior things. As to the virtues and vices, virtues are derived from the primitive nature of the soul, while the vices result from dealings of the soul with exterior things. But this has been treated of elsewhere.
2.3.9This brings us to a consideration of the spindle, which, according to the ancients, is turned by the Fates, and by which Plato signifies that which, in the evolution of the world, moves, and that which is immovable. According to (Plato), it is the Fates, and their mother Necessity, which turn this spindle, and which impress it with a rotary motion in the generation of each being. It is by this motion that begotten beings arrive at generation. In the Timaeus the (Intelligence, or) divinity which has created the universe gives the (immortal) principle of the soul, (the reasonable soul), and the deities which revolve in the heaven add (to the immortal principle of the soul) the violent passions which subject us to Necessity, namely, angers, desires, sufferings, and pleasures; in short, they furnish us with that other kind of soul (the animal nature, or vegetable soul) from which they derive these passions. Plato thus seems to subject us to the stars, by hinting that we receive from them our souls, subordinating to the sway of Necessity when we descend here below, both ourselves and our morals, and through these, the "actions" and "passions" which are derived from the passional habit of the soul (the animal nature). Our genuine selves are what is essentially "us"; we are the principle to which Nature has given the power to triumph over the passions. For, if we be surrounded by evils because of the body, nevertheless, the divinity has given us virtue, which "knows of no master" (is not subject to any compulsion). Indeed we need virtue not so much when we are in a calm state, but when its absence exposes us to evils. We must, therefore, flee from here below; we must divorce ourselves from the body added to us in generation, and apply ourselves to the effort to cease being this animal, this composite in which the predominant element is the nature of the body, a nature which is only a trace of the soul, and which causes animal life to pertain chiefly to the body. Indeed, all that relates to this life is corporeal. The other soul (the reasonable soul, which is superior to the vegetative soul), is not in the body; she rises to the beautiful, to the divine, and to all the intelligible things, which depend on nothing else. She then seeks to identify herself with them, and lives conformably to the divinity when retired within herself (in contemplation). Whoever is deprived of this soul (that is, whoever does not exercise the faculties of the reasonable soul), lives in subjection to fatality. Then the actions of such a being are not only indicated by the stars, but he himself becomes a part of the world, and he depends on the world of which he forms a part. Every man is double, for every man contains both the composite (organism), and the real man (which constitutes the reasonable soul). Likewise the universe is a compound of a body and of a Soul intimately united to it, and of the universal Soul, which is not in the Body, and which irradiates the Soul united to the Body. There is a similar doubleness in the sun and the other stars, (having a soul united to their body, and a soul independent thereof). They do nothing that is shameful for the pure soul. The things they produce are parts of the universe, inasmuch as they themselves are parts of the universe, and inasmuch as they have a body, and a soul united to this body; but their will and their real soul apply themselves to the contemplation of the good Principle. It is from this Principle, or rather from that which surrounds it, that other things depend, just as the fire radiates its heat in all directions, and as the superior Soul (of the universe) infuses somewhat of her potency into the lower connected soul. The evil things here below originate in the mixture inhering in the nature of this world. After separating the universal Soul out of the universe, the remainder would be worthless. Therefore, the universe is a deity if the Soul that is separable from it be included within its substance. The remainder constitutes the guardian which (Plato) names the Great Guardian, and which, besides, possesses all the passions proper to guardians.
2.3.10Under these circumstances, we must acknowledge that events are, by the stars, announced, though not produced, not even by their (lower) corporeal soul. By their lower part, their body, they produce only the things which are passions of the universe. Besides, we shall have to acknowledge, that the soul, even before entering into generation, while descending here below, brings something which she has by herself; for she would not enter into a body unless she had a great disposition to suffer. We must also admit that while passing into a body the soul is exposed to accidents, inasmuch as she is subjected to the course of the universe, and as this very course contributes to the production of what the universe is to accomplish; for the things which are comprised in the course of the universe act as its parts.
2.3.11We must also reflect that the impressions which we derive from the stars do not reach us in the same condition in which they leave them. Just as fire in us is much degenerated from that in the heaven, so sympathy, degenerating within the receiving person, begets an unworthy affection. Courage produces in those who do not possess it in the proper proportions, either violence or cowardliness. Love of the beautiful and good thus becomes the search for what only appears so. Discernment, in undergoing this degradation, becomes the trickiness which seeks to equal it, without succeeding in doing so. Thus all these qualities become evil in us, without being such in the stars. All the impressions we receive thereof are in us not such as they are in the stars; besides they are still further degraded by mingling with the bodies, with matter, and with each other.
2.3.12The influences proceeding from the stars commingle; and this mixture modifies all generated things, determining their nature and qualities. It is not the celestial influence which produces the horse, it is limited to exercising an influence upon him; for, the horse is begotten from horse, man from man; the sun can only contribute to their formation. Man is born from the (seminal logos), or reason of man; but the circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable to him. In fact, a son resembles the father, though he may be formed better or worse; but never does he entirely detach himself from matter. Sometimes, however, the matter so prevails over nature that the being is imperfect because the form does not dominate.
2.3.13We must now distinguish, decide and express the origin of various things, inasmuch as there are some things that are produced by the course of the stars, and others that are not. Our principle is that the Soul governs the universe by Reason, just as each animal is governed by the principle (the reason) which fashions his organs, and harmonizes them with the whole of which they are parts; now the All contains everything, while the parts contain only what is individual to them. As to exterior influences, some assist, while others oppose the tendency of nature. All things are subordinated to the All because they are parts of it; by their co-operation, each with its own nature and their particular tendencies they form the total life of the universe. The inanimate beings serve as instruments for the others that set them in motion by a mechanical impulse. Irrational animated beings move indeterminately; such as horses attached to a chariot before the driver indicates which direction they are to follow; for they need the whip to be directed. The nature of the reasonable animal contains the directing driver; if the driver be skilful, it follows the straight road, instead of going blindly at chance, as often happens. Beings gifted with reason and those that lack it are both contained within the universe, and contribute to the formation of the whole. Those which are more powerful, and which occupy a more elevated rank do many important things, and co-operate in the life of the universe where their part is active, rather than passive. The passive ones act but little. Those of intermediary rank are passive in regard to some, and often active in regard to others, because they themselves possess the power of action and production (the stars, the brutes, and men.). The universe leads an universal and perfect life, because the good principles (the star-Souls) produce excellency, that is, the more excellent part in every object. These principles are subordinate to the Soul that governs the universe, as soldiers are to their general; consequently, (Plato) describes this by the figure of the attendants of Jupiter (the universal Soul) advancing to the contemplation of the intelligible world. The beings which possess a nature inferior to the star-Souls, that is, men, occupy the second rank in the universe, and play in it the same part played in us by the second power of the soul (the discursive reason). The other beings, that is, the animals, occupy about the same rank occupied in us by the lowest (or vegetative) power of the soul; for all these powers in us are not of equal rank. Consequently, all the beings which are in the heaven, or which are distributed in the universe are animated beings, and derive their life from the total Reason of the universe (because it contains the "seminal reasons" of all living beings). None of the parts of the universe, whatever be its greatness, possesses the power of altering the reasons, nor the beings engendered with the co-operation of these reasons. It may improve or degrade these beings, but cannot deprive them of their individual nature. It degrades them by injuring either their body or their soul; which occurs when an accident becomes a cause of vice for the soul which partakes of the passions of the body (the sensitive and vegetative soul) and which is given over to the inferior principle (to the animal) by the superior principle (the reasonable soul); or when the body, by its poor organization, hinders the actions in which the soul needs its co-operation; then it resembles a badly attuned lyre, which is incapable of producing sounds which could form a perfect harmony.
2.3.14Poverty, wealth, glory, and authoritative positions may have many different causes. If a man derive his wealth from his parents, the stars have only announced that he would be rich; and they would have only announced his nobility if he owed his wealth to his birth. If a man acquire wealth by his merit, in some way in which his body contributed thereto, the causes of his bodily vigor co-operated in his fortune; first his parents, then his fatherland, if it be possessed of a good climate, and last the fertility of the soil. If this man owe his wealth to virtue, this source should be considered exclusive; and likewise with the transitory advantages he may by divine favor possess. Even if his wealth be derived from virtuous persons, still, in another way, his fortune is due to virtue. If his wealth were derived from evil men, though by a just means, yet the wealth proceeds from a good principle which was active in them. Finally, if a man who has amassed wealth be evil, the cause of his fortune is this very wickedness, and the principle from which it derives; even those who may have given him money must be included in the order of its causes. If a man owe his wealth to labor, such as agricultural work, the causes of the wealth include the care of the ploughman and the co-operation of exterior circumstances. Even if he found a treasure, it is something in the universe which contributed thereto. Besides, this discovery may have been foretold; for all things concatenate with everything else, and, consequently, announce each other. If a man scatter his wealth, he is the cause of their loss; if his wealth be taken from him, the cause is the man who takes it. Many are the contributory causes of a shipwreck. Glory may be acquired justly or unjustly. Just glory is due to services rendered, or to the esteem of other people. Unjust glory is caused by the injustice of those who glorify that man. Deserved power is due to the good sense of the electors, or to the activity of the man who acquired it by the co-operation of his friends, or to any other circumstance. A marriage is determined by a preference, or by some accidental circumstance, or by the co-operation of several circumstances. The procreation of children is one of its consequences; it occurs in accordance with the ("seminal) reason," in case it meet no obstacle; if it be defective, there must be some interior defect in the pregnant mother, or the fault lies in the impotence of the father.
2.3.15Plato speaks of the lots, and conditions chosen by one turn of the spindle (of Clotho); he speaks also of a guardian who helps each man to fulfil his destiny. These conditions are the disposition of the universe at the time of the soul's entrance into the body, the nature of their body, parents and fatherland; in short, the aggregate of external circumstances. Evidently all these things, in detail as well as in totality, are simultaneously produced and related by one of the Fates, namely Clotho. Lachesis then presents the conditions to the souls. Finally Atropos renders the accomplishment of all the circumstances of each destiny irrevocable. Some men, fascinated by the universe and exterior objects, completely or partially abdicate their freedom. Others, dominating their environment, raise their head to the sky, and freeing themselves from exterior circumstances, release that better part of their souls which forms their primitive being. As to the latter point, it would be wrong to think that the nature of the soul was determined by the passions aroused in her by external objects, and that she did not possess her own individual nature. On the contrary, as she plays the part of a principle, she possesses, much more than other things, faculties suitable to accomplish actions suitable to her nature. Since she is a being, the soul necessarily possesses appetites, active faculties, and the power of living well. The aggregate (of the soul and body, the organism) depends on the nature which formed it, and from it receives its qualities and actions. If the soul separate from the body, she produces actions which are suitable to her nature, and which do not depend from the body; she does not appropriate the credit for the passions of the body, because she recognizes the difference of her nature.
2.3.16What is the mingled, and what is the pure part of the soul? What part of the soul is separable? What part is not separable so long as the soul is in a body? What is the animal? This subject will have to be studied elsewhere, for there is practically no agreement on the subject. For the present, let us explain in which sense we above said that the soul governs the universe by Reason. Does the universal Soul form all the beings successively, first man, then the horse, then some other animal, and last the wild beasts? Does she begin by producing earth and fire; then, seeing the co-operation of all these things which mutually destroy or assist each other, does she consider only their totality and their connections, without regarding the accidents which occur to them later? Does she limit herself to the reproduction of preceding generations of animals, and does she leave these exposed to the passions with which they inspire each other? Does the "reason" of each individual contain both his "actions" and "reactions" in a way such that these are neither accidental nor fortuitous, but necessary? Are these produced by the reasons? Or do the reasons know them, without producing them? Or does the soul, which contains the generative "reasons," know the effects of all her works by reasoning according to the following principle, that the concourse of the same circumstances must evidently produce the same effects? If so, the soul, understanding or foreseeing the effects of her works, by them determines and concatenates all the events that are to happen. She, therefore, considers all the antecedents and consequents, and foresees what is to follow from what precedes. It is (because the beings thus proceed from each other) that the races continually degenerate. For instance, men degenerate because in departing continually and unavoidably (from the primitive type) the ("seminal) reasons" yield to the "passions" of matter. Is the soul the cause of these passions, because she begets the beings that produce them? Does the soul then consider the whole sequence of events, and does she pass her existence watching the "passions" experienced by her works? Does she never cease thinking of the latter, does she never put on them the finishing touch, regulating them so that they should always go well? Does she resemble some farmer who, instead of limiting himself to sowing and planting, should ceaselessly labor to repair the damage caused by the rains, the winds, and the storms? Unless this hypothesis be absurd, it must be admitted that the soul knows in advance, or even that the ("seminal) reasons" contain accidents which happen to begotten beings, that is, their destruction and all the effects of their faults. In this case, we are obliged to say that the faults are derived from the ("seminal) reasons", although the arts and their reasons contain neither error, fault, nor destruction of a work of art. It might here be objected that there could not be in the universe anything bad or contrary to nature; and it must be acknowledged that even what seems less good still has its utility. If this seem to admit that things that are less good contribute to the perfection of the universe, and that there is no necessity that all things be beautiful, it is only because the very contraries contribute to the perfection of the universe, and so the world could not exist without them. It is likewise with all living beings. The ("seminal) reason" necessarily produces and forms what is better; what is less good is contained in the "potentiality" of the "reasons," and "actualized" in the begotten beings. The (universal) Soul has, therefore, no need to busy herself therewith, nor to cause the "reasons" to become active. For the "reasons" successfully subdue matter to what is better (the forms), even though matter alters what it receives by imparting a shock to the "reasons" that proceed from the higher principles. All things, therefore, form a harmonious totality because they simultaneously proceed from matter, and the "reasons" which beget them.
2.3.17Let us examine if the "reasons" contained in the Soul are thoughts. How could the Soul produce by thoughts? It is the Reason which produces in matter; but the principle that produces naturally is neither a thought nor an intuition, but a power that fashions matter unconsciously, just as a circle gives water a circular figure and impression. Indeed, the natural generative power has the function of production; but it needs the co-operation of the governing (principle) of the Soul, which forms and which causes the activity of the generative soul engaged in matter. If the governing power of the Soul form the generative soul by reasoning, it will be considering either another object, or what it possesses in herself. If the latter be the case, she has no need of reasoning, for it is not by reasoning that the Soul fashions matter, but by the power which contains the reasons, the power which alone is effective, and capable of production. The Soul, therefore, produces by the forms. The forms she transmits are by her received from the Intelligence. This Intelligence, however, gives the forms to the universal Soul which is located immediately below her, and the universal Soul transmits them to the inferior soul (the natural generative power), fashioning and illuminating her. The inferior soul then produces, at one time without meeting any obstacles, at others, when doing so, although, in the latter case, she produces things less perfect. As she has received the power of production, and as she contains the reasons which are not the first (the "seminal reasons," which are inferior to the Ideas) not only does she, by virtue of what she has received, produce, but she also draws from herself something which is evidently inferior (matter). It doubtless produces a living being (the universe), but a living being which is less perfect, and which enjoys life much less, because it occupies the last rank, because it is coarse and hard to manage, because the matter which composes it is, as it were, the bitterness or the superior principles, because it spreads its bitterness around her, and communicates some of it to the universe.
2.3.18Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary, because they are the consequences of the superior principles? Yes, for without them the universe would be imperfect. The greater number of evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as the venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility. Even wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many beautiful things; for example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces men to prudence, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent security. Under these circumstances, it is plain that the universal Soul ever contemplates the better principles, because it is turned towards the intelligible world, and towards the divinity. As she fills herself with God, and is filled with God, she, as it were, overflows over her image, namely, the power which holds the last rank (the natural generative power), and which, consequently, is the last creative power. Above this creative power is the power of the Soul which immediately receives the forms from the Intelligence. Above all is the Intelligence, the Demiurge, who gives the forms to the universal Soul, and the latter impresses its traces on the third-rank power (the natural generative power). This world, therefore, is veritably a picture which perpetually pictures itself. The two first principles are immovable; the third is also immovable (in essence); but it is engaged in matter, and becomes immovable (only) by accident. As long as the Intelligence and the Soul subsist, the "reasons" flow down into this image of the Soul (the natural generative power); likewise, so long as the sun subsists, all light emanates therefrom.
2.4.1Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying nature, as thought Aristotle, and a residence for forms. Thus much is agreed upon by all authors who have studied matter, and who have succeeded in forming a clear idea of this kind of nature; but further than this, there is no agreement. Opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature (as thought Aristotle), as to its receptivity, and to what it is receptive. (The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories to four, substrate, quality-mode and relation), who admit the existence of nothing else than bodies, acknowledge no existence other than that contained by bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of matter, which serves as substrate to the elements, and that it constitutes "being"; that all other things are only affections ("passions") of matter, or modified matter: as are the elements. The teachers of this doctrine do not hesitate to introduce this matter into the (very nature of the) divinities, so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified matter. Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a "quantityless body," still attributing to it magnitude. Others (Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians) insist that matter is incorporeal. Some even distinguish two kinds of matter, first, the (Stoic) substrate of bodies, mentioned above; the other matter being of a superior nature, the substrate of forms and incorporeal beings.
2.4.2Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter exists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter be something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect (intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or shapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any need of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes something composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make one thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to the conception of matter (as thought Aristotle). It may however be objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence could it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings), and remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some principle; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be contingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter, their union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities) will be corporeal.
2.4.3To this it may first be answered that the indeterminate should not be scorned everywhere, nor that which is conceived of as shapeless, even if this be the substrate of the higher and better entities; for we might call even the soul indeterminate, in respect to intelligence and reason, which give it a better shape and nature. Besides, when we say that intelligible things are composite (of matter and form), this is not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies. Even reasons would thus be called composite, and by their actualization form another alleged composite, nature, which aspires to form. If, in the intelligible world, the composite tend toward some other principle, or depend thereon, the difference between this composite and bodies is still better marked. Besides, the matter of begotten things ceaselessly changes form, while the matter of the intelligible entities ever remains identical. Further, matter here below is subject to other conditions (than in the intelligible world). Here below, indeed, matter is all things only partly, and is all things only successively; consequently, amidst these perpetual changes nothing is identical, nothing is permanent. Above, on the contrary, matter is all things simultaneously, and possessing all things, could not transform itself. Consequently, matter is never shapeless above; for it is not even shapeless here below. Only the one (intelligible matter) is situated differently from the other (sense-matter). Whether, however, (intelligible matter) be begotten, or be eternal, is a question that cannot be determined until we know what it is.
2.4.4Granting now the existence of ideas, whose reality has been demonstrated elsewhere, we must draw their legitimate consequences. Necessarily ideas have something in common, inasmuch as they are manifold; and since they differ from each other, they must also have something individual. Now the individuality of any idea, the difference that distinguishes it from any other, consists of its particular shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate, that might be determined by the difference. There is therefore always a matter that receives form, and there is always a substrate (even in ideas, whose matter is genus, and whose form is its difference). Besides, our world is an image of the intelligible world. Now as our world is a composite of matter (and form), there must be matter also on high (that is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could we call the intelligible world "kosmos" (that is, either world, or adornment), unless we see matter (receiving) form therein? How could we find form there, without (a residence) that should receive it? That world is indivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but in a relative sense, is it divisible? Now if its parts be distinct from each other, their division or distinction is a passive modification of matter; for what can be divided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals constitute an indivisible being, this multitude, which resides in a single being, has this single being as substrate, that is, as matter and is its shapes. This single, yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless, before conceiving of itself as varied. If then by thought you abstract from it variety, forms, reasons, and intelligible characteristics, that which is prior is indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain in this (subject) none of the things that are in it and with it.
2.4.5If, we were to conclude that there were no matter in intelligible entities, because they were immutable, and because, in them, matter is always combined with (shape), we would be logically compelled to deny the existence of matter in bodies; for the matter of bodies always has a form, and every body is always complete (containing a form and a matter). Each body, however, is none the less composite, and intelligence observes its doubleness; for it splits until it arrives to simplicity, namely, to that which can no longer be decomposed; it does not stop until it reaches the bottom things. Now the bottom of each thing is matter. Every matter is dark, because the reason (the form) is the light, and because intelligence is the reason. When, in an object, intelligence considers the reason, it considers as dark that which is below reason, or light. Likewise, the eye, being luminous, and directing its gaze on light and on the colors which are kinds of light, considers what is beneath, and hidden by the colors, as dark and material. Besides, there is a great difference between the dark bottom of intelligible things and that of sense-objects; there is as much difference between the matter of the former and of the latter as there is between their form. The divine matter, on receiving the form that determines it, possesses an intellectual and determinate life. On the contrary, even when the matter of the bodies becomes something determinate, it is neither alive nor thinking; it is dead, in spite of its borrowed beauty. As the shape (of sense-objects) is only an image, their substrate also is only an image. But as the shape (of intelligible entities) possesses veritable (reality), their substrate is of the same nature. We have, therefore, full justification for calling matter "being," that is, when referring to intelligible matter; for the substrate of intelligible entities really is "being," especially if conceived of together with its inherent (form). For "being" is the luminous totality (or complex of matter and form). To question the eternity of intelligible matter is tantamount to questioning that of ideas; indeed, intelligible entities are begotten in the sense that they have a principle; but they are non-begotten in the sense that their existence had no beginning, and that, from all eternity, they derive their existence from their principle. Therefore they do not resemble the things that are always becoming, as our world; but, like the intelligible world, they ever exist. The difference that is in the intelligible world ever produces matter; for, in that world, it is the difference that is the principle of matter, as well as of primary motion. That is why the latter is also called difference, because difference and primary motion were born simultaneously. The movement and difference, that proceed from the First (the Good), are indeterminate, and need it, to be determinate. Now they determine each other when they turn towards it. Formerly, matter was as indeterminate as difference; it was not good because it was not yet illuminated by the radiance of the First. Since the First is the source of all light, the object that receives light from the First does not always possess light; this object differs from light, and possesses light as something alien, because it derives light from some other source. That is the nature of matter as contained in intelligible (entities). Perhaps this treatment of the subject is longer than necessary.
2.4.6Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements demonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is not a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being" would perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed from absolute nonentity to essence; and all change is no more than the passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle). It presupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form. This is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something composite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite. Dissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved, the result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements necessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites of form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without matter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can they be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They must therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting their shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate, because it is not a form.
2.4.7(According to Aristotle), Empedocles thinks matter consists of elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they are exposed. (According to Aristotle), Anaxagoras supposes that matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) is capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all things in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that he had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is contemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it. Now it is impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if mixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if, however, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third principle. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter, for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is possible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of its own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all? (Anaximander) had better explain the consistence of the infinity by which he explains matter. Does he, by infinity, mean immensity? In reality this would be impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself, nor in any other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body. The infinite does not exist by itself, because each of its parts would necessarily be infinite. Nor does the infinite exist as an accident, because that of which it would be an accident would, by itself, be neither infinite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be matter. (According to Aristotle's account of Democritus), neither could the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before thought Cicero). Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against the system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence and soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked continuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be made; but further discussion is unnecessary.
2.4.8What then is this matter which is one, continuous, and without qualities? Evidently, it could not be a body, since it has no quality; if it were a body, it would have a quality. We say that it is the matter of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and the form of others, just as clay is matter, in respect to the potter, without being matter absolutely (as thought Aristotle). As we are not considering the matter of any particular object, but the matter of all things, we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls under our senses--no quality, color, heat, cold, lightness, weight, density, sparseness, figure or magnitude; for magnitude is something entirely different from being large, and figure from the figured object. Matter therefore is not anything composite, but something simple, and by nature one (according to the views of Plato and Aristotle combined). Only thus could matter be deprived of all properties (as it is). The principle which informs matter will give it form as something foreign to its nature; it will also introduce magnitude and all the real properties. Otherwise, it would be enslaved to the magnitude of matter, and could not decide of the magnitude of matter, and magnitude would be dependent on the disposition of matter. A theory of a consultation between it and the magnitude of matter would be an absurd fiction. On the contrary, if the efficient cause precede matter, matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause, and be capable of docilely receiving any kind of form, including magnitude. If matter possessed magnitude, it would also possess figure, and would thus be rather difficult to fashion. Form therefore enters into matter by importing into it (what constitutes corporeal being); now every form contains a magnitude and a quantity which are determined by reason ("being"), and with reason. That is why in all kinds of beings, quantity is determined only along with form; for the quantity (the magnitude) of man is not the quantity of the bird. It would be absurd to insist on the difference between giving to matter the quantity of a bird, and impressing its quality on it, that quality is a reason, while quantity is not a form; for quantity is both measure and number.
2.4.9It may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of something without magnitude. The fact is that not everything is identical with quantity. Essence is distinct from quantity; for many other things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal nature has any quantity. Matter, therefore, is incorporeal. Besides, even quantity itself is not quantative, which characterizes only what participates in quantity (in general); a further proof that quantity is a form, as an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; and as that which, in the animal, produces whiteness and the different colors, is not a varied color, but a varied reason; likewise that which produces a quantity is not a definite quantity, but either quantity in itself, or quantity as such, or the reason of quantity. Does quantity, on entering into matter extend matter, so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for matter had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to matter the magnitude which it did not possess, just as form impresses on matter the quality it lacked.
2.4.10(Some objector) might ask how one could conceive of matter without quantity? This might be answered by a retort. How then do you (as you do) manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you again object, by what conception or intelligence could it be reached? By the very indetermination of the soul. Since that which knows must be similar to that which is known (as Aristotle quotes from Empedocles), the indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate. Reason, indeed, may be determined in respect to the indeterminate; but the glance which reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate. If everything were known by reason and by intelligence, reason here tells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it. By wishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelligence arrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence, or rather, reason forms of matter a "bastard" or "illegitimate" image, which is derived from the other, which is not true, and which is composed of the other (deceptive material called) reason. That is why Plato said that matter is perceived by a "bastard reasoning." In what does the indetermination of the soul consist? In an absolute ignorance, or in a complete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate condition of the soul implies something positive (besides something negative). As for the eye, darkness is the matter of all invisible color, so the soul, by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that somehow are luminous, cannot determine what then remains; and likewise, as the eye, in darkness (becomes assimilated to darkness), the soul becomes assimilated to what she sees. Does she then see anything else? Doubtless, she sees something without figure, without color, without light, or even without magnitude. If this thing had any magnitude, the soul would lend it a form. (An objector might ask) whether there be identity of conditions between the soul's not thinking, and her experience while thinking of matter? By no means; when the soul is not thinking of anything, she neither asserts anything, nor experiences anything. When she thinks of matter, she experiences something, she receives the impression of the shapeless. When she presents to herself objects that possess shape and magnitude, she conceives of them as composite; for she sees them as distinct (or, colored?) and determined by qualities they contain. She conceives of both the totality and its two constituent elements. She also has a clear perception, a vivid sensation of properties inherent (in matter). On the contrary, the soul receives only an obscure perception of the shapeless subject, for there is no form there. Therefore, when the soul considers matter in general, in the composite, with the qualities inherent in this composite, she separates them, analyzes them, and what is left (after this analysis), the soul perceives it vaguely, and obscurely, because it is something vague and obscure; she thinks it, without really thinking it. On the other hand, as matter does not remain shapeless, as it is always shaped, within objects, the soul always imposes on matter the form of things, because only with difficulty does she support the indeterminate, since she seems to fear to fall out of the order of beings, and to remain long in nonentity.
2.4.11(Following the ideas of Aristotle, Plotinos wonders whether some objector) will ask whether the composition of a body requires anything beyond extension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands a substrate to receive them (as a residence). This substrate is not a mass; for in this case, it would be an extension. But if this substrate have no extension, how can it be a residence (for form)? Without extension, it could be of no service, contributing neither to form nor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems that extension, wherever it be, is given to bodies by matter. Just as actions, effects, times and movements, though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless are beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily imply matter (without extension), being individual beings, whose diverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms. Matter without extension, therefore, seems to be no more than a meaningless name. (Our answer to the above objection is this:) To begin with, not every residence is necessarily a mass, unless it have already received extension. The soul, which possesses all things, contains them all simultaneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess all things in extension. Consequently matter receives all it contains in extension, because it is capable thereof. Likewise in animals and plants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of their magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be wrong to claim that magnitude is necessary to matter because, in sense-objects, there exists a previous magnitude, on which is exerted the action of the forming principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure matter, but individual matter (as said Aristotle). Matter pure and simple must receive its extension from some other principle. Therefore the residence of form could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it would also receive the other qualities. Matter therefore, is the image of extension, because as it is primary matter, it possesses the ability to become extended. People often imagine matter as empty extension; consequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical with emptiness. I repeat: matter is the image of extension because the soul, when considering matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads into indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or mark anything; otherwise, matter would determine something. This substrate could not properly be called big or little; it is simultaneously big and little (as said Aristotle). It is simultaneously extended and non-extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it were enlarged or made smaller, it would somehow move in extension. Its indetermination is an extension which consists in being the very residence of extension, but really in being only imaginary extension, as has been explained above. Other beings, that have no extension, but which are forms, are each of them determinate, and consequently imply no other idea of extension. On the contrary, matter, being indeterminate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being moved to receive all forms everywhere, ever being docile, by this very docility, and by the generation (to which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It is in this way its nature seems to be extension. POLEMIC AGAINST MODERATUS OF GADES, FORMS DEMAND A RESIDENCE, VASE, or LOCATION.
2.4.12Extensions therefore contribute to the constitutions of bodies; for the forms of bodies are in extensions. These forms produce themselves not in extension (which is a form), but in the substrate that has received extension. If they occurred in extension, instead of occurring in matter, they would nevertheless have neither extension nor (hypostatic) substance; for they would be no more than reasons. Now as reasons reside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore, in the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have a single substrate which has received extension, and therefore must be other than extension. All things that mingle form a mixture, because they contain matter; they have no need of any other substrate, because each of them brings its matter along with it. But (forms) need a receptacle (a residence), a "vase" (or stand), a location (this in answer to the objection at the beginning of the former section). Now location is posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, therefore, presuppose matter. Bodies are not necessarily immaterial, merely because actions and operations are. In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as substrate to the agent; it remains within him without itself entering into action; for that is not that which is sought by the agent. One action does not change into another, and consequently has no need of containing matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to another, and who, consequently, serves as matter to the actions (as thought Aristotle). Matter, therefore, is necessary to quality as well as to quantity, and consequently, to bodies. In this sense, matter is not an empty name, but a substrate, though it be neither visible nor extended. Otherwise, for the same reason, we would be obliged also to deny qualities and extension; for you might say that each of these things, taken in itself, is nothing real. If these things possess existence, though their existence be obscure, so much the more must matter possess existence, though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the senses. Indeed, matter cannot be perceived by sight, since it is colorless; nor by hearing, for it is soundless; nor by smell or taste, because it is neither volatile nor wet. It is not even perceived by touch, for it is not a body. Touch cognizes only body, recognizes that it is dense or sparse, hard or soft, wet or dry; now none of these attributes is characteristic of matter. The latter therefore can be perceived only by a reasoning which does not imply the presence of intelligence, which, on the contrary, implies the complete absence of matter; which (unintelligent reasoning therefore) deserves the name of "bastard" (or, illegitimate) reasoning. Corporeity itself, is not characteristic of matter. If corporeity be a reason (that is, by a pun, a 'form'), it certainly differs from matter, both being entirely distinct. If corporeity be considered when it has already modified matter and mingled with it, it is a body; it is no longer matter pure and simple.
2.4.13Those who insist that the substrate of things is a quality common to all elements are bound to explain first the nature of this quality; then, how a quality could serve as substrate; how an unextended, immaterial (?) quality could be perceived in something that lacked extension; further, how, if this quality be determinate, it can be matter; for if it be something indeterminate, it is no longer a quality, but matter itself that we seek. Let us grant that matter has no quality, because, by virtue of its nature, it does not participate in a quality of any other thing. What, however, would hinder this property, because it is a qualification in matter, from participating in some quality? This would be a particular and distinctive characteristic, which consists of the privation of all other things (referring to Aristotle)? In man, the privation of something may be considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation of sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things inhere in matter, this privation is also a qualification for matter. If further the privation in matter extend to all things, absolutely, our objection is still better grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an objection, however, amounts to making qualities and qualified things of everything. In this case quantity, as well as "being," would be a quality. Every qualified thing must possess some quality. It is ridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what itself has no quality, being other than quality. Some one may object that that is possible, because "being something else" is a quality. We would then have to ask whether the thing that is other be otherness-in-itself? If it be otherness-in-itself, it is so not because it is something qualified, because quality is not something qualified. If this thing be only other, it is not such by itself, it is so only by otherness, as a thing that is identical by identity. Privation, therefore, is not a quality, nor anything qualified, but the absence of quality or of something else, as silence is the absence of sound. Privation is something negative; qualification is something positive. The property of matter is not a form; for its property consists precisely in having neither qualification nor form. It is absurd to insist that it is qualified, just because it has no quality; this would be tantamount to saying that it possessed extension by the very fact of its possessing no extension. The individuality (or, property) of matter is to be what it is. Its characteristic is not an attribute; it consists in a disposition to become other things. Not only are these other things other than matter, but besides each of them possesses an individual form. The only name that suits matter is "other," or rather, "others," because the singular is too determinative, and the plural better expresses indetermination.
2.4.14Let us now examine if matter be privation, or if privation be an attribute of matter. If you insist that privation and matter are though logically distinct, substantially one and the same thing, you will have to explain the nature of these two things, for instance, defining matter without defining privation, and conversely. Either, neither of these two things implies the other, or they imply each other reciprocally, or only one of them implies the other. If each of them can be defined separately, and if neither of them imply the other, both will form two distinct things, and matter will be different from privation, though privation be an accident of matter. But neither of the two must even potentially be present in the definition of the other. Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose, and the man with the stub nose (as suggested by Aristotle)? Then each of these is double, and there are two things. Is their relation that between fire and heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily contained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a quality), as fire has heat (as a quality), privation will be a form of matter, and has a substrate different from itself, which is matter. Not in this sense, therefore, is there a unity (between them). Are matter and privation substantially identical, yet logically distinct, in this sense that privation does not signify the presence of anything, but rather its absence? That it is the negation of beings, and is synonymous with nonentity? Negation adds no attribute; it limits itself to the assertion that something is not. In a certain sense, therefore, privation is nonentity. If matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is not essence, but something else than essence, there is still room to draw up two definitions, of which one would apply to the substrate, and the other to the privation, merely to explain that it is a disposition to become something else? It would be better to acknowledge that matter, like the substrate, should be defined a disposition to become other things. If the definition of privation shows the indetermination of matter, it can at least indicate its nature. But we could not admit that matter and privation are one thing in respect to their substrate, though logically distinct; for how could there be a logical distinction into two things, if a thing be identical with matter as soon as it is indeterminate, indefinite, and lacking quality?
2.4.15Let us further examine if the indeterminate, or infinite, be an accident, or an attribute of some other nature; how it comes to be an accident, and whether privation ever can become an accident. The things that are numbers and reasons are exempt from all indetermination, because they are determinations, orders, and principles of order for the rest. Now these principles do not order objects already ordered, nor do they order orders. The thing that receives an order is different from that which gives an order, and the principles from which the order is derived are determination, limitation and reason. In this case, that which receives the order and the determination must necessarily be the infinite (as thought Plato). Now that which receives the order is matter, with all the things which, without being matter, participate therein, and play the part of matter. Therefore matter is the infinite itself. Not accidentally is it the infinite; for the infinite is no accident. Indeed, every accident must be a reason; now of what being can the infinite be an accident? Of determination, or of that which is determined? Now matter is neither of these two. Further, the infinite could not unite with the determinate without destroying its nature. The infinite, therefore, is no accident of matter (but is its nature, or "being"). Matter is the infinite itself. Even in the intelligible world, matter is the infinite. The infinite seems born of the infinity of the One, either of its power, or eternity; there is no infinity in the One, but the One is creator of the infinite. How can there be infinity simultaneously above and below (in the One and in matter)? Because there are two infinities (the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite in the One, the indefinite in matter). Between them obtains the same difference as the archetype and its image. Is the infinite here below less infinite? On the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the image is far from veritable "being," it is more infinite. Infinity is greater in that which is less determinate (as thought Aristotle). Now that which is more distant from good is further in evil. Therefore the infinite on high, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite; here below, as the infinite possesses less essence, because it is far from essence and truth, it degenerates into the image of essence, and is the truer (indefinite) infinite. Is the infinite identical with the essence of the infinite? There is a distinction between them where there is reason and matter; where however matter is alone, they must be considered identical; or, better, we may say absolutely that here below the infinite does not occur; otherwise it would be a reason, which is contrary to the nature of the infinite. Therefore matter in itself is the infinite, in opposition to reason. Just as reason, considered in itself, is called reason, so matter, which is opposed to reason by its infinity, and which is nothing else (than matter), must be called infinite.
2.4.16Is there any identity between matter and otherness? Matter is not identical with otherness itself, but with that part of otherness which is opposed to real beings, and to reasons. It is in this sense that one can say of nonentity that it is something, that it is identical with privation, if only privation be the opposition to things that exist in reason. Will privation be destroyed by its union with the thing of which it is an attribute? By no means. That in which a (Stoic) "habit" occurs is not itself a "habit," but a privation. That in which determination occurs is neither determination, nor that which is determined, but the infinite, so far as it is infinite. How could determination unite with the infinite without destroying its nature, since this infinite is not such by accident? It would destroy this infinite, if it were infinite in quantity; but that is not the case. On the contrary, it preserves its "being" for it, realizes and completes its nature; as the earth which did not contain seeds (preserves its nature) when it receives some of them; or the female, when she is made pregnant by the male. The female, then, does not cease being a female; on the contrary she is so far more, for she realizes her nature ("being"). Does matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in the good? Yes, because it was formerly deprived of good, and did not possess it. That which lacks something, and obtains it, holds the middle between good and evil, if it be in the middle between the two. But that which possesses nothing, that which is in indigence, or rather that which is indigence itself, must necessarily be evil; for it is not indigence of wealth, but indigence of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty, of vigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed, could such a thing not be shapeless, absolutely ugly and evil? In the intelligible world, matter is essence; for what is above it (the One), is considered as superior to essence. In the sense-world, on the contrary, essence is above matter; therefore matter is nonentity, and thereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of essence.
2.5.1(Aristotle) spoke of (things) existing "potentially," and "actually"; and actuality is spoken of as a "being." We shall, however, have to examine this potential and actual existence; and whether this actual existence be the same as actuality, and whether this potential existence be identical with potentiality; also, whether these conceptions differ so that what exists actually be not necessarily actuality. It is evident that among sense-objects there exist things potentially. Are there also such among the intelligibles? This then is the problem: whether the intelligibles exist only actually; and on the hypothesis of the existence among intelligibles of something existing potentially, whether, because of its eternity, this always remains there in potentiality; and, because it is outside of time, never arrives to actuality. Let us first define potentiality. When a thing is said to exist potentially, this means that it does not exist absolutely. Necessarily, what exists potentially is potential only in relation to something else; for example, metal is the statue potentially. Of course, if nothing were to be done with this thing, or within it, if it were not to become something beyond itself, if there were no possibility of its becoming anything else, it would only be what it was already. How could it then become something different from what it was? It did not, therefore, exist potentially. Consequently, if, on considering what is a thing that exists potentially, and one that exists actually, we say that it exists potentially, we must mean that it might become different from what it is, whether, after having produced this different thing, it remain what it is, or whether, on becoming this different thing, which it is potentially, it ceases being what it is itself. Indeed, if metal be a statue potentially, this is a relation different from water being metal potentially, as air is potentially fire. Shall we say that what thus exists potentially is potentiality in respect of what is to be; as, for instance, that the metal is the potentiality of a statue? Not so, if we refer to the producing potentiality; for the producing potentiality cannot be said to exist potentially. If, then, we identified existing potentially not only with existing actually, but also with actuality, then potentiality would coincide with potential existence. It would be better and clearer, therefore, to contrast potential existence with actual existence, and potentiality with actuality. The thing which thus exists potentially is the substance underlying the reactions, shapes and forms which it is naturally fitted to receive, to which it aspires for their betterment or deterioration, and for the destruction of those whose actualization constitutes differentiation.
2.5.2As to matter, we shall have to examine whether it be something actually, while simultaneously it potentially is the shapes it receives; or whether it be nothing at all actually. Everything else of which we predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on receiving its form, and remaining the same. We may call a statue an actual statue, thus contrasting with it a potential statue; but an actual statue will not be implied by the metal which we called the potential statue. Consequently, what exists potentially does not become what exists actually; but from what was previously a potential (statue) proceeds what later is an actual (statue). Indeed, what exists actually is the compound, and not the matter; it is the form added to matter; this occurs when there is produced another being; when, for example, from the metal is made a statue; for the statue exists by this very being something other than the metal; namely, the compound. In non-permanent things, what exists potentially is evidently something quite different (from what is said to exist actually). But when the potential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian, why should not the potential and actual coincide? The potential wise Socrates is the same as the actual Socrates. Is the ignorant man, who was potentially learned, the same as the learned? No: only accident makes of the ignorant man a learned one; for it was not his ignorance that made him potentially wise; with him, ignorance was only an accident; but his soul, being by herself disposed (to be actually learned), still remains potentially learned, in so far as she was actually so, and still keeps what is called potential existence; thus the actual grammarian does not cease being a potential grammarian. Nothing hinders these two different things (of being a potential and actual grammarian) from coinciding; in the first case, the man is no more than a potential grammarian; in the latter, the man is still a potential grammarian, but this potentiality has acquired its form (that is, has become actual). If however what is potential be the substrate, while the actual is both (potential and actual) at the same time, as in the (complete) statue, what then shall we call the form in the metal? We might well call the actuality by which some object exists actually, and not merely potentially, the form and shape; therefore not merely actuality, but the actuality of this individual thing. The name actuality would better suit the (general) actuality rather (than the actuality of some one thing); the actuality corresponding to the potentiality which brings a thing to actuality. Indeed, when that which was potential arrives at actuality, it owes the latter to something else. As to the potentiality which by itself produces that of which it is potentiality, that is, which produces the actuality (corresponding to this potentiality), it is a (Stoic) "habituation;" while the actuality (which corresponds to this habituation) owes its name thereto; for instance, the "habituation" is courageousness; while the actuality is being brave. But enough of this!
2.5.3The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to decide whether every intelligible exist only actually, or whether it be only an actuality; and third, how even up there in the intelligible, where all things are actualities, there can also exist something potentially. If, then, in the intelligible world, there be no matter which might be called potential, if no being is to become something which it not yet is, nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it is, beget something else, nor by altering, cause any substitution, then there could not be anything potential in this World of eternal essence outside of time. Let us now address the following question to those who admit the existence of matter, even in intelligible things: "How can we speak of matter in the intelligible world, if by virtue of this matter nothing exists potentially? For even if in the intelligible world matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world, still in every being would be the matter, the form and the compound which constitutes it." They would answer that in intelligible things, what plays the part of matter is a form, and that the soul, by herself, is form; but, in relation to something else, is matter. Is the soul then potential in respect of this other thing? Hardly, for the soul possesses the form, and possesses it at present, without regard to the future, and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason; if she contain matter, it is only because thought conceives of her as double (by distinguishing form and matter in her). But these two things form a single nature, as Aristotle also says that his "quintessence" is immaterial. What shall we say? Potentially, she is the animal, when it is unborn, though to be born. Potentially she is the music, and all the things that become, because they are transient. Thus in the intelligible world there are things which exist, or do not exist potentially. But the soul is the potentiality of these things. How might one apply actual existence to intelligible things? Each of them exists actually because it has received form, as the statue (the compound) exists actually, or rather, because it is a form, and because its essence is a perfect form. The intelligence does not pass from the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking. Otherwise, it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not pass from potentiality to actuality, which would possess everything by itself; for what exists potentially implies another principle whose intervention brings it to actuality, so as to be something existing actually. A being is an actuality when it always is what it is, by itself. Therefore, all first principles are actualities; for they possess all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such is the state of the soul which is not in matter, but in the intelligible world. The soul which is in matter is another actuality; she is, for instance, the vegetative soul; for she is in actuality what she is. We shall, therefore, have to admit that (in the intelligible world) everything exists actually, and that thus everything is actuality, because it has rightly been said that intelligible nature is always awake, that it is a life, an excellent life, and that there on high all actualities are perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world, everything exists actually, and everything is actuality and life. The place of intelligible things is the place of life, the principle and source of the veritable soul, and of intelligence.
2.5.4All the other objects (the sense-objects), which are something potentially, are also actually something else, which, in regard to the First, may be said to be potential existence. As to matter, which exists potentially in all beings, how could it actually be some of these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be all beings potentially. If matter be none of the beings, it necessarily is not a being. If it be none of the beings, how could it actually be something? Consequently, matter is none of the beings that in it "become." But might it not be something else, since all things are not in matter? If matter be none of the beings which are therein, and if these really are beings, matter must be non-being. Since, by imagination, it is conceived as something formless, it could not be a form; as being, it could not be counted among the forms; which is an additional reason why it should be considered as non-being. As matter, therefore, is no "being" neither in respect of beings, nor of forms, matter is non-being in the highest degree. Since matter does not possess the nature of veritable beings, and since it cannot even claim a place among the objects falsely called beings (for not even like these is matter an image of reason), in what kind of being could matter be included? If it cannot be included in any, it can evidently not be something actually.
2.5.5If this be so, what opinion shall we form of matter? How can it be the matter of beings? Because matter potentially constitutes the beings. But, since matter already exists potentially, may we not already say that it exists, when we consider what it is to be? The being of matter is only what is to be; it consists of what is going to be; therefore matter exists potentially; but it is potentially not any determinate thing, but all things. Therefore, being nothing by itself, and being what it is, namely, matter, it is nothing actually. If it were something actually, what it would actually be would not be matter; consequently, matter would no longer be absolutely matter; it would be matter only relatively, like metal. Matter is, therefore, non-being; it is not something which merely differs from being, like movement, which relates to matter because it proceeds from matter, and operates in it. Matter is denuded and despoiled of all properties; it can not transform itself, it remains ever what it was at the beginning, non-being. From the very being it actually was no being, since it had withdrawn from all beings, and had never even become any of them; for never was it able to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to assume. Its permanent condition is to trend towards something else, to exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow. As it appears where ends the order of intelligible beings, and as it is contained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it, it is their last degree. Being contained in both intelligible and sense-things, it does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes of beings. It exists only potentially; it limits itself to being a feeble and obscure image, which can not assume any form. May we not thence conclude that matter is the image actually; and consequently, is actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that is, it is essentially non-being. If then matter actually be non-being, it is the highest degree of non-being, and thus again essentially is non-being. Since non-being is its real nature, it is, therefore, far removed from actually being any kind of a being. If it must at all be, it must actually be non-being, so that, far from real-being, its "being" (so to speak) consists in non-being. To remove the deception of deceptive beings, is to remove their "being." To introduce actuality in the things which possess being and essence potentially, is to annihilate their reason for being, because their being consists in existing potentially. Therefore, if matter were to be retained as unchangeable, it would be first necessary to retain it as matter; evidently, it will be necessary to insist that it exists only potentially, so that it may remain what it essentially is; the only alternative would be to refute the arguments we have advanced.
2.6.1Is "essence" something different from "being"? Does essence indicate an abstraction of the other (four categories), and is being, on the contrary, essence with the other (four categories), motion and rest, identity and difference? Are these the elements of being? Yes: "being" is the totality of these things, of which one is essence, the other is motion, and so forth. Motion, therefore, is accidental essence. Is it also accidental "being?" Or is it being completely? Motion is being, because all intelligible things are beings. But why is not each of the sense-things a being? The reason is, that on high all things form only a single group of totality, while here below they are distinct one from another because they are images that have been distinguished. Likewise, in a seminal (reason), all things are together, and each of them is all the others; the hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the contrary, in a body all the organs are separate, because they are images instead of being genuine beings. We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the characteristic differences in being or essence. These differences effect distinction between the beings; in short, they cause them to be beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the qualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being, as biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle); others are not differences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still, the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of the being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a complement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness is a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human being like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle). So long as the whiteness is in the ("seminal) reason," it is a complement of being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is a quality. Two kinds of qualities must be distinguished; the essential quality, which is a peculiarity of its being, and the mere quality, which affects the being's classification. The mere quality introduces no change in the essence, and causes none of its characteristics to disappear; but, when the being exists already, and is complete, this quality gives it a certain exterior disposition; and, whether in the case of a soul or body, adds something to it. Thus visible whiteness, which is of the very being of white lead, is not of the being of the swan, because a swan may be of some color other than white. Whiteness then completes the being of white lead, just as heat completes the being of fire. If igneousness is said to be the being of fire, whiteness is also the being of white lead. Nevertheless, the igneousness of the visible fire is heat, which constitutes the complement of its being; and whiteness plays the same part with respect to white lead. Therefore (differing according to the difference of various beings) the same things will be complements of being, and will not be qualities, or they will not be complements of being, and will be qualities; but it would not be reasonable to assert that these qualities are different according to whether or not they are complements of being, since their nature is the same. We must acknowledge that the reasons which produce these things (as heat, and whiteness) are beings, if taken in their totality; but on considering their production, we see that what constitutes a whatness or quiddity (the Aristotelian "what it were to be") in the intelligible world, becomes a quality in the sense-world. Consequently, we always err on the subject of the quiddity, when we try to determine it, mistaking the simple quality for it (as thought Plato), for, when we perceive a quality, the fire is not what we call fire, but a being. As to the things which arrest our gaze, we should distinguish them from the quiddity, and define them by the qualities of sense (objects); for they do not constitute the being, but the affections of being. We are thus led to ask how a being can be composed of non-beings? It has already been pointed out that the things subject to generation could not be identical with the principles from which they proceed. Let us now add that they could not be beings. But still, how can one say that the intelligible being is constituted by a non-being? The reason is that in the intelligible world since being forms a purer and more refined essence, being really is somehow constituted by the differences of essence; or rather, we feel it ought to be called being from considering it together with its energies (or, actualizations). This being seems to be a perfecting of essence; but perhaps being is less perfect when it is thus considered together with its actualizations; for, being less simple, it veers away from essence.
2.6.2Let us now consider what quality in general is; for when we shall know this, our doubts will cease. First, must it be admitted that one and the same thing is now a quality, and then a complement of being? Can one say that quality is the complement of being, or rather of such a being? The suchness of being implies a previously existing being and quiddity. Taking the illustration of fire, is it "mere being" before it is "such being?" In this case, it would be a body. Consequently, the body will be a being; fire will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not constitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the property of having a stub nose (as said Aristotle). Consequently, if we abstract heat, shine and lightness, which seem to be qualities, and also impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional extension, and matter will be "being." But this hypothesis does not seem likely; it is rather form which will be "being." Is form a quality? No: form is a reason. Now what is constituted by (material) substance, and reason? (In the warm body) it is neither what burns, nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said that combustion is an act emanating from reason, that being hot and white are actualities, we could not find anything to explain quality. What we call a complement of being should not be termed a quality, because they are actualizations of being, actualizations which proceed from the reasons and the essential potentialities. Qualities are therefore something outside of being; something which does not at times seem to be, and at other times does not seem not to be qualities; something which adds to being something that is not necessary; for example, virtues and vices, ugliness and beauty, health, and individual resemblance. Though triangle, and tetragon, each considered by itself, are not qualities; yet being "transformed into triangular appearance" is a quality; it is not therefore triangularity, but triangular formation, which is a quality. The same could be said of the arts and professions. Consequently, quality is a disposition, either adventitious or original, in already existing beings. Without it, however, being would exist just as much. It might be said that quality is either mutable or immutable; for it forms two kinds, according to whether it be permanent or changeable.
2.6.3The whiteness that I see in you is not a quality, but an actualization of the potentiality of whitening. In the intelligible world all the things that we call qualities are actualizations. They are called qualities because they are properties, because they differentiate the beings from each other, because in respect to themselves they bear a particular character. But since quality in the sense-world is also an actualization, in what does it differ from the intelligible quality? The sense-quality does not show the essential quality of every being, nor the difference or character of substances, but simply the thing that we properly call quality, and which is an actualization in the intelligible world. When the property of something is to be a being, this thing is not a quality. But when reason separates beings from their properties, when it removes nothing from them, when it limits itself to conceiving and begetting different from these beings, it begets quality, which it conceives of as the superficial part of being. In this case, nothing hinders the heat of the fire, so far as it is natural to it, from constituting a form, an actualization, and not a quality of the fire; it is a quality when it exists in a substance where it no longer constitutes the form of being, but only a trace, an adumbration, an image of being, because it finds itself separated from the being whose actualization it is. Qualities, therefore, are everything that, instead of being actualizations and forms of beings, are only its accidents, and only reveal its shapes. We will therefore call qualities the habituations and the dispositions which are not essential to substances. The archetypes (or models) of qualities are the actualizations of the beings, which are the principles of these qualities. It is impossible for the same thing at one time to be, and at another not to be a quality. What can be separated from being is quality; what remains united to being is being, form, and actualization. In fact, nothing can be the same in itself, and in some other condition where it has ceased to be form and an actualization. What, instead of being the form of a being, is always its accident, is purely and exclusively a quality.
2.7.1The subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point of total penetration of the different bodies. This has been explained in two ways: that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to interpenetrate each other totally, or that only one of them penetrates the other. The difference between these two theories is of small importance. First we must set aside the opinion of (Anaxagoras and Democritus), who explain mixture as a juxtaposition, because this is a crude combination, rather than a mixture. Mixture should render the whole homogeneous, so that even the smallest molecules might each be composed of the various elements of the mixture. As to the (Peripatetic) philosophers who assert that in a mixture only the qualities mingle, while the material extension of both bodies are only in juxtaposition, so long as the qualities proper to each of them are spread throughout the whole mass, they seem to establish the rightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that the two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture. (They object) that the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude by this continuous division which will leave no interval between the parts of either of the two bodies; for if the two bodies mutually interpenetrate each other in every part, their division must become continuous. Besides, the mixture often occupies an extent greater than each body taken separately, and as great as if mere juxtaposition had occurred. Now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally, the resulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them taken separately. The case where two bodies occupy no more space than a single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's expulsion, which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the pores of the other. Besides, in the case of the mixture of two bodies of unequal extent, how could the body of the smaller extend itself sufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater? There are many other such reasons. We now pass to the opinions of (Zeno and the other Stoic) philosophers, who assert that two bodies which make up a mixture mutually interpenetrate each other totally. They support this view by observing that when the bodies interpenetrate totally, they are divided without the occurrence of a continuous division (which would make their molecules lose their magnitude). Indeed, perspiration issues from the human body without its being divided or riddled with holes. To this it may be objected that nature may have endowed our body with a disposition to permit perspiration to issue easily. To this (the Stoics) answer that certain substances (like ivory), which when worked into thin sheets, admit, in all their parts, a liquid (oat-gruel) which passes from one surface to the other. As these substances are bodies, it is not easy to understand how one element can penetrate into another without separating its molecules. On the other hand, total division must imply mutual destruction (because their molecules would lose all magnitude whatever). When, however, two mingled bodies do not together occupy more space than either of them separately (the Stoics) seem forced to admit to their adversaries that this phenomenon is caused by the displacement of air. In the case where the compound occupies more space than each element separately, it might (though with little probability), be asserted, that, since every body, along with its other qualities, implies size, a local extension must take place. No more than the other qualities could this increase perish. Since, out of both qualities, arises a new form, as a compound of the mixture of both qualities; so also must another size arise, the mixture combining the size out of both. Here (the Peripatetics) might answer (the Stoics): "If you assert a juxtaposition of substances, as well as of the masses which possess extension, you are actually adopting our opinions. If however one of the masses, with its former extension, penetrate the entire mass of the other, the extension, instead of increasing, as in the case where one line is added to another by joining their extremities, will not increase any more than when two straight lines are made to coincide by superimposing one on the other." The case of the mixture of a smaller quantity with a greater one, such as of a large body with a very small one, leads (the Peripatetics) to consider it impossible that the great body should spread in all the parts of the small one. Where the mixture is not evident, the (Peripatetics) might claim that the smaller body does not unite with all the parts of the greater. When however the mixture is evident, they can explain it by the extension of the masses, although it be very doubtful that a small mass would assume so great an extension, especially when we attribute to the composite body a greater extent, without nevertheless admitting its transformation, as when water transforms itself into air.
2.7.2What happens when a mass of water transforms itself into air? This question demands particular treatment; for how can the transformed element occupy a greater extension? (We shall not try to explain it on either the Peripatetic or Stoic principles) because we have sufficiently developed above the numerous reasons advanced by both those schools. We had better now consider which of the two systems we ourselves might adopt, and on which side lies reason. Besides, we should consider whether, besides these both, there be not place for a third opinion. When water flows through wool, or when paper allows water to filter through it, why does not the whole of the water pass through these substances (without partly remaining within them)? If the water remain therein partially, we shall not be able to unite the two substances or masses. Shall we say that the qualities alone are confused (or, mingled)? Water is not in juxtaposition with the paper, nor is lodged in its pores; for the whole paper is penetrated thereby, and no portion of the matter lacks that quality. If matter be united to quality everywhere, water must everywhere be present in the paper. If it be not water that everywhere is present in the paper, but only (humidity which is) the quality of the water, where then is the water itself? Why is not the mass the same? The matter that has insinuated itself into the paper extends it, and increases its volume. Now this augmentation of volume implies augmentation of mass; and the latter implies that the water has not been absorbed by the book, and that the two substances occupy different places (and do not interpenetrate each other). Since one body causes another to participate in its quality, why would it not also make it participate in its extension? By virtue of this union with a different quality, one quality, united with a different one, cannot, either remain pure, or preserve its earlier nature; it necessarily becomes weaker. But one extension, added to another extension, does not vanish. One body is said to divide another, by penetrating it. This assertion, however, demands demonstration, for it is more reasonable to suppose that qualities may penetrate a body without dividing it. Such demonstration is attempted by the claim that qualities are incorporeal. But if matter itself be as incorporeal as the qualities, why could not some qualities along with the matter penetrate into some other body? That some solids do not penetrate other bodies, is due to their possession of qualities incompatible with that of penetration. The objection that many qualities could not, along with matter, penetrate some body, would be justified only if it were the multitude of qualities that produced density; but if density be as much of a quality as corporeity, the qualities will constitute the mixture not in themselves alone, but only as they happen to be determined. On the other hand, when matter does not lend itself to mixture, this occurs not by virtue of its being matter, but as matter united to some determinative quality. That is all the truer as matter is receptive to any magnitude, not having any of its own. But enough of this.
2.7.3Since we have spoken of corporeity, it must be analyzed. Is it a composite of all qualities, or does it constitute a form, a "reason," which produces the body by presence in matter? If the body be the composite of all the qualities together with matter, this totality of qualities will constitute corporeity. But if corporeity be a reason which produces the body by approaching matter, doubtless it is a reason which contains all the qualities. Now, if this reason be not at all a definition of being, if it be a reason productive of the object, it will not contain any matter. It is the reason which applies itself to matter, and which, by its presence, produces the body there. Body is matter with indwelling "reason." This "reason," being a form, may be considered separately from matter, even if it were entirely inseparable therefrom. Indeed, "reason" separated (from matter), and residing in intelligence, is different (from "reason" united to matter); the "Reason" which abides within Intelligence is Intelligence itself. But this subject (I shall) refer to elsewhere.
2.8.1What is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller, and that, though separated by a great space, they seem to be close to each other, while if close, we see them in their true size, and their true distance? The cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might be that light needs to be focussed near the eye, and to be accommodated to the size of the pupils; that the greater the distance of the matter of the visible object, the more does its form seem to separate from it during its transit to the eyes; and that, as there is a form of quantity as well as of quality, it is the reason (or, form) of the latter which alone reaches the eye. On the other hand, (Epicurus) thinks that we feel magnitude only by the passage and the successive introduction of its parts, one by one; and that, consequently, magnitude must be brought within our reach, and near us, for us to determine its quantity. (Do objects at a distance seem smaller) because we perceive magnitude only by accident, and because color is perceived first? In this case, when an object is near, we perceive its colored magnitude; when at a distance, we perceive first its color, not well enough distinguishing its parts to gather exact knowledge of its quantity, because its colors are less lively. Why should we be surprised at magnitudes being similar to sounds, which grow weaker as their form decreases in distinctness? As to sounds, indeed, it is the form that is sought by the sense of hearing, and here intensity is noticed only as an accident. But if hearing perceive magnitude only by accident, to what faculty shall we attribute the primitive perception of intensity in sound, just as primitive perception of magnitude in the visible object is referable to the sense of touch? Hearing perceives apparent magnitude by determining not the quantity but the intensity of sounds; this very intensity of sounds, however, is perceived only by accident (because it is its proper object). Likewise, taste does not by accident feel the intensity of a sweet savor. Speaking strictly, the magnitude of a sound is its extent. Now the intensity of a sound indicates its extent only by accident, and therefore in an inexact manner. Indeed a thing's intensity is identical with the thing itself. The multitude of a thing's parts is known only by the extent of space occupied by the object. It may be objected that a color cannot be less large, and that it can only be less vivid. However, there is a common characteristic in something smaller and less vivid; namely, that it is less than what it is its being to be. As to color, diminution implies weakness; as to size, smallness. Magnitude connected with color diminishes proportionally with it. This is evident in the perception of a varied object, as, for instance, in the perception of mountains covered with houses, forests, and many other objects; here the distinctness of detail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole. But when the view of the details does not impress itself on the eye, the latter no longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the extent offered to its contemplation by the details. Even in the case where the objects are near and varied, if we include them all in one glance without distinguishing all their parts, the more parts our glance loses, the smaller do the objects seem. On the contrary, if we distinguish all their details, the more exactly do we measure them, and learn their real size. Magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye because the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts; and because, even if the eye attempt to do so, it loses itself, not knowing where to stop, for lack of difference between the parts. The distant object seems to us close because our inability to distinguish the parts of the intervening space does not permit us to determine exactly its magnitude. When sight can no longer traverse the length of an interval by determining its quality, in respect to its form, neither can it any longer determine its quantity in respect to magnitude.
2.8.2Some hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because they are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere we have shown that this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following considerations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest of the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this be some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether this object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the glance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object should not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even though it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even if we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces the whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater than its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the sky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle which makes distant objects appear smaller?
2.9.1We have already seen that the nature of the Good is simple and primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself, but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added. Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient, because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must not have anything above it. Consequently there are no principles other (than the three divine hypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned to Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking principle, and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural order, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have often pointed out their mutual differences. The only thing left is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic substances; and in this case, what their nature might be. The Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the most simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in distinguishing within that (supreme Principle) potentiality from actualization; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that (Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the divine hypostatic substances.) Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one at rest, and the other in motion. We should have to define the resting of the First, and the movement or utterance of the second. The inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally mysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and identically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to move around it is the proper function of the soul. Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence into the Soul, and intellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the Soul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them. Nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker. Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that one thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore the same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. Otherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness of thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two (hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively think, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought. If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and discursive reason were in such a condition, we would, even if otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence, by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself. When Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent, but as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought, Intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things that form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If Intelligence always thinks what it is, is there any reason to separate, even by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness of thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first; we might thus go on to infinity. Last, if we suppose that Reason is derived from Intelligence, and then from reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived from Reason in itself, so as to constitute a principle intermediary between Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would be deprived of the power of thought. For thus the Soul, instead of receiving reason from Intelligence, would receive reason from an intermediary principle. Instead of possessing Reason itself, the Soul would possess only an adumbration of Reason; the Soul would not know Intelligence, and would not be able to think.
2.9.2In the intelligible world, therefore, we shall not recognize more than three principles (Unity, Intelligence, and Soul), without those superfluous and incongruous fictions. We shall insist that there is a single Intelligence that is identical, and immutable, which imitates its Father so far as it can. Then there is our soul, of which one part ever remains among the intelligibles, while one part descends to sense-objects, and another abides in an intermediary region. As our soul is one nature in several powers, she may at times entirely rise to the intelligible world, with the best part of herself and of essence; at other times the soul's lower part allows itself to be dragged down to the earth, carrying with it the intermediate portion; for the soul cannot be entirely dragged down. This being dragged down occurs only because the soul does not abide in the better region. While dwelling in it, the Soul, which is not a part (of it) and of which we are not a part, has given to the body of the universe all the perfections of which she was capable. The Soul governs it by remaining quiet, without reasoning, without having to correct anything. With wonderful power she beautifies the universe by the contemplation of the intelligible world. The more the Soul attaches herself to contemplation, the more powerful and beautiful she is; what she receives from above, she communicates to the sense-world, and illuminates because she herself is always illuminated (by Intelligence).
2.9.3Thus the Soul, ever being illuminated, in turn herself illuminates lower things that subsist only through her, like plants that feed on dew, and which participate in life, each according to its capacity. Likewise a fire heats the objects that surround it, each in proportion to its nature. Now if such is the effect of fire whose power is limited, while intelligible beings exert unlimited powers, how would it be possible for these beings to exist without causing anything to participate in their nature? Each of them must therefore communicate some degree of its perfection to other beings. The Good would no longer be the good, Intelligence would no longer be intelligence, the Soul would no longer be soul, if, beneath that which possesses the first degree of life, there was not some other thing which possessed the second degree of life, and which subsisted only so long as subsists He who occupies the first rank. It is therefore unavoidable that all things (inferior to the First) must always exist in mutual dependence, and that they be begotten, because they derive their existence from some other source. They were not begotten at a definite moment. When we affirm that they are begotten, we should say, they were begotten, or, they shall be begotten. Nor will they be destroyed, unless they are composed of elements in which they could be dissolved. Those that are indissoluble will not perish. It may be objected that they could be resolved into matter. But why should matter also not be liable to be destroyed? If it were granted that matter was liable to destruction, there was no necessity for its existence. It may be further objected that the existence of matter necessarily results from the existence of other principles. In this case, this necessity still subsists. If matter is to be considered as isolated (from the intelligible world), then the divine principles also, instead of being present everywhere, will, as it were, be walled up in a limited place. But if the latter be impossible, then must matter be illuminated (by the intelligible world).
2.9.4But in that case, the Soul created only because she had lost her wings. The universal Soul, however, could not have been subject to such an accident. Those (Gnostics) who claim that she committed a fault should explain the nature of that fault. Why did this fall occur? If she fell from all eternity, she must similarly remain in her fault; if only at a determinate time, why not earlier? We however believe that the Soul created the world not by inclining (towards matter), but rather because she did not incline towards it. Thus to incline towards matter the Soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities; but if she had forgotten them, she could not have created the world (using them as models). From what (models) would the soul have created the world? She must have formed it according to the intelligible models she had contemplated above. If she remembered them while creating, she had not inclined (away from them towards matter). Neither did the Soul have an obscure notion of the intelligibles; otherwise she would have inclined herself towards them, to get a clear intuition of them. For if she kept some memory of the intelligible world, why would she not have wished to reascend therein? Besides, what advantage could the (world-Soul) have imagined she was gaining by creating the world? That she did so in order to be honored seems unworthy, for it would be attributing to her the desires of a sculptor. Another theory is that the (world-Soul) created the world by virtue of a rational conception, and she thus exercised her power, though creating did not inhere in her nature. If so, how did she make the world? When will she destroy it? If she repented, what is she waiting for (before she destroys her handiwork)? If, however, she has not yet repented, she could not repent after time will have accustomed her to her work, and will have made her more kindly disposed thereto. If however she be awaiting individual souls, the latter should not have returned into generation, since, in the former generation, they have already experienced evils here below, and consequently, they should long since have ceased to descend upon this earth. Nor should the world be considered badly made, merely because we suffer so much therein. This idea results from entertaining unjustifiable expectations of its perfections, and from confusing it with the intelligible world of which it is an image. Could a more beautiful image, indeed, be imagined? After the celestial fire could we imagine a better fire than our own? After the intelligible earth, could we imagine a better earth than ours? After the actualization by which the intelligible world embraces itself, could we imagine a sphere more perfect, more wonderful, or better ordered in its movements? After the intelligible sun, how could we imagine any sun different from the one that we see?
2.9.5Is it not absurd to see those (Gnostics) who, like everybody else, possess a body, passions, fears, and excitements, holding an idea of their own powers high enough to make them believe themselves capable of attaining the intelligible, while to the sun, though it be immutable and perfect, and though it be impassible power, refusing a wisdom superior to ours, we who were born only yesterday, and who find so many obstacles in our search after truth? We certainly are surprised to see these (Gnostics) considering the souls of both themselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine, while refusing immortality to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though they be composed of elements more beautiful and purer (than we), though they manifest a marvellous beauty and order, while (these Gnostics) themselves acknowledge that disorder is observed here below? According to their theories, however, the immortal Soul would have picked out the worst part of the world, while giving up the best to mortal souls. It is also absurd to see them introduce into the world, after the universal Soul, another soul said to be composed of elements. How could a composition of elements possess life? A mixture of elements does not produce heat or cold, humidity or dryness, or any combination thereof. Besides, how could this soul (that is inferior to the universal Soul), hold in union together the four elements, if she herself were composed of them, and therefore were posterior to them? We may also rightfully demand of the (Gnostics) an explanation of their predicating perception, reflection, and other faculties to this (mythical) soul. Besides, as the (Gnostics) have no appreciation of the work of the demiurgic creator, nor for this earth, they insist that the divinity has created for them a new earth, which is destined to receive them when they shall have left here below, and which is the reason of the world. But what need do they have of inhabiting the model of this world that they pretend to hate? In any case, from where does this model come? According to them, the model was created only when its author inclined towards things here below. But what was the use of the model, if its creator busied himself considerably with the world to make a world inferior to the intelligible world which he possessed? If (the model were created) before the world, what could have been its use? Was it for the saved souls? Why therefore were those souls not saved (by remaining within the model)? Under this hypothesis the creation of the model was useless. If (the model, however, was created) after this world, its author derived it from this world, stealing the form away from matter; the experience that the souls had acquired in their earlier trials sufficed to teach them to seek their salvation. Last, if the (Gnostics) pretend to have, in their souls, received the form of the world, we have a new incomprehensible language.
2.9.6We hardly know what to say of the other new conceptions they have injected into the universe, such as exiles, antitypes, and repentances. If by "repentances" and "exiles" they mean certain states of the Soul (in the normal meaning of the word, where a soul) yields to repentance; and if by "antitypes" they mean the images of the intelligible beings that the Soul contemplates before contemplating the intelligible beings themselves, they are using meaningless words, invented merely as catchwords and terms for their individual sect; for they imagine such fictions merely because they have failed clearly to understand the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Before them the Greeks, clearly and simply, had spoken of "ascensions" of souls that issued from the "cavern," and which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation. The doctrines of these (Gnostics) are partly stolen from Plato, while the remainder, which were invented merely to form their own individual system, are innovations contrary to truth. It is from Plato that they borrowed their judgments, the rivers of Hades. They do speak of several intelligible principles, such as essence, intelligence, the second demiurgic creator or universal Soul; but all that comes from Plato's Timaeus, which says, "Likewise as the ideas contained in the existing Organism were seen by Intelligence, so he [the creator of this universe] thought that the latter should contain similar and equally numerous (natures)." But, not clearly understanding Plato, the Gnostics here imagined (three principles), an intelligence at rest, which contains all (beings), a second intelligence that contemplates them (as they occur) in the first intelligence, and a third intelligence that thinks them discursively. They often consider this discursive intelligence as the creative soul, and they consider this to be the demiurgic creator mentioned by Plato, because they were entirely ignorant of the true nature of this demiurgic creator. In general, they alter entirely the idea of creation, as well as many other doctrines of Plato, and they give out an entirely erroneous interpretation thereof. They imagine that they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible nature, while Plato and many other divine intellects never attained thereto. By speaking of a multitude of intelligible principles, they think that they seem to possess an exact knowledge thereof, while really they degrade them, assimilating them to lower, and sensual beings, by increasing their number. The principles that exist on high must be reduced to the smallest number feasible; we must recognize that the principle below the First contains all (the essences), and so deny the existence of any intelligible (entities) outside of it, inasmuch as it contains all beings, by virtue of its being primary "Being," of primary Intelligence, and of all that is beautiful beneath the First Himself. The Soul must be assigned to the third rank. The differences obtaining between souls must further be explained by the difference of their conditions or nature. Instead of besmirching the reputation of divine men, the (Gnostics) should interpret the doctrines of the ancient sages in a friendly way, borrowing from them such as they are right in professing, as, for instance, the immortality of the soul, the existence of the intelligible world, and of the first Divinity (who is the Good), the necessity for the soul to flee from intercourse with the body, and the belief that separation of the soul from body is equivalent to a return from generation to "being." They do well indeed if they borrow these ideas from Plato, for the purpose of developing them. They are even at liberty to express any opinion they please in diverging from his views; but their own doctrine should not be established in the minds of their followers by insults and sarcasms against Greek sages. They could only do so by demonstrating the propriety of their distinctive tenets, whenever they differ from those of the ancient philosophers, and by expounding their own tenets with a really philosophic reserve and equanimity. Even when they controvert a system they are still bound to consider nothing but the truth, without any attempt at self-glorification, either by attacking men whose teachings have long since been approved by worthy philosophers, or by claims of superiority to the latter. For that which the ancients taught on the subject of the intelligible world will always be considered as the best and wisest by all who do not permit themselves to be misled by the errors that to-day mislead so many. If from the doctrines of the (Gnostics) we remove what they have borrowed from the teachings of the ancients, their remaining additions will be discovered as very unfortunate. Their polemic against (Greek philosophy) consists of an introduction of a great number of genealogies, and destructions, blaming the intercourse of the soul with the body, complaining of the universe, criticising its administration, identifying the demiurgic creator (that is, Intelligence) with the universal souls.
2.9.7Elsewhere we have demonstrated that this world never began, and will never end; and that it must last as long as the intelligible entities. We have also shown, and that earlier than these (Gnostics), that the soul's intercourse with the body is not advantageous to her. But to judge the universal Soul according to ours is to resemble a man who would blame the totality of a well governed city by an examination limited to the workers in earth or metal. The differences between the universal Soul and our (human) souls are very important. To begin with, the universal Soul does not govern the world in the same manner (as our soul governs the body); for she governs the world without being bound thereto. Besides many other differences elsewhere noted, we were bound to the body after the formation of a primary bond. In the universal Soul the nature that is bound to the body (of the world) binds all that it embraces; but the universal Soul herself is not bound by the things she binds. As she dominates them, she is impassible in respect to them, while we ourselves do not dominate exterior objects. Besides, that part of the universal Soul which rises to the intelligible world remains pure and independent; even that which communicates life to the body (of the world) receives nothing therefrom. In general what is in another being necessarily participates in the state of that being; but a principle which has its own individual life would not receive anything from any other source. That is why, when one thing is located within another, it feels the experiences of the latter, but does not any the less retain its individual life in the event of the destruction of the latter. For instance, if the fire within yourself be extinguished, that would not extinguish the universal fire; even if the latter were extinguished, the universal Soul would not feel it, and only the constitution of the body (of the world) would be affected thereby. If a world exclusively composed of the remaining three elements were a possibility, that would be of no importance to the universal Soul, because the world does not have a constitution similar that of each of the contained organisms. On high, the universal Soul soars above the world, and thereby imposes on it a sort of permanence; here below, the parts, which as it were flow off, are maintained in their place by a second bond. As celestial entities have no place (outside of the world), into which they might ooze out, there is no need of containing them from the interior, nor of compressing them from without to force them back within; they subsist in the location where the universal Soul placed them from the beginning. Those which naturally move modify the beings which possess no natural motion. They carry out well arranged revolutions because they are parts of the universe. Here below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to the universal order. For instance, if a tortoise happened to be caught in the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order, it would be trodden under foot because it could not withdraw from the effects of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers; on the contrary, if it conformed to that order, it would suffer no harm.
2.9.8To ask (as do the Gnostics) why the world was created, amounts to asking the reason of the existence of the universal Soul, and of the creation of the demiurgic creator himself. To ask such a question well characterizes men who first wish to find a principle of that which (in the world) is eternal, but who later opine that the demiurgic creator became the creating cause only as a result of an inclination or alteration. If indeed they be at all willing to listen to us fairly, we shall have to teach them the nature of these intelligible principles, to end their habit of scorning (those) venerable (intelligible) beings, and (to induce them to) pay these a deserved respect. No one, indeed, has the right to find fault with the constitution of the world, which reveals the greatness of intelligible nature. We are forced to recognize that the world is a beautiful and brilliant statue of the divinities, from the fact that the world achieved existence without beginning with an obscure life, such as that of the little organisms it contains, and which the productiveness of universal life never ceases to bring forth, by day or night; on the contrary, its life is continuous, clear, manifold, extended everywhere, and illustrating marvellous wisdom. It would be no more than natural that the world should not equal the model it imitates; otherwise, it would no longer be an imitation. It would be an error, however, to think that the world imitates its model badly; it lacks none of the things that could be contained by a beautiful and natural image; for it was necessary for this image to exist, without implying reasoning or skill. Intelligence, indeed, could not be (the last degree of existence). It was necessarily actualization of a double nature, both within itself, and for other beings. It was inevitable that it should be followed by other beings, for only the most impotent being would fail to produce something that should proceed from it, while (it is granted that) the intelligible possesses a wonderful power; wherefore, it could not help creating. What would be the nature of a world better than the present one, if it were possible? The present one must be a faithful image of the intelligible world, if the existence of the world be necessary, and if there be no better possible world. The whole earth is peopled with animate and even immortal beings; from here below up to the heaven (the world) is full of them. Why should the stars in the highest sphere (the fixed stars), and those in the lower spheres (the planets), not be divinities, in view of their regular motion, and their carrying out a magnificent revolution around the world? Why should they not possess virtue? What obstacle could hinder them from acquiring it? Not on high are found the things which here below make men evil; namely, that evil nature which both is troubled, and troubles. With their perpetual leisure why should not the stars possess intelligence, and be acquainted with the divinity and all the other intelligible deities? How should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs? Only a foolish man would entertain such thoughts. How could our souls be superior to the stars when at the hands of the universal Soul they undergo the constraint of descending here below? For the best part of souls is that which commands. If, on the contrary, the souls descend here below voluntarily, why should the (Gnostics) find fault with this sphere whither they came voluntarily, and from which they can depart whenever it suits them? That everything here below depends on the intelligible principles is proved by the fact that the organization of the world is such that, during this life, we are able to acquire wisdom, and live out a life similar to that of the divinities.
2.9.9No one would complain of poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth if one realized that the sage does not seek equality in such things, because he does not consider that the rich man has any advantage over the poor man, the prince over the subject. The sage leaves such opinions to commonplace people, for he knows that there are two kinds of life; that of the virtuous who achieve the supreme degree (of perfection) and the intelligible world, and that of common earthly men. Even the latter life is double; for though at times they do think of virtue, and participate somewhat in the good, at other times they form only a vile crowd, and are only machines, destined to satisfy the primary needs of virtuous people. There is no reason to be surprised at a man committing a murder, or, through weakness, yielding to his passions, when souls, that behave like young, inexperienced persons, not indeed like intelligences, daily behave thus. It has been said that this life is a struggle in which one is either victor or vanquished. But is not this very condition a proof of good arrangement? What does it matter if you are wronged, so long as you are immortal? If you be killed, you achieve the fate that you desired. If you have reason to complain of how you are treated in some particular city, you can leave it. Besides, even here below, there evidently are rewards and punishments. Why then complain of a society within which distributive justice is exercised, where virtue is honored, and where vice meets its deserved punishment? Not only are there here below statues of the divinities, but even the divinities condescend to look on us, leading everything in an orderly manner from beginning to end, and they apportion to each the fate that suits him, and which harmonizes with his antecedents in his successive existences. This is unknown only to persons who are most vulgarly ignorant of divine things. Try therefore to become as good as you can, but do not on that account imagine that you alone are capable of becoming good; for then you would no longer be good. Other men (than you) are good; there are most excellent (ministering spirits called) guardians; further, there are deities who, while inhabiting this world, contemplate the intelligible world, and are still better than the guardians. Further still is the blissful (universal) Soul that manages the universe. Honor therefore the intelligible divinities, and above all the great King of the intelligible world, whose greatness is especially manifested in the multitude of the divinities. It is not by reducing all things to unity, but by setting forth the greatness developed by the divinity itself, that one manifests his knowledge of divine power. The Divinity (manifests His power) when, though remaining what He is, He produces many divinities which depend on Him, which proceed from Him, and exist by Him. In this way this world holds existence from Him, and contemplates Him along with all the divinities which announce to men the divine decrees, and who reveal to them whatever pleases them. These stars must not be blamed for not being what the divinity is, for they only represent their nature. If, however, you pretend to scorn these (stars that are considered) divinities, and if you hold yourself in high esteem, on the plea that you are not far inferior to them, learn first that the best man is he who is most modest in his relations with divinities and men. In the second place, learn that one should think of the divinity only within limits, without insolence, and not to seek to rise to a condition that is above human possibilities. It is unreasonable to believe that there is no place by the side of the divinity for all other men, while impudently proposing alone to aspire to that dignity. This by itself would deprive the Soul of the possibility of assimilation to the Divinity to the limit of her receptivity. This the Soul cannot attain unless guided by Intelligence. To pretend to rise above Intelligence, is to fall short of it. There are people insane enough to believe, without reflection, claims such as the following ("By initiation into secret knowledge, or gnosis), you will be better, not only than all men, but even than all the deities." These people are swollen with pride; and men who before were modest, simple and humble, become arrogant on hearing themselves say, "You are a child of the divinity; the other men that you used to honor are not his children, any more than the stars who were worshipped by the ancients. You yourself, without working, are better than heaven itself." Then companions crowd around him, and applaud his utterance. He resembles a man who, though not knowing how to count, should, in the midst of a crowd of men, equally ignorant with him, hear it said by somebody that he was a thousand feet high while others were only five feet high. He would not realize what was meant by a thousand feet, but he would consider this measure very great. (Gnostics) admit that the Divinity interests Himself in men. How then could He (as they insist), neglect the world that contains them? Could this be the case because He lacked the leisure to look after it? In this case He would lack the leisure to look after anything beneath Him (including men also). On the other hand, if He do care for men, that care would include the world that surrounds and contains them. If He ignored what surrounded men, in order to ignore the world, He would thereby also ignore the men themselves. The objection that men do need that the Divinity should care for the world (is not true), for the world does need the care of the Divinity. The Divinity knows the arrangement of the world, the men it contains, and their condition therein. The friends of the Divinity support meekly all that results necessarily therefrom. (They are right), for that which happens should be considered not only from one's own standpoint, but also from that of the totality of circumstances. Each (person or thing) should be considered from his place (in the scale of existence); one should ever aspire to Him to whom aspire all beings capable of (the Good); one should be persuaded that many beings, or rather that all beings, aspire thereto; that those who attain to Him are happy, while the others achieve a fate suitable to their nature; finally, one should not imagine oneself alone capable of attaining happiness. Mere assertion of possession does not suffice for real possession thereof. There are many men who, though perfectly conscious that they do not possess some good, nevertheless boast of its possession, or who really believe they do possess it, when the opposite is the true state of affairs; or that they exclusively possess it when they are the only ones who do not possess it.
2.9.10On examining many other assertions (of the Gnostics), or rather, all of their assertions, we find more than enough to come to some conclusion concerning the details of their doctrines. We cannot, indeed, help blushing when we see some of our friends, who had imbued themselves with (Gnostic) doctrines before becoming friends of ours, somehow or another persevere therein, working zealously to try to prove that they deserved full confidence, or speaking as if they were still convinced that they were based on good grounds. We are here addressing our friends, not the partisans (of the Gnostics). Vainly indeed would we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be deceived by men who furnish no proofs--what proofs indeed could they furnish?--but who only impose on others by their boastfulness. Following another kind of discussion, we might write a refutation of these men who are impudent enough to ridicule the teachings of those divine men who taught in ancient times, and who conformed entirely to truth. We shall not however embark on this, for whoever understands what we have already said will from that (sample) be able to judge of the remainder. Neither will we controvert an assertion which overtops all their others in absurdity--we use this term for lack of a stronger. Here it is: "The Soul and another Wisdom inclined downwards towards things here below, either because the Soul first inclined downwards spontaneously, or because she was misled by Wisdom; or because (in Gnostic view), Soul and Wisdom were identical. The other souls descended here below together (with the Soul), as well as the "members of Wisdom," and entered into bodies, probably human. Nevertheless the Soul, on account of which the other soul descended here below, did not herself descend. She did not incline, so to speak, but only illuminated the darkness. From this illumination was born in matter an image (Wisdom, the image of the Soul). Later was formed (the demiurgic creator, called) an image of the image, by means of matter or materiality, or of a principle by (Gnostics) designated by another name (the "Fruit of the fall")--for they make use of many other names, for the purpose of increasing obscurity. This is how they derive their demiurgic creator. They also suppose that this demiurgic creator separated himself from his mother, Wisdom, and from him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity of the images." The perpetration of such assertions amounts to a bitter sarcasm of the power that created the world.
2.9.11To begin with, if the Soul did not descend, if she limited herself to illuminating the darkness (which is synonymous with matter), by what right could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (downwards)? If indeed a kind of light issued from the Soul, this does not justify an inclination of the Soul, unless we admit the existence of something (darkness) beneath her, that the Soul approached the darkness by a local movement, and that, on arriving near it, the Soul illuminated it. On the contrary, if the Soul illuminated it while remaining self-contained, without doing anything to promote that illumination, why did the Soul alone illuminate the darkness? (According to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the Soul had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only could the Soul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of this rational conception. But then, why did the Soul not create the world at the same time she illuminated the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation of ("psychic) images"? Further, why did this Reason of the world, which (the Gnostics) call the "foreign land," and which was produced by the superior powers, as they say, not move its authors to that inclination? Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic images, and not bodies? (Wisdom, or) the image of the Soul does not seem to stand in need of darkness or matter. If the Soul create, then her image (Wisdom) should accompany her, and remain attached to her. Besides, what is this creature of hers? Is it a being, or is it, as the (Gnostics) say, a conception? If it be a being, what difference is there between it and its principle? If it be some other kind of a soul, it must be a "soul of growth and generation," since its principle is a reasonable soul. If however (this Wisdom) be a "soul of growth and generation," how could it be said to have created for the purpose of being honored? In short, how could it have been created by pride, audacity, and imagination? Still less would we have the right to say that it had been created by virtue of a rational conception. Besides, what necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to have formed him of matter and of an image? Speaking of conception, it would be necessary to explain the origin of this term; then, unless a creative force be predicated of this conception, it would be necessary to show how a conception can constitute a real being. But what creative force can be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics) say that this image (the demiurgic creator) was produced first, and that only afterwards other images were created; but they permit themselves to assert that without any proof. For instance, how could it be said that fire was produced first (and other things only later)?
2.9.12How could this newly formed image (the demiurgic creator) have undertaken to create by memory of the things he knew? As he did not exist before, he could not have known anything, any more than the mother (Wisdom) which is attributed to him. Besides, it is quite surprising that, though the (Gnostics) did not descend upon this world as images of souls, but as veritable, genuine souls, nevertheless hardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching themselves from the (sense) world and by gathering together their memories, to remember some of the things they previously knew, while this image (the demiurgical creator), as well as his mother (Wisdom), which is a material image, was capable of conceiving intelligible entities in a feeble manner, indeed, as say the Gnostics, but after all from her very birth. Not only did she conceive intelligible things, and formed an idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world, but she also discovered with what elements she was to produce the sense-world. Why did she first create the fire? Doubtless because she judged she would begin thereby; for why did she not begin with some other element? If she could produce fire because she had the conception thereof, why, as she had the conception of the world--as she must have begun by a conception of the totality--did she not create the whole at one single stroke? Indeed, this conception of the world embraced all its parts. It would also have been more natural, for the demiurgical creator should not have acted like a workman, as all the arts are posterior to nature and to the creation of the world. Even to-day, we do not see the natures when they beget individuals, first produce the fire, then the other elements successively, and finally mingle them. On the contrary, the outline and organization of the entire organism are formed at once in the germ born at the monthly periods in the womb of the mother. Why then, in creation, should matter not have been organized at one stroke by the type of the world, a type that must have contained fire, earth, and all the rest of them? Perhaps the (Gnostics) would have thus conceived of the creation of the world, if (instead of an image) they had had in their system a genuine Soul. But their demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus. To conceive of the greatness, and especially of the dimension of the heavens, of the obliquity of the zodiac, of the course of the stars, the form of the earth, and to understand the reason of each of these things, would not have been the work of an image, but rather of a power that proceeded from the better principles, as the (Gnostics) in spite of themselves acknowledge. Indeed, if we examine attentively that in which this illumination of the darkness consists, the (Gnostics) may be led to a recognition of the true principles of the world. Why was the production of this illumination of the darkness necessary, if its existence was not absolutely unavoidable? This necessity (of an illumination of the darkness) was either in conformity with, or in opposition to nature. If it conformed thereto, it must have been so from all time; if it were contrary thereto, something contrary to nature would have happened to the divine powers, and evil would be prior to the world. Then it would no longer be the world that was the cause of evil (as the Gnostics claim), but the divine powers. The world is not the principle of evil for the soul, but it is the soul that is the principle of evil for the world. Ascending from cause to cause, reason will relate this world to the primary principles. If matter is also said to be the cause of evil, where does it originate? For the darkness existed already, as say (the Gnostics), when the soul has seen and illuminated them. From whence (comes darkness)? If (the Gnostics) answer that it is the soul herself that created (darkness) by inclining (downwards to matter), then evidently (the darkness) did not exist before the inclination of the soul. Darkness therefore is not the cause of this inclination; the cause is in the nature of the soul. This cause may thus be related to preceding necessities, and as a result to first principles.
2.9.13Those who complain of the nature of the world do not know what they are doing, nor the extent of their audacity. Many men are ignorant of the close concatenation which unites the entities of the first, second, and third ranks, and which descends even to those of the lowest degree. Instead of blaming what is subordinate to first principles, we should gently submit to the laws of the universe, rise to first principles, not undergo those tragic terrors, inspired in certain people by the spheres of the world which exert on us nothing but a beneficent influence. What is so terrible in them? Why should they be feared by these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learning? Though celestial spheres do have fiery bodies, they should not inspire us with any fear, because they are perfectly harmonious with the universe and with the earth. We must besides consider the souls of the stars to which those (Gnostics) consider themselves so superior, while their bodies, which surpass ours so much in size and beauty, efficaciously concur in the production of things that are conformed to the order of nature; for such things could not be born if first principles alone existed. Finally the stars complete the universe, and are important members thereof. If even man holds a great superiority over animals, there must be a far greater superiority in those stars which exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish order therein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence. The events that are said to flow from the stars are rather signs thereof than causes. Besides, the events that really do flow from the stars differ among each other by circumstances. It is not therefore possible that the same things should happen to all men, separated as they are by their times of birth, the places of their residence, and the dispositions of their souls. It is just as unreasonable to expect that all would be good, nor, because of the impossibility of this, to go and complain on the grounds that all sense-objects should be similar to intelligible objects. Moreover, evil is nothing but what is less complete in respect to wisdom, and less good, in a decreasing gradation. For instance, nature (that is, the power of growth and generation) should not be called evil because she is not sensation; nor sensation be called evil, because it is not reason. Otherwise, we might be led to think that there was evil in the intelligible world. Indeed, the Soul is inferior to Intelligence, and Intelligence is inferior to the One.
2.9.14Another error of the (Gnostics) is their teaching that intelligible beings are not beyond the reach of being affected by human beings. When the (Gnostics) utter magic incantations, addressing them to (intelligible beings), not only to the Soul, but to the Principles superior thereto, what are they really trying to do? To bewitch them? To charm them? Or, to influence them? They therefore believe that divine beings listen to us, and that they obey him who skilfully pronounces these songs, cries, aspirations and whistlings, to all of which they ascribe magic power. If they do not really mean this, if they by sounds only claim to express things which do not fall under the senses, then, through their effort to make their art more worthy of respect, they unconsciously rob it of all claim to respect, in our estimation. They also pride themselves on expelling diseases. If this were done through temperance, by a well regulated life, as do the philosophers, this claim might be respected. But they insist that diseases are demons, which they can expel by their words, and they boast of this in order to achieve reputation among the common people, that is always inclined to stand in awe of magic. They could not persuade rational individuals that diseases do not have natural causes, such as fatigue, satiety, lack of food, corruption, or some change depending on an interior or exterior principle. This is proved by the nature of diseases. Sometimes a disease is expelled by moving the bowels, or by the administration of some potion; diet and bleeding are also often resorted to. Is this because the demon is hungry, or the potion destroys him? When a person is healed on the spot, the demon either remains or departs. If he remain, how does his presence not hinder recovery? If he depart, why? What has happened to him? Was he fed by the disease? In this case, the disease was something different from the demon. If he enter without any cause for the disease, why is the individual into whose body he enters not always sick? If he enter into a body that contains already a natural cause of disease, how far does he contribute to the disease? The natural cause is sufficient to produce the disease. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the disease would have a cause, but that, as soon as this cause is active there would be a demon ready to come and assist it. The reader must now clearly see the kind of assertions given out by the (Gnostics), and what their purpose must be. What they say about demons (or guardians) has here been mentioned only as a commentary on their vain pretenses. Other opinions of the (Gnostics) may best be judged by a perusal of their books, by each individual for himself. Remember always that our system of philosophy contains, beside the other good (reasons), the simplicity of moral habits, the purity of intelligence, and that instead of vain boasting it recommends the care of personal dignity, rational self-confidence, prudence, reserve, and circumspection. The remainder (of Gnostic philosophy) may well be contrasted with ours. As all that is taught by the Gnostics is very different (from our teachings), we would have no advantage in a further detailed contrast; and it would be unworthy of us to pursue the matter(?).
2.9.15We should however observe the moral effect produced in the soul of those who listen to the speeches of these men who teach scorn of the world and its contents. About the destiny of man there are two principal doctrines. The one assigns as our end the pleasures of the body, the other suggests honesty and virtue, the love of which comes from the divinity, and leads back to the Divinity, as we have shown elsewhere. Epicurus, who denies divine Providence, advises us to seek the only thing that remains, the enjoyments of pleasure. Well, the (Gnostics) hold a still more pernicious doctrine; they blame the manner in which divine Providence operates, and they accuse Providence itself; they refuse respect to laws established here below, and the virtue which has been honored by all centuries. To destroy the last vestiges of honor, they destroy temperance by joking at it; they attack justice, whether natural, or acquired by reason or exercise; in one word, they annihilate everything that could lead to virtue. Nothing remains but to seek out pleasure, to profess selfishness, to renounce all social relations with men, to think only of one's personal interest, unless indeed one's own innate disposition be good enough to resist their pernicious doctrines. Nothing that we regard as good is by them esteemed, for they seek entirely different objects. Nevertheless, those who know the Divinity should attach themselves to Him even here below, and by devoting themselves to His first principles, correct earthly things by applying their divine nature thereto. Only a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand that of which honor consists; those who have no virtue could never rise to intelligible entities. Our criticism of the (Gnostics) is justified by this that they never speak of virtue, never study it, give no definition of it, do not make out its kinds, and never repeat anything of the beautiful discussions thereof left to us by the ancient sages. The (Gnostics) never tell how one could acquire or preserve moral qualities, how one should cultivate or purify the soul. Their precept, "Contemplate the divinity," is useless if one does not also teach how this contemplation is to take place. One might ask the (Gnostics) if such contemplation of the divinity would be hindered by any lust or anger? What would hinder one from repeating the name of the divinity, while yielding to the domination of the passions, and doing nothing to repress them? Virtue, when perfected, and by wisdom solidly established in the soul, is what shows us the divinity. Without real virtue, God is no more than a name.
2.9.16One does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities, the world, and the beauties it contains. Scorn of the divinities is the chief characteristic of the evil. Perversity is never complete until scorn of the divinities is reached; and if a man were not otherwise perverse, this vice would be sufficient to make him such. The respect which the (Gnostic) pretend to have for the intelligible divinities (the aeons) is an illogical accident. For when one loves a being, he loves all that attaches thereto; he extends to the children the affection for the parent. Now every soul is a daughter of the heavenly Father. The souls that preside over the stars are intellectual, good, and closer to the divinity than ours. How could this sense-world, with the divinities it contains, be separated from the intelligible world? We have already shown above the impossibility of such a separation. Here we insist that when one scorns beings so near to those that hold the front rank, it can only be that one knows them by name only. How could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine Providence does not extend to sense-objects, or at least interests itself only in some of them (the spiritual men, not the psychical)? Such an assertion must surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that divine Providence interests itself only in them. Was this the case while they were living on high, or only since they live here below? In the first case, why did they descend onto this earth? In the second, why do they remain here below? Besides, why should the Divinity not be present here below also? Otherwise how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are here below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become perverse? If He know those that have not become perverse, He must also know those who have become perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter. He must therefore be present to all men, and to the entire world, in some manner or other. Thus the world will participate in the Divinity. If the Divinity deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive you also thereof, and you could not say anything of Him or of the beings below Him. The world certainly derives its existence from Him whether the divinity protect you by His providence or His help, and whatever be the name by which you refer to Him. The world never was deprived of the Divinity, and never will be. The world has a better right than any individuals to the attentions of Providence, and to participation in divine perfections. This is particularly true in respect to the universal Soul, as is proved by the existence and wise arrangement of the world. Which of these so proud individuals is as well arranged, and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? Indeed, unless made merely in the course of a discussion, such a comparison is really an impiety. To doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind and senseless man, without experience or reason, and who is so far removed from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not even know the sense-world? Could any musician who had once grasped the intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound emotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy symmetry, order and proportion, in the objects that meet his view? Though their eyes behold the same objects as common people, experts see in them different things; when, for instance, with practiced glance, they examine some picture. When recognizing in sense-objects an image of intelligible (essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine beauty: that is the origin of love. One rises to the intelligible by seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face. Heavy and senseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible beauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement, this grand panoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance, without being stirred to enthusiasm, and admiration of their splendor and magnificence. He who can fail to experience such feelings must have failed to observe sense-objects, or know even less the intelligible world.
2.9.17Some (Gnostics) object that they hate the body because Plato complains much of it, as an obstacle to the soul, and as something far inferior to her. In this case, they should, making abstraction of the body of the world by thought, consider the rest; that is, the intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the world, and then the incorporeal souls which, in perfect order, communicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an intelligible model, so that what is begotten might, so far as possible, by its greatness, equal the indivisible nature of its model; for the greatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of intelligible power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the celestial sphere, whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine power that contains its principle, middle and end, or whether they imagine it as immovable, and not yet exerting its action on any of the things it governs by its revolution. In both ways they will attain a proper idea of the Soul that presides over this universe. Let them then conceive of this soul as united to a body, though remaining impassible, and still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of participating therein, some of its perfections, for the divinity is incapable of jealousy. Then they will form a proper idea of the world. They will understand how great is the power of the Soul, since she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of her receptivity. This body has no beauty by nature, but when (it is beautified by the Soul) it entrances divine souls. The (Gnostics) pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of the world, and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly bodies. In this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste, nor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contemplation, nor in the divinity itself; for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation in first principles. If they be not beautiful, neither could those first principles be such. Consequently sense-beings are beautiful, though less beautiful than intelligible beings. The scorn professed by (Gnostics) for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only to the beauty of women and of young boys, and if its only purpose be to lead to chastity. But you may be sure that they do not boast of scorning what is ugly, they only boast of scorning what they had at first recognized and loved as being beautiful. We must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in the parts and in the whole, in individuals and in the universe; that there are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals, for instance, in the guardians, to lead us to admire their creator, and to prove to us that they indeed are works of his. In this way we may attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal Soul, if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects, and if, without scorning them, we know how to rise to intelligible entities. If the interior of a sense-being be beautiful, we shall judge that it is in harmony with its exterior beauty. If it be ugly we will consider that it is inferior to its principle. But it is impossible for a being really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within; for the exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the interior. Those who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within, are externally beautiful only deceptively. In contradiction to those who claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly soul, I insist that such never existed, and that it was a mistake to consider them beautiful. If such men were ever seen, their interior ugliness was accidental, and also their soul was, by nature, beautiful; for we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching our goal. But the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from possessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior beauty. The beings to whom nature has not, from the beginning, given perfection, may indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may become perverted; but the universe never was a child, nor imperfect; it did not develop, and received no physical increase. Such a physical increase would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed everything. Nor could we admit that its Soul had ever, in the course of time, gained any increase. But even if this were granted to the (Gnostics), this could not constitute any evil.
2.9.18(Gnostics) however might object that their doctrine inspired revulsion from, and hate for the body, while (that of Plotinos) really attached the soul to the body (by recognition of its beauty). Hardly. We may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful house. The first guest blamed the disposition of the plan, and the architect who constructed it, but nevertheless remained within it. The other guest, instead of blaming the architect, praised his skill, and awaited the time when he might leave this house, when he should no longer need it. The first guest would think himself wiser and better prepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are composed of lifeless stones and beams, and that this house was far from truly representing the intelligible house. He would however not know that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion, is that he did not know how to support necessary things, while his companion (who did not blame the house) will be able to leave it without regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately. So long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed by the (world) Soul, who is our beneficent sister, and who had the power to do such great things without any effort. The Gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their "brothers," but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities of heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are! Doubtless, to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of kindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have become good, and instead of being bodies, we must be souls in these bodies; and, so far as possible, we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the universal Soul dwells within the body of the universe. To do this, one has to be firm, not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of sight or hearing, and to remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul of the world is not troubled by anything, because she is outside of the reach of all. We, however, who here below are exposed to the blows of fortune, must repel them by our virtue, weakening some, and foiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul. When we shall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach (of all exigencies), having approached the Soul of the universe and of the stars, we shall try to become her image, and even to increase this resemblance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having been well disposed by nature and exercised, we also will contemplate what these souls have been contemplating since the beginning. We must also remember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege of contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really contemplate this world any more than any other men. Vainly also do some (Gnostics) boast of having to leave their bodies when they will have ceased to live, while this is impossible to the divinities because they always fill the same function in heaven. They speak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside of the body, and of how the universal Soul in her entirety wisely governs what is inanimate. We ourselves may very well not love the body, we may become pure, scorn death, and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are superior to earthly things. But on this account we should not be jealous of other men, who are not only capable of following the same goal, but who do constantly pursue it. Let us not insist that they are incapable of doing so. Let us not fall into the same error as those who deny the movement of the stars, because their senses show them to remain immovable. Let us not act as do the (Gnostics), who believe that the nature of the stars does not see what is external, because they themselves do not see that their own souls are outside.
3.1.1The first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things that become, and those that are; the cause of the former being their becoming, and that of the latter, their existence. Again, neither of them may have a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and some not. Further, those that become might have a cause, while, of these that exist, some might partly have a cause. Contrariwise, all things that exist may have a cause, while of those that become, parts may have a cause, and part not. Last, none of the things that become might have any cause. Speaking of eternal things, the first cannot be derived from other causes, just because they are first. Things dependent from the first, however, may indeed thence derive their being. To each thing we should also attribute the resultant action; for a thing's being is constituted by its displayed energy. Now among the things that become, or among those that although perpetually existent do not always result in the same actions, it may be boldly asserted that everything has a cause. We should not admit (the Stoic contention) that something happens without a cause, nor accept the (Epicurean) arbitrary convergence of the atoms, nor believe that any body initiates a movement suddenly and without determining reason, nor suppose (with Epicurus again) that the soul undertakes some action by a blind impulse, without any motive. Thus to suppose that a thing does not belong to itself, that it could be carried away by involuntary movements, and act without motive, would be to subject it to the most crushing determinism. The will must be excited, or the desire awakened by some interior or exterior stimulus. No determination (is possible) without motive. If everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover such fact's proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go downtown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases it is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived from the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be referred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become rich, this is due to his finding some treasure, or receiving some donation, to working, or exercising some lucrative profession. The birth of a child depends on its father, and the concourse of exterior circumstances, which, by the concatenation of causes and effects, favored his procreation; for example, right food, or even a still more distant cause, the fertility of the mother, or, still more generally, of nature (or, in general, it is usual to assign natural causes).
3.1.2To stop, on arriving at these causes, and to refuse further analysis, is to exhibit superficiality. This is against the advice of the sages, who advise ascending to the primary causes, to the supreme principles. For example, why, during the full moon, should the one man steal, and the other one not steal? Or, why, under the same influence of the heavens, has the one, and not the other, been sick? Why, by use of the same means, has the one become rich, and the other poor? The difference of dispositions, characters, and fortunes force us to seek ulterior causes, as indeed the sages have always done. Those sages who (like Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus) assumed material principles such as the atoms, and who explain everything by their motion, their shock and combinations, pretend that everything existent and occurring is caused by the agency of these atoms, their "actions and reactions." This includes, according to them, our appetites and dispositions. The necessity residing in the nature of these principles, and in their effects, is therefore, by these sages, extended to everything that exists. As to the (Ionic Hylicists), who assume other physical (ultimate) principles, referring everything to them, they thus also subject all beings to necessity. There are others (such as Heraclitus), who, seeking the (supreme) principle of the universe, refer everything to it; saying that this principle penetrates, moves, and produces everything. This they call Fate, and the Supreme Cause. From it they derive everything; its motions are said to give rise not only to the things that are occurring, but even our thought. That is how the members of an animal do not move themselves, but receive the stimulus from the "governing principle" within them. Some (of the astrologers) explain everything by the circular motion of the heavens, by the relative positions of the planets and stars, and by their mutual aspects (or, relations). They base this (principle) on the prevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures about futurity. Others (like the Stoic Chrysippus) define Fate otherwise: it is "the concatenation of causes" in "their connection towards the infinite," by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an anterior one. Thus the things that follow relate to the things that precede, and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon. Amidst these (Stoic) philosophers there are two conceptions of Fate: some consider that everything depends from a single principle, while others do not. These views we shall study later. We shall first examine the system with which we began; later we shall review the others.
3.1.3To refer everything to physical causes, whether you call them atoms or elements, and from their disordered motion to deduce order, reason and the soul that directs (the body), is absurd and impossible; nevertheless, to deduce everything from atoms, is, if possible, still more impossible; and consequently many valid objections have been raised against this theory. To begin with, even if we do admit such atomic principles, their existence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity of all things, or fatality. Let us, indeed, grant the existence of atoms; now some will move downwards--that is, if there is an up and down in the universe--others obliquely, by chance, in various directions. As there will be no order, there will be nothing determinate. Only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate. It will therefore be impossible to guess or predict events, whether by art--and indeed, how could there be any art in the midst of orderless things?--or by enthusiasm, or divine inspiration; for prediction implies that the future is determined. True, bodies will obey the impulses necessarily communicated to them by the atoms; but how could you explain the operations and affections of the soul by movements of atoms? How could atomic shock, whether vertical or oblique, produce in the soul these our reasonings, or appetites, whether necessarily, or in any other way? What explanation could they give of the soul's resistance to the impulsions of the body? By what concourse of atoms will one man become a geometrician, another become a mathematician and astronomer, and the other a philosopher? For, according to that doctrine we no longer produce any act for which we are responsible, we are even no longer living beings, since we undergo the impulsion of bodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things. The same objections apply to the doctrine of the philosophers who explain everything by other physical causes (such as "elements"). Principles of inferior nature might well warm us, cool us, or even make us perish; but they could not beget any of the operations which the soul produces; these have an entirely different cause.
3.1.4But might (Heraclitus) suppose that a single Soul interpenetrating the universe produces everything, and by supplying the universe with motion supplies it simultaneously to all its constituent beings, so that from this primary cause, would necessarily flow all secondary causes, whose sequence and connection would constitute Fate? Similarly, in a plant, for instance, the plant's fate might be constituted by the ("governing") principle which, from the root, administers its other parts, and which organizes into a single system their "actions" and "reactions." To begin with, this Necessity and Fate would by their excess destroy themselves, and render impossible the sequence and concatenation of the causes. It is, indeed, absurd to insist that our members are moved by Fate when they are set in motion, or innervated, by the "governing principle." It is a mistake to suppose that there is a part which imparts motion, and on the other hand, a part which receives it from the former; it is the governing principle that moves the leg, as it would any other part. Likewise, if in the universe exists but a single principle which "acts and reacts," if things derive from each other by a series of causes each of which refers to the preceding one, it will no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise through causes, for their totality will constitute but a single being. In that case, we are no longer ourselves; actions are no longer ours; it is no longer we who reason; it is a foreign principle which reasons, wills, and acts in us, just as it is not our feet that walk, but we who walk by the agency of our feet. On the contrary, common sense admits that every person lives, thinks, and acts by his own individual, proper life, thought and action; to each must be left the responsibility of his actions, good or evil, and not attribute shameful deeds to the universal cause.
3.1.5Others, again, insist that this is not the state of affairs. Their disposition depends on the circular movement of the heaven which governs everything, on the course of the stars, of their mutual relative position at the time of their rising, of their setting, of their zenith, or of their conjunction. Indeed, such are the signs on which are founded prognostications and predictions of what is to happen, not only to the universe, but also to each individual, both as to his fortunes and his thought. It is noticed that the other animals and vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind of sympathy existing between them and the stars, that all other things experience their influence, that various regions of the earth differ according to their adjustment with the stars, and especially the sun; that from the nature of these regions depend not only the character of the plants and animals, but also human forms, size, color, affections, passions, tastes, and customs. In this system, therefore, the course of the stars is the absolute cause of everything. To this we answer that our astrologer attributes indirectly to the stars all our characteristics: will, passions, vices and appetites; he allows us no rôle other than to turn like mills, instead of responsibility, as befits men, producing actions that suit our nature. On the contrary, we should be left in possession of what belongs to us by the observation that the universe limits itself to exercising some influence on what we possess already thanks to ourselves, and which is really characteristic of us. Moreover, one should distinguish the deeds in which we are "active," from those in which we are necessarily "passive," and not deduce everything from the stars. Nobody, indeed, doubts that the differences of place and climate exert an influence over us, imparting to us, for instance, a cool or warm-hearted disposition. Heredity also should be considered; for children usually resemble their parents by their features, form, and some affections of the irrational soul. Nevertheless, even though they resemble them by their facial features, because they are born in the same place, they may differ in habits and thoughts, because these things depend on an entirely different principle. In addition, we can adduce to the support of this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the temperament and to the appetites. As to the claim that the stars are the causes of everything, because one can predict what is to happen to each man from a consideration of their positions, it would be just as reasonable to assert that the birds and the other beings which the augurs consult as omens produce the events of which they are the signs. This leads us to consider, more in detail, what sort of facts may be predicted according to the inspection of the positions occupied by the stars presiding over the birth of a man. They who, from the assertion that the stars indicate a man's future, draw the consequence that the stars produce them, are in error. In some person's horoscope which indicates birth from noble parents, on either maternal or paternal side, this nobility of birth cannot be attributed to the stars, as this nobility subsisted already in the parents before the stars had taken the position according to which the horoscope is cast. Besides, astrologers pretend they can discover the parent's fortune from the birth of their children, and from the condition of the parents the disposition and fate of the unborn offspring. From a child's horoscope, they announce his brother's death; and from a woman's horoscope, the fortunes of her husband, and conversely. It is unreasonable to refer to the stars things which evidently are necessary consequences of parental conditions. We then reach a dilemma: the cause lies either in these antecedent conditions, or in the stars. The beauty and ugliness of children, when they resemble their parents, must evidently be derived from them, and not from the course of the stars. Moreover, it is probable that at any one moment are born a crowd of human and animal young; now, inasmuch as they are born under the same star, they all ought to have the same nature. How does it then happen that, in the same positions, stars produce men and other beings simultaneously (as Cicero asks)?
3.1.6Each being derives his character from his nature. One being is a horse because he is born from a mare, while another is human, because born from a human mother; and more: he is that particular horse, and that particular man because he is born from such and such a horse, or woman. Doubtless, the course of the stars may modify the result, but the greatest part of the influence must be allowed to heredity. The stars act on the body only in a physical way, and thus impart to them heat, cold, and the variety of temperament which results therefrom. But how could they endow the man with habits, tastes, and inclinations which do not seem to depend on the temperament, such as the avocation of a surveyor, a grammarian, a gambler, or an inventor? Besides, nobody would admit that perversity could come from beings who are divinities. How could one believe that they are the authors of the evils attributed to them, and that they themselves become evil because they set or pass under the earth, as if they could possibly be affected by the fact that, in regard to us, they seem to set; as if they did not continue to wander around the heavenly sphere, and remained in the same relation to the earth? Besides it is incredible that because a star is in such or such a position in respect of another star, it becomes better or worse, and that it affects us with goodness when it is well disposed, and evil in the contrary case. We grant that by their movement the stars co-operate in the conservation of the universe, and that they simultaneously play in it another part. They serve as letters for those skilled in deciphering this kind of writing; and who, by the observation of the figures formed by the stars, read into them future events according to the laws of analogy, as for instance, if one presaged high deeds from seeing a bird fly high.
3.1.7There remains to be considered the (Stoic) doctrine which, concatenating and interrelating all things among each other, establishes "a single cause which produces everything through seminal reasons." This doctrine reattaches itself to (Heraclitus's) which deduces from the action of the universal Soul the constitution and the movements of the individuals as well as those of the universe. In this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by ourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the universe subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole series of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate includes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence of that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of a single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed, in this case, the fancies of our imagination would result from anterior facts, and would in turn determine our appetites; our liberty would then have become a mere word; nor would we gain any advantage from obeying our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be determined by anterior facts. We would have no more liberty than the other animals, than children, or the insane, who run hither and yon, driven by blind appetites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire would do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions of their nature. These objections will be decisive for those capable of apprehending them; and in the search for other causes of our appetites they will not content themselves with the principles which we have examined.
3.1.8What other cause, besides the preceding, will we have to invoke so as to let nothing occur without a cause, to maintain order and interdependence of things in the world, and in order to preserve the possibility of predictions and omens without destroying our personality? We shall have to introduce among the number of beings another principle, namely: the soul; and not only the World-soul, but even the individual soul of every person. In the universal concatenation of causes and effects, this soul is a principle of no little importance, because, instead of, like all other things, being born of a "seminal reason," it constitutes a "primary cause." Outside of a body, she remains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent of the cause which administers the world. As soon as she has descended into a body, she is no longer so independent, for she then forms part of the order to which all things are subjected. Now, inasmuch as the accidents of fortune, that is to say, the surrounding circumstances, determine many events, the soul alternately yields to the influence of external circumstances, and then again she dominates them, and does what she pleases. This she does more or less, according as she is good or evil. When she yields to the corporeal temperament, she is necessarily subjected to desire or anger, discouraged in poverty, or proud in prosperity, as well as tyrannical in the exercise of power. But she can resist all these evil tendencies if her disposition is good; she modifies her surroundings more than she is affected by them; some things she changes, others she tolerates without herself incurring guilt.
3.1.9All things therefore, which result either from a choice by the soul, or from exterior circumstances, are "necessary," or determined by a cause. Could anything, indeed, be found outside of these causes? If we gather into one glance all the causes we admit, we find the principles that produce everything, provided we count, amidst external causes, the influence exercised by the course of the stars. When a soul makes a decision, and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by external things, and yields to a blind impulse, we should not consider her determination and action to be free. The soul is not free when, perverting herself, she does not make decisions which direct her in the straight path. On the contrary, when she follows her own guide, pure and impassible reason, her determination is really voluntary, free and independent, and the deed she performs is really her own work, and not the consequence of an exterior impulse; she derives it from her inner power, her pure being, from the primary and sovereign principle which directs her, being deceived by no ignorance, nor vanquished by the power of appetites; for when the appetites invade the soul, and subdue her, they drag her with them by their violence, and she is rather "passive" than "active" in what she does.
3.1.10The conclusion of our discussion is that while everything is indicated and produced by causes, these are of two kinds: First the human soul, and then only exterior circumstances. When the soul acts "conformably to right reason" she acts freely. Otherwise, she is tangled up in her deeds, and she is rather "passive" than "active." Therefore, whenever she lacks prudence, the exterior circumstances are the causes of her actions; one then has good reason to say that she obeys Fate, especially if Fate is here considered as an exterior cause. On the contrary, virtuous actions are derived from ourselves; for, when we are independent, it is natural for us to produce them. Virtuous men act, and do good freely. Others do good only in breathing-spells left them in between by their passions. If, during these intervals, they practice the precepts of wisdom, it is not because they receive them from some other being, it is merely because their passions do not hinder them from listening to the voice of reason. As the first book seemed Platonic, and the second Numenian, so this third one seems called forth by the practical opposition of astrologers or Gnostics. Later in life, his thirty-third book, ii. 9, was to take up again this polemic in more extended form. This chronologic arrangement of Plotinos's first three books reveals his three chief sources of interest--devotion to Plato, reliance on Numenius, and opposition to the Gnostics and astrologers.
3.2.1When Epicurus derives the existence and constitution of the universe from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and stultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have elsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated. But (if the world do not owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an adequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings. This (teleological) question deserves the most careful consideration. Things that seem evil do indeed exist, and they do suggest doubts about universal Providence; so that some (like Epicurus) insist there is no providence, while others (like the Gnostics), hold that the demiurgic creator is evil. The subject, therefore, demands thorough investigation of its first principles. Let us leave aside this individual providence, which consists in deliberating before an action, and in examining whether we should or should not do something, or whether we should give or not give it. We shall also assume the existence of the universal Providence, and from this principle we shall deduce the consequences. We would acknowledge the existence of a particular Providence, such as we mentioned above, if we thought that the world had had a beginning of existence, and had not existed since all eternity. By this particular Providence we mean a recognition, in the divinity, of a kind of prevision and reasoning (similar to the reasoning and prevision of the artist who, before carrying out a work, deliberates on each of the parts that compose it). We would suppose that this prevision and reasoning were necessary to determine how the universe could have been made, and on what conditions it should have been the best possible. But as we hold that the world's existence had no beginning, and that it has existed since all time, we can, in harmony with reason and our own views, affirm that universal Providence consists in this that the universe is conformed to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is prior to the universe, not indeed in time--for the existence of the Intelligence did not temporarily precede that of the universe--but (in the order of things), because, by its nature, Intelligence precedes the world that proceeds from it, of which it is the cause, type and model, and cause of unchanged perpetual persistence. This is how Intelligence continues to make the world subsist. Pure Intelligence and Being in itself constitute the genuine (intelligible) World that is prior to everything, which has no extension, which is weakened by no division, which has no imperfection, even in its parts, for none of its parts are separated from its totality. This world is the universal Life and Intelligence. Its unity is both living and intelligent. In it each part reproduces the whole, its totality consists of a perfect harmony, because nothing within it is separate, independent, or isolated from anything else. Consequently, even if there were mutual opposition, there would be no struggle. Being everywhere one and perfect, the intelligible World is permanent and immutable, for it contains no internal reaction of one opposite on another. How could such a reaction take place in this world, since nothing is lacking in it? Why should Reason produce another Reason within it, and Intelligence produce another Intelligence merely because it was capable of doing so? If so, it would not, before having produced, have been in a perfect condition; it would produce and enter in motion because it contained something inferior. But blissful beings are satisfied to remain within themselves, persisting within their essence. A multiple action compromises him who acts by forcing him to issue from himself. The intelligible World is so blissful that even while doing nothing it accomplishes great things, and while remaining within itself it produces important operations.
3.2.2The sense-world draws its existence from that intelligible World. The sense-world, however, is not really unitary; it is indeed multiple, and divided into a plurality of parts which are separated from each other, and are mutually foreign. Not love reigns there, but hate, produced by the separation of things which their state of imperfection renders mutually inimical. None of its parts suffices to itself. Preserved by something else, it is none the less an enemy of the preserving Power. The sense-world has been created, not because the divinity reflected on the necessity of creating, but because (in the nature of things) it was unavoidable that there be a nature inferior to the intelligible World, which, being perfect, could not have been the last degree of existence. It occupied the first rank, it had great power, that was universal and capable of creating without deliberation. If it had had to deliberate, it would not, by itself, have expressed the power of creation. It would not have possessed it essentially. It would have resembled an artisan, who, himself, does not have the power of creating, but who acquires it by learning how to work. By giving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything without issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is Reason, because reason is the emanation of Intelligence, an emanation that is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal reason all the parts exist in an united condition, without any of them struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This Reason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass, where the parts are separated from each other, and hinder each other, and destroy each other. Likewise, from this unitary Intelligence, and from the Reason that proceeds thence, issues this universe whose parts are separate and distinct from each other, some of the parts being friendly and allied, while some are separate and inimical. They, therefore, destroy each other, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and through this destruction their generation is mutually operated. In such a way did the divinity arrange their actions and experiences that all concur in the formation of a single harmony, in which each utters its individual note because, in the whole, the Reason that dominates them produces order and harmony. The sense-world does not enjoy the perfection of Intelligence and Reason: it only participates therein. Consequently, the sense-world needed harmony, because it was formed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity. Necessity drives the sense-world to evil, and to what is irrational, because necessity itself is irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity. The intelligible World is pure reason; none other could be such. The world, which is born of it, had to be inferior to it, and be neither pure reason, nor mere matter; for order would have been impossible in unmingled matter. The sense-world, therefore, is a mixture of matter and Reason; those are the elements of which it is composed. The principle from which this mixture proceeds, and which presides over the mixture, is the Soul. Neither must we imagine that this presiding over the mixture constitutes an effort for the Soul; for she easily administers the universe, by her presence.
3.2.3For not being beautiful this world should not be blamed; neither for not being the best of corporeal worlds; nor should the Cause, from which it derives its existence, be accused. To begin with, this world exists necessarily. It is not the work of a reflecting determination. It exists because a superior Being naturally begets it in His own likeness. Even if its creation were the result of reflective determination, it could not shame its author; for the divinity made the universe beautiful, complete and harmonious. Between the greater and lesser parts He introduced a fortunate accord. A person who would blame the totality of the world from consideration of its parts is therefore unjust. He should examine the parts in their relation to the totality, and see whether they be in accord and in harmony with it. Then the study of the whole should continue down to that of the least details. Otherwise criticism does not apply to the world as a whole, but only to some of its parts. For instance, we well know how admirable, as a whole, is man; yet we grant that there would be justification for criticism of a separate hair, or toe, or some of the vilest animals, or Thersites, as a specimen of humanity. Since the work under consideration is the entire world, we would, were our intelligence attentively to listen to its voice, hear it exclaim as follows: "It is a divinity who has made Me, and from the divinity's hands I issued complete, including all animated beings, entire and self-sufficient, standing in need of nothing, since everything is contained within Me; plants, animals, the whole of Nature, the multitude of the divinities, the troupe of guardians, excellent souls, and the men who are happy because of virtue. This refers not only to the earth, which is rich in plants and animals of all kinds; the power of the Soul extends also to the sea. Nor are the air and entire heaven inanimate. They are the seat of all the excellent Souls, which communicate life to the stars, and which preside over the circular revolution of the heaven, a revolution that is eternal and full of harmony, which imitates the movement of Intelligence by the eternal and regular movement of the stars around one and the same centre, because heaven has no need to seek anything outside of itself. All the beings I contain aspire to the Good; all achieve Him, each according to its potentiality. Indeed, from the Good depends the entire heaven, my whole Soul, the divinities that inhabit my various parts, all the animals, all the plants, and all my apparently inanimate beings. In this aggregation of beings some seem to participate only in existence, others in life, others in sensation, others in intelligence, while still others seem to participate in all the powers of life at one time; for we must not expect equal faculties for unequal things, as for instance sight for the fingers, as it is suitable to the eye; while the finger needs something else; it needs its own form, and has to fulfil its function."
3.2.4We should not be surprised at water extinguishing fire, or at fire destroying some other element. Even this element was introduced to existence by some other element, and it is not surprising that it should be destroyed, since it did not produce itself, and was introduced to existence only by the destruction of some other element (as thought Heraclitus and the Stoics). Besides, the extinguished fire is replaced by another active fire. In the incorporeal heaven, everything is permanent; in the visible heaven, the totality, as well as the more important and the most essential parts, are eternal. The souls, on passing through different bodies, (by virtue of their disposition), themselves change on assuming some particular form; but, when they can do so, they stand outside of generation, remaining united to the universal Soul. The bodies are alive by their form, and by the whole that each of them constitutes (by its union with a soul), since they are animals, and since they nourish themselves; for in the sense-world life is mobile, but in the intelligible world it is immobile. Immobility necessarily begat movement, self-contained life was compelled to produce other life, and calm being naturally exhaled vibrating spirit. Mutual struggle and destruction among animals is necessary, because they are not born immortal. Their origin is due to Reason's embracing all of matter, and because this Reason possessed within itself all the things that subsist in the intelligible World. From what other source would they have arisen? The mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused by the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus). But, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they turned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation these evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death, they are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order established by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea). Order does not, as some would think, exist because of disorder, nor law on account of lawlessness; in general, it is not the better that exists on account of the worse. On the contrary, disorder exists only on account of order, lawlessness on account of law, irrationality on account of reason, because order, law and reason, such as they are here below, are only imitations (or, borrowings). It is not that the better produced the worse, but that the things which need participation in the better are hindered therefrom, either by their nature, by accident, or by some other obstacle (as Chrysippus thought that evils happen by consequence or concomitance). Indeed, that which succeeds only in acquiring a borrowed order, may easily fail to achieve it, either because of some fault inherent in its own nature, or by some foreign obstacle. Things hinder each other unintentionally, by following different goals. Animals whose actions are free incline sometimes towards good, sometimes towards evil (as the two horses in Plato's Phaedrus). Doubtless, they do not begin by inclining towards evil; but as soon as there is the least deviation at the origin, the further the advance in the wrong road, the greater and more serious does the divergence become. Besides, the soul is united to a body, and from this union necessarily arises appetite. When something impresses us at first sight, or unexpectedly, and if we do not immediately repress the motion which is produced within us, we allow ourselves to be carried away by the object towards which our inclination drew us. But the punishment follows the fault, and it is not unjust that the soul that has contracted some particular nature should undergo the consequences of her disposition (by passing into a body which conforms thereto). Happiness need not be expected for those who have done nothing to deserve it. The good alone obtain it; and that is why the divinities enjoy it.
3.2.5If then, even here below, souls enjoy the faculty of arriving at happiness, we should not accuse the constitution of the universe because some souls are not happy; the fault rather lies with their weakness, which hinders them from struggling courageously enough in the career where prizes are offered to virtue. Why indeed should we be astonished that the spirits which have not made themselves divine should not enjoy divine life? Poverty and diseases are of no importance to the good, and they are useful to the evil (as thought Theognis). Besides, we are necessarily subject to diseases, because we have a body. Then all these accidents are not useless for the order and existence of the universe. Indeed, when a being is dissolved into its elements, the Reason of the universe uses it to beget other beings, for the universal Reason embraces everything within its sphere of activity. Thus when the body is disorganized, and the soul is softened by her passions, then the body, overcome by sickness, and the soul, overcome by vice, are introduced into another series and order. There are things, like poverty and sickness, which benefit the persons who undergo them. Even vice contributes to the perfection of the universe, because it furnishes opportunity for the exercise of the divine justice. It serves other purposes also; for instance, it increases the vigilance of souls, and excites the mind and intelligence to avoid the paths of perdition; it also emphasizes the value of virtue by contrast with the evils that overtake the wicked. Of course, such utilities are not the cause of the existence of evils; we only mean that, since evils exist, the divinity made use of them to accomplish His purposes. It would be the characteristic of a great power to make even evils promote the fulfilment of its purposes, to cause formless things to assist in the production of forms. In short, we assert that evil is only an omission or failure of good. Now a coming short of good must necessarily exist in the beings here below, because in them good is mingled with other things; for this thing to which the good is allied differs from the good, and thus produces the lack of good. That is why "it is impossible for evil to be destroyed": because things are successively inferior, relatively to the nature of the absolute Good; and because, being different from the Good from which they derive their existence, they have become what they are by growing more distant from their principle.
3.2.6It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and favors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist between virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no harm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious man. Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary to nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can distributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the obtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of the virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature do not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance (as thought Plato), are either of these conditions? Neither will it matter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly. Further objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the contrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we could expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were a matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked should be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should be slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the wicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the extremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine Providence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some work (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention, nevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when they are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine Providence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its duty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we shall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is good, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme Intelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere.
3.2.7To begin with, we must remark that to show that all is good in the things mingled with matter (and therefore of sense), we must not expect to find in them the whole perfection of the World which is not soiled by matter, and is intelligible; nor should we expect to find in that which holds the second rank characteristics of that which is of the first. Since the world has a body, we must grant that this body will have influence on the totality, and expect no more than that Reason will give it that which this mixed nature was capable of receiving. For instance, if we were to contemplate the most beautiful man here below, we would be wrong in believing that he was identical with the intelligible Man, and inasmuch as he was made of flesh, muscles and bones, we would have to be satisfied with his having received from his creator all the perfection that could be communicated to him to embellish these bones, muscles and flesh, and to make the ("seminal) reason" in him predominate over the matter within him. Granting these premises, we may start out on an explanation of the above mentioned difficulties. For in the world we will find remarkable traces of the Providence and divine Power from which it proceeds. Let us take first, the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the actions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other men equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the wickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary determinations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the souls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are not pure, but rather are animals (as would naturally be the case with souls united to bodies). Now, it is not surprising that, finding themselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that condition. Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made them descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were already disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to infuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power in a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its (issues), and by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending into it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual manner. The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject we are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that, however these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed. But how shall we explain the difference that is observed between the lot of the good and the evil? How can it occur that the former are poor, while others are rich, and possess more than necessary to satisfy their needs, being even powerful, and governing cities and nations? (The Gnostics and Manicheans) think that the sphere of activity of Providence does not extend down to the earth. No! For all of the rest (of this world) conforms to (universal) Reason, inasmuch as animals and plants participate in Reason, Life and Soul. (The Gnostic) will answer that if Providence do extend to this earth, it does not predominate therein. As the world is but a single organism, to advance such an objection is the part of somebody who would assert that the head and face of man were produced by Nature, and that reason dominated therein, while the other members were formed by other causes, such as chance or necessity, and that they were evil either on this account, or because of the importance of Nature. Wisdom and piety, however, would forbid the admission that here below not everything was well, blaming the operation of Providence.
3.2.8It remains for us to explain how sense-objects are good and participate in the (cosmic) Order; or at least, that they are not evil. In every animal, the higher parts, such as the face and head, are the most beautiful, and are not equalled by the middle or lower parts. Now men occupy the middle and lower region of the universe. In the higher region we find the heaven containing the divinities; it is they that fill the greater part of the world, with the vast sphere where they reside. The earth occupies the centre and seems to be one of the stars. We are surprised at seeing injustice reigning here below chiefly because man is regarded as the most venerable and wisest being in the universe. Nevertheless, this being that is so wise occupies but the middle place between divinities and animals, at different times inclining towards the former or the latter. Some men resemble the divinities, and others resemble animals; but the greater part continue midway between them. It is those men who occupy this middle place who are forced to undergo the rapine and violence of depraved men, who resemble wild beasts. Though the former are better than those whose violence they suffer, they are, nevertheless, dominated by them because of inferiority in other respects, lacking courage, or preparedness. It would be no more than a laughing matter if children who had strengthened their bodies by exercise, while leaving their souls inviolate in ignorance, should in physical struggle conquer those of their companions, who had exercised neither body nor soul; if they stole their food or soft clothing. No legislator could hinder the vanquished from bearing the punishment of their cowardliness and effeminacy, if, neglecting the gymnastic exercises which had been taught them, they did not, by their inertia, effeminacy and laziness, fear becoming fattened sheep fit to be the prey of wolves? They who commit this rapine and violence are punished therefor first because they thereby become wolves and noxious beasts, and later because (in this or some subsequent existence) they necessarily undergo the consequences of their evil actions (as thought Plato). For men who here below have been evil do not die entirely (when their soul is separated from their bodies). Now in the things that are regulated by Nature and Reason, that which follows is always the result of that which precedes; evil begets evil, just as good begets good. But the arena of life differs from a gymnasium, where the struggles are only games. Therefore, the above-mentioned children which we divided into two classes, after having grown up in ignorance, must prepare to fight, and take up arms, an display more energy than in the exercises of the gymnasium. As some, however, are well armed, while the others are not, the first must inevitably triumph. The divinity must not fight for the cowardly; for the (cosmic) law decrees that in war life is saved by valor, and not by prayers. Nor is it by prayers that the fruits of the earth are obtained; they are produced only by labor. Nor can one have good health without taking care of it. If the evil cultivate the earth better, we should not complain of their reaping a better harvest. Besides, in the ordinary conduct of life, it is ridiculous to listen only to one's own caprice, doing nothing that is prescribed by the divinities, limiting oneself exclusively to demanding one's conservation, without carrying out any of the actions on which (the divinities) willed that our preservation should depend. Indeed it would be better to be dead than to live thus in contradiction with the laws that rule the universe. If, when men are in opposition to these laws, divine Providence preserved peace in the midst of all follies and vices, it would deserve the charge of negligence in allowing the prevalence of evil. The evil rule only because of the cowardice of those who obey them; this is juster than if it were otherwise.
3.2.9Nor should the sphere of Providence be extended to the point of suppressing our own action. For if Providence did everything, and Providence alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated. To what, indeed, would it apply? There would be nothing but divinity! It is indeed incontestable that divinity exists, and that its sphere extends over other beings--but divinity does not suppress the latter. For instance, divinity approaches man, and preserves in him what constitutes humanity; that is, divinity makes him live in conformity to the law of Providence, and makes him fulfil the commandments of that law. Now, this law decrees that the life of men who have become virtuous should be good both here below and after their death; and that the evil should meet an opposite fate. It would be unreasonable to expect the existence of men who forget themselves to come and save the evil, even if the latter addressed prayers to the divinity. Neither should we expect the divinities to renounce their blissful existence to come and administer our affairs; nor that the virtuous men, whose life is holy and superior to human conditions, should be willing to govern the wicked. The latter never busy themselves with promoting the good to the governing of other men, and themselves to be good (as thought Plato). They are even jealous of the man who is good by himself; there would indeed be more good people if virtuous men were chosen as chiefs. Man is therefore not the best being in the universe; according to his choice he occupies an intermediate rank. In the place he occupies, however, he is not abandoned by Providence, which ever leads him back to divine things by the numerous means it possesses to cause the triumph of virtue. That is the reason why men have never lost rationality, and why, to some degree, they always participate in wisdom, intelligence, art, and the justice that regulates their mutual relations. Even when one wrongs another, he is still given credit for acting in justice to himself, and he is treated according to his deserts. Besides, man, as a creature, is handsome, as handsome as possible, and, by the part he plays in the universe, he is superior to all the animals that dwell here below. No one in his senses would complain of the existence of animals inferior to man, if, besides, they contribute towards the embellishment of the universe. Would it not be ridiculous to complain that some of them bite men, as if the latter had an imprescriptible right to complete security? The existence of these animals is necessary; it procures us advantages both evident and still unknown, but which will be revealed in the course of time. Thus there is nothing useless in animals, either in respect to themselves, or to man. It is, besides, ridiculous to complain because many animals are wild, when there are even men who are such; what should surprise us most is that many animals are not submissive to man, and defend themselves against him.
3.2.10But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily, it would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and those who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity, and the latter for their cowardice. To this we answer that if the wickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be, necessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of a principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by physical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that produces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice? Unjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not have the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder the spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously, one is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for the fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that the wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo an external constraint, but that their character is constituted by wickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy our liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior influence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents desired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary to the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors of all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore, impiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the effects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But man himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own nature, and he is a free cause.
3.2.11Is it true that all things are produced by necessity, and by the natural concatenation of causes and effects, and that, thus, they are as good as possible? No! It is the Reason which, governing the world, produces all things (in this sense that it contains all the "seminal reasons"), and which decrees that they shall be what they are. It is Reason that, in conformity with its rational nature, produces what are called evils, because it does not wish everything to be equally good. An artist would not cover the body of a pictured animal with eyes. Likewise, Reason did not limit itself to the creation of divinities; it produced beneath them guardians, then men, then animals, not by envy (as Plato remarks); but because its rational essence contains an intellectual variety (that is, contains the "seminal reasons" of all different beings). We resemble such men as know little of painting, and who would blame an artist for having put shadows in his picture; nevertheless, he has only properly disposed the contrasts of light. Likewise, well-regulated states are not composed of equal orders. Further, one would not condemn a tragedy, because it presents personages other than heroes, such as slaves or peasants who speak incorrectly. To cut out these inferior personages, and all the parts in which they appear, would be to injure the beauty of the composition.
3.2.12Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things by an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature, which is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by the principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the work produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved in beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of homogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused, because it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others. If it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously contained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into the order of the world without considering their nature, and if it had made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason, and that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their degradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her.
3.2.13There is a further consideration that should not be overlooked, namely: that if you desire to discover the exercise of the distributive Justice of the divinity, it is not sufficient to examine only the present; the past and future must also be considered. Those who, in a former life, were slave-owners, if they abused their power, will be enslaved; and this change would be useful to them. It impoverishes those who have badly used their wealth; for poverty is of service even to virtuous people. Likewise, those who kill will in their turn be killed; he who commits homicide acts unjustly, but he who is its victim suffers justly. Thus arises a harmony between the disposition of the man who is maltreated, and the disposition of him who maltreats him as he deserved. It is not by chance that a man becomes a slave, is made prisoner, or is dishonored. He (must himself) have committed the violence which he in turn undergoes. He who kills his mother will be killed by his son; he who has violated a woman will in turn become a woman in order to become the victim of a rape. Hence, the divine Word called Adrastea. The orderly system here mentioned really is "unescapeable," truly a justice and an admirable wisdom. From the things that we see in the universe we must conclude that the order which reigns in it is eternal, that it penetrates everywhere, even in the smallest thing; and that it reveals an admirable art not only in the divine things, but also in those that might be supposed to be beneath the notice of Providence, on account of their minuteness. Consequently, there is an admirable variety of art in the vilest animal. It extends even into plants, whose fruits and leaves are so distinguished by the beauty of form, whose flowers bloom with so much grace, which grow so easily, and which offer so much variety. These things were not produced once for all; they are continually produced with variety, because the stars in their courses do not always exert the same influence on things here below. What is transformed is not transformed and metamorphosed by chance, but according to the laws of beauty, and the rules of suitability observed by divine powers. Every divine Power acts according to its nature, that is, in conformity with its essence. Now its essence is to develop justice and beauty in its actualizations; for if justice and beauty did not exist here, they could not exist elsewhere.
3.2.14The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without implying that on that account its author needed to go through the process of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he who best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with reasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as realized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to the laws of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning. It can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason that produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of any natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has begun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning, and which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this sense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should possess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient the form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining, that man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had to spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great to contain something less, that in everything there should be parts, and that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts. In the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing is not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties as the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which was not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect an individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for then it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty of the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more beautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part becomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating its essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme Intelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a star in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a colossal statue that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed by the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with shimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.
3.2.15The above considerations suffice for things studied each in itself. The mutual relation, however, between things already begotten, and those that are still being begotten from time to time, deserves to attract attention, and may give rise to some objections, such as the following: How does it happen that animals devour each other, that men attack each other mutually, and that they are always in ceaseless internecine warfare? How could the reason (of the universe) have constituted such a state of affairs, while still claiming that all is for the best? It does not suffice here to answer: "Everything is for the best possible. Matter is the cause that things are in a state of inferiority; evils could not be destroyed." It is true enough, indeed, that things had to be what they are, for they are good. It is not matter which has come to dominate the universe; it has been introduced in it so that the universe might be what it is, or rather, it is caused by reason (?). The principle of things is, therefore, the Logos, or Reason (of the universe), which is everything. By it were things begotten, by it were they co-ordinated in generation. What then (will it be objected) is the necessity of this natural internecine warfare of animals, and also of men? First, animals have to devour each other in order to renew themselves; they could not, indeed, last eternally, even if they were not killed. Is there any reason to complain because, being already condemned to death, as they are, they should find an end which is useful to other beings? What objection can there be to their mutually devouring each other, in order to be reborn under other forms? It is as if on the stage an actor who is thought to be killed, goes to change his clothing, and returns under another mask. Is it objected that he was not really dead? Yes indeed, but dying is no more than a change of bodies, just as the comedian changes his costume, or if the body were to be entirely despoiled, this is no more than when an actor, at the end of a drama, lays aside his costume, only to take it up again when once more the drama begins. Therefore, there is nothing frightful in the mutual transformation of animals into each other. Is it not better for them to have lived under this condition, than never to have lived at all? Life would then be completely absent from the universe, and life could no longer be communicated to other beings. But as this universe contains a multiple life, it produces and varies everything during the course of its existence; as it were joking with them, it never ceases to beget living beings, remarkable by beauty and by the proportion of their forms. The combats in which mortal men continually fight against each other, with a regularity strongly reminding of the Pyrrhic dances (as thought Plato), clearly show how all these affairs, that are considered so serious, are only children's games, and that their death was nothing serious. To die early in wars and battles is to precede by only a very little time the unescapable fate of old age, and it is only an earlier departure for a closer return. We may be comforted for the loss of our possessions during our lifetime by observing that they have belonged to others before us, and that, for those who have deprived us thereof, they form but a very fragile possession, since they, in turn, will be bereft thereof by others; and that, if they be not despoiled of their riches, they will lose still more by keeping them. Murders, massacres, the taking and pillaging of towns should be considered as in the theatre we consider changes of scene and of personages, the tears and cries of the actors. In this world, indeed, just as in the theatre, it is not the soul, the interior man, but his shadow, the exterior man, who gives himself up to lamentations and groans, who on this earth moves about so much, and who makes of it the scene of an immense drama with numberless different acts (?) Such is the characteristic of the actions of a man who considers exclusively the things placed at his feet, and outside of him, and who does not know that his tears and serious occupations are any more than games. The really earnest man occupies himself seriously only with really serious affairs, while the frivolous man applies himself to frivolous things. Indeed, frivolous things become serious for him who does not know really serious occupations, and who himself is frivolous. If, indeed, one cannot help being mixed up in this child's play, it is just as well to know that he has fallen into child's play where one's real personality is not in question. If Socrates were to mingle in these games, it would only be his exterior man who would do so. Let us add that tears and groans do not prove that the evils we are complaining of are very real evils; for often children weep and lament over imaginary grievances.
3.2.16If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness, injustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be agents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful, how can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform to nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is begotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point of view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it be the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity resemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose business it was to ridicule and criticize the author? Let us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe), and let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our conclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason. This Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence. Neither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational quiet life. Now all life is an actualization, even that which occupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes the life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The actualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling, is not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason, and which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive a rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which constitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that actualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a dancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the image of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because the art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of life, whatever it be. As reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both fulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of Intelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the totality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it imparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and creates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and struggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be the absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists of parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of a drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however, the harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being co-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is from unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may well compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds, and to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries. In a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by virtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these divers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony itself, the supreme Reason of which they are only parts. In the same way we must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and white, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and irrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal Organism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in mutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains in perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is universal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason must therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very opposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the world) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would not even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore, contain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is opposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different things, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that which exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is opposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence produce things not only different, but even opposed.
3.2.17If Reason thus from its essence produce opposed things, the things it will produce will be so much the more opposed as they are more separated from each other. The sense-world is less unitary than its Reason, and consequently, it is more manifold, containing more oppositions. Thus, in individuals, the love of life has greater force; selfishness is more powerful in them; and often, by their avidity, they destroy what they love, when they love what is perishable. The love which each individual has for himself, makes him appropriate all he can in his relations with the universe. Thus the good and evil are led to do opposite things by the Art that governs the universe; just as a choric ballet would be directed. One part is good, the other poor; but the whole is good. It might be objected that in this case no evil person will be left. Still, nothing hinders the existence of the evil; only they will not be such as they would be taken by themselves. Besides, this will be a motive of leniency in regard to them, unless Reason should decide that this leniency be not deserved, thereby making it impossible. Besides, if this world contain both bad and good people, and if the latter play the greater part in the world, there will take place that which is seen in dramas where the poet, at times, imposes his ideas on the actors, and again at others relies on their ingenuity. The obtaining of the first, second or third rank by an actor does not depend on the poet. The poet only assigns to each the part he is capable of filling, and assigns to him a suitable place. Likewise (in the world), each one occupies his assigned place, and the bad man, as well as the good one, has the place that suits him. Each one, according to his nature and character, comes to occupy the place that suits him, and that he had chosen, and then speaks and acts with piety if he be good, and impiously, if he be evil. Before the beginning of the drama, the actors already had their proper characters; they only developed it. In dramas composed by men, it is the poet who assigns their parts to the actors; and the latter are responsible only for the efficiency or inefficiency of their acting; for they have nothing to do but repeat the words of the poet. But in this drama (of life), of which men imitate certain parts when their nature is poetic, it is the soul that is the actor. This actor receives his part from the creator, as stage-actors receive from the poet their masks, garments, their purple robe, or their rags. Thus in the drama of the world it is not from chance that the soul receives her part. Indeed, the fate of a soul conforms to her character, and, by going through with her part properly, the soul fulfils her part in the drama managed by universal Reason. The soul sings her part, that is, she does that which is in her nature to do. If her voice and features be beautiful, by themselves, they lend charm to the poem, as would be natural. Otherwise they introduce a displeasing element, but which does not alter the nature of the work. The author of the drama reprimands the bad actor as the latter may deserve it, and thus fulfils the part of a good judge. He increases the dignity of the good actor, and, if possible, invites him to play beautiful pieces, while he relegates the bad actor to inferior pieces. Likewise, the soul which takes part in the drama of which the world is the theatre, and which has undertaken a part in it, brings with her a disposition to play well or badly. At her arrival she is classed with the other actors, and after having been allotted to all the various gifts of fortune without any regard for her personality or activities, she is later punished or rewarded. Such actors have something beyond usual actors; they appear on a greater scene; the creator of the universe gives them some of his power, and grants them the freedom to choose between a great number of places. The punishments and rewards are so determined that the souls themselves run to meet them, because each soul occupies a place in conformity with her character, and is thus in harmony with the Reason of the universe. Every individual, therefore, occupies, according to justice, the place he deserves, just as each string of the lyre is fixed to the place assigned to it by the nature of the sounds it is to render. In the universe everything is good and beautiful if every being occupy the place he deserves, if, for instance, he utter discordant sounds when in darkness and Tartarus; for such sounds fit that place. If the universe is to be beautiful, the individual must not behave "like a stone" in it; he must contribute to the unity of the universal harmony by uttering the sound suitable to him (as thought Epictetus). The sound that the individual utters is the life he leads, a life which is inferior in greatness, goodness and power (to that of the universe). The shepherd's pipe utters several sounds, and the weakest of them, nevertheless, contributes to the total Harmony, because this harmony is composed of unequal sounds whose totality constitutes a perfect harmony. Likewise, universal Reason though one, contains unequal parts. Consequently, the universe contains different places, some better, and some worse, and their inequality corresponds to the inequality of the soul. Indeed, as both places and souls are different, the souls that are different find the places that are unequal, like the unequal parts of the pipe, or any other musical instrument. They inhabit different places, and each utters sounds proper to the place where they are, and to the universe. Thus what is bad for the individual may be good for the totality; what is against nature in the individual agrees with the nature in the whole. A sound that is feeble does not change the harmony of the universe, as--to use another example--one bad citizen does not change the nature of a well-regulated city; for often there is need of such a man in a city; he therefore fits it well.
3.2.18The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and virtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists between souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the essence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because they differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have three ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that the same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to explain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let us imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the drama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill omissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts of the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the remainder so far as it was in his power. In the universe, indeed, all things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are produced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from an illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that may become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by perverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities. It might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the world souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we absolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also simultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however, hinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama, in the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from universal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below? For universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors with so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as everything depends on it. But why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The souls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that. They will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently, remain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are souls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should certain "reasons" be souls, and others only ("seminal) reasons"?
3.3.1The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons merely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul), may be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the universal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong to its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its universality. In fact, these "logoses" (or reasons) (or, particular souls), are the acts of the universal Soul; and these reasons being parts (of the universal Soul) have parts (of the operations) as their acts (or energies). Therefore, just as the universal Soul, which is one, has different parts, so this difference occurs again in the reasons and in the operations they effect. Just as their works (harmonize), so do the souls themselves mutually harmonize; they harmonize in this, that their very diversity, or even opposition, forms an unity. By a natural necessity does everything proceed from, and return to unity; thus creatures which are different, or even opposed, are not any the less co-ordinated in the same system, and that because they proceed from the same principle. Thus horses or human beings are subsumed under the unity of the animal species, even though animals of any kind, such as horses, for example, bite each other, and struggle against each other with a jealousy which rises to fury; and though animals of either species, including man, do as much. Likewise, with inanimate things; they form divers species, and should likewise be subsumed under the genus of inanimate things; and, if you go further, to essence, and further still, to super-Essence (the One). Having thus related or subsumed everything to this principle, let us again descend, by dividing it. We shall see unity splitting, as it penetrates and embraces everything simultaneously in a unique (or all-embracing system). Thus divided, the unity constitutes a multiple organism; each of its constituent parts acts according to its nature, without ceasing to form part of the universal Being; thus is it that the fire burns, the horse behaves as a horse should, and men perform deeds as various as their characters. In short, every being acts, lives well or badly, according to its own nature.
3.3.2Circumstances, therefore, are not decisive of human fortune; they themselves only derive naturally from superior principles, and result from the mutual concatenation of all things. This concatenation, however, derives from the (Stoic) "predominant (element in the universe"), and every being contributes to it according to its nature; just as, in an army, the general commands, and the soldiers carry out his orders cooperatively. In the universe, in fact, everything has been strategically ordered by Providence, like a general, who considers everything, both actions and experiences, victuals and drink, weapons and implements, arranging everything so that every detail finds its suitable location. Thus nothing happens which fails to enter into the general's plan, although his opponents' doings remain foreign to his influence, and though he cannot command their army. If indeed, Providence were "the great Chief over all," to whom the universe is subordinated, what could have disarranged His plans, and could have failed to be intimately associated therewith?
3.3.3Although I am able to make any desired decision, nevertheless my decision enters into the plan of the universe, because my nature has not been introduced into this plan subsequently; but it includes me and my character. But whence originates my character? This includes two points: is the cause of any man's character to be located in Him who formed him, or in that man himself? Must we, on the other hand, give up seeking its cause? Surely: just as it is hopeless to ask why plants have no sensation, or why animals are not men; it would be the same as asking why men are not gods. Why should we complain that men do not have a more perfect nature, if in the case of plants and animals nobody questions or accuses either these beings themselves, nor the power which has made them? (This would be senseless, for two reasons): if we say that they might have been better, we are either speaking of the qualities which each of them is capable of acquiring by himself; and in this case we should blame only him who has not acquired them--or, we are speaking of those qualities which he should derive not from himself, but from the Creator, in which case it would be as absurd to claim for man more qualities than he has received, than it would be to do so in the case of plants or animals. What we should examine is not if one being be inferior to another, but if it be complete within its own sphere; for evidently natural inequalities are unavoidable. This again depends on conformity to nature, not that inequalities depend on the will of the principle which has regulated all things. The Reason of the Universe, indeed, proceeds from the universal Soul; and the latter, in turn, proceeds from Intelligence. Intelligence, however, is not a particular being; it consists of all (intelligible beings), and all the beings form a plurality. Now, a plurality of being implies mutual differences between them, consisting of first, second and third ranks. Consequently, the souls of engendered animals are rather degradations of souls, seeming to have grown weaker by their procession. The (generating) reason of the animal, indeed, although it be animated, is a soul other than that from which proceeds universal Reason. This Reason itself loses excellence in the degree that it hastens down to enter into matter, and what it produces is less perfect. Nevertheless, we may well consider how admirable a work is the creature, although it be so far distant from the creator. We should, therefore, not attribute to the creator the (imperfections of the) creature; for any principle is superior to its product. So we may assert that (the principle even of imperfect things) is perfect; and, (instead of complaining), we should rather admire His communication of some traits of His power to beings dependent from Him. We have even reason to be more than grateful for His having given gifts greater than they can receive or assimilate; and as the gifts of Providence are superabundant, we can find the cause (of imperfection) only in the creatures themselves.
3.3.4If man were simple--that is, if he were no more than what he had been created, and if all his actions and passions derived from the same principle--we would no more exercise our reason to complain for his behoof than we have to complain for that of other animals. But we do have something to blame in the man, and that in the perverted man. We have good grounds for this blame, because man is not only that which he was created, but has, besides, another principle which is free (intelligence, with reason). This free principle, however, is not outside of Providence, and the Reason of the universe, any more than it would be reasonable to suppose that the things above depended on the things here below. On the contrary, it is superior things which shed their radiance on inferior ones, and this is the cause of the perfection of Providence. As to the Reason of the universe, it itself is double also; one produces things, while the other unites generated things to intelligible ones. Thus are constituted two providences: a superior one, from above (intellectual Reason, the principal power of the soul), and an inferior one, the (natural and generative power, called) reason, which derives from the first; and from both results the concatenation of things, and universal Providence (or, Providence, and destiny). Men (therefore, not being only what they were made) possess another principle (free intelligence with reason); but not all make use of all the principles they possess; some make use of the one principle (their intelligence), while others make use of the other (principle of reason), or even of the lower principle (of imagination and sensation). All these principles are present in the man, even when they do not react on him; and even in this case, they are not inert; each fulfils its peculiar office; only they do not all act simultaneously upon him (or, are not perceived by his consciousness). It may seem difficult to understand how this may be the case with all of them present, and it might seem easier to consider them absent; but they are present in us, in the sense that we lack none of them; although we might consider them absent in the sense that a principle that does not react on a man might be considered absent from him. It might be asked why these principles do not react on all men, since they are part of them? We might, referring chiefly to this (free, intelligent, reasonable) principle, say that first, it does not belong to animals; second, it is not even (practiced) by all men. If it be not present in all men, so much the more is it not alone in them, because the being in whom this principle alone is present lives according to this principle, and lives according to other principles only so far as he is compelled by necessity. The cause (which hinders intelligence and reason from dominating us) will have to be sought in the (Stoic) substrate of the man, either because our corporeal constitution troubles the superior principle (of reason and intelligence), or because of the predominance of our passions. (After all), we have not yet reached any conclusion, because this substrate of man is composed of two elements: the ("seminal) reason," and matter; (and either of them might be the cause). At first blush, it would seem that the cause (of the predominance of our lower natures) must be sought in matter, rather than in the ("seminal) reason"; and that which dominates in us is not ("seminal) reason," but matter and organized substrate. This, however, is not the case. What plays the part of substrate in respect of the superior principle (of free intelligence and reason), is both the ("seminal) reason," and that which is generated thereby, conforming to that reason; consequently, the predominant element in us is not matter, any more than our corporeal constitution. Besides, our individual characters might be derived from pre-existences. In this case we would say that our ("seminal) reason" has degenerated as a result of our antecedents, that our soul has lost her force by irradiating what was below her. Besides, our ("seminal) reason" contains within itself the very reason of our constituent matter, a matter which it discovered, or conformed to its own nature. In fact, the ("seminal) reason" of an ox resides in no matter other than that of an ox. Thus, as said (Plato), the soul finds herself destined to pass into the bodies of animals other than men, because, just like the ("seminal) reason," she has altered, and has become such as to animate an ox, instead of a man. By this decree of divine justice she becomes still worse than she was. But why did the soul ever lose her way, or deteriorate? We have often said that not all souls belong to the first rank; some belong to a second, or even third rank, and who, consequently, are inferior to those of the first. Further, leaving the right road may be caused by a trifling divergence. Third, the approximation of two differing things produces a combination which may be considered a third somewhat, different from the other two components. (Thus even in this new element, or "habituation") the being does not lose the qualities he received with his existence; if he be inferior, he has been created inferior from the very origin; it is what he was created, he is inferior by the very virtue of his nature; if he suffer the consequences thereof, he suffers them justly. Fourth, we must allow for our anterior existence, because everything that happens to us to-day results from our antecedents.
3.3.5From first to last Providence descends from on high, communicating its gifts not according to the law of an equality that would be numeric, but proportionate, varying its operations according to locality (or occasion). So, in the organization of an animal, from beginning to end, everything is related; every member has its peculiar function, superior or inferior, according to the rank it occupies; it has also its peculiar passions, passions which are in harmony with its nature, and the place it occupies in the system of things. So, for instance, a blow excites responses that differ according to the organ that received it; the vocal organ will produce a sound; another organ will suffer in silence, or execute a movement resultant from that passion; now, all sounds, actions and passions form in the animal the unity of sound, life and existence. The parts, being various, play different roles; thus there are differing functions for the feet, the eyes, discursive reason, and intelligence. But all things form one unity, relating to a single Providence, so that destiny governs what is below, and providence reigns alone in what is on high. In fact, all that lies in the intelligible world is either rational or super-rational, namely: Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives therefrom constitutes Providence, as far as it derives therefrom, as it is in pure Soul, and thence passes into the animals. Thence arises (universal) Reason, which, being distributed in unequal parts, produces things unequal, such as the members of an animal. As consequences from Providence are derived the human deeds which are agreeable to the divinity. All such actions are related (to the plan of Providence); they are not done by Providence; but when a man, or another animate or inanimate being performs some deeds, these, if there be any good in them, enter into the plan of Providence, which everywhere establishes virtue, and amends or corrects errors. Thus does every animal maintain its bodily health by the kind of providence within him; on the occasion of a cut or wound the ("seminal) reason" which administers the body of this animal immediately draws (the tissues) together, and forms scars over the flesh, re-establishes health, and invigorates the members that have suffered. Consequently, our evils are the consequences (of our actions); they are its necessary effects, not that we are carried away by Providence, but in the sense that we obey an impulsion whose principle is in ourselves. We ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of Providence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our acts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in the universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an affection conformed to the intentions of Providence. In fact, the same cause does not act identically on different beings, for the effects experienced by each differ according to their nature. Thus Helena causes emotions in Paris which differ from those of Idumeneus. Likewise, the handsome man produces on a handsome man an effect different from that of the intemperate man on the intemperate; the handsome and temperate man acts differently on the handsome and temperate man than on the intemperate; and than the intemperate on himself. The deed done by the intemperate man is done neither by Providence, nor according to Providence. Neither is the deed done by the temperate man done by Providence; since he does it himself; but it conforms to Providence, because it conforms to the Reason (of the universe). Thus, when a man has done something good for his health, it is he himself who has done it, but he thereby conforms to the reason of the physician; for it is the physician who teaches him, by means of his art, what things are healthy or unhealthy; but when a man has done something injurious to his health, it is he himself who has done it, and he does it against the providence of the physician.
3.3.6If then (the bad things do not conform to Providence), the diviners and astrologers predict evil things only by the concatenation which occurs between contraries, between form and matter, for instance, in a composite being. Thus in contemplating the form and ("seminal) reason" one is really contemplating the being which receives the form; for one does not contemplate in the same way the intelligible animal, and the composite animal; what one contemplates in the composite animal is the ("seminal) reason" which gives form to what is inferior. Therefore, since the world is an animal, when one contemplates its occurrences, one is really contemplating the causes that make them arise, the Providence which presides over them, and whose action extends in an orderly manner to all beings and events; that is, to all animals, their actions and dispositions, which are dominated by Reason and mingled with necessity. We thus contemplate what has been mingled since the beginning, and what is still continually mingled. In this mixture, consequently, it is impossible to distinguish Providence from what conforms thereto, nor what derives from the substrate (that is, from matter, and which, consequently, is deformed, and evil). This is not a human task, not even of a man who might be wise or divine; such a privilege can be ascribed only to God. In fact, the function of the diviner is not to distinguish the cause, but the fact; his art consists in reading the characters traced by nature, and which invariably indicate the order and concatenation of facts; or rather, in studying the signs of the universal movement, which designate the character of each being before its revelation in himself. All beings, in fact, exercise upon each other a reciprocal influence, and concur together in the constitution and perpetuity of the world. To him who studies, analogy reveals the march of events, because all kinds of divination are founded on its laws; for things were not to depend on each other, but to have relations founded on their resemblance. This no doubt is that which is meant by the expression that "analogy embraces everything." Now, what is this analogy? It is a relation between the worse and the worse, the better and the better, one eye and the other, one foot and the other, virtue and justice, vice and injustice. The analogy which reigns in the universe is then that which makes divination possible. The influence which one being exercises on another conforms to the laws of influence which the members of the universal Organism must exercise upon each other. The one does not produce the other; for all are generated together; but each is affected according to its nature, each in its own manner. This constitutes the unity of the Reason of the universe.
3.3.7It is only because there are good things in the world, that there are worse ones. Granting the conception of variety, how could the worse exist without the better, or the better without the worse? We should not, therefore, accuse the better because of the existence of the worse; but rather we should rejoice in the presence of the better, because it communicates a little of its perfection to the worse. To wish to annihilate the worse in the world is tantamount to annihilating Providence itself; for if we annihilate the worse, to what could Providence be applied? Neither to itself, nor to the better; for when we speak of supreme Providence, we call it supreme in contrast with that which is inferior to it. Indeed, the (supreme) Principle is that to which all other things relate, that in which they all simultaneously exist, thus constituting the totality. All things proceed from the Principle, while it remains wrapt in itself. Thus, from a single root, which remains wrapt in itself, issue a host of parts, each of which offers the image of their root under a different form. Some of them touch the root; others trend away from it, dividing and subdividing down to the branches, twigs, leaves and fruits; some abide permanently (like the branches); others swirl in a perpetual flux, like the leaves and fruits. These latter parts which swirl in a perpetual flux contain within themselves the ("seminal) reasons" of the parts from which they proceed (and which abide permanently); they themselves seem disposed to be little miniature trees; if they engendered before perishing, they would engender only that which is nearest to them. As to the parts (which abide permanently), and which are hollow, such as the branches, they receive from the root the sap which is to fill them; for they have a nature different (from that of the leaves, flowers, and fruits). Consequently, it is the branches' extremities that experience "passions" (or modifications) which they seem to derive only from the contiguous parts. The parts contiguous to the Root are passive on one end, and active on the other; but the Principle itself is related to all. Although all the parts issue from the same Principle, yet they differ from each other more as they are more distant from the root. Such would be the mutual relations of two brothers who resemble each other because they are born from the same parents.
3.4.1Other principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting their ("hypostases," substantial acts, or) forms of existence. The (universal) Soul, however, is in motion while producing and exhibiting her ("substantial act," or) forms of existence, namely, the functions of sensation and growth, reaching down as far as (the sphere of the) plants. In us also does the Soul function, but she does not dominate us, constituting only a part of our nature. She does, however, dominate in plants, having as it were remained alone there. Beyond that sphere, however, nature begets nothing; for beyond it exists no life, begotten (matter) being lifeless. All that was begotten prior to this was shapeless, and achieved form only by trending towards its begetting principle, as to its source of life. Consequently, that which is begotten cannot be a form of the Soul, being lifeless, but must be absolute in determination. The things anterior (to matter, namely, the sense-power and nature), are doubtless indeterminate, but only so within their form; the are not absolutely indeterminate; they are indeterminate only in respect of their perfection. On the contrary, that which exists at present, namely, (matter), is absolutely indeterminate. When it achieves perfection, it becomes body, on receiving the form suited to its power. This (form) is the receptacle of the principle which has begotten it, and which nourishes it. It is the only trace of the higher things in the body, which occupies the last rank amidst the things below.
3.4.2It is to this (universal) Soul especially that may be applied these words of Plato: "The general Soul cares for all that is inanimate." The other (individual) souls are in different conditions. "The Soul (adds Plato), circulates around the heavens successively assuming divers forms"; that is, the forms of thought, sense or growth. The part which dominates in the soul fulfills its proper individual function; the others remain inactive, and somehow seem exterior to them. In man, it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate. They do indeed co-exist with the others. Neither is it always the best power (reason), which always dominates; for the inferior powers equally have their place. Consequently, man (besides being a reasonable being) is also a sensitive being, because he possesses sense-organs. In many respects, he is also a vegetative being; for his body feeds and grows just like a plant. All these powers (reason, sensibility, growth), therefore act together in the man; but it is the best of them that characterizes the totality of the man (so that he is called a "reasonable being"). On leaving the body the soul becomes the power she had preponderatingly developed. Let us therefore flee from here below, and let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world, so as not to fall into the pure sense-life, by allowing ourselves to follow sense-images, or into the life of growth, by abandoning ourselves to the pleasures of physical love, and to gormandizing; rather, let us rise to the intelligible world, to the intelligence, to the divinity! Those who have exercised their human faculties are re-born as men. Those who have made use of their senses only, pass into the bodies of brutes, and particularly into the bodies of wild animals, if they have yielded themselves to the transports of anger; so that, even in this case, the difference of the bodies they animate is proportioned to the difference of their inclinations. Those whose only effort it was to satisfy their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of lascivious and gluttonous animals. Last, those who instead of following their desires or their anger, have rather degraded their senses by their inertia, are reduced to vegetate in plants; for in their former existence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power, and they worked at nothing but to make trees of themselves. Those who have loved too much the enjoyments of music, and who otherwise lived purely, pass into the bodies of melodious birds. Those who have reigned tyrannically, become eagles, if they have no other vice. Last, those who spoke lightly of celestial things, having kept their glance directed upwards, are changed into birds which usually fly towards the high regions of the air. He who has acquired civil virtues again becomes a man; but if he does not possess them to a sufficient degree, he is transformed into a sociable animal, such as the bee, or other animal of the kind.
3.4.3What then is our guardian? It is one of the powers of our soul. What is our divinity? It is also one of the powers of our soul. (Is it the power which acts principally in us as some people think?) For the power which acts in us seems to be that which leads us, since it is the principle which dominates in us. Is that the guardian to which we have been allotted during the course of our life? No: our guardian is the power immediately superior to the one that we exercise, for it presides over our life without itself being active. The power which is active in us is inferior to the one that presides over our life, and it is the one which essentially constitutes us. If then we live on the plane of the sense-life, our guardian is reason; if we live on the rational plane, our guardian will be the principal superior to reason (namely, intelligence); it will preside over our life, but it itself does not act, leaving that to the inferior power. Plato truly said that "we choose our guardian"; for, by the kind of life that we prefer, we choose the guardian that presides over our life. Why then does He direct us? He directs us during the course of our mortal life (because he is given to us to help us to accomplish our (destiny); but he can no longer direct us when our destiny is accomplished, because the power over the exercise of which he presided allows another power to act in his place (which however is dead, since the life in which it acted is terminated). This other power wishes to act in its turn, and, after having established its preponderance, it exercises itself during the course of a new life, itself having another guardian. If then we should chance to degrade ourselves by letting an inferior power prevail in us, we are punished for it. Indeed, the evil man degenerates because the power which he has developed in his life makes him descend to the existence of the brute, by assimilating him to it by his morals. If we could follow the guardian who is superior to him, he himself would become superior by sharing his life. He would then take as guide a part of himself superior to the one that governs him, then another part, still more elevated until he had arrived at the highest. Indeed, the soul is several things, or rather, the soul is all things; she is things both inferior and superior; she contains all the degrees of life. Each of us, in a certain degree, is the intelligible world; by our inferior part we are related to the sense-world, and by our superior part, to the intelligible world; we remain there on high by what constitutes our intelligible essence; we are attached here below by the powers which occupy the lowest rank in the soul. Thus we cause an emanation, or rather an actualization which implies no loss to the intelligible, to pass from the intelligible into the sense-world.
3.4.4Is the power which is the act of the soul always united to a body? No; for when the soul turns towards the superior regions, she raises this power with her. Does the universal (Soul) also raise with herself to the intelligible world the inferior power which is her actualization (nature)? No: for she does not incline towards her low inferior portion, because she neither came nor descended into the world; but, while she remains in herself, the body of the world comes to unite with her, and to offer itself to receive her light's radiation; besides, her body does not cause her any anxiety, because it is not exposed to any peril. Does not the world, then, possess any senses? "It has no sight" (says Plato) "for it has no eyes. Neither has it ears, nostrils, nor tongue." Does it, then, as we, possess the consciousness of what is going on within it? As, within the world, all things go on uniformly according to nature, it is, in this respect, in a kind of repose; consequently, it does not feel any pleasure. The power of growth exists within it without being present therein; and so also with the sense-power. Besides, we shall return to a study of the question. For the present, we have said all that relates to the question in hand.
3.4.5But if (before coming on to the earth) the soul chooses her life and her guardian, how do we still preserve our liberty? Because what is called "choice" designates in an allegorical manner the character of the soul, and her general disposition everywhere. Again, it is objected that if the character of the soul preponderate, if the soul be dominated by that part which her former life rendered predominantly active, it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil; for if the character of the soul be anterior to her union with the body; if she have the character she has chosen; if, as said (Plato), she do not change her guardian, it is not here below that a man may become good or evil. The answer to this is, that potentially man is equally good or evil. (By his choices) however he may actualize one or the other. What then would happen if a virtuous man should have a body of evil nature, or a vicious man a body of a good nature? The goodness of the soul has more or less influence on the goodness of the body. Exterior circumstances cannot thus alter the character chosen by the soul. When (Plato) says that the lots are spread out before the souls, and that later the different kinds of conditions are displayed before them, and that the fortune of each results from the choice made amidst the different kinds of lives present--a choice evidently made according to her character--(Plato) evidently attributes to the soul the power of conforming to her character the condition allotted to her. Besides, our guardian is not entirely exterior to us; and, on the other hand, he is not bound to us, and is not active in us; he is ours, in the sense that he has a certain relation with our soul; he is not ours, in the sense that we are such men, living such a life under his supervision. This is the meaning of the terms used (by Plato) in the Timaeus. If these be taken in the above sense, all explains itself; if not, Plato contradicts himself. One can still understand thus why he says that our guardian helps us to fulfil the destiny we have chosen. In fact, presiding over our life, he does not permit us to descend very far below the condition we have chosen. But that which then is active is the principle below the guardian and which can neither transcend him, nor equal him; for he could not become different from what he is.
3.4.6Who then is the virtuous man? He in whom is active the highest part of the soul. If his guardian contributed to his actions, he would not deserve being called virtuous. Now it is the Intelligence which is active in the virtuous man. It is the latter, then, who is a guardian, or lives according to one; besides, his guardian is the divinity. Is this guardian above Intelligence? Yes, if the guardian have, as guardian, the principle superior to Intelligence (the Good). But why does the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the beginning? Because of the trouble he felt in falling into generation. Even before the exercise of reason, he has within him a desire which leads him to the things which are suitable to him. But does this desire direct with sovereign influence? No, not with sovereignty; for the soul is so disposed that, in such circumstances becoming such, she adopts such a life, and follows such an inclination. (Plato) says that the guardian leads the soul to the hells, and that he does not remain attached to the same soul, unless this soul should again choose the same condition. What does the guardian do before this choice? Plato teaches us that he leads the soul to judgment, that after the generation he assumes again the same form as before; and then as if another existence were then beginning, during the time between generations, the guardian presides over the chastisements of the souls, and this period is for them not so much a period of life, as a period of expiation. Do the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also have a guardian? Yes, doubtless, but an evil or stupid one. What is the condition of the souls that have raised themselves on high? Some are in the sensible world, others are outside of it. The souls that are in the sense-world dwell in the sun, or in some other planet, or in the firmament, according as they have more or less developed their reason. We must, indeed, remember that our soul contains in herself not only the intelligible world, but also a disposition conformable to the Soul of the world. Now as the latter is spread out in the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere by her various powers, our soul must possess powers conformable to these, each of which exercise their proper function. The souls which rise from here below into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmonizes with their moral life, and with the power which they have developed; with their divinity, or their guardian. Then they will have either the same guardian, or the guardian which is superior to the power which they exert. This matter will have to be considered more minutely. As to the souls which have left the sense-world, so long as they remain in the intelligible world, they are above the guardian condition, and the fatality of generation. Souls bring with them thither that part of their nature which is desirous of begetting, and which may reasonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible in the body, and which multiplies by dividing along with the bodies. Moreover, if a soul divide herself, it is not in respect to extension; because she is entirely in all the bodies. On the other hand, the Soul is one; and from a single animal are ceaselessly born many young. This generative element splits up like the vegetative nature in plants; for this nature is divisible in the bodies. When this divisible essence dwells in the same body, it vivifies the body, just as the vegetative power does for plants. When it retires, it has already communicated life, as is seen in cut trees, or in corpses where putrefaction has caused the birth of several animals from a single one. Besides, the vegetative power of the human soul is assisted by the vegetative power that is derived from the universal (Soul), and which here below is the same (as on high). If the soul return here below, she possesses, according to the life which she is to lead, either the same guardian, or another. With her guardian she enters into this world as if in a skiff. Then she is subjected to the power (by Plato) called the Spindle of Necessity; and, embarking in this world, she takes the place assigned to her by fortune. Then she is caught by the circular movement of the heavens, whose action, as if it were the wind, agitates the skiff in which the soul is seated; or rather, is borne along. Thence are born varied spectacles, transformations and divers incidents for the soul which is embarked in this skiff; whether because of the agitation of the sea which bears it, or because of the conduct of the passenger who is sailing in the bark, and who preserves her freedom of action therein. Indeed, not every soul placed in the same circumstances makes the same movements, wills the same volitions, or performs the same actions. For different beings, therefore, the differences arise from circumstances either similar or different, or even the same events may occur to them under different circumstances. It is this (uncertainty) that constitutes Providence.
3.5.1Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or is it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is it under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are to consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the philosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here deserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion capable of being born in souls, but he calls it also a guardian, and he gives many details about its birth and parents. To begin with passion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the passion designated as love is born in the souls which desire to unite themselves to a beautiful object. But its object may be either a shameful practice, or one (worthy to be pursued by) temperate men, who are familiar with beauty. We must, therefore, investigate in a philosophical manner what is the origin of both kinds of love. The real cause of love is fourfold: the desire of beauty; our soul's innate notion of beauty; our soul's affinity with beauty, and our soul's instinctive sentiment of this affinity. (Therefore as beauty lies at the root of love, so) ugliness is contrary to nature and divinity. In fact, when Nature wants to create, she contemplates what is beautiful, determinate, and comprehended within the (Pythagorean) "sphere" of the Good. On the contrary, the (Pythagorean) "indeterminate" is ugly, and belongs to the other system. Besides, Nature herself owes her origin to the Good, and, therefore, also to the Beautiful. Now, as soon as one is attracted by an object, because one is united to it by a secret affinity, he experiences for the images of this object a sentiment of sympathy. We could not explain its origin, or assign its cause on any other hypothesis, even were we to limit ourselves to the consideration of physical love. Even this kind of love is a desire to procreate beauty, for it would be absurd to insist that that Nature, which aspires to create beautiful things, should aspire to procreate that which is ugly. Of course, those who, here below, desire to procreate are satisfied in attaining that which is beautiful here below: namely, the beauty which shines in images and bodies; for they do not possess that intelligible Beauty which, nevertheless, inspires them with that very love which they bear to visible beauty. That is the reason why those who ascend to the reminiscence of intelligible Beauty love that which they behold here below only because it is an image of the other. As to those who fail to rise to the reminiscence of the intelligible Beauty, because they do not know the cause of their passion, they mistake visible beauty for that veritable Beauty, and they may even love it chastely, if they be temperate: but to go as far as a carnal union is an error, in any case. Hence, it happens that only he who is inspired by a pure love for the beautiful really loves beauty, whether or not he have aroused his reminiscence of intelligible Beauty. They who join to this passion as much of a desire for immortality as our mortal nature admits, seek beauty in the perpetuity of the procreation which renders man imperishable. They determine to procreate and produce beauty according to nature; procreating because their object is perpetuity; and procreating beautifully because they possess affinity with it. In fact, perpetuity does bear affinity to beauty; perpetual nature is beauty itself; and such also are all its derivatives. Thus he who does not desire to procreate seems to aspire to the possession of the beautiful in a higher degree. He who desires to procreate does no doubt desire to procreate the beautiful; but his desire indicates in him the presence of need, and dissatisfaction with mere possession of beauty; He thinks he will be procreating beauty, if he begets on that which is beautiful. They who wish to satisfy physical love against human laws, and nature, no doubt have a natural inclination as principle of a triple passion; but they lose their way straying from the right road for lack of knowledge of the end to which love was impelling them, of the goal of the aspiration (roused by) the desire of generation, and of the proper use of the image of beauty. They really do ignore Beauty itself. They who love beautiful bodies without desiring to unite themselves to them, love them for their beauty only. Those who love the beauty of women, and desire union with them, love both beauty and perpetuity, so long as this object is not lost from sight. Both of these are temperate, but they who love bodies for their beauty only are the more virtuous. The former admire sensual beauty, and are content therewith; the latter recall intelligible beauty, but, without scorning visible beauty, regard it as an effect and image of the intelligible Beauty. Both, therefore, love beauty without ever needing to blush. But, as to those (who violate laws human and divine), love of beauty misleads them to falling into ugliness; for the desire of good may often mislead to a fall into evil. Such is love considered as a passion of the soul.
3.5.2Now let us speak of the Love which is considered a deity not only by men in general, but also by the (Orphic) theologians, and by Plato. The latter often speaks of Love, son of Venus, attributing to him the mission of being the chief of the beautiful children (or, boys); and to direct souls to the contemplation of intelligible Beauty, or, if already present, to intensify the instinct to seek it. In his "Banquet" Plato says that Love is born (not of Venus, but) of Abundance and Need, ... on some birthday (?) of Venus. To explain if Love be born of Venus, or if he were only born contemporaneously with his mother, we shall have to study something about Venus. What is Venus? Is she the mother of Love, or only his contemporary? As answer hereto we shall observe that there are two Venuses. The second (or Popular Venus) is daughter of Jupiter and Dione, and she presides over earthly marriages. The first Venus, the celestial one, daughter of Uranus (by Plato, in his Cratylus, interpreted to mean "contemplation of things above"), has no mother, and does not preside over marriages, for the reason that there are none in heaven. The Celestial Venus, therefore, daughter of Kronos, that is, of Intelligence, is the divine Soul, which is born pure of pure Intelligence, and which dwells above. As her nature does not admit of inclining earthward, she neither can nor will descend here below. She is, therefore, a form of existence (or, an hypostasis), separated from matter, not participating in its nature. This is the significance of the allegory that she had no mother. Rather than a guardian, therefore, she should be considered a deity, as she is pure Being unmingled (with matter), and abiding within herself. In fact, that which is immediately born of Intelligence is pure in itself, because, by its very proximity to Intelligence, it has more innate force, desiring to unite itself firmly to the principle that begat it, and which can retain it there on high. The soul which is thus suspended to Intelligence could not fall down, any more than the light which shines around the sun could separate from the body from which it radiates, and to which it is attached. Celestial Venus (the universal Soul, the third principle or hypostasis), therefore, attaches herself to Kronos (divine Intelligence, the second principle), or, if you prefer to Uranos (the One, the Good, the first Principle), the father of Kronos. Thus Venus turns towards Uranos, and unites herself to him; and in the act of loving him, she procreates Love, with which she contemplates Uranus. Her activity thus effects a hypostasis and being. Both of them therefore fix their gaze on Uranus, both the mother and the fair child, whose nature it is to be a hypostasis ever turned towards another beauty, an intermediary essence between the lover and the beloved object. In fact, Love is the eye by which the lover sees the beloved object; anticipating her, so to speak; and before giving her the faculty of seeing by the organ which he thus constitutes, he himself is already full of the spectacle offered to his contemplation. Though he thus anticipates her, he does not contemplate the intelligible in the same manner as she does, in that he offers her the spectacle of the intelligible, and that he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful, a vision that passes by him (or, that coruscates around him, as an aureole).
3.5.3We are therefore forced to acknowledge that Love is a hypostasis and is "being," which no doubt is inferior to the Being from which it (emanates, that is, from celestial Venus, or the celestial Soul), but which, nevertheless, still possesses "being." In fact, that celestial Soul is a being born of the activity which is superior to her (the primary Being), a living Being, emanating from the primary Being, and attached to the contemplation thereof. In it she discovers the first object of her contemplation, she fixes her glance on it, as her good; and finds in this view a source of joy. The seen object attracts her attention so that, by the joy she feels, by the ardent attention characterizing her contemplation of its object, she herself begets something worthy of her and of the spectacle she enjoys. Thus is Love born from the attention with which the soul applies herself to the contemplation of its object, and from the very emanation of this object; and so Love is an eye full of the object it contemplates, a vision united to the image which it forms. Thus Love (Eros) seems to owe its name to its deriving its existence from vision. Even when considered as passion does Love owe its name to the same fact, for Love-that-is-a-being is anterior to Love-that-is-not-a-being. However much we may explain passion as love, it is, nevertheless, ever the love of some object, and is not love in an absolute sense. Such is the love that characterizes the superior Soul (the celestial Soul). It contemplates the intelligible world with it, because Love is the Soul's companion, being born of the Soul, and abiding in the Soul, and with her enjoys contemplation of the divinities. Now as we consider the Soul which first radiates its light on heaven as separate from matter, we must admit that the love which is connected with her, is likewise separate from matter. If we say that this pure Soul really resides in heaven, it is in the sense in which we say that that which is most precious in us (the reasonable soul) resides in our body, and, nevertheless, is separate from matter. This love must, therefore, reside only there where resides this pure Soul. But as it was similarly necessary that beneath the celestial Soul there should exist the world-Soul, there must exist with it another love, born of her desire, and being her eye. As this Venus belongs to this world, and as it is not the pure soul, nor soul in an absolute sense, it has begotten the Love which reigns here below, and which, with her, presides over marriages. As far as this Love himself feels the desire for the intelligible, he turns towards the intelligible the souls of the young people, and he elevates the soul to which he may be united, as far as it is naturally disposed to have reminiscence of the intelligible. Every soul, indeed, aspires to the Good, even that soul that is mingled with matter, and that is the soul of some particular being; for it is attached to the superior Soul, and proceeds therefrom.
3.5.4Does each soul include such a love in her being, and possess it as a hypostatic (form of existence)? Since the world-Soul possesses, as hypostasis (form of existence), the Love which is inherent in her being, our soul should also similarly possess, as hypostatic (form of existence), a love equally inherent in our being. Why should the same not obtain even with animals? This love inherent to the being of every soul is the guardian considered to be attached to each individual. It inspires each soul with the desires natural for her to experience; for, according to her nature, each soul begets a love which harmonizes with her dignity and being. As the universal Soul possesses universal Love, so do individual souls each possess her individual love. But as the individual souls are not separated from the universal Soul, and are so contained within her that their totality forms but a single soul, so are individual loves contained within the universal Love. On the other hand, each individual love is united to an individual soul, as universal Love is united to the universal Soul. The latter exists entire everywhere in the universe, and so her unity seems multiple; she appears anywhere in the universe that she pleases, under the various forms suitable to her parts, and she reveals herself, at will, under some visible form. We shall have to assume also a multiplicity of Venuses, which, born with Love, occupy the rank of guardians. They originate from the universal Venus, from which derive all the individual "venuses," with the loves peculiar to each. In fact, the soul is the mother of love; now Venus is the Soul, and Love is the Soul's activity in desiring the Good. The love which leads each soul to the nature of the Good, and which belongs to her most exalted part, must also be considered a deity, inasmuch as it unites the soul to the Good. The love which belongs to the soul mingled (with matter), is to be considered a Guardian only.
Эннеады (греч.)древнегреческий
Открыть в читалке1.1.1Ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι φόβοι τε καὶ θάρρη ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τίνος ἂν εἶεν; ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι, ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο: ἢ γὰρ τοῦτο μῖγμα, ἢ ἄλλο ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων γινόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ δοξαζόμενα. καὶ οὖν καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα ζητητέαι, πότερα ὧν τὰ πάθη, ἢ αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως. καὶ τὰς νοήσεις δὲ θεωρητέον πῶς καὶ τίνος, καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπισκοποῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιούμενον τί ποτ̓ ἂν εἴη. καὶ πρότερον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος; ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι προσήκει, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάθη ἢ αἰσθήσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.
1.1.2πρῶτον δὲ ψυχὴν ληπτέον, πότερον ἄλλο μὲν ψυχή, ἄλλο δὲ ψυχῇ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, σύνθετόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἤδη δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰ ἐπιτρέψει καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅλως ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις χείρους καὶ βελτίους. ἤ, εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι, εἰδός τι ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ ἄδεκτον τούτων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὧν ἐποιστικὸν ἄλλῳ, ἑαυτῷ δὲ συμφυᾶ ἔχον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἥντινα ἂν φήνῃ ὁ λόγος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατον ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἀπαθὲς εἶναι, ἄλλῳ ἑαυτοῦ πως διδόν, αὐτὸ δὲ παῤ ἄλλου μηδὲν ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν, ὧν μὴ ἀποτέτμηται κρειττόνων ὄντων. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ φοβοῖτο τοιοῦτον ἄδεκτον ἂν παντὸς τοῦ ἔξω; ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν φοβείσθω, ὃ δύναται παθεῖν. οὐδὲ θαρρεῖ τοίνυν: τούτοις γὰρ θάρρος, οἷς ἂν τὰ φοβερὰ παρῇ. ἐπιθυμίαι δὲπῶς, αἳ διὰ σώματος ἀποπληροῦνται κενουμένου καὶ πληρουμένου, ἄλλου τοῦ πληρουμένου καὶ κενουμένου ὄντος. πῶς δὲ μίξεως δεκτικόν, εἰ τὸ οὐσιῶδες ἄμικτον. πῶς δὲ ἐπεισαγωγῆς τινων; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σπεύδοι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τὸ δ’ ἀλγεῖν ἔτι πόρρω. λυπεῖσθαι δὲ πῶς ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι; αὔταρκες γὰρ τό γε ἁπλοῦν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, οἷόν ἐστι μένον ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ αὑτοῦ. ἥδεται δὲ προσγενομένου τίνος, οὐδενὸς οὐδ’ ἀγαθοῦ προσιόντος; ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἀεί. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἴσθησις ἔσται οὐδὲ διάνοια οὐδὲ δόξα περὶ αὐτό: αἴσθησις γὰρ παραδοχὴ εἴδους ἢ ἀπαθοῦς σώματος, διάνοια δὲ καὶ δόξα ἐπ’ αἴσθησιν. περὶ δὲ νοήσεως ἐπισκεπτέον πῶς, εἰ ταύτην αὐτῇ καταλείψομεν: καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς αὖ καθαρᾶς, εἰ συμβαίνει περὶ αὐτὴν μόνην οὖσαν.
1.1.3ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν σώματι θετέον ψυχήν, οὖσαν εἴτε πρὸ τούτου, εἴτ̓ ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ αὐτῆς ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη. χρωμένη μὲν οὖν σώματι οἷα ὀργάνῳ οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται δέξασθαι τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων παθήματα οἱ τεχνῖται: αἴσθησιν δὲ τάχ̓ ἂν ἀναγκαίως, εἴπερ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῷ ὀργάνῳ γινωσκούσῃ τὰ ἔξωθεν παθήματα ἐξ αἰσθήσεως: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι ὄμμασίν ἔστιν ὁρᾶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ βλάβαι περὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ὥστε καὶ λῦπαι καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ὅλως ὅ τι περ ἂν περὶ σῶμα πᾶν γίγνηται: ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ζητούσης τὴν θεραπείαν τοῦ ὀργάνου. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς αὐτὴν ἥξει τὰ πάθη; σῶμα μὲν γὰρ σώματι ἄλλῳ μεταδώσει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ, σῶμα δὲ ψυχῇ πῶς; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν οἷον ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλο παθεῖν. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ ᾧ χρῆται, χωρίς ἐστιν ἑκάτερον: χωρίζει γοῦν ὁ τὸ χρώμενον διδούς. ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ χωρίσαι διὰ φιλοσοφίας αὐτὸ πῶς εἶχεν; ἢ ἐμέμικτο. ἀλλὰ εἰ ἐμέμικτο, ἢ κρᾶσίς τις ἦν, ἢ ὡς διαπλακεῖσα, ἢ ὡς εἶδός τι κεχωρισμένον, ἢ εἶδος ἐφαπτόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐκείνως: λέγω δὴ τὸ μὲν κεχωρισμένον, ὅπερ τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ὁπωσοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν ἐν τάξει τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ἵνα τοῦτο ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπιστρέφῃ πρὸς τὸ χρώμενον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον ἀπάγῃ, ὅσον μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ὡς μὴ ἀεὶ χρῆσθαι.
1.1.4θῶμεν τοίνυν μεμῖχθαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μέμικται, τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔσται βέλτιον, τὸ δὲ βέλτιον χεῖρον: καὶ βέλτιον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ζωῆς μεταλαβόν, χεῖρον δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ θανάτου καὶ ἀλογίας. τὸ δὴ ἀφαιρεθὲν ὁπωσοῦν ζωῆς πῶς ἂν προσθήκην λάβοι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; τοὐναντίον δ’ ἂν τὸ σῶμα ζωὴν λαβὸν τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως παθημάτων μεταλαμβάνον. τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ὀρέξεται: τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀπολαύσει ὧν ὀρέγεται καὶ φοβήσεται περὶ αὑτοῦ: τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ οὐ τεύξεται τῶν ἡδέων καὶ φθαρήσεται. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μίξεως, μήποτε οὐ δυνατὸς ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι μεμῖχθαι λευκῷ γραμμήν, φύσιν ἄλλην ἄλλῃ. τὸ δὲ διαπλακεῖσα οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοπαθῆ τὰ διαπλακέντα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ διαπλακὲν καὶ ἔστι ψυχὴν διαπεφοιτηκυῖαν μήτι πάσχειν τὰ ἐκείνου πάθη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ οὕτω, δἰ ὅλου ὡς διαπεπλέχθαι. οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὖν πείσεται τὰ σώματος πάθη, ὅτι διαπέπλεκται, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ἔσται ἐν τῷ σώματι. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ὡς χωριστὸν εἶδος ἔσται, εἴπερ οὐσία, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον: εἰ δὲ ὡς τῷ πελέκει τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ σιδήρῳ, καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον ποιήσει ἃ ποιεῖ ὁ σίδηρος ὁ οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένος, κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα μέντοι, μᾶλλον ἂν τῷ σώματι διδοῖμεν ὅσα κοινὰ πάθη, τῷ μέντοι τοιούτῳ, τῷ φυσικῷ, ὀργανικῷ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντι. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπόν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν λέγειν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι: ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον μᾶλλον.
1.1.5ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον ἢ τὸ σῶμα δεῖ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε, ἢ τὸ κοινόν, ἢ ἕτερόν τι τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γεγενημένον. ὅπως δ’ ἂν ἔχῃ, ἤτοι ἀπαθῆ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάττειν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γενομένην ἄλλῳ τοῦ τοιούτου, ἢ συμπάσχειν καὶ αὐτήν: καὶ ἢ ταὐτὸν πάσχουσαν πάθημα πάσχειν, ἢ ὅμοιόν τι, οἷον ἄλλως μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον: τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον οἷον λυπεῖσθαι πῶς; ἆρα, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος καὶ μέχρις αἰσθήσεως διελθόντος τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτώσης; ἀλλ’ ἡ αἴσθησις οὔπω δῆλον πῶς. ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἡ λύπη ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ κρίσεως λάβῃ τοῦ κακόν τι παρεῖναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἤ τινι τῶν οἰκείων, εἶτ̓ ἐντεῦθεν τροπὴ λυπηρὰ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ζῷον γένηται; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς δόξης οὔπω δῆλον τίνος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου: εἶτα ἡ μὲν δόξα ἡ περὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ τῆς λύπης οὐκ ἔχει πάθος: καὶ γὰρ δυνατὸν τῆς δόξης παρούσης μὴ πάντως ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, μηδ’ αὖ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι δόξης τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι γενομένης, μηδ’ αὖ ἀγαθοῦ δόξης κινεῖσθαι τὴν ὄρεξιν. πῶς οὖν κοινὰ ταῦτα; ἤ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἡ ἐπί τι ἔκτασις; ἀλλ’ οὕτως οὐκέτι κοινὰ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης, ἢ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι δεῖ αἷμα καὶ χολὴν ζέσαι καί πως διατεθὲν τὸ σῶμα τὴν ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀφροδισίων. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις μὴ κοινὸν πάθημα ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἔσται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ πάντα τῷ κοινῷ δίδωσιν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ ὀρεγομένου ἀφροδισίων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν, ἔσται δὲ ἄλλως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐπιθυμοῦν. καὶ πῶς; ἆρα ἄρξει μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπακολουθήσει δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἀλλὰ πῶς ὅλως ἐπεθύμησεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κεκινημένου; ἀλλ’ ἄρξει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ πρότερον οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος πόθεν ἄρξεται;
1.1.6ἀλλ’ ἴσως βέλτιον εἰπεῖν καθόλου τῷ παρεῖναι τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ ἐνεργοῦντα κατ’ αὐτάς, αὐτὰς δὲ ἀκινήτους εἶναι χορηγούσας τὸ δύνασθαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτό ἐστι, πάσχοντος τοῦ ζῴου τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ζῆν τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ δοῦσαν ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ ἔχοντος ὄντων. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅλως οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ἔσται: ἢ τὸ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ζῆν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔσται: καὶ ἡ δύναμις δὲ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ σώματος κίνησις οὖσα εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτᾷ, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται; ἢ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αἰσθητικῆς παρούσης τῷ ταύτην παρεῖναι αἰσθήσεται. τί οὖν αἰσθήσεται; τὸ συναμφότερον. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ δύναμις μὴ κινήσεται, πῶς ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον μὴ συναριθμουμένης ψυχῆς μηδὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως;
1.1.7ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἔσται τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ παρεῖναι οὐχ αὑτὴν δούσης τῆς τοιαύτης εἰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ εἰς θάτερον, ἀλλὰ ποιούσης ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τοιούτου καί τινος οἷον φωτὸς τοῦ παῤ αὐτῆς δοθέντος τὴν τοῦ ζῴου φύσιν ἕτερόν τι, οὗ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ζῴου πάθη εἴρηται. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡμεῖς αἰσθανόμεθα; ἤ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπηλλάγημεν τοῦ τοιούτου ζῴου, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἡμῖν τιμιώτερα εἰς τὴν ὅλην ἀνθρώπου οὐσίαν ἐκ πολλῶν οὖσαν πάρεστι. τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγιγνομένων τῷ ζῴῳ τύπων ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι μᾶλλον: νοητὰ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα: ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν ἔξω εἴδωλον εἶναι ταύτης, ἐκείνην δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὖσαν εἰδῶν μόνον ἀπαθῶς εἶναι θεωρίαν. ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ̓ ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις: ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα. τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄνω ἐφεστηκότες τῷ ζῴῳ. κωλύσει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ σύμπαν ζῷον λέγειν, μικτὸν μὲν τὰ κάτω, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθὴς σχεδόν: ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὸ λεοντῶδες καὶ τὸ ποικίλον ὅλως θηρίον. συνδρόμου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν λογιζώμεθα, ἡμεῖς λογιζόμεθα τῷ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἐνεργήματα.
1.1.8πρὸς δὲ τὸν νοῦν πῶς; νοῦν δὲ λέγω οὐχ ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὖσαν ʽτῶν̓ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. ἢ ἔχομεν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπεράνω ἡμῶν. ἔχομεν δὲ ἢ κοινὸν ἢ ἴδιον, ἢ καὶ κοινὸν πάντων καὶ ἴδιον: κοινὸν μέν, ὅτι ἀμέριστος καὶ εἷς καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ. ἔχομεν οὖν καὶ τὰ εἴδη διχῶς, ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ οἷον ἀνειλιγμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα, ἐν δὲ νῷ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα. πρὸς δὲ θεὸν πῶς; ἢ ὡς ἐποχούμενον τῇ νοητῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ὄντως, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τρίτους ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου, φησί, τῆς ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς, ἣν δὴ δεῖ νοεῖν οὕτω μεριστὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅτι δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν τοῖς σώματος μεγέθεσιν, ὁπόσον ἂν ζῷον ᾖ ἕκαστον, ἐπεὶ κἀν τῷ παντὶ ὅλῳ οὖσα μία: ἤ, ὅτι φαντάζεται τοῖς σώμασι παρεῖναι ἐλλάμπουσα εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσα οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῆς καὶ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μένουσα μὲν αὐτή, εἴδωλα δὲ αὑτῆς διδοῦσα, ὥσπερ πρόσωπον ἐν πολλοῖς κατόπτροις. πρῶτον δὲ εἴδωλον αἴσθησις ἡ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ: εἶτα ἀπὸ ταύτης αὖ πᾶν ἄλλο εἶδος λέγεται ψυχῆς, ἕτερον ἀφ̓ ἑτέρου ἀεί, καὶ τελευτᾷ μέχρι γεννητικοῦ καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ὅλως ποιήσεως ἄλλου καὶ ἀποτελεστικοῦ ἄλλου παῤ αὐτὴν τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐπεστραμμένης αὐτῆς τῆς ποιούσης πρὸς τὸ ἀποτελούμενον.
1.1.9ἔσται τοίνυν ἐκείνης ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀπηλλαγμένη αἰτίας κακῶν, ὅσα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει: περὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ταῦτα καὶ τὸ κοινόν, ὡς εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ εἰ δόξα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διάνοια, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος; ψευδὴς γὰρ δόξα καὶ πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν πράττεται τῶν κακῶν. ἢ πράττεται μὲν τὰ κακὰ ἡττωμένων ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος: πολλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς: ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ θυμοῦ ἢ εἰδώλου κακοῦ: ἡ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν λεγομένη διάνοια φαντασία οὖσα οὐκ ἀνέμεινε τὴν τοῦ διανοητικοῦ κρίσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπράξαμεν τοῖς χείροσι πεισθέντες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὶν τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐπικρῖναι ψευδῆ ὁρᾶν συμβαίνει τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει. ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἐφήψατο, ὥστε ἀναμάρτητος. ἢ οὕτω δὴ λεκτέον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἢ ἐφηψάμεθα τοῦ ἐν τῷ νῷ νοητοῦ ἢ οὔ, ʽἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν̓: δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ πρόχειρον ἔχειν. διείλομεν δὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῷ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι, ὅσα δὲ οὐ δεῖται σώματος εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ταῦτα ἴδια ψυχῆς εἶναι καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίκρισιν ποιουμένην τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τύπων εἴδη ἤδη θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν οἷον συναισθήσει, τήν γε κυρίως τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀληθοῦς διάνοιαν: νοήσεων γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ διάνοια ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλάκις πρὸς τἄνδον ὁμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία. ἀτρεμήσει οὖν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ: αἱ δὲ τροπαὶ καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐν ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν συνηρτημένων καὶ τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὅ τι δήποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο, ὡς εἴρηται, παθημάτων.
1.1.10ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡ ψυχή, πάσχομεν δὲ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς, ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη πάσχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὖ ποιήσει ἃ ποιοῦμεν. ἢ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα οὔπω κεχωρισμένων: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἃ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φαμεν πάσχειν. διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου, ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἤδη: θηρίον δὲ ζῳωθὲν τὸ σῶμα. ὁ δ’ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τούτου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει, αἳ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένῃ ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται, χωριζομένῃ δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὔσῃ: ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν αὕτη παντάπασιν ἀποστῇ, καὶ ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐλλαμφθεῖσα ἀπελήλυθε συνεπομένη. αἱ δ’ ἀρεταὶ αἱ μὴ φρονήσει, ἔθεσι δὲ ἐγγινόμεναι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι, τοῦ κοινοῦ: τούτου γὰρ αἱ κακίαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φθόνοι καὶ ζῆλοι καὶ ἔλεοι. φιλίαι δὲ τίνος; ἢ αἱ μὲν τούτου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἔνδον ἀνθρώπου.
1.1.11παίδων δὲ ὄντων ἐνεργεῖ μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου, ὀλίγα δὲ ἐλλάμπει ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰς αὐτό. ὅταν δ’ ἀργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω: εἰς ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, ὅταν μέχρι τοῦ μέσου ἥκῃ. τί οὖν; οὐχ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου; ἀλλ’ ἀντίληψιν δεῖ γενέσθαι: οὐ γάρ, ὅσα ἔχομεν, τούτοις χρώμεθα ἀεί, ἀλλ’ ὅταν τὸ μέσον τάξωμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, ʽἢ ὅσα ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἕξεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγομεν. τὰ δὲ θηρία πῶς τὸ ζῷον ἔχει; ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχαὶ εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπειοι, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἁμαρτοῦσαι, οὐ τῶν θηρίων γίνεται τοῦτο, ὅσον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ παρὸν οὐ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἡ συναίσθησις τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδωλον μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔχει: σῶμα δὴ τοιόνδε οἷον ποιωθὲν ψυχῆς εἰδώλῳ: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ εἰσέδυ, ἐλλάμψει ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῷον γενόμενόν ἐστιν.
1.1.12ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχή, πῶς αἱ δίκαι; ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσυμφωνεῖ παντὶ λόγῳ, ὅς φησιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ καθαρθῆναι καὶ διδόναι δίκας ʽκαἲ ἐν ᾅδου καὶ μετενσωματοῦσθαι. προσθετέον μὲν οὖν ὅτῳ τις βούλεται λόγῳ: τάχα δ’ ἄν τις ἐξεύροι καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ μαχοῦνται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον διδοὺς τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος ἓν ἁπλοῦν πάντη ἐτίθετο τὸ αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι λέγων, ὁ δ’ ἁμαρτεῖν διδοὺς συμπλέκει μὲν καὶ προστίθησιν αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχον πάθη: σύνθετος οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἡ ψυχὴ αὕτη γίνεται καὶ πάσχει δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἁμαρτάνει τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ διδὸν δίκην αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο. ὅθεν φησί: ʽτεθεάμεθα γὰρ αὐτήν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες.ʼ δεῖ δὲ περικρούσαντας τὰ προστεθέντα, εἴπερ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν, φησίν, αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὧν ἐφάπτεται καὶ τίσι συγγενὴς οὖσα ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστιν. ἄλλη οὖν ζωὴ καὶ ἄλλαι ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸ κολαζόμενον ἕτερον: ἡ δὲ ἀναχώρησις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς οὐ μόνον τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅπαντος τοῦ προστεθέντος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡ προσθήκη: ἢ ὅλως ἡ γένεσις τοῦ ἄλλου ψυχῆς εἴδους. τὸ δὲ πῶς ἡ γένεσις εἴρηται, ὅτι καταβαινούσης, ἄλλου του ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γινομένου τοῦ καταβαίνοντος ἐν τῇ νεύσει. ἆῤ οὖν ἀφίησι τὸ εἴδωλον; καὶ ἡ νεῦσις δὲ πῶς οὐχ ἁμαρτία; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ νεῦσις ἔλλαμψις πρὸς τὸ κάτω, οὐχ ἁμαρτία, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἡ σκιά, ἀλλ’ αἴτιον τὸ ἐλλαμπόμενον: εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη, οὐκ ἔχει ὅποι ἐλλάμψει. καταβαίνειν οὖν καὶ νεύειν λέγεται τῷ συνεζηκέναι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐλλαμφθὲν παῤ αὐτῆς. ἀφίησιν οὖν τὸ εἴδωλον, εἰ μὴ ἐγγὺς τὸ ὑποδεξόμενον: ἀφίησι δὲ οὐ τῷ ἀποσχισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μηκέτι εἶναι: οὐκέτι δὲ ἔστιν, ἐὰν ἐκεῖ βλέπῃ ὅλη. χωρίζειν δὲ ἔοικεν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ ʽΗρακλέους τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ διδοὺς ἐν ᾅδου, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐν θεοῖς εἶναι ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν λόγων κατεχόμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ὅτι ἐν ᾅδου: ἐμέρισε δ’ οὖν. τάχα δ’ ἂν οὕτω πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος εἴη: ὅτι δὴ πρακτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων ʽΗρακλῆς καὶ ἀξιωθεὶς διὰ καλοκαγαθίαν θεὸς εἶναι, ὅτι πρακτικός, ἀλλ’ οὐ θεωρητικὸς ἦν, ἵνα ἂν ὅλος ἦν ἐκεῖ, ἄνω τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔτι ἐστί τι αὐτοῦ καὶ κάτω.
1.1.13τὸ δὲ ἐπισκεψάμενον περὶ τούτων ἡμεῖς ἢ ἡ ψυχή; ἢ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ. τὸ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ πῶς; ἆρα τῷ ἔχειν ἐπεσκέψατο; ἢ ᾗ ψυχή. οὔκουν κινήσεται. ἢ κίνησιν τὴν τοιαύτην δοτέον αὐτῇ, ἣ μὴ σωμάτων, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ζωή. καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ἡμῶν οὕτως, ὅτι καὶ νοερὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ κρείττων ἡ νόησις, καὶ ὅταν ψυχὴ νοῇ, καὶ ὅταν νοῦς ἐνεργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς: μέρος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἄνιμεν.
2:1.2.1Ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φεύγειν τὰ κακά, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῷ, φησιν, ὁμοιωθῆναι. τοῦτο δέ, εἰ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι μετὰ φρονήσεως γενοίμεθα καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀρετῇ. εἰ οὖν ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ἆρα ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι; καὶ δὴ καὶ τίνι ʽθεᾦ; ἆῤ οὖν τῷ μᾶλλον δοκοῦντι ταῦτα ἔχειν καὶ δὴ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν ταύτῃ ἡγουμένῳ, ᾧ φρόνησις θαυμαστὴ ὑπάρχει; καὶ γὰρ εὔλογον ἐνταῦθα ὄντας τούτῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, εἰ καὶ τούτῳ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι: οἷον σώφρονι ἢ ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, ᾧ μήτε τι δεινόν ἐστιν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξωθεν: μήτε προσιὸν ἡδύ, οὗ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἂν γένοιτο μὴ παρόντος, ἵν’ ἔχῃ ἢ ἕλῃ. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖθεν ὁ κόσμος καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. ἆῤ οὖν ἐκεῖνο ταύτας ἔχει; ἢ οὐκ εὔλογον τάς γε πολιτικὰς λεγομένας ἀρετὰς ἔχειν, φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ περὶ τὸ θυμούμενον, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς λογισμόν, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἑκάστου τούτων ὁμοῦ οἰκειοπραγίαν ἀρχῆς πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. ἆῤ οὖν οὐ κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὁμοιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς μείζους τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρωμένας; ἀλλ’ εἰ κατ’ ἄλλας, κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὅλως οὔ; ἢ ἄλογον μηδ’ ὁπωσοῦν ὁμοιοῦσθαι κατὰ ταύτας — τούτους γοῦν καὶ θείους ἡ φήμη λέγει καὶ λεκτέον ἀμηγέπη ὡμοιῶσθαι — κατὰ δὲ τὰς μείζους τὴν ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ἑκατέρως γε συμβαίνει ἀρετὰς ἔχειν κἂν εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας. εἰ οὖν τις συγχωρεῖ ὁμοιοῦσθαι δύνασθαι, ἄλλως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλλας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρετὰς ὡμοιωμένων, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡμᾶς ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀρεταῖς ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ μὴ ἀρετὴν κεκτημένῳ. καὶ πῶς; ὧδε: εἴ τι θερμότητος παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὅθεν ἡ θερμότης ἐλήλυθε θερμαίνεσθαι; καὶ εἴ τι πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρότερον εἴποι ἄν τις καὶ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ εἶναι θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον, ὥστε τὸν λόγον ποιεῖν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ἑπόμενον ἐπακτὸν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐκείνῳ δέ, ὅθεν μιμησαμένη ἔχει, σύμφυτον: πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς λόγον τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἀρετὴν εἶναι: ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι μείζονα. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὗ μεταλαμβάνει ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τῷ ἀφ̓ οὗ, οὕτως ἔδει λέγειν: νῦν δὲ ἕτερον μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ νοητῇ, καίτοι ὡμοίωται: καὶ τάξεως δὲ καὶ κόσμου μεταλαμβάνει ἡ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ κἀκεῖ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστι τάξις οὐδὲ κόσμος οὐδὲ συμμετρία. οὕτως οὖν κόσμου καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὁμολογίας μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τούτων ὄντων τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνθάδε, οὐ δεομένων δὲ τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογίας οὐδὲ κόσμου οὐδὲ τάξεως, οὐδ’ ἂν ἀρετῆς εἴη χρεία καὶ ὁμοιοίμεθα δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς ἐκεῖ δἰ ἀρετῆς παρουσίαν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον κἀκεῖ ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐπείπερ ἡμεῖς ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ταυτί: δεῖ δὲ πειθὼ ἐπάγειν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ μένοντας ἐπὶ τῆς βίας.
2:1.2.2πρῶτον τοίνυν τὰς ἀρετὰς ληπτέον, καθ̓ ἅς φαμεν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ εὕρωμεν, ὃ παῤ ἡμῖν μὲν μίμημα ὂν ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ οἷον ἀρχέτυπον ὂν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐπισημηνάμενοι, ὡς ἡ ὁμοίωσις διττή: καὶ ἡ μέν τις ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀπαιτεῖ, ὅσα ἐπίσης ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ: ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡμοίωται πρὸς ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλον τρόπον ληπτέον οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπαιτοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἕτερον, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον ὡμοίωται. τί ποτε οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἥ τε σύμπασα καὶ ἑκάστη; σαφέστερος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἐφ̓ ἑκάστης: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὅ τι κοινόν, καθ̓ ὃ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ῥᾳδίως ἔσται. αἱ μὲν τοίνυν πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἃς ἄνω που εἴπομεν, κατακοσμοῦσι μένοντας ἔτι καὶ ἔχοντας ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀμείνους ποιοῦσιν ὁρίζουσαι καὶ μετροῦσαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀφαιροῦσαι τῷ ὅλως ἀμείνονι καὶ τῷ ὡρίσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀμέτρων καὶ ἀορίστων ἔξω εἶναι τὸ μεμετρημένον: καὶ αὐταὶ ὁρισθεῖσαι ᾗ μέτρα γε ἐν ὕλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὡμοίωνται τῷ ἐκεῖ μέτρῳ καὶ ἔχουσιν ἴχνος τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρίστου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντη ἄμετρον ὕλη ὂν πάντη ἀνωμοίωται: καθ̓ ὅσον δὲ μεταλαμβάνει εἴδους, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὁμοιοῦται ἀνειδέῳ ἐκείνῳ ὄντι. μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἐγγὺς μεταλαμβάνει: ψυχὴ δὲ ἐγγυτέρω σώματος καὶ συγγενέστερον ταύτῃ καὶ πλέον μεταλαμβάνει, ὥστε καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν θεὸς φαντασθεῖσα, μὴ τὸ πᾶν θεοῦ τοῦτο ᾖ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν αὗται ὁμοιοῦνται.
2:1.2.3ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλην ὑποφαίνει ὡς τῆς μείζονος ἀρετῆς οὖσαν, περὶ ἐκείνης λεκτέον: ἐν ᾧ καὶ σαφέστερον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἥτις ἡ μείζων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι ἔστι παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἑτέρα. λέγων δὴ ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν πρὸς θεὸν φυγὴν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς διδούς, ἀλλὰ προστιθεὶς πολιτικάς γε, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ καθάρσεις λέγων ἁπάσας δῆλός τέ ἐστι διττὰς τιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν οὐ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τιθείς. πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ταύτας καθάρσεις καὶ πῶς καθαρθέντες μάλιστα ὁμοιούμεθα; ἢ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθὴς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα, εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μήτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ: ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν: μήτε ὁμοπαθὴς εἴη: ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν: μήτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος: ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι: ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι: δικαιοσύνη δ’ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ̓ ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς οὕτως ἐστίν, εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγοι πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι: καθαρὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοιαύτη, ὡς τὸ μιμούμενον ἔχειν φρόνησιν. τί οὖν; οὐ κἀκεῖνο οὕτως διάκειται; ἢ οὐ διάκειται, ψυχῆς δὲ ἡ διάθεσις. νοεῖ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἄλλως: τῶν δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν ἑτέρως, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως. πάλιν οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ὁμώνυμον; οὐδαμῶς: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ παῤ ἐκείνου ἑτέρως. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ὡς οὖν μεμιμημένος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ ἑρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἡ δὴ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς: νοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα.
2:1.2.4ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἡ κάθαρσις ταὐτὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ, ἢ προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, ἕπεται δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ πότερον ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι. ἡ γοῦν ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι ἀτελεστέρα τῆς ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι, τὸ γὰρ κεναθάρθαι οἷον τέλος ἤδη. ἀλλὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ. ἤ, εἰ πρὸ τῆς καθάρσεως ἀγαθὸν ἦν, ἡ κάθαρσις ἀρκεῖ; ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τό δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ἡ κάθαρσις. καὶ τί τὸ καταλειπόμενόν ἐστι ζητητέον: ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἡ φύσις ἡ καταλειπομένη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. ἆῤ οὖν ἀγαθοειδῆ λεκτέον; ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ μένειν ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ: πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄμφω. τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ συγγενεῖ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. δεῖ οὖν καθηραμένην συνεῖναι. συνέσται δὲ ἐπιστραφεῖσα. ἆῤ οὖν μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; ἢ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. τοῦτο οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς; ἢ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. τί οὖν τοῦτο; θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὀφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ’ ἀναμιμνήσκεται; ἢ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα. ἵνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γνῶ αὐτὰ ἐνόντα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι. εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους: δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται ἔχειν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπῃ: εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ παρὼν ἀλλότριος. ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἐὰν μηδ’ ὅλως ἐνεργῶμεν κατ’ αὐτάς, ἀλλότριαι.
2:1.2.5ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πόσον ἡ κάθαρσις λεκτέον: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι φανερὰ καὶ ἡ ταυτότης τίνι θεῷ. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μάλιστα ζητεῖν θυμὸν πῶς καθαίρει καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, λύπην καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ, καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ σώματος ἐπὶ πόσον δυνατόν. ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ σώματος ἴσως μὲν καὶ τοῖς οἷον τόποις συνάγουσαν ἑαυτήν, πάντως γε μὴν ἀπαθῶς ἔχουσαν καὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. μόνον ποιουμένην ἰατρεύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγὰς πόνων, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλοῖτο, τὰς δὲ ἀλγηδόνας ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε, πρᾴως φέρουσαν καὶ ἐλάττους τιθεῖσαν τῷ μὴ συμπάσχειν: τὸν δὲ θυμὸν ὅσον οἷόν τε ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντη, εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ γοῦν αὐτὴν συνοργιζομένην, ἀλλ’ ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον, τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον ὀλίγον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενές: τὸν δὲ φόβον πάντη — περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ φοβήσεται: τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ ἐνταῦθα — πλήν γε ἐν νουθετήσει. ἐπιθυμία δὲ ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς φαύλου, δῆλον: σίτων δὲ καὶ ποτῶν πρὸς ἄνεσιν οὐκ αὐτὴ ἕξει: οὐδὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων δέ: εἴ δ’ ἄρα, φυσικῶν, οἶμαι, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ἐχόντων: εἴ δ’ ἄρα, ὅσον μέχρι φαντασίας προπετοῦς καὶ ταύτης. ὅλως δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν πάντως τούτων καθαρὰ ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον δὲ βουλήσεται καὶ αὐτὸ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι, ὥστε μηδὲ πλήττεσθαι: εἰ δ’ ἄρα, μὴ σφόδρα, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγας τὰς πληγὰς αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ εὐθὺς λυομένας τῇ γειτονήσει: ὥσπερ εἴ τις σοφῷ γειτονῶν ἀπολαύοι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ γειτνιάσεως ἢ ὅμοιος γινόμενος ἢ αἰδούμενος, ὡς μηδὲν τολμᾶν ποιεῖν ὧν ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ θέλει. οὔκουν ἔσται μάχη: ἀρκεῖ γὰρ παρὼν ὁ λόγος, ὃν τὸ χεῖρον αἰδέσεται, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρον δυσχερᾶναι, ἐάν τι ὅλως κινηθῇ, ὅτι: μὴ ἡσυχίαν ἦγε παρόντος τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ ἀσθένειαν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιτιμῆσαι.
2:1.2.6ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτία, ἀλλὰ κατόρθωσις ἀνθρώπῳ: ἀλλ’ ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπροαίρετον γίγνοιτο, θεὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δαίμων διπλοῦς ὤν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχων σὺν αὑτῷ ἄλλον ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα: εἰ δὲ μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον: θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ πρώτῳ. αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃς ἦλθεν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τὸ καθ̓ αὑτόν, εἰ γένοιτο οἷος ἦλθεν, ἐκεῖ ἐστι: νῷ δὲ συνῳκίσθη ἐνθάδε ἥκων καὶ τοῦτον αὑτῷ ὁμοιώσει κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνου, ὥστε, εἰ δυνατόν, ἄπληκτον εἶναι ἢ ἄπρακτόν γε τῶν μὴ δοκούντων τῷ δεσπότῃ. τίς οὖν ἑκάστη ἀρετὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ; ἢ σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει: νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ. διττὴ δὴ ἑκατέρα, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ. κἀκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετή. ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν: ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρετή. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἑκάστη ἀρετή, ἀλλ’ οἷον παράδειγμα: τὸ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετή. τινὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή: αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ, οὐχὶ δ’ ἄλλου τινός. δικαιοσύνη δὲ εἴπερ οἰκειοπραγία, ἆρα ἀεὶ ἐν πλήθει μερῶν; ἢ ἡ μὲν ἐν πλήθει, ὅταν πολλὰ ᾖ τὰ μέρη, ἡ δὲ ὅλως οἰκειοπραγία, κἂν ἑνὸς ᾖ. ἡ γοῦν ἀληθὴς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἑνὸς πρὸς αὑτό, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο: ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἀπάθεια καθ̓ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει ἀπαθὲς ὂν τὴν φύσιν: αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χείρονι συνοίκῳ.
2:1.2.7ἀντακολουθοῦσι τοίνυν ἀλλήλαις καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐν νῷ ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. καὶ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἡ οἰκειοπραγία, τὸ δὲ οἷον ἀνδρεία ἡ ταυτότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ̓ αὑτοῦ μένειν καθαρόν. ἐν ψυχῇ τοίνυν πρὸς νοῦν ἡ ὅρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὴ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἀκολουθεῖ: καὶ τῇ καθάρσει δέ, εἴπερ πᾶσαι καθάρσεις κατὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι, ἀνάγκη πάσας ἢ οὐδὲ μία τελεία. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰς μείζους καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνάμει, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐλάττους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐκείνας. ὁ μὲν δὴ προηγούμενος τοῦ σπουδαίου βίος οὗτος: πότερα δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχει καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἢ τὰς μείζους ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καθ̓ ἑκάστην: οἷον φρόνησιν: εἰ γὰρ ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς χρήσεται, πῶς ἔτι ἐκείνη μένει κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐνεργοῦσα; καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν φύσει τοσόνδε, ἡ δὲ τοσόνδε, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐκεῖνα μετροῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὅλως ἀναιροῦσα; ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως τῆς φρονήσεως κινηθείσης. ἢ εἰδήσει γε αὐτὰς καὶ ὅσον παῤ αὐτῶν ἕξει: τάχα δέ ποτε περιστατικῶς ἐνεργήσει κατά τινας αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μείζους δὲ ἀρχὰς ἥκων καὶ ἄλλα μέτρα κατ’ ἐκεῖνα πράξει: οἷον τὸ σωφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ ἐκείνῳ τιθείς, ἀλλ’ ὅλως κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν χωρίζων καὶ ὅλως ζῶν οὐχὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃν ἀξιοῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ διαζῆν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν καταλιπών, ἕτερον δὲ ἀλλαξάμενος τὸν τῶν θεῶν: πρὸς γὰρ τούτους αὐτῷ, οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς ἡ ὁμοίωσις. ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὡς εἰκὼν εἰκόνι ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑκατέρα. ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα.
3:1.3.1Τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος ἢ ἐπιτήδευσις ἡμᾶς οἷ δεῖ πορευθῆναι ἀνάγει; ὅποι μὲν οὖν δεῖ ἐλθεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην, κείσθω διωμολογημένον καὶ διὰ πολλῶν δεδειγμένον: καὶ δὴ καὶ δἰ ὧν τοῦτο ἐδείκνυτο ἀναγωγή τις ἦν. τίνα δὲ δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀναχθησόμενον; ἆρά γε τὸν πάντα ἢ τὸν πλεῖστά, φησιν, ἰδόντα, ὃς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει εἰσῄει εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς ἐσομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος ἢ ἐρωτικοῦ; ὁ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ ὁ ἐρωτικὸς ἀνακτέοι. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος; ἆρά γε εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅπασι τούτοις, ἢ καθ̓ ἕνα ἕκαστον εἷς τις; ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ πορεία διττὴ πᾶσιν ἢ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἢ ἄνω ἐλθοῦσιν: ἡ μὲν γὰρ προτέρα ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἡ δέ γε δευτέρα, οἷς ἤδη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γενομένοις καὶ οἷον ἴχνος θεῖσιν ἐκεῖ πορεύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ τόπου ἀφίκωνται, ὃ δὴ τέλος τῆς πορείας ἂν τυγχάνει, ὅταν τις ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ γένηται τῷ νοητῷ. ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν περιμενέτω, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς πρότερον πειρατέον λέγειν. πρῶτον δὴ διασταλτέον τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους ἡμῖν ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ τοῦ μουσικοῦ ὅστις ἐστὶ λέγοντας τὴν φύσιν. θετέον δὴ αὐτὸν εὐκίνητον καὶ ἐπτοημένον μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ παῤ αὑτοῦ κινεῖσθαι, ἕτοιμον δὲ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων οἷον κτύπων, ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ψόφους, οὕτως καὶ τοῦτον πρὸς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἕτοιμον, φεύγοντα ʽδἒ ἀεὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ᾀδομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τὸ εὔρυθμον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον διώκειν. μετὰ τοίνυν τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς τούτους φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχήματα οὕτως ἀκτέον: χωρίζοντα τὴν ὕλην ἐφ̓ ὧν αἱ ἀναλογίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι εἰς τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀκτέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὡς περὶ ἃ ἐπτόητο ἐκεῖνα ἦν, ἡ νοητὴ ἁρμονία καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ καλὸν καὶ ὅλως τὸ καλόν, οὐ τό τι καλὸν μόνον, καὶ λόγους τοὺς φιλοσοφίας ἐνθετέον: ἀφ̓ ὧν εἰς πίστιν ἀκτέον ὧν ἀγνοεῖ ἔχων. τίνες δὲ οἱ λόγοι, ὕστερον.
3:1.3.2ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικός, εἰς ὃν μεταπέσοι ἂν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ μεταπεσὼν ἢ μένοι ἂν ἢ παρέλθοι, μνημονικός ἐστί πως κάλλους: χωρὶς δὲ ἂν ἀδυνατεῖ καταμαθεῖν, πληττόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄψει καλῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ἐπτόηται. διδακτέον οὖν αὐτὸν μὴ περὶ ἓν σῶμα πεσόντα ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀκτέον τῷ λόγῳ σώματα δεικνύντα τὸ ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοθεν λεκτέον καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ νόμους καλοὺς δεικνύντα — ἐν ἀσωμάτοις γὰρ ὁ ἐθισμὸς τοῦ ἐρασμίου ἤδη — καὶ ὅτι ἐν τέχναις καὶ ἐν ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ἐν ἀρεταῖς. εἶτα ἓν ποιητέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὅπως ἐγγίνονται. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἤδη δεῖ ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν: κἀκεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν.
3:1.3.3ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν ἕτοιμος οὗτος καὶ οἷον ἐπτερωμένος καὶ οὐ δεόμενος χωρίσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, κεκινημένος πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀπορῶν δὲ τοῦ δεικνύντος δεῖται μόνον. δεικτέον οὖν καὶ λυτέον βουλόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τῇ φύσει καὶ πάλαι λελυμένον. τὰ μὲν δὴ μαθήματα δοτέον πρὸς συνεθισμὸν κατανοήσεως καὶ πίστεως ἀσωμάτου — καὶ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον δέξεται φιλομαθὴς ὤν — καὶ φύσει ἐνάρετον ὄντα πρὸς τελείωσιν ἀρετῶν ἀκτέον καὶ μετὰ τὰ μαθήματα λόγους διαλεκτικῆς δοτέον καὶ ὅλως διαλεκτικὸν ποιητέον.
3:1.3.4τίς δὲ ἡ διαλεκτική, ἣν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις παραδιδόναι; ἔστι μὲν δὴ ἡ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου δυναμένη ἕξις εἰπεῖν τί τε ἕκαστον καὶ τί ἄλλων διαφέρει καὶ τίς ἡ κοινότης: ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ποῦ τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ὅ ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ὁπόσα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα αὖ, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντων. αὕτη καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διαλέγεται καὶ περὶ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ τί τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, ἐπιστήμῃ δηλονότι περὶ πάντων, οὐ δόξῃ. παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ κἀκεῖ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος ἀφεῖσα ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἀληθείας πεδίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφουσα, τῇ διαιρέσει τῇ Πλάτωνος χρωμένη μὲν καὶ εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν εἰδῶν, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων νοερῶς πλέκουσα, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ πᾶν τὸ νοητόν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀναλύουσα, εἰς ὃ ἂν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ἔλθῃ. τότε δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἄγουσα, ὡς μέχρι γέ του ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, οὐδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονοῦσα εἰς ἓν γενομένη βλέπει, τὴν λεγομένην λογικὴν πραγματείαν περὶ προτάσεων καὶ συλλογισμῶν, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ εἰδέναι γράφειν, ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ δοῦσα: ὧν τινα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πρὸ τέχνης ἡγουμένη, κρίνουσα δὲ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἡγουμένη καὶ μεθόδου τῆς ταῦτα βουλομένης.
3:1.3.5ἀλλὰ πόθεν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη; ἢ νοῦς δίδωσιν ἐναργεῖς ἀρχάς, εἴ τις λαβεῖν δύναιτο ψυχή: εἶτα τὰ ἑξῆς καὶ συντίθησι καὶ συμπλέκει καὶ διαιρεῖ, ἕως ἂν εἰς τέλειον νοῦν ἥκῃ. ʽἔστι γάῤ, φησιν, ʽαὕτη τὸ καθαρώτατον νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως.ʼ ἀνάγκη οὖν τιμιωτάτην οὖσαν ἕξιν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν περὶ τὸ ἂν καὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον εἶναι, φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, νοῦν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. τί οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία; τὸ τιμιώτατον. ἢ ταὐτὸν φιλοσοφία καὶ διαλεκτική; ἢ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον: οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον ὄργανον τοῦτο εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου: οὐ γὰρ ψιλὰ θεωρήματά ἐστι καὶ κανόνες, ἀλλὰ περὶ πράγματά ἐστι καὶ οἷον ὕλην ἔχει τὰ ὄντα: ὁδῷ μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτὰ χωρεῖ ἅμα τοῖς θεωρήμασι τὰ πράγματα ἔχουσα: τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ σόφισμα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινώσκει ἄλλου ποιήσαντος ὡς ἀλλότριον κρίνουσα τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀληθέσι τὸ ψεῦδος, γινώσκουσα, ὅταν τις προσαγάγῃ, ὅτι παρὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. περὶ προτάσεως οὖν οὐκ οἶδε — καὶ γὰρ γράμματα — εἰδυῖα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οἶδεν ὃ καλοῦσι πρότασιν, καὶ καθόλου οἶδε τὰ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅ τε τίθησι καὶ ὃ αἴρει, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο αἴρει ὃ τίθησιν ἢ ἄλλο, καὶ εἰ ἕτερα ἢ ταὐτά, προσφερομένων ὥσπερ κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἐπιβάλλουσα, ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι δὲ ἑτέρᾳ δίδωσι τοῦτο ἀγαπώσῃ.
3:1.3.6μέρος οὖν τὸ τίμιον: ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα φιλοσοφία: καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ φύσεως θεωρεῖ βοήθειαν παρὰ διαλεκτικῆς λαβοῦσα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ προσχρῶνται αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι: μᾶλλον μέντοι αὕτη ἐγγύθεν κομίζεται παρὰ τῆς δἱ??ʼλεκτικῆς: καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν ὡσαύτως θεωροῦσα μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, προστιθεῖσα δὲ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς ἀσκήσεις, ἐξ ὧν προίασιν αἱ ἕξεις. ἴσχουσι δὲ αἱ λογικαὶ ἕξεις καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἤδη τὰ ἐκεῖθεν: καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὰ πλεῖστα: καὶ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιλογισμός τις καὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον καὶ εἰ ἀντακολουθοῦσι καὶ εἰ δεῖ νῦν ἐπισχεῖν ἢ εἰσαῦθις ἢ ὅλως ἄλλο βέλτιον: ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἔτι καθόλου καὶ ἀύλως πάντα εἰς χρῆσιν προφέρει τῇ φρονήσει. πότερα δὲ ἔστι τὰ κάτω εἶναι ἄνευ διαλεκτικῆς καὶ σοφίας; ἢ ἀτελῶς καὶ ἐλλειπόντως. ἔστι δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικὸν οὕτως ἄνευ τούτων; ἢ οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἢ πρότερον ἢ ἅμα συναύξεται. καὶ τάχα ἂν φυσικάς τις ἀρετὰς ἔχοι, ἐξ ὧν αἱ τέλειαι σοφίας προσγενομένης. μετὰ τὰς φυσικὰς οὖν ἡ σοφία: οἶτα τελειοῖ τὰ ἤθη. ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν οὐσῶν συναύξεται ἤδη ἄμφω καὶ συντελειοῦται ἢ προλαβοῦσα ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν ἐτελείωσεν: ὅλως γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὄμμα ἀτελὲς καὶ ἦθος ἔχει, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀμφοτέραις, ἀφ̓ ὧν ἔχομεν.
4:1.4.1Τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἆρα τούτων μεταδώσομεν; εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ᾗ πεφύκασιν ἀνεμποδίστως διεξάγειν, κἀκεῖνα τί κωλύει ἐν εὐζωίᾳ λέγειν εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ εἴτε ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ τὴν εὐζωίαν τις θήσεται, εἴτε ἐν ἔργῳ οἰκείῳ τελουμένῳ, κατ’ ἄμφω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρξει. καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθεῖν ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργῳ εἶναι: οἷον καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα τοῖς τε ἄλλοις εὐπαθεῖ καὶ δὴ καὶ ᾅδοντα ᾗ πέφυκε καὶ ταύτῃ αἱρετὴν αὑτοῖς τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ εἰ τέλος τι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τιθέμεθα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν αὐτοῖς μεταδοίημεν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἔσχατον ἀφικνουμένων, εἰς ὃ ἐλθοῦσιν ἵσταται ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις πᾶσαν ζωὴν αὑτῆς διεξελθοῦσα καὶ πληρώσασα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος. εἰ δέ τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καταφέρειν εἰς τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα — οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις αὐτῶν μεταδώσειν: μεταδώσειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ζῶσι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ζωὴν ἐξελιττομένην εἰς τέλος ἔχουσι — πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος εἶναι οὐ δόξει μὴ ζῆν εὖ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα λέγων, ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξια αὐτῷ δοκεῖ εἶναι; τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι ὃ τοῖς ἅπασι ζῴοις δίδωσιν, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς. εἴη δ’ ἄν τις ἴσως καὶ ὁ διδοὺς τοῖς φυτοῖς, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν: ζωὴ δὲ ἡ μὲν εὖ ἂν εἴη, ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον: οἷον ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ φυτῶν εὐπαθεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ καρπὸν αὖ φέρειν καὶ μὴ φέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ἄτοπος ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὸ εὖ ζῆν: καὶ εἰ ἀταραξία δὲ εἴη, ὡσαύτως: καὶ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν δὲ λέγοιτο τὸ εὖ ζῆν εἶναι.
4:1.4.2τοῖς μέντοι φυτοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ διδόντες κινδυνεύουσιν οὐδὲ τοῖς ζῴοις ἤδη ἅπασι διδόναι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ πάθος πρὸ τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν, οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, κἂν λανθάνῃ, καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶναι, κἂν μήπω γινώσκηται ὅτι οἰκεῖον καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ: δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι: ὥστε ἀγαθοῦ τούτου ὄντος καὶ παρόντος ἤδη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ ἔχον. ὥστε τί δεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσλαμβάνειν; εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ πάθει τῇ καταστάσει τὸ ἀγαθὸν διδόασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γνώσει καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει. ἀλλ’ οὕτω γε τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐνέργειαν ζωῆς αἰσθητικῆς: ὥστε καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἀντιλαμβανομένοις. εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον αἰσθήσεως τοιούτου, πῶς ἑκατέρου ἀδιαφόρου ὄντος τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν; εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν τοιάνδε κατάστασιν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὅταν γνῷ τις τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ παρόν, ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, εἰ γνοὺς τὸ παρὸν δὴ τοῦτο ὅτι πάρεστιν εὖ ζῇ, ἢ δεῖ γνῶναι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἡδύ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο ἔργον ἤδη, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρας μείζονος ἢ κατ’ αἴσθησιν δυνάμεως. οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκειν δυναμένῳ, ὅτι ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δὴ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ πάθος: λόγος γὰρ ἢ νοῦς: ἡδονὴ δὲ πάθος: οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος αὑτὸν ἀφεὶς ἄλλο θήσεται ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει κείμενον κρεῖττον εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐοίκασιν, ὅσοι τε τοῖς φυτοῖς οὐ διδόασι καὶ ὅσοι αἰσθήσει τοιᾷδε τὸ εὖ, λανθάνειν ἑαυτοὺς μεῖζόν τι τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητοῦντες καὶ ἐν τρανοτέρᾳ ζωῇ τὸ ἄμεινον τιθέντες. καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ζωῇ, οὐδ’ εἰ αἰσθητικὴ εἴη, καλῶς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιεν. διὰ τί δὲ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον μόνον τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθενται ἐρωτᾶν αὐτοὺς προσήκει: ʽἆρά γε τὸ λογικὸν προσλαμβάνετε, ὅτι εὐμήχανος μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀνιχνεύειν καὶ περιποιεῖν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν δύναται, ἢ κἂν μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ ἀνιχνεύειν μηδὲ τυγχάνειν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀνευρίσκειν μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, ἔσται καὶ τοῖς μὴ λόγον ἔχουσιν, εἰ ἄνευ λόγου φύσει τυγχάνοιεν τῶν πρώτων, κατὰ φύσιν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, καὶ ὑπουργὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ δἰ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς γίγνοιτο οὐδ’ αὖ ἡ τελείωσις αὐτοῦ, ἥν φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ φήσετε μὴ διὰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτα ἔχειν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ δἰ αὑτὸν ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι, λεκτέον τί τε ἄλλο ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ʽ??ʼ τέλειον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.ʼ ποιεῖν γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν τέλειον οὐ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τὸ τέλειον αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ φύσιν ἄλλην εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν τούτων τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν μηδ’ ὅλως τούτου τοῦ γένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κρείττονα τούτων ἁπάντων: ἢ πῶς τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶμαι ἕξειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν. ἀλλ’ οὗτοι μέν, ἕως ἂν κρείττονα εὕρωσι φύσιν τῶν περὶ ἃ νῦν ἵστανται, ἐατέοι ἐνταυθοῖ εἶναι, οὗπερ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν, ἀπόρως ἔχοντες ὅπῃ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οἷς δυνατόν ἐστι τούτων.
4:1.4.3ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. τιθέμενοι δὴ το εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν ζωῇ, εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆς ἐποιούμεθα, πᾶσι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἀπέδομεν δεκτικοῖς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι, εὖ δὲ ζῆν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνα, οἷς παρῆν ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν λογικῷ ἔδομεν δύνασθαι τοῦτο, τῷ δ’ ἀλόγῳ οὐκέτι: ζωὴ γὰρ ἦν τὸ κοινόν, ὃ δεκτικὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλεν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐν ζωῇ τινι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπῆρχεν. ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ λέγοντες τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ ζωῇ τιθέντες ἠγνόησαν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν οὐδὲ ζωὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι. ποιότητα δὴ τὴν λογικὴν δύναμιν, περὶ ἣν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἀναγκάζοιντο ἂν λέγειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς λογική ἐστι ζωή: περὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται: ὥστε περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἀντιδιῃρημένον τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. πολλαχῶς τοίνυν τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχούσης κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὁμωνύμως τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου — ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου — καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχόντων, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ. καὶ εἰ εἴδωλον ἄλλο ἄλλου, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ ὡς εἴδωλον τοῦ εὖ. εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν — τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδενὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐλλείπει — τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι: τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, εἴπερ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἄριστον τὸ ὄντως ἐν ζωῇ καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχοι, οὐδ’ ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλαχόθεν γενόμενον παρέξει αὐτῷ ἐν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. τί γὰρ τῇ τελείᾳ ζωῇ ἂν προσγένοιτο εἰς τὸ ἀρίστην εἶναι; εἰ δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐρεῖ, οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον ζητοῦμεν. ὅτι δ’ ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἰνδάλματα ζωῆς καὶ οὐ τελείως οὐδὲ καθαρῶς καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον, πολλάκις μὲν εἴρηται: καὶ νῦν δὲ λελέχθω συντόμως ὡς, ἕως ἂν πάντα τὰ ζῶντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ᾖ, μὴ ἐπίσης δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ζῇ; ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην εἶναι.
4:1.4.4εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἔχειν οἷός τε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ζωὴν εὐδαίμων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν θεοῖς ἄν τις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν θεῖτο, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, σκεπτέον πῶς ἔστι τοῦτο. λέγω δὲ ὧδε: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. ἀλλ’ ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; ἢ οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχων, ὃ δὴ καί φαμεν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τοῦτο: περικεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικείμενα: ἦν δ’ ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα. τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τῷ ὅπερ ἔχει: τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως. μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζητήσειε; τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν. αὐτάρκης οὖν ὁ βίος τῷ οὕτω ζωὴν ἔχοντι. κἂν σπουδαῖος ᾖ, αὐτάρκης εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἰς κτῆσιν ἀγαθοῦ: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἔχει. ἀλλ’ ὃ ζητεῖ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖ, καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλά τινι τῶν αὑτοῦ. σώματι γὰρ προσηρτημένῳ ζητεῖ: κἂν ζῶντι δὲ σώματι, τὰ αὑτοῦ ζῶντι τούτῳ, οὐχ ἃ τοιούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστί. καὶ γινώσκει ταῦτα καὶ δίδωσιν ἃ δίδωσιν οὐδὲν τῆς αὑτοῦ παραιρούμενος ζωῆς. οὐδ’ ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις ἐλαττώσεται εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν: μένει γὰρ καὶ ὣς ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή: ἀποθνησκόντων τε οἰκείων καὶ φίλων οἶδε τὸν θάνατον ὅ τι ἐστίν, ἴσασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πάσχοντες σπουδαῖοι ὄντες. οἰκεῖοι δὲ καὶ προσήκοντες τοῦτο πάσχοντες κὰν λυπῶσιν, οὐκ αὐτόν, τὸ δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, οὗ τὰς λύπας οὐ δέξεται.
4:1.4.5ἀλγηδόνες δ’ ἔτι καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; εἰ δὲ δὴ μηδ’ ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καί τινων νόσων. πῶς δὴ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν ἔχοι; πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον. καίτοι καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀποβλέψας ἐπιστήσειε καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους αὖ μάλιστα Πριαμικὰς τύχας: ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ φέροι καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέροι, ἀλλ’ οὐ βουλητά γε ἦν αὐτῷ: δεῖ δὲ βουλητὸν τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι: ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον, ψυχὴν τοιάνδε, μὴ συναριθμεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτοῦ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν. ἑτοίμως γὰρ τοῦτο φαῖεν ἂν λαμβάνειν, ἕως ἂν αἱ τοῦ σώματος πείσεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρωνται καὶ αὖ καὶ αἱ αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγαὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνωνται αὐτῷ. ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης τῷ εὐδαίμονι βίῳ πῶς ἂν λυπηρὸν διὰ τύχας καὶ ὀδύνας ἔχων εὐδαίμων εἴη, ὅτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαίῳ ὄντι γίγνοιτο; ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις εὐδαίμων καὶ αὐτάρκης, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσθήκην τοῦ χείρονος λαβοῦσι περὶ ὅλον χρὴ τὸ γενόμενον τὸ εὔδαιμον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ μέρος, ὅτι ἐκ θατέρου κακῶς ἔχοντος ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν καὶ θάτερον ἐμποδίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου καλῶς ἔχει. ἢ ἀπορρήξαντα δεῖ σῶμα ἢ καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν σώματος οὕτω τὸ αὔταρκες ζητεῖν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν.
4:1.4.6ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀλγεῖν μηδὲ νοσεῖν μηδὲ δυστυχεῖν μηδὲ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων εἶναι ὁντινοῦν εὐδαίμονα: εἰ δ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει τοῦτό ἐστι κείμενον, τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας κρίνειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν, ἃ μὴ ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἠρίθμηται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ συμφόρησις ἦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτων λεγομένων, ἐχρῆν καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ζητεῖν: εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἕν τι εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ — οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τέλη ἂν ζητοῖ — ἐκεῖνο χρὴ λαμβάνειν μόνον, ὃ ἔσχατόν τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ ζητεῖ ἐν αὑτῇ ἐγκολπίσασθαι. ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐχὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι: ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει ἀλλὰ παρόντα μόνον φεύγει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποικονομούμενος ἢ καὶ προσλαμβάνειν ζητεῖ: αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῆς, οὗ ἐγγενομένου ἀποπεπλήρωται καὶ ἔστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ βουλητὸς ὄντως βίος. τῶν δ’ ἀναγκαίων τι παρεῖναι οὐ βούλησις ἂν εἴη, εἰ κυρίως τὴν βούλησιν ὑπολαμβάνοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταχρώμενός τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ἀξιοῦμεν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνομεν, καὶ οὐ δήπου βουλητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης: μᾶλλον γὰρ βουλητὸν τὸ μηδὲ δεηθῆναι τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά, ὅταν παρῇ: οἶον ὑγίεια καὶ ἀνωδυνία. τί γὰρ τούτων ἐπαγωγόν ἐστι; καταφρονεῖται γοῦν ὑγίεια παροῦσα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν. ἃ δὲ παρόντα μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχει οὐδὲ προστίθησί τι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀπόντα δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων λυπούντων παρουσίαν ζητεῖται, εὔλογον ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ φάσκειν εἶναι. οὐδὲ συναριθμητέα τοίνυν τῷ τέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος τηρητέον.
4:1.4.7διὰ τί οὖν ὁ εὐδαιμονῶν ταῦτα ἐθέλει παρεῖναι καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπωθεῖται; ἢ φήσομεν οὐχ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰσφέρεταί τινα μοῖραν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι: τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ὅτι ἐνοχλεῖ τῷ τέλει παρόντα, οὐχ ὡς ἀφαιρούμενα αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὸ ἄριστον αὐτὸ μόνον βούλεται ἔχειν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι μετ’ αὐτοῦ, ὃ ὅταν παρῇ, οὐκ ἀφῄρηται μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δ’ ὅμως κἀκείνου ὄντος. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ, εἴ τι ὁ εὐδαίμων μὴ ἐθέλοι, παρείη δὲ τοῦτο, ἤδη παραιρεῖταί τι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας: ἢ οὕτω γε καθ̓ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν μεταπίπτοι ἂν καὶ ἐκπίπτοι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας: οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλοι ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν κτημάτων. καὶ μυρία ἂν εἴη ἃ οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβάντα οὐδέν τι παρακινεῖ τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, φασί, καὶ οὐ τὰ τυχόντα. τί δ’ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγα, ὥστ̓ ἂν μὴ καταφρονηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναβεβηκότος πρὸς τὸ ἀνωτέρω ἁπάντων τούτων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν κάτω ἐξηρτημένου; διὰ τί γὰρ τὰς μὲν εὐτυχίας, ἡλικαιοῦν ἂν ὦσιν, οὐ μεγάλα ἡγεῖται, οἷον βασιλείας καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν ἀρχάς, οὐδὲ οἰκίσεις καὶ κτίσεις πόλεων, οὐδ’ εἰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γίγνοιντο, ἐκπτώσεις δὲ ἀρχῶν καὶ πόλεως αὑτοῦ κατασκαφὴν ἡγήσεταί τι εἶναι μέγα; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ κακὸν μέγα ἢ ὅλως κακὸν, γέλοιος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δόγματος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σπουδαῖος εἴη ξύλα καὶ λίθους καὶ νὴ Δία θανάτους θνητῶν μέγα ἡγούμενος, ᾧ φαμεν δεῖν δόγμα παρεῖναι περὶ θανάτου τὸ ἄμεινον ζωῆς τῆς μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. αὐτὸς δὲ εἰ τυθείη, κακὸν οἰήσεται αὑτῷ τὸν θάνατον, ὅτι παρὰ βωμοῖς τέθνηκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ταφείη, πάντως που καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τεθὲν τὸ σῶμα ἂν σαπείη. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μὴ πολυδαπάνως, ἀλλ’ ἀνωνύμως τέθαπται οὐκ ἀξιωθεὶς ὑψηλοῦ μνήματος, τῆς μικρολογίας. ἀλλ’ εἰ αἰχμάλωτος ἄγοιτο, πάρ τοί ἐστιν ὁδὸς ἐξιέναι, εἰ μὴ εἴη εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἰ δὲ οἰκεῖοι αὐτῷ αἰχμάλωτοι, οἷον ἑλκόμενοι υἱοὶ καὶ θυγατέρες — τί οὖν, φήσομεν, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἑωρακώς; ἆῤ ἂν οὕτως δόξης ἔχοι ἀπιών, ὡς μὴ ἂν τούτων ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι; ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δοξάσειεν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται τοιαύταις τύχαις τοὺς οἰκείους περιπεσεῖν; ἆῤ οὖν διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἂν δοξάσαι ὡς καὶ γενησομένου ἂν οὐκ εὐδαίμων; ἢ καὶ δοξάζων οὕτως εὐδαίμων: ὥστε καὶ γινομένου. ἐνθυμοῖτο γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τοιαύτη, οἵαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φέρειν καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή. καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωτοι γενόμενοι πράξουσι. καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν: ἢ μένοντες ἢ εὐλόγως μένουσι καὶ οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἢ ἀλόγως μένοντες, δέον μή, αὑτοῖς αἴτιοι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄνοιαν οἰκείων ὄντων αὐτὸς ἐν κακῷ ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἄλλων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας ἀναρτήσεται.
4:1.4.8τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αὐτοῦ, ὅταν σφοδραὶ ὦσιν, ἕως δύναται φέρειν, οἴσει: εἰ δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἐξοίσουσι. καὶ οὐκ ἐλεεινὸς ἔσται ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἔνδον φέγγος, οἷον ἐν λαμπτῆρι φῶς πολλοῦ ἔξωθεν πνέοντος ἐν πολλῇ ζάλῃ ἀνέμων καὶ χειμῶνι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ παρακολουθοῖ, ἢ παρατείνοι τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αἰρόμενον, ὥστε ἐν τῷ σφοδρῷ ὅμως μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν παρατείνοι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν βουλεύσεται: οὐ γὰρ ἀφῄρηται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐν τούτοις. χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ, οἷα τοῖς ἄλλοις φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ φανεῖται ἕκαστα, καὶ οὐ μέχρι τοῦ εἴσω ἕκαστα οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ οὔτε λυπηρά, ὅταν περὶ ἄλλους τὰ ἀλγεινά: ἀσθένεια γὰρ ἂν εἴη ψυχῆς ἡμετέρας. καὶ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ, ὅταν λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς κέρδος ἡγώμεθα καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν, εἰ γίγνοιτο, κέρδος εἶναι τιθεμένων καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐκείνων ἔτι σκοπουμένων, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῶν, ὅπως μὴ λυποίμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἡμετέρα ἤδη ἀσθένεια, ἣν δεῖ περιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐῶντας φοβεῖσθαι μὴ γένηται. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οὕτως ἡμᾶς πεφυκέναι, ὥστε ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων συμφοραῖς, γιγνωσκέτω, ὅτι οὐ πάντες οὕτω, καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἄγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς: κάλλιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς νομιζομένοις τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δεινοῖς εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς δεῖ, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἀθλητὴν μέγαν διακεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης πληγὰς ἀμυνόμενον, γινώσκοντα μέν, ὅτι τινὶ φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀρεστά, τῇ δὲ αὑτοῦ φύσει οἰστά, οὐχ ὡς δεινά, ἀλλ’ ὡς παισὶ φοβερά. ταῦτ̓ οὖν ἤθελεν; ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ θελητά, ὅταν παρῇ, ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχει δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν.
4:1.4.9ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ βαπτισθεὶς ἢ νόσοις ἢ μάγων τέχναις; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν φυλάξουσιν αὐτὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ οἷα ἐν ὕπνῳ κοιμώμενον, τί κωλύει εὐδαίμονα αὐτὸν εἶναι; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀφαιροῦνται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτόν, οὐδ’ ὑπὸ λόγον ποιοῦνται τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ πάντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγειν: εἰ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον φήσουσιν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔτι τὸν λόγον ποιοῦνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑποθέμενοι σπουδαῖον, εἰ εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ σπουδαῖος, ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ’ ἔστω σπουδαῖός, φασι: μὴ αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδ’ ἐνεργῶν κατ’ ἀρετήν, πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων εἴη; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ὅτι ὑγιαίνει, ὑγιαίνει οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅτι καλός, οὐδὲν ἧττον καλός: εἰ δὲ ὅτι σοφὸς μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο, ἧττον σοφὸς ἂν εἴη; εἰ μή πού τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν αὑτῷ παρεῖναι: ἐν γὰρ τῇ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν σοφίᾳ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν παρεῖναι. ἐπακτοῦ μὲν οὖν ὄντος τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τῆς σοφίας λέγοι ἄν τι ἴσως ὁ λόγος οὗτος: εἰ δ’ ἡ τῆς σοφίας ὑπόστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐκ ἀπόλωλε δὲ αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἔν τε τῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας αὖ ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄυπνος ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργοῖ μὲν ἂν καὶ τότε ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾗ τοιοῦτος: λανθάνοι δ’ ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ: οἷον καὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργούσης οὐκ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, καί, εἴπερ ἦμεν τὸ φυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐνεργοῦντες ἦμεν: νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐσμέν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοοῦντος ἐνέργεια: ὥστε ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.
4:1.4.10λανθάνει δὲ ἴσως τῷ μὴ περὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσθητῶν: διὰ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὥσπερ μέσης περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων. αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς διὰ τί οὐκ ἐνεργήσει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως; δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πρὸ ἀντιλήψεως ἐνέργημα εἶναι, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι. καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνακάμπτοντος τοῦ νοήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον ἀπωσθέντος πάλιν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον. ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις παρόντος μὲν τοῦ κατόπτρου ἐγένετο τὸ εἴδωλον, μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἐνέργεια πάρεστιν οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον ἦν ἄν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιούτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἷον αἰσθητῶς γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ. συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ εἰδώλου ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε: ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν τι νοοῖτο μετὰ φαντασίας τὴν νόησιν γίγνεσθαι οὐκ οὔσης τῆς νοήσεως φαντασίας. πολλὰς δ’ ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐγρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεις, ὅτε θεωροῦμεν καὶ ὅτε πράττομεν, τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας. οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει καὶ τότε μάλιστα, ὅτε μετὰ τοῦ συντόνου ἀναγινώσκει: οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνδριζόμενος ὅτι ἀνδρίζεται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὅσῳ ἐνεργεῖ: καὶ ἄλλα μυρία: ὥστε τὰς παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας, αἷς παρακολουθοῦσι, ποιεῖν, μόνας δὲ αὐτὰς οὔσας καθαρὰς τότε εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει τῶν σπουδαίων γενομένων μᾶλλον τὸ ζῆν εἶναι, οὐ κεχυμένον εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον.
4:1.4.11εἰ δέ τινες μηδὲ ζῆν λέγοιεν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ζῆν μὲν αὐτὸν φήσομεν, λανθάνειν δ’ αὐτοὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ τοιούτου, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν. εἰ δὲ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑποθεμένους τὸν ζῶντα καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον οὕτω ζητεῖν, εἰ εὐδαίμων, μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ ἐλαττώσαντας τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητεῖν εἰ πάρεστι μηδὲ ἀνελόντας τὸν ἄνθρωπον περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖν μηδὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον συγχωρήσαντας εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπεστράφθαι ἐν ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνεργείαις αὐτὸν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ὑπόστασις εὐδαιμονίας εἴη, εἰ τὰ ἔξω βουλητὰ λέγοις καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βούλεσθαι ταῦτα. ἐθέλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὖ πράττειν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν κακῶν περὶ μηδένα εἶναι: ἀλλὰ μὴ γινομένων ὅμως εὐδαίμων. εἰ δέ τις παράλογον ἂν αὐτὸν ποιήσειν φήσει, εἰ ταῦτα ἐθελήσει — μὴ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι — δῆλον ὅτι συγχωρήσει ἡμῖν ἐπιστρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν βούλησιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω.
4:1.4.12τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ τῷ βίῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅταν ἀπαιτῶσιν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀκολάστων οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἀξιώσουσι παρεῖναι — αὗται γὰρ ἀδύνατοι παρεῖναι καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν — οὐδὲ μὴν τὰς περιχαρείας — διὰ τί γάρ; — ἀλλὰ τὰς συνούσας παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐν κινήσεσιν οὔσας, οὐδὲ γινομένας τοίνυν: ἤδη γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάρεστι, καὶ ἕστηκε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο. ἵλεως δὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀεὶ καὶ κατάστασις ἥσυχος καὶ ἀγαπητὴ ἡ διάθεσις, ἣν οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν παρακινεῖ, εἴπερ σπουδαῖος. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο εἶδος ἡδονῆς περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ, οὐ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ.
4:1.4.13οὐδ’ αἱ ἐνέργειαι δὲ διὰ τὰς τύχας ἐμποδίζοιντ̓ ἄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλαι ἂν κατ’ ἄλλας γίγνοιντο τύχας, πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαὶ καὶ καλλίους ἴσως ὅσῳ περιστατικαί. αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι αἱ μὲν καθ̓ ἕκαστα τάχα ἂν οἷον ἃς ζητήσας ἂν καὶ σκεψάμενος προφέροι: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μάθημα πρόχειρον ἀεὶ καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, κἂν ἐν τῷ Φαλάριδος ταύρῳ λεγομένῳ ᾖ, ὃ μάτην λέγεται ἡδὺ δὶς ἢ καὶ πολλάκις λεγόμενον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φθεγξάμενον τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν ὑπάρχον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀλγοῦν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὃ συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ, οὐκ ἀπολελείψεται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας.
4:1.4.14τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφότερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις. τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι γελοῖον εὐζωίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔσης, ἣ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας ταύτης οὔσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης — οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς, ἵν’ ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο ἦν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ εὐεξία — οὐδ’ αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εὖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσουσιν αἱ τούτων πλεονεξίαι βαρύνασαι πρὸς αὑτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα γενομένης μινύθειν δεῖ καὶ χείρω τὰ σώματα ποιεῖν, ἵνα δεικνύοιτο οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ἂν ἢ τὰ ἔξω. ὁ δὲ τῶν τῇδε ἄνθρωπος ἔστω καὶ καλὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων ὡς ἂν ὢν τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, καὶ οὐ φθονητέον αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἠπατημένῳ. περὶ δὲ σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως μὲν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένοιτο, γενομένων δὲ ἐλαττώσει αὐτός, εἴπερ αὑτοῦ κήδεται. καὶ ἐλαττώσει μὲν καὶ μαρανεῖ ἀμελείᾳ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πλεονεξίας, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται. σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων οὐκ ἄπειρος νόσων εἶναι παντάπασι βουλήσεται: οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄπειρος εἶναι ἀλγηδόνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων νέος ὢν μαθεῖν βουλήσεται, ἤδη δὲ ἐν γήρᾳ ὢν οὔτε ταύτας οὔτε ἡδονὰς ἐνοχλεῖν οὐδέ τι τῶν τῇδε οὔτε προσηνὲς οὔτε ἐναντίον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ. γινόμενος δὲ ἐν ἀλγηδόσι τὴν πρὸς ταύτας αὐτῷ πεπορισμένην δύναμιν ἀντιτάξει οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑγιείαις καὶ ἀπονίαις πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λαμβάνων οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἐλάττωσιν ταύτης ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων. τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίου μὴ προστιθέντος τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;
4:1.4.15ἀλλ’ εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ παρείη ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, τῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἴσον φήσομεν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι; φήσομεν, εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί. εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα μὴ πρὸς σοφίαν μηδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι, τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων σεμνυνεῖται ὡς μᾶλλον εὐδαίμων τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρὸς αὐλητικὸν τέλος ἡ τούτων πλεονεξία συμβάλλοιτο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ θεωροῦμεν τὸν εὐδαίμονα μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσθενείας φρικτὰ καὶ δεινὰ νομίζοντες, ἃ μὴ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων νομίσειεν: ἢ οὔπω οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε εὐδαίμων εἴη μὴ τὰς περὶ τούτων φαντασίας ἁπάσας ἀλλαξάμενος καὶ οἷον ἄλλος παντάπασι γενόμενος πιστεύσας ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι μηδέν ποτε κακὸν ἕξει: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀδεὴς ἔσται περὶ πάντα ἢ δειλαίνων περί τινα οὐ τέλειος πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ἥμισύς τις ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον πρὸ κρίσεως δέος κἄν ποτε πρὸς ἄλλοις ἔχοντι γένηται, προσελθὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἀπώσεται καὶ τὸν ἐν αὑτῷ κινηθέντα οἷον πρὸς λύπας παῖδα καταπαύσει ἢ ἀπειλῇ ἢ λόγῳ: ἀπειλῇ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἐμβλέψαντος σεμνὸν μόνον ὁ παῖς ἐκπλαγείη. οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα ἄφιλος οὐδὲ ἀγνώμων ὁ τοιοῦτος: τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὑτὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις φίλος ἂν εἴη μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν.
4:1.4.16εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ νῷ τούτῳ ἄρας θήσει τὸν σπουδαῖον, κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει, οἷον ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι. ὃς εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων εἴη ἄξιος οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖθεν ἄνωθεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπειν τὸν μέλλοντα σοφὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο ζῆν. τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα, ὡς ἂν καὶ τόπους μεταβάλλοι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τόπων προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὡς στοχαζόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περικεχυμένων αὐτόν, οἷον εἰ ὡδὶ κατακείσεται ἢ ὡδί, διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ ὅσα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ δύναται, αὐτὸς δὲ ὢν ἄλλος οὐ κωλυόμενος καὶ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, καὶ ἀφήσων δὲ ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως, κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου. ὥστε αὐτῷ τὰ ἔργα τὰ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνοντα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ οὐ τοῦ τέλους χάριν καὶ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ προσεζευγμένου, οὗ φροντιεῖ καὶ ἀνέξεται, ἕως δυνατόν, οἱονεὶ μουσικὸς λύρας, ἕως οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι: εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλην ἀλλάξεται, ἢ ἀφήσει τὰς λύρας χρήσεις καὶ τοῦ εἰς λύραν ἐνεργεῖν ἀφέξεται ἄλλο ἔργον ἄνευ λύρας ἔχων καὶ κειμένην πλησίον περιόψεται ᾅδων ἄνευ ὀργάνων. καὶ οὐ μάτην αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄργανον ἐδόθη: ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις.
5:1.5.1Εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπίδοσιν τῷ χρόνῳ λαμβάνει τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὸς λαμβανομένου; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ εὐδαιμονῆσαι ποιοῖ ἄν τι, οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. ἡ δὲ διάθεσις ἐν τῳ παρεῖναι καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ζωῆς.
5:1.5.2εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἐφιέμεθα ἀεὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τοῦ τοιούτου εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγοι μᾶλλον, πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω καὶ ἡ αὔριον εὐδαιμονία μείζων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἑξῆς ἀεὶ τῆς προτέρας, καὶ οὐκέτι μετρηθήσεται τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τῇ ἀρετῇ. ἔπειτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ νῦν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονήσουσιν ἢ πρότερον καὶ οὔπω τέλειον καὶ οὐδέποτε τέλειον. ἔπειτα καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις λαβοῦσα τὴν τεῦξιν τὸ παρὸν εἴληφε καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν ζητεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι ζητοῦσα τοῦ παρόντος ἂν εἴη, εἰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι. εἰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θέλει, ὃ ἔχει θέλει καὶ ὅ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὃ παρελήλυθεν οὐδ’ ὃ μέλλει, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ εἰσαεὶ ζητοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη εἶναι ἤδη.
5:1.5.3τί οὖν; εἰ πλείονα χρόνον εὐδαιμόνησε καὶ πλείονα χρόνον εἶδε τοῖς ὄμμασι τὸ αὐτό; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλείονι τὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶδε, πλέον ἄν τι ὁ χρόνος αὐτῷ εἰργάσατο: εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς εἶδε, τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁ ἅπαξ θεασάμενος ἔχει.
5:1.5.4ἀλλὰ πλείονα ἅτερος ἥσθη χρόνον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι ἀριθμεῖν εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγει τις τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ζητουμένῳ λέγει. καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ δὲ ἡ πλείων ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς αὐτῆς οἴχεται.
5:1.5.5τί οὖν; εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐδαιμόνησεν εἰς τέλος, ὁ δὲ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὁ δὲ πρότερον εὐδαιμονήσας μετέβαλεν, ἔχουσι τὸ ἴσον; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἡ παραβολὴ οὐκ εὐδαιμονούντων γεγένηται πάντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐδαιμονούντων, ὅτε μὴ εὐδαιμόνουν, πρὸς εὐδαιμονοῦντα. εἴ τι οὖν πλέον ἔχει, τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅσον ὁ εὐδαίμων πρὸς οὐκ εὐδαίμονας, ᾧ καὶ συμβαίνει πλεονεκτεῖν αὐτῶν τῷ παρόντι.
5:1.5.6τί οὖν ὁ κακοδαίμων; οὐ μᾶλλον κακοδαίμων τῷ πλείονι; καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα δυσχερῆ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλείονι χρόνῳ πλείονα τὴν συμφορὰν δίδωσιν, οἷον ὀδύναι πολυχρόνιοι καὶ λῦπαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτου τοῦ τύπου; ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ κακὸν ἐπαύξει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὡσαύτως; ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λυπῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν ἔχοι ἄν τις λέγειν, ὡς προσθήκην ὁ χρόνος δίδωσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐπιμένειν τὴν νόσον: ἕξις γὰρ γίνεται, καὶ κακοῦται μᾶλλον τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ σῶμα. ἐπεί, εἴ γε τὸ αὐτὸ μένοι καὶ μὴ μείζων ἡ βλάβη, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν ἔσται, εἰ μὴ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς προσαριθμοῖ ἀφορῶν εἰς τὸ γενόμενον καὶ μένον ἐπί τε τῆς κακοδαίμονος ἕξεως τὸ κακὸν εἰς τὸν πλείονα χρόνον ἐπιτείνεσθαι αὐξανομένης καὶ τῆς κακίας τῷ ἐμμόνῳ. τῇ γοῦν προσθήκῃ τοῦ μᾶλλον, οὐ τῷ πλείονι τὸ μᾶλλον κακοδαιμονεῖν γίνεται. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἴσως οὐχ ἅμα ἐστὶν οὐδὲ δὴ πλεῖον ὅλως λεκτέον τὸ μηκέτι ὂν τῷ ὄντι συναριθμοῦντα. τὸ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὅρον τε καὶ πέρας ἔχει καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπίδοσις παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον, ὥστε μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδόντα μείζονα, οὐ τὴν πολυετῆ εὐδαιμονίαν ἀριθμῶν ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μᾶλλον γενομένην τότε, ὅτε μᾶλλόν ἐστιν.
5:1.5.7ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἰ τὸ παρὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ μόνον καὶ μὴ συναριθμεῖν τῷ γενομένῳ, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τῷ παρόντι συναριθμοῦντες πλείω λέγομεν; διὰ τί οὖν οὐχ, ὅσος ὁ χρόνος, τοσαύτην καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐροῦμεν; καὶ διαιροῖμεν ἂν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ χρόνου διαιρέσεις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν: καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῷ παρόντι μετροῦντες ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν. ἢ τὸν μὲν χρόνον ἀριθμεῖν καὶ μηκέτι ὄντα οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ τῶν γενομένων μέν, μηκέτι δὲ ὄντων, ἀριθμὸν ἂν ποιησαίμεθα, οἷον τῶν τετελευτηκότων: εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ μηκέτι οὖσαν παρεῖναι λέγειν τῆς παρούσης πλείονα ἄτοπον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν συμβεβηκέναι ἀξιοῖ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁ πλείων παρὰ τὸν παρόντα τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι. ὅλως δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ πλέον σκέδασιν βούλεται ἑνός τινος ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄντος. διὸ καὶ εἰκὼν αἰῶνος εἰκότως λέγεται ἀφανίζειν βουλομένη ἐν τῷ σκιδναμένῳ αὑτῆς τὸ ἐκείνου μένον. ὅθεν κἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀφέληται τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μεῖναν καὶ αὑτῆς ποιήσηται, ἀπώλεσεν αὐτό, σωζόμενον τέως ἐκείνῳ τρόπον τινά, ἀπολόμενον δέ, ἐν αὐτῇ εἰ πᾶν γένοιτο. εἴπερ οὖν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κατὰ ζωὴν ἀγαθήν, δηλονότι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος αὐτὴν θετέον ζωήν: αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη. οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμητέα χρόνῳ, ἀλλ’ αἰῶνι: τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον οὔτε μήκει τινί, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀδιάστατον καὶ τὸ οὐ χρονικὸν εἶναι. οὐ συναπτέον τοίνυν τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲ τῷ αἰῶνι τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲ τὸ χρονικὸν ἀεὶ τῷ αἰωνίῳ οὐδὲ παρεκτατέον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὅλον ληπτέον, εἴ ποτε λαμβάνοις, λαμβάνων οὐ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὴν ζωὴν τὴν οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ παντὸς χρόνου πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ.
5:1.5.8εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν μνήμην τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστηκότι μένουσαν παρέχεσθαι τὸ πλέον τῷ πλείονα χρόνον ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν γεγενημένῳ, τί ἂν τὸ τῆς μνήμης λέγοι; ἢ γὰρ φρονήσεως μνήμην τῆς πρόσθεν γεγενημένης, ὥστε φρονιμώτερον ἂν λέγοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν τηροῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν: ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν μνήμην, ὥσπερ πολλῆς περιχαρείας δεομένου τοῦ εὐδαίμονος καὶ οὐκ ἀρκουμένου τῇ παρούσῃ. καίτοι τί ἂν ἡδὺ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ ἡδέος ἔχοι; ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ μνημονεύοι τις, ὅτι χθὲς ἐπὶ ὄψῳ ἥσθη: ἢ εἰς δέκατον ἔτος, ἔτι ἂν εἴη γελοιότερος: τὸ δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως, ὅτι πέρυσιν ἐφρόνουν.
5:1.5.9εἰ δὲ τῶν καλῶν εἴη ἡ μνήμη, πῶς οὐκ ἐνταῦθα λέγοιτο ἄν τι; ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐλλείποντος τοῖς καλοῖς ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν νυνὶ ζητοῦντος τὴν μνήμην τῶν γεγενημένων.
5:1.5.10ἀλλ’ ὁ πολὺς χρόνος πολλὰς ποιεῖ καλὰς πράξεις, ὧν ἄμοιρος ὁ πρὸς ὀλίγον εὐδαίμων: εἰ δεῖ λέγειν ὅλως εὐδαίμονα τὸν οὐ διὰ πολλῶν τῶν καλῶν. ἢ ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων λέγει, ἐκ τῶν μηκέτι ὄντων ἀλλὰ παρεληλυθότων καὶ ἑνός τινος τοῦ παρόντος τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν συνίστησι. διὸ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐθέμεθα τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, εἶτα ἐζητοῦμεν, τὸ μᾶλλον εἰ ἐν πλείονι εὐδαιμονῆσαι μᾶλλόν ἐστι. τοῦτο οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ ταῖς πράξεσι ταῖς πλείοσι πλεονεκτεῖ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἐν πράξεσι γενόμενον εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ πεπραχότος: ἔπειτα αἱ πράξεις οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῶν τὸ εὖ διδόασιν, ἀλλ’ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ποιοῦσι καρποῦταί τε ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πράττων, οὐχ ὅτι πράττει οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ οὗ ἔχει. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πατρίδος γένοιτο ἂν καὶ παρὰ φαύλου, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς πατρίδος ἡδὺ καὶ ἄλλου πράξαντος γένοιτο ἂν αὐτῷ. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἡδονήν, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἴ τι ἡδὺ δἰ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ. τὸ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι τιθέντος: ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὡδὶ ἐνεργῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐδαιμόνως.
6:1.6.1Τὸ καλόν ἐστι μὲν ἐν ὄψει πλεῖστον, ἐστι δ’ ἐν ἀκοαῖς κατά τε λόγων συνθέσεις καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ ἁπάσῃ: καὶ γὰρ μέλη καὶ ῥυθμοί εἰσι καλοί: ἔστι δὲ καὶ προιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἕξεις καὶ ἐπιστῆμαί τε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν κάλλος. εἰ δέ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, αὐτὸ δείξει. τί οὖν δὴ τὸ πεποιηκὸς καὶ τὰ σώματα καλὰ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐπινεύειν ταῖς φωναῖς, ὡς καλαῖς; καὶ ὅσα ἐφεξῆς ψυχῆς ἔχεται, πῶς ποτε πάντα καλά; καὶ ἆρά γε ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ πάντα, ἢ ἄλλο μὲν ἐν σώματι ʽτὂ κάλλος, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ; καὶ τίνα ποτὲ ταῦτα ἢ τοῦτο; τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ παῤ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καλά, οἷον τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ μεθέξει, τὰ δὲ καλὰ αὐτά, ὥσπερ ἀρετῆς ἡ φύσις. σώματα μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁτὲ μὲν καλά, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ καλὰ φαίνεται, ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ σώματα εἶναι, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ καλά. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρὸν τοῖς σώμασι; πρῶτον γὰρ περὶ τούτου σκεπτέον. τί οὖν ἐστιν, ὃ κινεῖ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν θεωμένων καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ ἕλκει καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι τῇ θέᾳ ποιεῖ; τοῦτο γὰρ εὑρόντες τάχ̓ ἂν ἐπιβάθρᾳ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεασαίμεθα. λέγεται μὲν δὴ παρὰ πάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τό τε τῆς εὐχροίας προστεθὲν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν κάλλος ποιεῖ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅλως τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τὸ καλοῖς εἶναι τὸ συμμέτροις καὶ μεμετρημένοις ὑπάρχειν: οἷς ἁπλοῦν οὐδέν, μόνον δὲ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀνάγκης καλὸν ὑπάρξει: τό τε ὅλον ἔσται καλὸν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἕκαστα οὐχ ἕξει παῤ ἑαυτῶν τὸ καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὅλον συντελοῦντα, ἵνα καλὸν ᾖ: καίτοι δεῖ, εἴπερ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐξ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὸ κάλλος. τά τε χρώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ καλά, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἁπλᾶ ὄντα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ συμμετρίας ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος ἔξω ἔσται τοῦ καλὰ εἶναι. χρυσός τε δὴ πῶς καλόν; καὶ νυκτὸς ἡ ἀστραπὴ ἢ τὰ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι τῷ καλόν; ἐπί τε τῶν φωνῶν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἁπλοῦν οἰχήσεται, καίτοι ἑκάστου φθόγγου πολλαχῇ τῷ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καλῷ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συμμετρίας μενούσης ὁτὲ μὲν καλὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον, ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ φαίνηται, πῶς οὐκ ἄλλο δεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ συμμέτρῳ λέγειν τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καλὸν εἶναι δἰ ἄλλο; εἰ δὲ δὴ μεταβαίνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καλοὺς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν αἰτιῷντο, τίς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασι συμμετρία καλοῖς ἢ νόμοις ἢ μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐπιστήμαις; θεωρήματα μὲν γὰρ σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν εἴη; εἰ δ’ ὅτι σύμφωνά ἐστι, καὶ κακῶν ἔσται ὁμολογία τε καὶ συμφωνία. τῷ γὰρ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἠλιθιότητα εἶναι τὸ τὴν δικαιοσύνην γενναίαν εἶναι εὐήθειαν σύμφωνον καὶ συνῳδὸν καὶ ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα. κάλλος μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ πᾶσα καὶ κάλλος ἀληθινώτερον ἢ τὰ πρόσθεν: ἀλλὰ πῶς σύμμετρα; οὔτε γὰρ ὡς μεγέθη οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμοὶ σύμμετρα καίτοι πλειόνων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντων. ἐν ποίῳ γὰρ λόγῳ ἡ σύνθεσις ἢ ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν μερῶν ἢ τῶν θεωρημάτων; τὸ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κάλλος μονουμένου τί ἂν εἴη;
6:1.6.2πάλιν οὖν ἀναλαβόντες λέγωμεν, τί δῆτά ἐστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καλὸν πρῶτον. ἔστι μὲν γάρ τι καὶ ἐπιβολῇ τῇ πρώτῃ αἰσθητὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ συνεῖσα λέγει καὶ ἐπιγνοῦσα ἀποδέχεται καὶ οἷον συναρμόττεται. πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνίλλεται καὶ ἀρνεῖται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριουμένη. φαμὲν δή, ὡς τὴν φύσιν οὖσα ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τῆς κρείττονος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐσίας, ὅ τι ἂν ἴδῃ συγγενὲς ἢ ἴχνος τοῦ συγγενοῦς, χαίρει τε καὶ διεπτόηται καὶ ἀναφέρει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεται ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῆς. τίς οὖν ὁμοιότης τοῖς τῇδε πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ καλά; καὶ γάρ, εἰ ὁμοιότης, ὅμοια μὲν ἔσται: πῶς δὲ καλὰ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα; μετοχῇ εἴδους φαμὲν ταῦτα. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄμορφον πεφυκὸς μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος δέχεσθαι ἄμοιρον ἂν λόγου καὶ εἴδους αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἔξω θείου λόγου: καὶ τὸ πάντη αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο. αἰσχρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ μορφῆς καὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀνασχομένης τῆς ὕλης τὸ πάντη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μορφοῦσθαι. προσιὸν οὖν τὸ εἶδος τὸ μὲν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐσόμενον μερῶν ἓν συνθέσει συνέταξέ τε καὶ εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ἤγαγε καὶ ἓν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ πεποίηκεν, ἐπείπερ ἓν ἦν αὐτὸ ἕν τε ἔδει τὸ μορφούμενον εἶναι ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτῷ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντι. ἵδρυται οὖν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος εἰς ἓν συναχθέντος καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι διδὸν ἑαυτὸ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις. ὅταν δὲ ἕν τι καὶ ὁμοιομερὲς καταλάβῃ, εἰς ὅλον δίδωσιν ἑαυτό: οἷον εἰ ὁτὲ μὲν πάσῃ οἰκίᾳ μετὰ τῶν μερῶν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἑνὶ λίθῳ διδοίη τις φύσις τὸ κάλλος, τῇ δὲ ἡ τέχνη. οὕτω μὲν δὴ καλὸν τὸ σῶμα γίγνεται λόγου ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐλθόντος κοινωνίᾳ.
6:1.6.3γινώσκει δὲ αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπ’ αὐτὸ δύναμις τεταγμένη, ἧς οὐδὲν κυριώτερον εἰς κρίσιν τῶν ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη συνεπικρίνῃ ψυχή. τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ λέγει συναρμόττουσα τῷ παῤ αὐτῇ εἴδει κἀκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν χρωμένη ὥσπερ κανόνι τοῦ εὐθέος. πῶς δὲ συμφωνεῖ τὸ περὶ σῶμα τῷ πρὸ σώματος; πῶς δὲ τὴν ἔξω οἰκίαν τῷ ἔνδον οἰκίας εἴδει ὁ οἰκοδομικος συναρμόσας καλὴν εἶναι λέγει; ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἔξω, εἰ χωρίσειας τοὺς λίθους, τὸ ἔνδον εἶδος μερισθὲν τῷ ἔξω ὕλης ὄγκῳ, ἀμερὲς ὂν ἐν πολλοῖς φανταζόμενον. ὅταν οὖν ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ ἐν σώμασιν εἶδος ἴδῃ συνδησάμενον καὶ κρατῆσαν τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐναντίας ἀμόρφου οὔσης καὶ μορφὴν ἐπὶ ἄλλαις μορφαῖς ἐκπρεπῶς ἐποχουμένην, συνελοῦσα ἀθρόον αὐτὸ τὸ πολλαχῇ ἀνήνεγκέ τε καὶ εἰσήγαγεν εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἀμερὲς ἤδη καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ ἔνδον σύμφωνον καὶ συναρμόττον καὶ φίλον: οἷα ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ προσηνὲς ἐπιφαινόμενον ἀρετῆς ἴχνος ἐν νέῳ συμφωνοῦν τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῷ ἔνδον. τὸ δὲ τῆς χρόας κάλλος ἁπλοῦν μορφῇ καὶ κρατήσει τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ σκοτεινοῦ, παρουσίᾳ φωτὸς ἀσωμάτου καὶ λόγου καὶ εἴδους ὄντος. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα σώματα καλόν, ὅτι τάξιν εἴδους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα ἔχει, ἄνω μὲν τῇ θέσει, λεπτότατον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ὡς ἐγγὺς ἂν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ εἰσδεχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα δέχεται αὐτό. θερμαίνεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, οὐ ψύχεται δὲ τοῦτο, κέχρωσταί τε πρώτως, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παρὰ τούτου τὸ εἶδος τῆς χρόας λαμβάνει. λάμπει οὖν καὶ στίλβει, ὡς ἂν εἶδος ὄν. τὸ δὲ μὴ κρατούμενον ἐξίτηλον τῷ φωτὶ γινόμενον οὐκέτι καλόν, ὡς ἂν τοῦ εἴδους τῆς χρόας οὐ μετέχον ὅλου. αἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαι αἱ ἐν ταῖς φωναῖς ἀφανεῖς τὰς φανερὰς ποιήσασαι καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν ψυχὴν σύνεσιν τοῦ καλοῦ λαβεῖν ἐποίησαν, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ δείξασαι. παρακολουθεῖ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς μετρεῖσθαι ἀριθμοῖς ἐν λόγῳ οὐ παντί, ἀλλ’ ὃς ἂν ᾖ δουλεύων εἰς ποίησιν εἴδους εἴς τε τὸ κρατεῖν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐν αἰσθήσει καλῶν, ἃ δὴ εἴδωλα καὶ σκιαί, αἳ οἷον ἐκδραμοῦσαι εἰς ὕλην ἐλθοῦσαι ἐκόσμησάν τε καὶ διεπτόησαν φανεῖσαι, τοσαῦτα.
6:1.6.4περὶ δὲ τῶν προσωτέρω καλῶν, ἃ οὐκέτι αἴσθησις ὁρᾶν εἴληχε, ψυχὴ δὲ ἄνευ ὀργάνων ὁρᾷ καὶ λέγει, ἀναβαίνοντας δεῖ θεάσασθαι καταλιπόντας τὴν αἴσθησιν κάτω περιμένειν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καλῶν οὐκ ἦν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν τοῖς μήτε ἑωρακόσι μήθ̓ ὡς καλῶν ἀντειλημμένοις, οἷον εἴ τινες ἐξ ἀρχῆς τυφλοὶ γεγονότες, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ περὶ κάλλους ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοῖς μὴ ἀποδεξαμένοις τὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων κάλλος, οὐδὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς φέγγους τοῖς μηδὲ φαντασθεῖσιν, ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον, καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος οὔτε ἑῷος οὕτω καλά. ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἰδόντας μὲν εἶναι, ὧν ψυχὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέπει, ἰδόντας δὲ ἡσθῆναι καὶ ἔκπληξιν λαβεῖν καὶ πτοηθῆναι πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ἅτε ἀληθινῶν ἤδη ἐφαπτομένους. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πάθη γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ καλόν, θάμβος καὶ ἔκπληξιν ἡδεῖαν καὶ πόθον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ πτόησιν μεθ̓ ἡδονῆς. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα παθεῖν καὶ πάσχουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα πᾶσαι μέν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μᾶλλον μέντοι αἱ τούτων ἐρωτικώτεραι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων πάντες μὲν ἐρῶσι, κεντοῦνται δὲ οὐκ ἴσα, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οἳ μάλιστα, οἳ καὶ λέγονται ἐρᾶν.
6:1.6.5τῷ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐν οὐκ αἰσθήσει ἐρωτικῶν ἀναπυνθάνεσθαι δεῖ: τί πάσχετε περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ τρόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἤθη σώφρονα καὶ ὅλως ἔργα ἀρετῆς καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν κάλλος; καὶ ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ἰδόντες τὰ ἔνδον καλοὺς τί πάσχετε; καὶ πῶς ἀναβακχεύεσθε καὶ ἀνακινεῖσθε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς συνεῖναι ποθεῖτε συλλεξάμενοι αὑτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων; πάσχουσι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ ὄντως ἐρωτικοί. τί δέ ἐστι, περὶ ὃ ταῦτα πάσχουσιν; οὐ σχῆμα, οὐ χρῶμα, οὐ μέγεθός τι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχήν, ἀχρώματον μὲν αὐτήν, ἀχρώματον δὲ καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχουσαν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν ἀρετῶν φέγγος, ὅταν ἢ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἴδητε, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ θεάσησθε μέγεθος ψυχῆς καὶ ἦθος δίκαιον καὶ σωφροσύνην καθαρὰν καὶ ἀνδρείαν βλοσυρὸν ἔχουσαν πρόσωπον καὶ σεμνότητα καὶ αἰδῶ ἐπανθοῦσαν ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ ἀκύμονι καὶ ἀπαθεῖ διαθέσει, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τὸν θεοειδῆ νοῦν ἐπιλάμποντα. ταῦτα οὖν ἀγάμενοι καὶ φιλοῦντες πῶς αὐτὰ λέγετε καλά; ἔστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ μήποτε ὁ ἰδὼν ἄλλο τι φήσει, ἢ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ταῦτα εἶναι. τί ὄντα ὄντως; ἢ καλά. ἀλλ’ ἔτι ποθεῖ ὁ λόγος, τί ὄντα πεποίηκε τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἐράσμιον: τί τὸ ἐπὶ πάσαις ἀρεταῖς διαπρέπον οἷον φῶς; βούλει δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία λαβών, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν αἰσχρὰ γινόμενα, ἀντιπαραθεῖναι; τάχα γὰρ ἂν συμβάλλοιτο πρὸς ὃ ζητοῦμεν τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὅ τί ποτ̓ ἐστὶ καὶ διότι φανέν. ἔστω δὴ ψυχὴ αἰσχρά, ἀκόλαστός τε καὶ ἄδικος, πλείστων μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμουσα, πλείστης δὲ ταραχῆς, ἐν φόβοις διὰ δειλίαν, ἐν φθόνοις διὰ μικροπρέπειαν, πάντα φρονοῦσα ἃ δὴ καὶ φρονεῖ θνητὰ καὶ ταπεινά, σκολιὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡδονῶν οὐ καθαρῶν φίλη, ζῶσα ζωὴν τοῦ ὅ τι ἂν πάθῃ διὰ σώματος ὡς ἡδὺ λαβοῦσα τὸ αἶσχος. αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ αἶσχος αὐτῇ ἆρα οὐ προσγεγονέναι οἷον ἐπακτὸν κακὸν φήσομεν, ὃ ἐλωβήσατο μὲν αὐτῇ, πεποίηκε δὲ αὐτὴν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ πολλῷ τῷ κακῷ συμπεφυρμένην, οὔτε ζωὴν ἔτι ἔχουσαν οὔτε αἴσθησιν καθαράν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μίγματι τοῦ κακοῦ ἀμυδρᾷ τῇ ζωῇ κεχρημένην καὶ πολλῷ τῷ θανάτῳ κεκραμένην, οὐκέτι μὲν ὁρῶσαν ἃ δεῖ ψυχὴν ὁρᾶν, οὐκέτι δὲ ἐωμένην ἐν αὑτῇ μένειν τῷ ἕλκεσθαι ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ σκοτεινόν; ἀκάθαρτος δή, οἶμαι, οὖσα καὶ φερομένη πανταχοῦ ὁλκαῖς πρὸς τὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει προσπίπτοντα, πολὺ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα ἐγκεκραμένον, τῷ ὑλικῷ πολλῷ συνοῦσα καὶ εἰς αὑτὴν εἰσδεξαμένη εἶδος ἕτερον ἠλλάξατο κράσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον: οἷον εἴ τις δὺς εἰς πηλὸν ἢ βόρβορον τὸ μὲν ὅπερ εἶχε κάλλος μηκέτι προφαίνοι, τοῦτο δὲ ὁρῷτο, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἢ βορβόρου ἀπεμάξατο: ᾧ δὴ τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσθήκῃ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου προσῆλθε καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἔσται πάλιν καλός, ἀπονιψαμένῳ καὶ καθηραμένῳ ὅπερ ἦν εἶναι. αἰσχρὰν δὴ ψυχὴν λέγοντες μίξει καὶ κράσει καὶ νεύσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὕλην ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο αἶσχος ψυχῇ μὴ καθαρᾷ μηδὲ εἰλικρινεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ χρυσῷ ἀναπεπλῆσθαι τοῦ γεώδους, ὃ εἴ τις ἀφέλοι, καταλέλειπται χρυσὸς καὶ ἔστι καλός, μονούμενος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, αὑτῷ δὲ συνὼν μόνῳ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ψυχή, μονωθεῖσα μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἃς διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἔχει, ᾧ ἄγαν προσωμίλει, ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δὲ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν καὶ καθαρθεῖσα ἃ ἔχει σωματωθεῖσα, μείνασα μόνη τὸ αἰσχρὸν τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἅπαν ἀπεθήκατο.
6:1.6.6ἔστι γὰρ δή, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. διὸ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς ᾅδου κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον: οἷα δὴ καὶ ὗες, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη σωφροσύνη ἀληθὴς ἢ τὸ μὴ προσομιλεῖν ἡδοναῖς τοῦ σώματος, φεύγειν δὲ ὡς οὐ καθαρὰς οὐδὲ καθαροῦ; ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἀφοβία θανάτου. ὁ δέ ἐστι χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος. οὐ φοβεῖται δὲ τοῦτο, ὃς ἀγαπᾷ μόνος γενέσθαι. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ δὴ ὑπεροψία τῷν τῇδε. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις νόησις ἐν ἀποστροφῇ τῶν κάτω, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄνω τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγουσα. γίνεται οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρθεῖσα εἶδος καὶ λόγος καὶ πάντη ἀσώματος καὶ νοερὰ καὶ ὅλη τοῦ θείου, ὅθεν ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ πάντα τοιαῦτα. ψυχὴ οὖν ἀναχθεῖσα πρὸς νοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι καλόν. νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ νοῦ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῇ οἰκεῖον καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον, ὅτι τότε ἐστὶν ὄντως μόνον ψυχή. διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιωθῆναι εἶναι θεῷ, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡ μοῖρα ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν ὄντων. μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἡ καλλονή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα φύσις τὸ αἰσχρόν. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ πρῶτον κακόν, ὥστε κἀκεῖνο ταὐτὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν, ἢ τἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλλονή. ὁμοίως οὖν ζητητέον καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν τε καὶ κακόν. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον θετέον τὴν καλλονήν, ὅπερ καὶ τἀγαθόν: ἀφ̓ οὗ νοῦς εὐθὺς τὸ καλόν: ψυχὴ δὲ νῷ καλόν: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη παρὰ ψυχῆς μορφούσης καλά, τά τε ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τά τε ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, ψυχὴ ἤδη ποιεῖ: ἅτε γὰρ θεῖον οὖσα καὶ οἷον μοῖρα τοῦ καλοῦ, ὧν ἂν ἐφάψηται καὶ κρατῇ, καλὰ ταῦτα, ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς μεταλαβεῖν, ποιεῖ.
6:1.6.7ἀναβατέον οὖν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὗ ὀρέγεται πᾶσα ψυχή. εἴ τις οὖν εἶδεν αὐτό, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὅπως καλόν. ἐφετὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τοῦτο, τεῦξις δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀναβαίνουσι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐπιστραφεῖσι καὶ ἀποδυομένοις, ἃ καταβαίνοντες ἠμφιέσμεθα: οἷον ἐπὶ τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἱερῶν τοῖς ἀνιοῦσι καθάρσεις τε καὶ ἱματίων ἀποθέσεις τῶν πρὶν καὶ τὸ γυμνοῖς ἀνιέναι: ἕως ἄν τις παρελθὼν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει πᾶν ὅσον ἀλλότριον τοῦ θεοῦ αὑτῷ μόνῳ αὐτὸ μόνον ἴδῃ εἰλικρινές, ἁπλοῦν, καθαρόν, ἀφ̓ οὗ πάντα ἐξήρτηται, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ ἔστι καὶ ζῇ καὶ νοεῖ: ζωῆς γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. τοῦτο οὖν εἴ τις ἴδοι, ποίους ἂν ἴσχοι ἔρωτας, ποίους δὲ πόθους, βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι, πῶς δ’ ἂν ἐκπλαγείη μεθ̓ ἡδονῆς; ἔστι γὰρ τῷ μὲν μήπω ἰδόντι ὀρέγεσθαι ὡς ἀγαθοῦ: τῷ δὲ ἰδόντι ὑπάρχει ἐπὶ καλῷ ἄγασθαί τε καὶ θάμβους πίμπλασθαι μεθ̓ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐκπλήττεσθαι ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀληθῆ ἔρωτα καὶ δριμέος πόθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων καταγελᾶν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν νομιζομένων καλῶν καταφρονεῖν: ὁποῖον πάσχουσιν ὅσοι θεῶν εἴδεσιν ἢ δαιμόνων προστυχόντες οὐκέτ̓ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ὁμοίως ἄλλων κάλλη σωμάτων. τί δῆτα οἰόμεθα, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν θεῷτο αὐτὸ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ καθαρόν, μὴ σαρκῶν, μὴ σώματος ἀνάπλεων, μὴ ἐν γῇ, μὴ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἵν’ ᾖ καθαρόν; καὶ γὰρ ἐπακτὰ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ μέμικται καὶ οὐ πρῶτα, παῤ ἐκείνου δέ. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ χορηγεῖ μὲν ἅπασιν, ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μένον δίδωσι καὶ οὐ δέχεταί τι εἰς αὑτό, ἴδοι, μένων ἐν τῇ θέᾳ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἀπολαύων αὐτοῦ ὁμοιούμενος τίνος ἂν ἔτι δέοιτο καλοῦ; τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ μάλιστα κάλλος ἂν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐργάζεται τοὺς ἐραστὰς αὐτοῦ καλοὺς καὶ ἐραστοὺς ποιεῖ. οὗ δὴ καὶ ἀγὼν μέγιστος καὶ ἔσχατος ψυχαῖς πρόκειται, ὑπἐρ οὗ καὶ ὁ πᾶς πόνος, μὴ ἀμοίρους γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρίστης θέας, ἧς ὁ μὲν τυχὼν μακάριος ὄψιν μακαρίαν τεθεαμένος ἀτυχὴς δὲ τούτου ὁ μὴ τυχών. οὐ γὰρ ὁ χρωμάτων ἢ σωμάτων καλῶν μὴ τυχὼν οὐδὲ δυνάμεως οὐδὲ ἀρχῶν οὐδ’ ὁ βασιλείας μὴ τυχὼν ἀτυχής, ἀλλ’ ὁ τούτου καὶ μόνου, ὑπὲρ οὗ τῆς τεύξεως καὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἀρχὰς γῆς ἁπάσης καὶ θαλάττης καὶ οὐρανοῦ προέσθαι χρεών, εἰ καταλιπών τις ταῦτα καὶ ὑπεριδὼν εἰς ἐκεῖνο στραφεὶς ἴδοι.
6:1.6.8τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος; τίς μηχανή; πῶς τις θεάσεται κάλλος ἀμήχανον οἷον ἔνδον ἐν ἁγίοις ἱεροῖς μένον οὐδὲ προιὸν εἰς τὸ ἔξω, ἵνα τις καὶ βέβηλος ἴδῃ; ἴτω δὴ καὶ συνεπέσθω εἰς τὸ εἴσω ὁ δυνάμενος ἔξω καταλιπὼν ὄψιν ὀμμάτων μηδ’ ἐπιστρέφων αὑτὸν εἰς τὰς προτέρας ἀγλαίας σωμάτων. ἰδόντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ ἐν σώμασι καλὰ μήτοι προστρέχειν, ἀλλὰ γνόντα, ὥς εἰσιν εἰκόνες καὶ ἴχνη καὶ σκιαί, φεύγειν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ταῦτα εἰκόνες. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιδράμοι λαβεῖν βουλόμενος ὡς ἀληθινοῦ, οἷα εἰδώλου καλοῦ ἐφ̓ ὕδατος ὀχουμένου, οὗ λαβεῖν βουληθείς, ὥς πού τις μῦθος, δοκεῖ μοι, αἰνίττεται, δὺς εἰς τὸ κάτω τοῦ ῥεύματος ἀφανὴς ἐγένετο, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὁ ἐχόμενος τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων καὶ μὴ ἀφιεὶς οὐ τῷ σώματι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ καταδύσεται εἰς σκοτεινὰ καὶ ἀτερπῆ τῷ νῷ βάθη, ἔνθα τυφλὸς καὶ ἐν ᾅδου μένων καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ σκιαῖς συνέσται. φεύγωμεν δὴ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα, ἀληθέστερον ἄν τις παρακελεύοιτο. τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; καὶ πῶς ἀναξόμεθα; οἷον ἀπὸ μάγου Κίρκης φησὶν ἢ Καλυψοῦς Ὀδυσσεὺς αἰνιττόμενος, δοκεῖ μοι, μεῖναι οὐκ ἀρεσθείς, καίτοι ἔχων ἡδονὰς δἰ ὀμμάτων καὶ κάλλει πολλῷ αἰσθητῷ συνών. πατρὶς δὲ ἡμῖν, ὅθενπερ ἤλθομεν, καὶ πατὴρ ἐκεῖ. τίς οὖν ὁ στόλος καὶ ἡ φυγή; οὐ ποσὶ δεῖ διανύσαι: πανταχοῦ γὰρ φέρουσι πόδες ἐπὶ γῆν ἄλλην ἀπ’ ἄλλης: οὐδέ σε δεῖ ἵππων ὄχημα ἤ τι θαλάττιον παρασκευάσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἀφεῖναι δεῖ καὶ μὴ βλέπειν, ἀλλ’ οἷον μύσαντα ὄψιν ἄλλην ἀλλάξασθαι καὶ ἀνεγεῖραι, ἣν ἔχει μὲν πᾶς, χρῶνται δὲ ὀλίγοι.
6:1.6.9τί οὖν ἐκείνη ἡ ἔνδον βλέπει; ἄρτι μὲν ἐγειρομένη οὐ πάνυ τὰ λαμπρὰ δύναται βλέπειν. ἐθιστέον οὖν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν πρῶτον μὲν τὰ καλὰ βλέπειν ἐπιτηδεύματα: εἶτα ἔργα καλά, οὐχ ὅσα αἱ τέχναι ἐργάζονται, ἀλλ’ ὅσα οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀγαθοί: εἶτα ψυχὴν ἰδὲ τῶν τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλὰ ἐργαζομένων. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἴδοις ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν οἷον τὸ κάλλος ἔχει; ἄναγε ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καὶ ἰδέ: κἂν μήπω σαυτὸν ἴδῃς καλόν, οἷα ποιητὴς ἀγάλματος, ὃ δεῖ καλὸν γενέσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀφαιρεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀπέξεσε, τὸ δὲ λεῖον, τὸ δὲ καθαρὸν ἐποίησεν, ἕως ἔδειξε καλὸν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀγάλματι πρόσωπον, οὕτω καὶ σὺ ἀφαίρει ὅσα περιττὰ καὶ ἀπεύθυνε ὅσα σκολιά, ὅσα σκοτεινὰ καθαίρων ἐργάζου εἶναι λαμπρὰ καὶ μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα, ἕως ἂν ἐκλάμψῃ σοι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ θεοειδὴς ἀγλαία, ἕως ἂν ἴδῃς σωφροσύνην ἐν ἁγνῷ βεβῶσαν βάθρῳ. εἰ γέγονας τοῦτο καὶ εἶδες σαυτὸν καὶ σαυτῷ καθαρῶς συνεγένου οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὸ εἷς οὕτω γενέσθαι οὐδὲ σὺν αὑτῷ ἄλλο τι ἐντὸς μεμιγμένον ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὅλος αὐτὸς φῶς ἀληθινὸν μόνον, οὐ μεγέθει μεμετρημένον οὐδὲ σχήματι εἰς ἐλάττωσιν περιγραφὲν οὐδ’ αὖ εἰς μέγεθος δἰ ἀπειρίας αὐξηθέν, ἀλλ’ ἀμέτρητον πανταχοῦ, ὡς ἂν μεῖζον παντὸς μέτρου καὶ παντὸς κρεῖσσον ποσοῦ: εἰ τοῦτο γενόμενον σαυτὸν ἴδοις, ὄψις ἤδη γενόμενος θαρσήσας περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἀναβεβηκὼς μηκέτι τοῦ δεικνύντος δεηθεὶς ἀτενίσας ἰδέ: οὗτος γὰρ μόνος ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ μέγα κάλλος βλέπει. ἐὰν δὲ ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν λημῶν κακίαις καὶ οὐ κεκαθαρμένος ἢ ἀσθενής, ἀνανδρίᾳ οὐ δυνάμενος τὰ πάνυ λαμπρὰ βλέπειν, οὐδὲν βλέπει, κἂν ἄλλος δεικνύῃ παρὸν τὸ ὁραθῆναι δυνάμενον. τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη. γενέσθω δὴ πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς καὶ καλὸς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι τἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν. ἥξει γὰρ πρῶτον ἀναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν κἀκεῖ πάντα εἰσόψεται καλὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ φήσει τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο εἶναι, τὰς ἰδέας: πάντα γὰρ ταύταις καλά, τοῖς νοῦ γεννήμασι καὶ οὐσίᾳ. τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τούτου τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγομεν φύσιν προβεβλημένον τὸ καλὸν πρὸ αὑτῆς ἔχουσαν. ὥστε ὁλοσχερεῖ μὲν λόγῳ τὸ πρῶτον καλόν: διαιρῶν δὲ τὰ νοητὰ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν καλὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν φήσει τόπον, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐπέκεινα καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ καλοῦ. ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν πρῶτον θήσεται: πλὴν ἐκεῖ τὸ καλόν.
7:1.7.1Ἆῤ ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ἢ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργειαν, καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ πολλῶν εἴη, τούτῳ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπουσαν; ψυχῆς δὴ ἐνέργεια κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἐνεργοῖ ἀρίστη οὖσα, οὐ μόνον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη. εἰ οὖν τι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνεργοῖ ἄριστον ὂν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, δἰ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διχῶς ἂν ἔχοι, ὅσα οὕτω τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡμοιῶσθαι καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖσθαι. εἰ οὖν ἔφεσις καὶ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν, δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπον μηδ’ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσαν πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐνεργειῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦσαν οὐ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργείᾳ — ἐκεῖνα γὰρ πρὸς αὐτήν — οὐ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ οὖν οὐδὲ τῇ νοήσει τἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ τῇ μονῇ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ νοήσεως. καὶ γὰρ αὖ τοῦτο δεῖ τἀγαθὸν τίθεσθαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς μηδέν: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀληθὲς τὸ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ: δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα, ὥσπερ κύκλον πρὸς κέντρον, ἀφ̓ οὗ πᾶσαι γραμμαί. καὶ παράδειγμα ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ κέντρον ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὸ παῤ αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτημένον πρὸς αὐτόν: πανταχοῦ γοῦν μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, κἂν ἀποτεμεῖν ἐθελήσῃς ἐπὶ θάτερα, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιόν ἐστι τὸ φῶς.
7:1.7.2τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸ πῶς; ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα πρὸς ψυχήν, ψυχὴ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ διὰ νοῦ. ἔχει δέ τι αὐτοῦ τῷ ἕν πως καὶ τῷ ὄν πως ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ μετέχει δὲ καὶ εἴδους. ὡς οὖν μετέχει τούτων, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. εἰδώλου ἄρα: ὧν γὰρ μετέχει, εἴδωλα ὄντος καὶ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὡσαύτως. ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ζῆν, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ τῇ μετὰ νοῦν, ἐγγυτέρω ἀληθείας, καὶ διὰ νοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς αὕτη: ἔχοι δ’ ἂν τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον βλέποι: νοῦς δὲ μετὰ τἀγαθόν. ζωὴ τοίνυν, ὅτῳ τὸ ζῆν, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ νοῦς, ὅτῳ νοῦ μέτεστιν: ὥστε ὅτῳ ζωὴ μετὰ νοῦ, διχῶς καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτό.
7:1.7.3εἰ δ’ ἡ ζωὴ ἀγαθόν, ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ζῶντι παντί; ἢ οὔ: χωλεύει γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ τῷ φαύλῳ, ὥσπερ ὄμμα τῷ μὴ καθαρῶς ὁρῶντι: οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον αὑτοῦ. εἰ δὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῖν, ᾗ μέμικται, κακὸν ἀγαθόν, πῶς οὐχ ὁ θάνατος κακόν; ἤ τίνι; τὸ γὰρ κακὸν συμβεβηκέναι δεῖ τῳ: ὃ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι ὄν, ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἐστερημένον ζωῆς, οὐκ ἔστι δεκτικὸν κακοῦ, οὐδ’ οὕτω κακὸν τῷ λίθῳ. εἰ δ’ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον, ἤδη ἄν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὰ αὑτῆς ἄνευ σώματος. εἰ δὲ τῆς ὅλης γίνεται, τί ἂν ἐκεῖ οὔσῃ εἴη κακόν; καὶ ὅλως ὥσπερ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστι, κακὸν δὲ οὐδέν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σωζούσῃ τὸ καθαρὸν αὑτῆς: εἰ δὲ μὴ σώζοι, οὐχ ὁ θάνατος ἂν εἴη κακον αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ζωή. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾅδου δίκαι, πάλιν αὐτῇ ἡ ζωὴ κἀκεῖ κακόν, ὅτι μὴ ζωὴ μόνον. ἀλλ’ εἰ σύνοδος μὲν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ζωή, θάνατος δὲ διάλυσις τούτων, ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται ἀμφοτέρων δεκτική. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀγαθὴ ἡ ζωή, πῶς ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; ἢ ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡ ζωὴ οἷς ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν οὐ καθόσον σύνοδος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι δἰ ἀρετῆς ἀμύνεται τὸ κακόν: ὁ δὲ θάνατος μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν. ἢ λεκτέον αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ζωὴν κακὸν μὲν παῤ αὑτῆς, τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ ζῶσαν κατὰ τὸ σύνθετον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη χωρίζουσαν ἑαυτήν.
1.7.4
в таблице соответствий места нетВ этом издании нет единицы с этой ссылкой (Plot.Enn.1.7.4); отсутствие текста этим не установлено.
8:1.8.1Οἱ ζητοῦντες πόθεν τὰ κακά, εἴτ̓ οὖν εἰς τὰ ὄντα εἴτε περὶ γένος τῶν ὄντων παρελήλυθεν, ἀρχὴν ἂν προσήκουσαν τῆς ζητήσεως ποιοῖντο, εἰ τί ποτ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ κακοῦ φύσις πρότερον ὑποθεῖντο. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὅθεν ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὅπου ἵδρυται καὶ ὅτῳ συμβέβηκε γνωσθείη ἄν, καὶ ὅλως εἰ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὁμολογηθείη. κακοῦ δὲ φύσιν τίνι ποτὲ δυνάμει τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνοίημεν ἂν τῆς γνώσεως ἑκάστων δἰ ὁμοιότητος γιγνομένης ἄπορον ἂν εἴη. νοῦς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχὴ εἴδη ὄντα εἰδῶν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ἂν ποιοῖντο, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἂν ἔχοιεν τὴν ὄρεξιν: εἶδος δὲ τὸ κακὸν πῶς ἄν τις φαντάζοιτο ἐν ἀπουσίᾳ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἰνδαλλόμενον; ἀλλ’ εἰ, ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ̓ ἂν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον τὸ κακόν, ἥπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἔσται, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διιδεῖν τοῖς μέλλουσι τὰ κακὰ γνώσεσθαι, ἐπείπερ προηγούμενα τὰ ἀμείνω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ εἴδη, τὰ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μᾶλλον. ζήτημα δ’ ὅμως καὶ ὥς, πῶς ἐναντίον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ: εἰ μὴ ἄρα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὡς στέρησις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον.
8:1.8.2νῦν δὲ λεγέσθω, τίς ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, καθ̓ ὅσον τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις προσήκει. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται καὶ οὗ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεται ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα αὐτὸ κἀκείνου δεόμενα: τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνενδεές, ἱκανὸν ἑαυτῷ, μηδενὸς δεόμενον, μέτρον πάντων καὶ πέρας, δὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ νοῦν καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ περὶ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτου καλὰ πάντα: αὐτός τε γὰρ ὑπέρκαλος καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ἀρίστων βασιλεύων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, νοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος οὐ κατὰ νοῦν, ὃν οἰηθείη ἄν τις κατὰ τοὺς παῤ ἡμῖν λεγομένους νοῦς εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ προτάσεων συμπληρουμένους καὶ τῶν λεγομένων συνιέναι δυναμένους λογιζομένους τε καὶ τοῦ ἀκολούθου θεωρίαν ποιουμένους καὶ ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τὰ ὄντα θεωμένους ὡς πρότερον οὐκ ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ κενοὺς ἔτι πρὶν μαθεῖν ὄντας, καίτοι νοῦς ὄντας. οὐ δὴ ἐκεῖνος ὁ νοῦς τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ’ ἔχει πάντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα καὶ σύνεστιν αὑτῷ συνὼν καὶ ἔχει πάντα οὐκ ἔχων. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος: οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ: ὅλον τε γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πανταχῇ πᾶν καὶ οὐ συγκέχυται, ἀλλὰ αὖ χωρίς. τὸ γοῦν μεταλαμβάνον οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ὅτου δύναται μεταλαμβάνει. καὶ ἔστι πρώτη ἐνέργεια ἐκείνου καὶ πρώτη οὐσία ἐκείνου μένοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ: ἐνεργεῖ μέντοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον οἷον περὶ ἐκεῖνον ζῶν. ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περὶ τοῦτον χορεύουσα ψυχὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπουσα καὶ τὸ εἴσω αὐτοῦ θεωμένη τὸν θεὸν δἰ αὐτοῦ βλέπει. καὶ οὗτος θεῶν ἀπήμων καὶ μακάριος βίος καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐδαμοῦ ἐνταῦθα καὶ εἰ ἐνταῦθα ἔστη, κακὸν οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα τἀγαθὰ καὶ τρίτα. καὶ περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστί, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον πάντων καλῶν, καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐκείνου, καὶ δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.
8:1.8.3εἰ δὴ τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ κακὸν ἐνείη, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων: ἀγαθὰ γὰρ ταῦτα. λείπεται τοίνυν, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι οἷον εἶδός τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὂν καὶ περί τι τῶν μεμιγμένων τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἢ ὁπωσοῦν κοινωνούντων τῷ μὴ ὄντι. μὴ ὂν δὲ οὔτι τὸ παντελῶς μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μόνον τοῦ ὄντος: οὐχ οὕτω δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὡς κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πάθη ἢ ὕστερόν τι τούτων καὶ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς τούτοις ἢ ἀρχὴ τούτων ἢ ἕν τι τῶν συμπληρούντων τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ὄν. ἤδη γὰρ ἄν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἥκοι αὐτοῦ οἷον ἀμετρίαν εἶναι πρὸς μέτρον καὶ ἄπειρον πρὸς πέρας καὶ ἀνείδεον πρὸς εἰδοποιητικὸν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐνδεὲς πρὸς αὔταρκες, ἀεὶ ἀόριστον, οὐδαμῇ ἑστώς, παμπαθές, ἀκόρητον, πενία παντελής: καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκότα ταῦτα αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἴδῃς, καὶ αὐτὸ πάντα ταῦτα: τὰ δ’ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλάβῃ καὶ ὁμοιωθῇ, κακὰ μὲν γίνεσθαι, οὐχ ὅπερ δὲ κακὰ εἶναι. τίνι οὖν ὑποστάσει ταῦτα πάρεστιν οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἑτέρῳ συμβαίνει τὸ κακόν, δεῖ τι πρότερον αὐτὸ εἶναι, κἂν μὴ οὐσία τις ᾖ. ὡς γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὃ συμβέβηκεν, οὕτω καὶ κακὸν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἤδη κατ’ ἐκεῖνο συμβεβηκὸς ἑτέρῳ. τίς οὖν ἀμετρία, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ἀμέτρῳ; τί δὲ μέτρον, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ; ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐστὶ μέτρον μὴ ἐν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἀμετρία οὐκ ἐν ἀμέτρῳ. εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ ἐν ἀμέτρῳ — ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ αὐτῷ ἀμετρίας αὐτῷ ἀμέτρῳ ὄντι — ἢ ἐν μεμετρημένῳ: ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ μεμετρημένον ἀμετρίαν ἔχειν καθ̓ ὃ μεμέτρηται. δεῖ οὖν εἶναί τι καὶ ἄπειρον καθ̓ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀνείδεον αὖ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τα πρόσθεν, ἃ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ ἐχαρακτήριζε φύσιν, καὶ εἴ τι μετ’ ἐκεῖνο τοιοῦτον, ἢ μεμιγμένον ἔχει τοῦτο ἢ βλέπον πρὸς αὐτό ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἢ ποιητικόν ἐστι τοιούτου. τὴν δὴ ὑποκειμένην σχήμασι καὶ εἴδεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ μέτροις καὶ πέρασι καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ κόσμῳ κοσμουμένην, μηδὲν παῤ αὑτῆς ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν, εἴδωλον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, κακοῦ δὲ οὐσίαν, εἴ τις καὶ δύναται κακοῦ οὐσία εἶναι, ταύτην ἀνευρίσκει ὁ λόγος κακὸν εἶναι πρῶτον καὶ καθ̓ αὑτὸ κακόν.
8:1.8.4σωμάτων δὴ φύσις, καθόσον μετέχει ὕλης, κακὸν ἂν εἴη: ἔχει μὲν γὰρ εἶδός τι οὐκ ἀληθινὸν ἐστέρηταί τε ζωῆς φθείρει τε ἄλληλα φορᾷ τῇ παῤ αὐτῶν ἀτάκτῳ ἐμπόδιά τε ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν φεύγει τε οὐσίαν ἀεὶ ῥέοντα, ψυχὴ δὲ καθ̓ ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὐ κακὴ οὐδ’ αὖ πᾶσα κακή. ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κακή; οἷόν, φησι, δουλωσαμένη μὲν ᾧ πέφυκε κακία ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι, ὡς τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους τὸ κακὸν δεχομένου, ἀμετρίαν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς κακία, ἀκούσια παθήματα, δόξας ψευδεῖς ἐμποιοῦντα κακά τε νομίζειν καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἃ φεύγει τε καὶ διώκει. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὴν κακίαν ταύτην καὶ πῶς εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ αἰτίαν ἀνάξεις; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔξω ὕλης οὐδὲ καθ̓ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη. μέμικται οὖν ἀμετρίᾳ καὶ ἄμοιρος εἴδους τοῦ κοσμοῦντος καὶ εἰς μέτρον ἄγοντος: σώματι γὰρ ἐγκέκραται ὕλην ἔχοντι. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον εἰ βλάπτοιτο, ὁρᾶν κωλύεται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ πρὸς ὕλην νενευκέναι καὶ ὅλως οὐ πρὸς οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γένεσιν ὁρᾶν, ἧς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλης φύσις οὕτως οὖσα κακὴ ὡς καὶ τὸ μήπω ἐν αὐτῇ, μόνον δὲ βλέψαν εἰς αὐτήν, ἀναπιμπλάναι κακοῦ ἑαυτῆς. ἄμοιρος γὰρ παντελῶς οὖσα ἀγαθοῦ καὶ στέρησις τούτου καὶ ἄκρατος ἔλλειψις ἐξομοιοῖ ἑαυτῇ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῆς προσάψηται ὁπωσοῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία καὶ πρὸς νοῦν νεύουσα ψυχὴ ἀεὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ὕλην ἀπέστραπται καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον καὶ κακὸν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὔτε πελάζει: καθαρὰ οὖν μένει ὁρισθεῖσα νῷ παντελῶς. ἡ δὲ μὴ μείνασα τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὑτῆς προελθοῦσα τῷ μὴ τελείῳ μηδὲ πρώτῳ οἷον ἴνδαλμα ἐκείνης τῷ ἐλλείμματι καθόσον ἐνέλιπεν ἀοριστίας πληρωθεῖσα σκότος ὁρᾷ καὶ ἔχει ἤδη ὕλην βλέπουσα εἰς ὃ μὴ βλέπει, ὡς λεγόμεθα ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ σκότος.
8:1.8.5ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰτία τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ συνεῖναι τῷ σκότει, τὸ κακὸν εἴη ἂν ἐν τῇ ἐλλείψει τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πρῶτον — δεύτερον δὲ ἔσται τὸ σκότος — καὶ ἡ φύσις τοῦ κακοῦ οὐκέτι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὕλης. ἢ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλλείψει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ παντελεῖ τὸ κακόν: τὸ γοῦν ἐλλεῖπον ὀλίγον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν, δύναται γὰρ καὶ τέλειον εἶναι ὡς πρὸς φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ. ἀλλ’ ὅταν παντελῶς ἐλλείπῃ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως κακὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἡ ὕλη, ἵνα ἀγαθοῦ ταύτῃ μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ’ ὁμώνυμον αὐτῇ τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν αὐτὴν μὴ εἶναι. ἡ οὖν ἔλλειψις ἔχει μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἡ δὲ παντελὴς τὸ κακόν: ἡ δὲ πλείων τὸ πεσεῖν εἰς τὸ κακὸν δύνασθαι καὶ ἤδη κακόν. τῷ χρὴ τὸ κακὸν νοεῖσθαι μὴ τόδε τὸ κακόν, οἷον ἀδικίαν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ κακίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ὃ οὐδὲν μέν πω τούτων, ταῦτα δὲ οἷον εἴδη ἐκείνου προσθήκαις εἰδοποιούμενα: οἷον ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν καὶ ταύτης αὖ εἴδη ἢ ὕλῃ περὶ ἥν, ἢ τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τῷ τὸ μὲν οἷον ὁρᾶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὁρμᾶν ἢ πάσχειν. εἰ δέ τις θεῖτο καὶ τὰ ἔξω ψυχῆς κακὰ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπ’ ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν ἀνάξει, οἷον νόσον, αἶσχος, πενίαν; ἢ νόσον μὲν ἔλλειψιν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν σωμάτων ἐνύλων τάξιν καὶ μέτρον οὐκ ἀνεχομένων, αἶσχος δὲ ὕλην οὐ κρατηθεῖσαν εἴδει, πενίαν δὲ ἔνδειαν καὶ στέρησιν ὧν ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην ᾗ συνεζεύγμεθα φύσιν ἔχουσαν χρησμοσύνην εἶναι. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐ θετέον ἡμᾶς ἀρχὴν κακῶν εἶναι κακοὺς παῤ αὑτῶν ὄντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἡμῶν ταῦτα: ἃ δ’ ἂν ἀνθρώπους κατάσχῃ, κατέχειν οὐχ ἑκόντας, ἀλλ’ εἶναι μὲν ἀποφυγὴν κακῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῖς δυνηθεῖσι, πάντας δὲ οὐ δύνασθαι. θέσις δὲ ὕλης παρούσης τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ κακὸν μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν κακίαν ἣν ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσιν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἀνθρώποις ἅπασι: κρατεῖν γὰρ αὐτῆς — ἀμείνους δέ, οἷς μὴ πάρεστι — καὶ τούτῳ κρατεῖν δὲ τῷ μὴ ἐνύλῳ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντι.
8:1.8.6ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πῶς λέγεται μὴ ἂν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά, ἀλλ’ εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης: καὶ ἐν θεοῖς μὲν οὐκ εἶναι, περιπολεῖν δὲ τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον ἀεί. ἆῤ οὖν οὕτως εἴρηται, ὡς τοῦ μὲν οὐρανοῦ καθαροῦ κακῶν ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐν τάξει ἰόντος καὶ κόσμῳ φερομένου καὶ μήτε ἀδικίας ἐκεῖ οὔσης μήτε ἄλλης κακίας μήτε ἀδικοῦντα ἄλληλα, κόσμῳ δὲ φερόμενα, ἐν γῇ δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας οὔσης; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ θνητὴ φύσις καὶ ὅδε ὁ τόπος. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν φεύγειν δεῖν οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς λέγεται. φυγὴ γάρ, φησιν, οὐ τὸ ἐκ γῆς ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄντα ἐπὶ γῆς δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι μετὰ φρονήσεως, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον φεύγειν κακίαν δεῖν, ὥστε τὰ κακὰ αὐτῷ ἡ κακία καὶ ὅσα ἐκ κακίας: καὶ τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου δὲ ἀναίρεσιν λέγοντος κακῶν ἔσεσθαι, εἰ πείθοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἃ λέγει, ὁ δέ φησι μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦτο γενέσθαι: τὰ γὰρ κακὰ εἶναι ἀνάγκῃ, ἐπείπερ τοὐναντίον τι δεῖ εἶναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ. τὴν μὲν οὖν κακίαν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον πῶς οἷόν τε ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ; ἐναντίον γὰρ τοῦτο τῇ ἀρετῇ, αὕτη δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθόν, ὃ κρατεῖν τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖ. ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πῶς ἄν τι εἴη ἐναντίον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιόν: εἶτα τίς ἀνάγκη πανταχοῦ, εἰ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ θάτερον; ἐνδεχέσθω μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἔστω γε καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ὄντος — οἷον ὑγιείας οὔσης ἐνδέχεται καὶ νόσον εἶναι — οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐπὶ παντὸς ἐναντίου τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ εἰ οὐσία τἀγαθόν, πῶς ἐστιν αὐτῷ τι ἐναντίον, ἢ τῷ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας; τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲν οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον ἐπὶ τῶν καθ̓ ἕκαστα οὐσιῶν ἐστι πιστὸν τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ δεδειγμένον:. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι δεδειγμένον. ἀλλὰ τί τῇ καθόλου οὐσίᾳ ἔσται ἐναντίον καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πρώτοις; ἢ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ ἡ μὴ οὐσία, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ φύσει ἥτις ἐστὶ κακοῦ φύσις καὶ ἀρχή: ἀρχαὶ γὰρ ἄμφω, ἡ μὲν κακῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθῶν: καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἑκατέρᾳ ἐναντία: ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅλα ἐναντία καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία ἢ τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει ὄντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καὶ κοινοῦ τινός ἐστι μετειληφότα ἐν οἷς ἐστιν: ὅσα δὲ χωρίς ἐστι, καὶ ἃ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐστὶ συμπλήρωσις τοῦ ὅ ἐστι, ὧν τἀναντία ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐστί, πῶς οὐ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἐναντία, εἴπερ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστηκότα; πέρατι δὴ καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ θείᾳ φύσει, ἀπειρία καὶ ἀμετρία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἔχει ἡ κακὴ φύσις, ἐναντία: ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῷ ὅλῳ ἐναντίον. καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ ψευδόμενον ἔχει καὶ πρώτως καὶ ὄντως ψεῦδος: τῷ δὲ τὸ ἀληθῶς εἶναι: ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ ψεῦδος τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ κατ’ οὐσίαν τῷ κατ’ οὐσίαν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον. ὥστε ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται τὸ μὴ πανταχοῦ οὐσίᾳ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐναντίον: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἐδεξάμεθα ἂν εἶναι ἐναντία, εἰ μὴ κοινὸν ἦν ἡ ὕλη ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐφ̓ ἧς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν συμβεβηκότα ἐγίγνετο: εἰ δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἦν μόνα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν συμπληροῦντα ἄνευ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ἐγίγνετο ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὐσία οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον. τὰ ἄρα πάντη κεχωρισμένα καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα κοινὸν καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ φύσει αὐτῶν ἐναντία: ἐπείπερ ἡ ἐναντίωσις οὐχ ᾗ ποῖόν τι οὐδὲ ὅλως ὁτιοῦν γένος τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται καὶ ἐξ ἀντιθέτων συνέστηκε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖ.
8:1.8.7ἀλλὰ πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἆῤ οὖν οὕτως, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι δεῖ; ἐξ ἐναντίων γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόδε τὸ πᾶν: ἢ οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη μὴ ὕλης οὔσης. μεμιγμένη οὖν δὴ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἔκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ὅσα παρὰ θεοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν ἥκει, ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως, τὴν ὕλην λέγων τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὔπω κοσμηθεῖσαν εἴδεσιν. ἀλλὰ πῶς θνητὴν φύσιν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόνδε τὸν τόπον ἔστω δεικνύειν τὸ πᾶν: ἢ τὸ ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ ἐγένεσθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἔστε, οὔτι γε μὴν λυθήσεσθε δἰ ἐμέ. εἰ δὴ οὕτως, ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο μὴ ἂν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά. πῶς οὖν ἐκφεύξεται; οὐ τῷ τόπῳ, φησίν, ἀλλ’ ἀρετὴν κτησάμενος καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὑτὸν χωρίσας: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὕλης: ὡς ὅ γε συνὼν τῷ σώματι καὶ ὕλῃ σύνεστι. τὸ δὲ χωρίσαι καὶ μὴ δῆλόν που αὐτὸς ποιεῖ: τὸ δ’ ἐν θεοῖς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς: οὗτοι γὰρ ἀθάνατοι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ οὕτω τὴν ἀνάγκην. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη τῇ ἐκβάσει τῇ παῤ αὐτοῦ, ἤ, εἰ οὕτω τις εθέλοι λέγειν, τῇ ἀεὶ ὑποβάσει καὶ ἀποστάσει, τὸ ἔσχατον, καὶ μεθ̓ ὃ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι γενέσθαι ὁτιοῦν, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ κακόν. ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον: τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲν ἔτι ἔχουσα αὐτοῦ. καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ κακοῦ.
8:1.8.8εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ διὰ τὴν ὕλην ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι κακούς — μήτε γὰρ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διὰ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι μήτε τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς πονηράς: καὶ γάρ, εἰ διὰ σώματος κακίαν ἡ σύστασις γίγνοιτο, μὴ τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖν, οἷον θερμότητας, ψυχρότητας, πικρόν, ἁλμυρὸν καὶ ὅσα χυμῶν εἴδη, ἔτι πληρώσεις, κενώσεις, καὶ πληρώσεις οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πληρώσεις τοιῶνδε, καὶ ὅλως τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καί, εἰ βούλει, δοξῶν ἐσφαλμένων, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ὕλην τὸ κακὸν εἶναι —: καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἧντον τὴν ὕλην συγχωρεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται τὸ κακὸν εἶναι. ἅ τε γὰρ ποιεῖ ἡ ἐν ὕλῃ ποιότης, οὐ χωρὶς οὖσα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ πελέκεως ἄνευ σιδήρου ποιεῖ: εἶτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἴδη οὐ ταὐτά ἐστιν, ἅπερ ἂν ἦν, εἰ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῶν ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ λόγοι ἔνυλοι φθαρέντες ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐκείνης ἀναπλησθέντες: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ καίει οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῶν ταῦτα ἐργάζεται, ἃ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ γινόμενα λέγεται ποιεῖν. γενομένη γὰρ κυρία τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμφαντασθέντος φθείρει αὐτὸ καὶ διόλλυσι τὴν αὑτῆς παραθεῖσα φύσιν ἐναντίαν οὖσαν, οὐ τῷ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρὸν προσφέρουσα, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ αὑτῆς ἀνείδεον προσάγουσα καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν τῇ μορφῇ καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸ ποιήσῃ αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ ἔτι εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐν τροφῇ ζῴων τὸ εἰσενεχθὲν μηκέτι εἶναι ὅπερ προσελήλυθεν, ἀλλ’ αἷμα κυνὸς καὶ πᾶν κύνειον, καὶ χυμοὶ πάντες ὅπερ τὸ δεξάμενον ἐκείνους. εἰ δὴ σῶμα αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν, ὕλη ἂν εἴη καὶ ταύτῃ αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν. ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν ἔδει, ἄλλος ἂν εἴποι. ἀλλ’ οὐ καθαρὸν τὸ δυνάμενον κρατεῖν, εἰ μὴ φύγοι. καἶ σφοδρότεραι δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κράσει τοιᾷδε σωμάτων, ἄλλαι δ’ ἄλλων, ὥστε μὴ κρατεῖν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ — ἀμβλύτεροι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν διὰ σωμάτων κάκην κατεψυγμένοι καὶ ἐμπεποδισμένοι — αἱ δ’ ἐναντίαι ποιοῦσι κούφους καὶ ἀνερματίστους. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ αἱ πρὸς καιρὸν ἕξεις. πλήρεις μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, κενοὶ δὲ ἄλλοι, καὶ ταδὶ πληρωθέντες ἄλλοι, ταδὶ δὲ ἄλλοι. ἔστω δὴ πρώτως μὲν τὸ ἄμετρον κακόν, τὸ δ’ ἐν ἀμετρίᾳ γενόμενον ἢ ὁμοιώσει ἢ μεταλήψει τῷ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ δευτέρως κακόν: καὶ πρώτως μὲν τὸ σκότος, τὸ δὲ ἐσκοτισμένον δευτέρως ὡσαύτως. κακία δὴ ἄγνοια οὖσα καὶ ἀμετρία περὶ ψυχὴν δευτέρως κακὸν καὶ οὐκ αὐτοκακόν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀρετὴ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὡμοίωται ἢ μετείληφεν αὐτοῦ.
8:1.8.9τίνι οὖν ἐγνωρίσαμεν ταῦτα; καὶ πρῶτον κακίαν τίνι; ἀρετὴν μὲν γὰρ νῷ αὐτῷ καὶ φρονήσει: αὑτὴν γὰρ γνωρίζει: κακίαν δὲ πῶς; ἢ ὥσπερ κανόνι τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ μή, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐναρμόζον τῇ ἀρετῇ; βλέποντες οὖν αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ βλέποντες, τὴν κακίαν λέγω; ἢ τὴν μὲν παντελῆ κακίαν οὐ βλέποντες, καὶ γὰρ ἄπειρον: ἀφαιρέσει οὖν τὸ μηδαμοῦ τοῦτο: τὴν δὲ μὴ παντελῆ τῷ ἐλλείπειν τούτῳ. μέρος οὖν ὁρῶντες τῷ παρόντι μέρει τὸ ἀπὸν λαμβάνοντες, ὅ ἐστι μὲν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ εἴδει, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἄπεστιν, οὕτω κακίαν λέγομεν ἐν ἀορίστῳ τὸ ἐστερημένον καταλιπόντες. καὶ δὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης οἷον αἰσχρόν τι πρόσωπον ἰδόντες οὐ κρατήσαντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε κρύψαι τὸ τῆς ὕλης αἶσχος, αἰσχρὸν φανταζόμεθα τῇ τοῦ εἴδους ἐλλείψει. ὃ δὲ μηδαμῇ εἴδους τετύχηκε, πῶς; ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀφαιροῦντες πᾶν εἶδος, ᾧ μὴ τοῦτο πάρεστι, λέγομεν εἶναι ὕλην, ἀμορφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡμῖν λαβόντες ἐν τῷ πᾶν εἶδος ἀφελεῖν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὕλην θεάσασθαι. διὸ καὶ νοῦς ἄλλος οὗτος, οὐ νοῦς, τολμήσας ἰδεῖν τὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ. ὥσπερ ὄμμα ἀποστῆσαν αὑτὸ φωτός, ἵνα ἴδῃ τὸ σκότος, καὶ μὴ ἴδῃ τῷ καταλιπεῖν τὸ φῶς, μεθ̓ οὗ οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν αὐτό: οὐδ’ αὖ ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οἷόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδεῖν, ἵνα γένηται αὐτῷ ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν — οὕτως οὖν καὶ νοῦς, εἴσω αὑτοῦ τὸ αὑτοῦ καταλιπὼν φῶς καὶ οἷον ἔξω αὑτοῦ προελθὼν εἰς τὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, μὴ ἐπαγόμενος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ φῶς ἔπαθε τοὐναντίον ἤ ἐστιν, ἵν’ ἴδῃ τὸ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον.
8:1.8.10καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἄποιος δὲ οὖσα πῶς κακή: ἢ ἄποιος λέγεται τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῆς τούτων τῶν ποιοτήτων, ἃς δέξεται καὶ αἳ ἐν αὐτῇ ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσονται, οὐ μὴν οὕτως, ὡς μηδεμίαν φύσιν ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ ἔχει τινὰ φύσιν, ταύτην τὴν φύσιν τί κωλύει κακὴν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ κακήν, ὡς ποιόν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τοῦτό ἐστι, καθ̓ ὃ ἕτερον ποιὸν λέγεται. συμβεβηκὸς οὖν τὸ ποιὸν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ: ἡ δὲ ὕλη οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ αὐτό. τοῦ οὖν ποιοῦ τὴν φύσιν συμβεβηκότος ἔχοντος οὐ τυχοῦσα ἄποιος λέγεται. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ὴ ποιότης αὐτὴ ἄποιος, πῶς ἡ ὕλη οὐ δεξαμένη ποιότητα ποιὰ ἂν λέγοιτο; ὀρθῶς ἄρα λέγεται καὶ ἄποιος εἶναι καὶ κακή: οὐ γὰρ λέγεται κακὴ τῷ ποιότητα ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ποιότητα μὴ ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ ἴσως κακὴ εἶδος οὖσα, ἀλλὰ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει φύσις.
8:1.8.11ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει παντὶ φύσις στέρησις: στέρησις δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑπόστασις: ὥστε τὸ κακὸν εἰ ἐν στερήσει, ἐν τῷ ἐστερημένῳ εἴδους τὸ κακὸν ἔσται: ὥστε καθ̓ ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἔσται. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσται κακόν, ἡ στέρησις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ κακία ἔσται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξω. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλοι λόγοι τὴν ὕλην ὅλως ἀναιρεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτὴν κακὴν εἶναι οὖσαν. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ ἄλλοθεν ζητεῖν τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ θέμενον ἐν ψυχῇ οὕτω θέσθαι ἀπουσίαν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ στέρησις ἐπιβάλλοντός ἐστι παρεῖναι εἴδους τινός, εἰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις ἐν ψυχῇ, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἐν αὑτῇ ποιεῖ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἀγαθόν: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ζωὴν οὖσα ψυχή. ἄψυχον ἄρα ἔσται ἡ ψυχή, εἴπερ μηδὲ ζωήν: ὥστε ψυχὴ οὖσα οὐκ ἔσται ψυχή. ἔχει ἄρα τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ ζωήν: ὥστε οὐ στέρησιν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παῤ αὑτῆς. ἀγαθοειδὲς ἄρα ἔχουσά τι ἀγαθὸν νοῦ ἴχνος καὶ οὐ κακὸν παῤ αὑτῆς: οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ πρώτως κακὸν οὐδὲ συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῇ τὸ πρώτως κακόν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἄπεστιν αὐτῆς πᾶν τὸ ἀγαθόν.
8:1.8.12τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ παντελῆ στέρησιν λέγοι ἀγαθοῦ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀλλά τινα στέρησιν ἀγαθοῦ; ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, τὸ μὲν ἔχουσα, τοῦ δὲ ἐστερημένη, μικτὴν ἕξει τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ οὐκ ἄκρατον τὸ κακόν, καὶ οὔπω εὕρηται τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἄκρατον κακόν: καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσται ἐν οὐσίᾳ, συμβεβηκὸς δέ τι τὸ κακόν.
8:1.8.13εἰ μὴ ἄρα τούτῳ κακόν, ᾗ ἐμπόδιον, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμῷ πρὸς τὸ βλέπειν. ἀλλ’ οὕτω ποιητικὸν κακοῦ ἔσται τὸ κακὸν αὐτῇ, καὶ οὕτω ποιητικόν, ὡς ἑτέρου τοῦ κακοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. εἰ οὖν ἡ κακία ἐμπόδιον τῇ ψυχῇ, ποιητικὸν κακοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ κακὸν ἡ κακία ἔσται: καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὡς συνεργόν: ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ’ ἡ κακία τὸ κακόν. εἶτα καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ’ αὐτοαγαθόν: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ κακία αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐδ’ αὐτοκακόν. ἔφαμεν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ αὐτοκαλὸν οὐδ’ αὐτοαγαθόν, ὅτι πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπέκεινα αὐτῆς αὐτοκαλὸν καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν: καὶ μεταλήψει πως ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. ὡς οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναβαίνοντι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας καταβαίνοντι τὸ κακὸν αὐτό, ἀρξαμένῳ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας καὶ θεωροῦντι μὲν ᾗ θεωρία τίς ἐστι τοῦ κακοῦ αὐτοῦ, γινομένῳ δὲ ᾗ μετάληψις αὐτοῦ: γίνεται γὰρ παντάπασιν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος τόπῳ, ἔνθα δὺς εἰς αὐτὴν εἰς βόρβορον σκοτεινὸν ἔσται πεσών: ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ παντελῶς ἴοι ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς παντελῆ κακίαν, οὐκέτι κακίαν ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν χείρω ἠλλάξατο: ἔτι γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὸν ἡ κακία μεμιγμένη τινὶ ἐναντίῳ. ἀποθνήσκει οὖν, ὡς ψυχὴ ἂν θάνοι, καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτῇ καὶ ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι βεβαπτισμένῃ ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καταδῦναι καὶ πλησθῆναι αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξελθούσῃ ἐκεῖ κεῖσθαι, ἕως ἂν ἀναδράμῃ καὶ ἀφέλῃ πως τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ τοῦ βορβόρου: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν ᾅδου ἐλθόντα ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν.
8:1.8.14εἰ δέ τις ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς τὴν κακίαν λέγοι — εὐπαθῆ γοῦν καὶ εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὴν κακὴν ἀπὸ παντὸς εἰς ἅπαν κακὸν φερομένην, εὐκίνητον μὲν εἰς ἐπιθυμίας, εὐερέθιστον δὲ εἰς ὀργάς, προπετῆ δὲ: εἰς συγκαταθέσεις, καὶ ταῖς ἀμυδραῖς φαντασίαις εἴκουσαν ῥᾳδίως, οἷα τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τῶν τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει πεποιημένων, ἃ ῥᾳδίαν ἔχει ὑπό τε πνευμάτων ὑπό τε εἰλήσεων τὴν φοράν — ἄξιον ἂν εἴη ζητεῖν, τίς καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀσθένεια τῇ ψυχῇ. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀσθενές: ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ εὐπαθές, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίᾳ τὴν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἔσχε προσηγορίαν: εἰ μὴ ταύτῃ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον ἡ ὕλη τῆς ἀσθενείας. ἀλλὰ προσιτέον ἐγγὺς τῷ λόγῳ, τί τὸ αἴτιον ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς: οὐ γὰρ δὴ πυκνότητες ἢ ἀραιότητες οὐδ’ αὖ ἰσχνότητες ἢ παχύτητες ἢ νόσος, ὥσπερ τις πυρετός, ἀσθενῆ ἐποίησε ψυχὴν εἶναι. ἀνάγκη δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς χωρισταῖς παντελῶς ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἐνύλοις ἢ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν ταῖς χωρὶς ὕλης — καθαραὶ γὰρ πᾶσαι καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπτερωμέναι καὶ τέλειοι καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐταῖς ἀνεμπόδιστον — λοιπὸν ἐν ταῖς πεσούσαις εἶναι τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ταῖς οὐ καθαραῖς οὐδὲ κεκαθαρμέναις, καὶ ἡ ἀσθένεια αὐταῖς εἴη ἂν οὐκ ἀφαίρεσις τινός, ἀλλ’ ἀλλοτρίου παρουσία, ὥσπερ φλέγματος ἢ χολῆς ἐν σώματι. τοῦ δὲ πτώματος τὸ αἴτιον ψυχῇ σαφέστερον λαμβάνουσι καὶ ὡς προσήκει λαβεῖν καταφανὲς ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον. ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὕλη, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ψυχή, καὶ οἷον τόπος εἷς τις. οὐ γὰρ χωρὶς μὲν ὁ τόπος τῇ ὕλῃ, χωρὶς δ’ αὖ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς — οἷον ὁ μὲν ἐν γῇ τῇ ὕλῃ, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἀέρι τῇ ψυχῇ — ἀλλ’ ὁ τόπος τῇ ψυχῇ χωρὶς τῷ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ: τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὴ ἑνωθῆναι τῇ ὕλῃ: τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὴ ἕν τι ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ὕλης γενέσθαι: τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ γενέσθαι: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ χωρὶς εἶναι. δυνάμεις δὲ ψυχῆς πολλαὶ καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ ἔσχατα ψυχὴ ἔχει: ὕλη δὲ παροῦσα προσαιτεῖ καὶ οἷον ἐνοχλεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ εἴσω παρελθεῖν θέλει: πᾶς δὲ ὁ χῶρος ἱερὸς καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὃ ἄμοιρόν ἐστι ψυχῆς. ἐλλάμπεται οὖν ὑποβάλλουσα ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀφ̓ οὗ μὲν ἐλλάμπεται οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν: οὐ γὰρ ἀνέχεται αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνο καίτοι παροῦσαν, ὅτι μὴ ὁρᾷ διὰ κάκην. τὴν δὲ ἔλλαμψιν καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν φῶς ἐσκότωσε τῇ μίξει καὶ ἀσθενὲς πεποίηκε τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὴ παρασχοῦσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦλθε τῷ μὴ παρόντι. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι πτῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς ὕλην, καὶ ἀσθενεῖ, ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις οὐ πάρεισιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν κωλυούσης ὕλης παρεῖναι τῷ τὸν τόπον ὃν κατέχει αὐτὴ καταλαβεῖν καὶ οἷον συσπειραθῆναι ποιῆσαι ἐκείνην, ὃ δὲ ἔλαβεν οἷον κλέψασα ποιῆσαι κακὸν εἶναι, ἕως ἂν δυνηθῇ ἀναδραμεῖν. ὕλη τοίνυν καὶ ἀσθενείας ψυχῇ αἰτία καὶ κακίας αἰτία. πρότερον ἄρα κακὴ αὐτὴ καὶ πρῶτον κακόν: καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ὕλῃ ἐγέννησε παθοῦσα, καὶ εἰ ἐκοινώνησεν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐγένετο κακή, ἡ ὕλη αἰτία παροῦσα: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο εἰς αὐτὴν μὴ τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῆς τὴν γένεσιν λαβοῦσα.
8:1.8.15εἰ δέ τις τὴν ὕλην μή φησιν εἶναι, δεικτέον αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ὕλης λόγων τὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῆς διὰ πλειόνων ἐκεῖ περὶ τούτου εἰρημένου. κακὸν δὲ εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀναιρεῖν καὶ μηδὲ ὀρεκτὸν μηδὲν εἶναι: μὴ τοίνυν μηδ’ ὄρεξιν μηδ’ αὖ ἔκκλισιν μηδὲ νόησιν: ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ δὲ ἔκκλισις κακοῦ, ἡ δὲ νόησις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ αὕτη ἕν τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἶναι μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄμικτον ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ἤδη ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πλείονος τοῦ κακοῦ μεταλαβὸν ἤδη καὶ αὐτὸ συντελέσαν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὅλως κακῷ, ἐλάττονος δέ, ᾗ ἠλάττωται, τῷ ἀγαθῷ: ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχῇ τί ἂν εἴη κακόν; ἢ τίνι ἂν μὴ ἐφαψαμένῃ τῆς φύσεως τῆς χείρονος; ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐδ’ αὖ λῦπαι, οὐ θυμοί, οὐ φόβοι: καὶ γὰρ φόβοι τῷ συνθέτῳ, μὴ λυθῇ, καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἀλγηδόνες λυομένου: ἐπιθυμίαι δὲ ἐνοχλοῦντός τινος τῇ συστάσει ἤ, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλῇ, ἴασιν προνοουμένου. φαντασία δὲ πληγὴ ἀλόγου ἔξωθεν: δέχεται δὲ τὴν πληγὴν διὰ τοῦ οὐκ ἀμεροῦς: καὶ δόξαι ψευδεῖς ἔξω γενομένῃ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αὐτοῦ: ἔξω δὲ γίνεται τῷ μὴ εἶναι καθαρά. ἡ δὲ πρὸς νοῦν ὄρεξις ἄλλο: συνεῖναι γὰρ δεῖ μόνην καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἱδρυμένην, οὐ νεύουσαν εἰς τὸ χεῖρον. τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ κακὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φύσιν, ἐπείπερ ἐφάνη ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιληφθὲν δεσμοῖς τισι καλοῖς, οἷα δεσμῶταί τινες χρυσῷ, καὶ κρύπτεται τούτοις, ἵνα οὖσα κακὴ μὴ ὁρῷτο τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἔχοιεν μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κακὸν βλέπειν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν καὶ βλέπωσιν, εἰδώλοις τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν συνῶσιν.
9:1.9.1οὐκ ἐξάξεις, ἵνα μὴ ἐξίῃ ἔχουσά τι: ἐξελεύσεται γὰρ ἔχουσά τι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξέλθῃ, τό τε ἐξελθεῖν ἐστι μεταβῆναι εἰς ἄλλον τόπον: ἀλλὰ μενεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἀποστῆναι πᾶν αὐτῆς, ὅτε μὴ δεῖται μετελθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι πάντη ἔξω. πῶς οὖν ἀφίσταται τὸ σῶμα; ὅταν μηδὲν ἔτι δεδεμένον ᾖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδυνατοῦντος τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεῖν τῆς ἁρμονίας αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι οὔσης, ἣν ἔχον εἶχε τὴν ψυχήν. τί οὖν, εἰ μηχανήσαιτό τις λυθῆναι τὸ σῶμα; ἢ ἐβιάσατο καὶ ἀπέστη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀφῆκε: καὶ ὅτε λύει οὐκ ἀπαθής, ἀλλ’ ἢ δυσχέρανσις ἢ λύπη ἢ θυμός: δεῖ δὲ μηδὲν πράττειν. εἰ οὖν ἀρχὴν αἴσθοιτο τοῦ ληρεῖν; ἢ τάχα μὲν οὐ περὶ σπουδαῖον: εἰ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο, τάττοιτο ἂν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ περιστάσεως αἱρετοῖς, οὐχ ἁπλῶς αἱρετοῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν φαρμάκων προσαγωγὴ πρὸς ἔξοδον ψυχῆς τάχα ἂν ψυχῇ οὐ πρόσφορος. καὶ εἰ εἱμαρμένος χρόνος ὁ δοθεὶς ἑκάστῳ, πρὸ τούτου οὐκ εὐτυχές, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ φαμέν, ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ δέ, οἷος ἕκαστος ἔξεισι, τοιαύτην ἴσχει ἐκεῖ τάξιν, εἰς τὸ προκόπτειν οὔσης ἐπιδόσεως οὐκ ἐξακτέον.
2.1.1Τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ λέγοντες καὶ πρόσθεν εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι σῶμα ἔχοντα εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνάγοιμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιμεν, σαφήνειαν δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἂν παρεχοίμεθα. ἐπεὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἡ μεταβολὴ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν περὶ γῆν ἡ φθορὰ τὸ εἶδος σώζουσα μήποτε οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀξιώσει γίγνεσθαι ὡς τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦτο δυναμένης ἀεὶ ὑπεκφεύγοντος καὶ ῥέοντος τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτιθέναι τὸ εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῳ, ὡς μὴ σώζεσθαι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν τῷ εἴδει: ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μόνον τὸ ἀεὶ ἕξει, τὰ δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τόδε ἕξει τὸ ἀεί; εἰ δὲ τῷ πάντα συνειληφέναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰς ὃ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσεται μηδέ τι ἔξωθεν ἂν προσπεσὸν φθεῖραι δύνασθαι τούτῳ δώσομεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς οὐ φθορᾶς, τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ δώσομεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὴ ἂν φθαρῆναι, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ἡ οὐσία τῷ μέρη καὶ μὴ ὅλον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πᾶν οὐχ ἕξει τὴν πίστιν παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι εἰς ἅπαντα μενεῖ τὸν χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ εἶδος τὴν μονὴν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μόνον ἂν δόξειε παρεῖναι καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἔξωθεν μὴ φθειρόμενον αὐτὸν τῶν μερῶν ἄλληλα φθειρόντων οὕτω τὴν φθορὰν ἀεὶ ἔχοντα τῷ εἴδει μόνον περιμένειν, καὶ ῥεούσης ἀεὶ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὸ εἶδος ἄλλου διδόντος γίγνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντος ζῴου, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. οὐ τοίνυν ἔσται τὸ μὲν μένον αὐτοῦ ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ οὐρανός, τὰ δὲ περὶ γῆν φθειρόμενα, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως ἅπαντα, τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχοντα μόνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ: ἔσται γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ. εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω συγχωρησαίμεθα τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν εἶναι, ἧττον ἂν τὸ ἄπορον τῇ δόξῃ προσείη: μᾶλλον δὲ παντάπασιν ἔξω ἀπορίας ἂν γιγνοίμεθα, εἰ τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἱκανὸν εἶναι δεικνύοιτο κἂν οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον συνέχειν τὸ πᾶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ τόδε τι αὐτοῦ ὁποσονοῦν λέγοιμεν ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, ἥ τε βούλησις δεικτέα εἰ ἱκανὴ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, τό τε ἄπορον μένει διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω, τὰ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει μόνον, τά τε μέρη τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ πῶς καὶ αὐτά: ἐπειδὴ οὕτω καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πάντα εἴη ἄν.
2.1.2εἰ οὖν ταύτην παραδεχόμεθα τὴν δόξαν καί φαμεν τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ τόδε ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῇ τῆς σελήνης σφαίρᾳ τὸ κατ’ εἶδος, δεικτέον πῶς σῶμα ἔχων ἕξει τὸ τόδε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυρίως, ὡς τὸ καθ̓ ἕκαστον ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, τῆς φύσεως τοῦ σώματος ῥεούσης ἀεί. τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ φύσεως εἰρηκόσι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Πλάτωνι οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων αὐτῶν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, φησι, σώματα ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα ἀπαραλλάκτως ἕξει ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως; συγχωρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων δηλονότι τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ, ὃς ἔφη ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον γίνεσθαι. Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς περὶ τοῦ πέμπτου παραδέξαιτο σώματος. τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτο τιθεμένοις, τοῦ σώματος δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὄντος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰ τῇδε ζῷα, πῶς τὸ τόδε ἀεὶ ἂν ἔχοι; ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πῶς ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ μόρια ὄντα; συγκειμένου δὴ παντὸς ζῴου ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς σώματος φύσεως ἀνάγκη τὸν οὐρανόν, εἴπερ ἀεὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἔσται, ἢ δἰ ἄμφω ἔσεσθαι, ἢ διὰ θάτερον τῶν ἐνόντων, οἷον ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα. ὁ μὲν δὴ τῷ σώματι διδοὺς τὸ ἄφθαρτον οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς δέοιτο, ἢ τοῦ ὁμοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι πρὸς ζῴου σύστασιν: τῷ δὲ τὸ σῶμα παῤ αὑτοῦ φθαρτὸν εἶναι λέγοντι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ διδόντι τὴν αἰτίαν πειρατέον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν μηδ’ αὐτὴν ἐναντιουμένην τῇ συστάσει καὶ τῇ διαμονῇ δεικνύναι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀσύμφωνον ἐν τοῖς συνεστηκόσιν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πρόσφορον καὶ τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὑπάρχειν προσήκει.
2.1.3πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς συνεργὸν ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἀθανασίαν ἀεὶ ῥέον; ἢ ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἄν, ῥεῖ: ῥεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω. εἰ οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτ’ ἂν αὔξοιτο οὔτε φθίνοι: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ γηράσκει. ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ καὶ γῆν μένουσαν ἐν σχήματι τῷ αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀιδίου καὶ ὄγκῳ, καὶ ἀὴρ οὐ μήποτ̓ ἐπιλείπῃ οὐδὲ ἡ ὕδατος φύσις: καὶ τοίνυν ὅσον μεταβάλλει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἠλλοίωσε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ζῴου φύσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόντων μορίων καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἀπιόντων μένει ἕκαστος εἰς πολύ: ᾧ δὲ ἔξω μηδέν, οὐκ ἀσύμφωνος ἂν τούτῳ ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ζῷον καὶ ἀεὶ μένον. πῦρ δὲ ὀξὺ μὲν καὶ ταχὺ τῷ μὴ ὧδε μένειν, ὥσπερ καὶ γῆ τῷ μὴ ἄνω: γενόμενον δὲ ἐκεῖ, οὗ στῆναι δεῖ, οὔτοι δεῖ νομίζειν οὕτως ἔχειν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἱδρυμένον, ὡς μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔκτασιν ἐπ’ ἄμφω ζητεῖν. ἀνωτέρω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν φέροιτο: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι: κάτω δ’ οὐ πέφυκε. λείπεται δὴ αὐτῷ εὐαγώγῳ τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν ὁλκὴν ἑλκομένῳ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν εὖ μάλα ἐν καλῷ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ γάρ, εἴ τῳ φόβος μὴ πέσῃ, θαρρεῖν δεῖ: φθάνει γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ πᾶσαν νεῦσιν, ὡς κρατοῦσαν ἀνέχειν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἔχει παῤ αὑτοῦ, οὐκ ἀντιτεῖνον μένει. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερα μέρη ἐν μορφῇ γενόμενα οὐ στέγοντα αὑτῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἀπαιτεῖ ἀπ’ ἄλλων μόρια, ἵνα μένῃ: εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖθεν μὴ ἀπορρέοι, οὐδὲν δεῖ τρέφεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἀπορρέοι ἀποσβεννύμενον ἐκεῖθεν, πῦρ δεῖ ἕτερον ἐξάπτεσθαι καί, εἰ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔχοι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορρέοι, δεῖ καὶ ἀντ̓ ἐκείνου ἄλλου. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μένοι ἂν τὸ πᾶν ζῷον τὸ αὐτό, εἰ καὶ οὕτως.
2.1.4ἀλλ’ αὐτό γ̓ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον, σκεπτέον εἴτε τι ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν, ὥστε δεῖσθαι κἀκεῖνα τῆς λεγομένης οὐ κυρίως τροφῆς, ἢ ἅπαξ τὰ ἐκεῖ ταχθέντα κατὰ φύσιν μένοντα οὐδεμίαν πάσχει ἀπορροήν: καὶ πότερον πῦρ μόνον ἢ πλέον τὸ πῦρ ἢ καὶ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰωρεῖσθαι καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος. εἰ γάρ τις προσθείη καὶ τὴν κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν, τὴν ψυχήν, μετὰ τῶν οὕτω σωμάτων καθαρῶν καὶ πάντως ἀμεινόνων — ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις αὐτῶν τὰ ἀμείνω ἐκλέγεται ἡ φύσις — πάγιον ἂν τὴν δόξαν περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τῆς ἀθανασίας λάβοι. ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν φλόγα ζέσιν τινὰ καὶ πῦρ οἷον διὰ κόρον ὑβρίζον: τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ἠρεμαῖον καὶ τῇ τῶν ἄστρων πρόσφορον φύσει. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς ἀρίστοις δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ κειμένην, πῶς ἐκφεύξεταί τι αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῶν ἅπαξ ἐν αὐτῇ τεθέντων; μὴ παντὸς δὲ δεσμοῦ οἴεσθαι κρείττονα εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ ὡρμημένην, ἀνθρώπων ἀπείρων ἐστὶν αἰτίας τῆς συνεχούσης τὰ πάντα. ἄτοπον γὰρ τὴν καὶ ὁποσονοῦν χρόνον δυνηθεῖσαν συνέχειν μὴ καὶ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ὥσπερ βίᾳ τοῦ συνέχειν γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλου ἢ τούτου ὄντος, ὃ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός ἐστι φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς καλῶς τεθεῖσιν, ἢ ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ βιασομένου καὶ διαλύσοντος τὴν σύστασιν καὶ οἷον βασιλείας τινὸς καὶ ἀρχῆς καταλύσοντος τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν. τό τε μήποτε ἄρξασθαι — ἄτοπον γὰρ καὶ ἤδη εἴρηται — πίστιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔχει. διὰ τί γὰρ ἔσται, ὅτε καὶ οὐκ ἤδη; οὐ γὰρ ἐκτέτριπται τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: μενόντων δ’ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ πᾶν μένει. καὶ εἰ μεταβάλλοι ἀεί, τὸ πᾶν μένει: μένει γὰρ καὶ ἡ τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτία. ἡ δὲ μετάνοια τῆς ψυχῆς ὅτι κενόν ἐστι δέδεικται, ὅτι ἄπονος καὶ ἀβλαβὴς ἡ διοίκησις: καὶ εἰ πᾶν οἷόν τε σῶμα ἀπολέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἀλλοιότερον αὐτῇ γίνοιτο.
2.1.5πῶς οὖν τὰ ἐκεῖ μέρη μένει, τὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα στοιχεῖά τε καὶ ζῷα οὐ μένει; ἢ ὅτι, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, τὰ μὲν παρὰ θεοῦ γεγένηται, τὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ζῷα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων παῤ αὐτοῦ θεῶν: γενόμενα δὲ παῤ ἐκείνου οὐ θεμιτὸν φθείρεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐφεξῆς μὲν τῷ δημιουργῷ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν οὐρανίαν, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας δέ: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς οὐρανίας ἴνδαλμα αὐτῆς ἰὸν καὶ οἷον ἀπορρέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῷα ποιεῖν. ψυχῆς οὖν μιμουμένης τοιαύτης τὴν ἐκεῖ, ἀδυνατούσης δὲ τῷ καὶ χείροσι σώμασι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν καὶ ἐν τόπῳ χείρονι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν σύστασιν ληφθέντων οὐκ ἐθελόντων μένειν, τά τε ζῷα ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀεὶ δύναται μένειν, τά τε σώματα οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατοῖτο ἄν, ὡς: ἂν ἄλλης ψυχῆς αὐτῶν προσεχῶς ἀρχούσης. τὸν δὲ ὅλον οὐρανὸν εἴπερ ἔδει μένειν, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, τὰ ἄστρα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔδει: ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔμεινε μὴ ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων μενόντων; τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐκέτι οὐρανοῦ μέρη: ἢ οὐ μέχρι σελήνης ὁ οὐρανός. ἡμεῖς δὲ πλασθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς διδομένης παρὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν ψυχῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατ’ ἐκείνην καὶ σύνεσμεν τοῖς σώμασιν: ἡ γὰρ ἄλλη ψυχή, καθ̓ ἣν ἡμεῖς, τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτία. ἤδη γοῦν τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται γενομένου μικρὰ ἐκ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι συνεπιλαμβανομένη.
2.1.6ἀλλὰ πότερον πῦρ μόνον καὶ εἰ ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς νῦν σκεπτέον. τῷ μὲν οὖν Τιμαίῳ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα πεποιηκότι πρῶτον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός, ἵνα ὁρατόν τε ᾖ διὰ τὸ πῦρ, στερεὸν δὲ διὰ τὴν γῆν, ἀκολουθεῖν ἔδοξε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ποιεῖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἄστρα τὸ στερεὸν φαίνεται ἔχοντα. καὶ ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι συνεπικρίναντος καὶ Πλάτωνος τῷ εἰκότι τὴν γνώμην ταύτην. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατά τε τὴν ὄψιν κατά τε τὴν τῆς ἁφῆς ἀντίληψιν πυρὸς ἔχειν τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ πᾶν φαίνεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκοποῦσιν, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν ἄνευ γῆς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γῆς ἂν ἔχοι. ὕδατος δὲ καὶ ἀέρος τί ἂν δέοιτο; ἄτοπόν τε γὰρ δόξει ὕδατος εἶναι ἐν τοσούτῳ πυρί, ὅ τε ἀὴρ εἰ ἐνείη μεταβάλλοι ἂν εἰς πυρὸς φύσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ δύο στερεὰ ἄκρων λόγον ἔχοντα δύο μέσων δεῖται, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, εἰ καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς οὕτως: ἐπεὶ καὶ γῆν ἄν τις ὕδατι μίξειεν οὐδενὸς δεηθεὶς μέσου. εἰ δὲ λέγοιμεν ʽἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῇ γῇ καὶ τῷ ὕδατι τὰ ἄλλἀ, δόξομεν ἴσως τι λέγειν: εἴποι δ’ ἄν τις ʽἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ συνδῆσαι συνιόντα τὰ δύὀ. ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐροῦμεν ἤδη συνδεῖσθαι τῷ ἔχειν ἑκάτερον πάντα. ἀλλ’ ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄνευ πυρὸς οὐχ ὁρατὸν γῆ, καὶ ἄνευ γῆς οὐ στερεὸν πῦρ: εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, τάχα ἂν οὐδὲν ἔχοι ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αὑτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πάντα μὲν μέμικται, λέγεται δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ ὑγροῦ φασι συστῆναι δύνασθαι: κόλλαν γὰρ εἶναι τῇ γῇ τὴν ὕδατος ὑγρότητα. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ δώσομεν οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστόν γε ἄτοπον λέγοντα εἶναί τι ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μὴ διδόναι σύστασιν αὐτῷ, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοῦ, οὐδενὸς ἑκάστου ὄντος. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη γῆς φύσις καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι γῆ μηδενὸς ὄντος μορίου γῆς ὃ γῆ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὕδωρ ἐνείη εἰς κόλλησιν; τί δ’ ἂν κολλήσειε μὴ ὄντος ὅλως μεγέθους, ὃ πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον συνεχὲς συνάψει; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέγεθος γῆς αὐτῆς ἔσται, ἔσται γῆν φύσει καὶ ἄνευ ὕδατος εἶναι: ἤ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὃ κολλήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος. ἀέρος δὲ τί ἂν δέοιτο γῆς ὄγκος πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἔτι ἀέρος μένοντος πρὶν μεταβάλλειν; περὶ δὲ πυρὸς εἰς μὲν τὸ γῆ εἶναι οὐκ εἴρηται, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὁρατὴ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα: εὔλογον μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν παρὰ φωτὸς τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σκότος ὁρᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φατέον, ὥσπερ τὴν ἀψοφίαν μὴ ἀκούεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῦρ γε ἐν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι: φῶς γὰρ ἀρκεῖ. χιὼν γοῦν καὶ τὰ ψυχρότατα πολλὰ λαμπρὰ πυρὸς ἄνευ. ἀλλ’ ἐνεγένετο, φήσει τις, καὶ ἔχρωσε πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ περὶ ὕδατος δὲ ἀπορητέον, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὕδωρ, εἰ μὴ γῆς λάβοι. ἀὴρ δὲ πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο μετέχειν γῆς εὔθρυπτος ὤν; περὶ δὲ πυρός, εἰ γῆς δεῖ αὐτῷ τὸ συνεχὲς παῤ αὑτοῦ οὐκ ἔχοντι οὐδὲ τὸ διάστατον τριχῇ. ἡ δὲ στερεότης αὐτῷ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν τὴν τριχῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντέρεισιν δηλονότι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται ᾗ φυσικὸν σῶμα; σκληρότης δὲ γῇ μόνῃ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν τῷ χρυσῷ ὕδατι ὄντι προσγίνεται οὐ γῆς προσγενομένης, ἀλλὰ πυκνότητος ἢ πήξεως. καὶ πῦρ δὲ ἐφ̓ αὑτοῦ διὰ τί ψυχῆς παρούσης οὐ συστήσεται πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς; καὶ ζῷα δὲ πύρινά ἐστι δαιμόνων. ἀλλὰ κινήσομεν τὸ τὸ πᾶν ζῷον ἐκ πάντων τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν; ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τις ἐρεῖ, γῆν δὲ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν αἴρειν παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τεταγμένοις: συμπεριάγειν δὲ τὴν ταχίστην φορὰν γεηρὰ σώματα οὐ πιθανὸν εἶναι ἐμπόδιόν τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὸν καὶ λευκὸν τοῦ ἐκεῖ πυρός.
2.1.7ἴσως οὖν βέλτιον χρὴ ἀκούειν τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος ἐν μὲν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ δεῖν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον στερεόν, τὸ ἀντίτυπον ὄν, ἵνα τε ἡ γῆ ἐν μέσῳ ἱδρυμένη ἐπιβάθρα καὶ τοῖς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς βεβηκόσιν ἑδραία ᾖ, τά τε ζῷα τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ τοιοῦτο στερεὸν ἔχῃ παρὰ γῆς, ἡ δὲ γῆ τὸ μὲν εἶναι συνεχὴς παῤ αὑτῆς ἔχοι, ἐπιλάμποιτο δὲ ὑπὸ πυρός: μετέχειν δὲ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ μὴ αὐχμηρὸν καὶ μερῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ κωλύεσθαι συναγωγήν: ἀέρα δὲ κουφίζειν γῆς ὄγκους: μεμῖχθαι δὲ τῷ ἄνω πυρὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν ἄστρων τὴν γῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐν κόσμῳ γενομένου ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀπολαῦσαί τι τῆς γῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν γῆν τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον ἑκάστων, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἀπολαῦσαν γενέσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ οὗ μετέσχεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίαν, ὂν ὅ ἐστι, λαβεῖν οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ, οἷον οὐκ ἀέρα, ἀλλ’ ἀέρος τὴν ἁπαλότητα καὶ πυρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα: τὴν δὲ μῖξιν πάντα διδόναι καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τότε ποιεῖν, οὐ γῆν μόνον καὶ τὴν πυρὸς φύσιν, τὴν στερεότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν πυκνότητα. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τούτοις εἰπών ʽφῶς ἀνῆψεν ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἀπὸ γῆς περιφοράν̓, τὸν ἥλιον λέγων, καὶ λαμπρότατόν που λέγει ἀλλαχοῦ τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λευκότατον, ἀπάγων ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἄλλο τι νομίζειν ἢ πῦρ εἶναι, πῦρ δὲ οὐδετέρων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, ὅ φησιν ἕτερον φλογὸς εἶναι, θερμὸν δὲ προσηνῶς μόνον: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ φῶς σῶμα εἶναι, ἀποστίλβειν δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὁμώνυμον αὐτῷ φῶς, ὃ δή φαμεν καὶ ἀσώματον εἶναι: τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ φωτὸς παρέχεσθαι, ἐκλάμπον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὥσπερ ἄνθος ἐκείνου καὶ στιλπνότητα, ὃ δὴ καὶ εἶναι τὸ ὄντως λευκὸν σῶμα. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ γεηρὸν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον λαμβάνοντες, τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν στερεότητα λαβόντος τὴν γῆν, ἕν τι δὴ γῆν ὀνομάζομεν ἡμεῖς διαφορὰς γῆς ἐκείνου τιθεμένου. τοῦ δὴ τοιούτου πυρὸς τοῦ φῶς παρέχοντος τὸ καθαρώτατον ἐν τῷ ἄνω τόπῳ κειμένου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκεῖ ἱδρυμένου, ταύτην τὴν φλόγα οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὑποληπτέον, ἀλλὰ φθάνουσαν μέχρι τινὸς ἀποσβέννυσθαι ἐντυχοῦσαν πλείονι ἀέρι ἀνελθοῦσάν τε μετὰ γῆς ῥίπτεσθαι κάτω οὐ δυναμένην ὑπερβαίνειν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, κάτω δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἵστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ λεπτότερον ποιεῖν τὸν ἐκεῖ ἀέρα καὶ φλόγα, εἰ μένοι, μαραινομένην εἰς τὸ πρᾳότερον γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν μὴ ἔχειν ὅσον εἰς τὴν ζέσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἄνω ἐναυγάζεσθαι: τὸ δὲ φῶς τὸ ἐκεῖ, τὸ μὲν ποικιλθὲν: ἐν λόγοις τοῖς ἄστροις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς χρόαις τὴν διαφορὰν ἐργάσασθαι, τὸν δ’ ἄλλον οὐρανὸν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τοιούτου φωτός, μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι δὲ λεπτότητι τοῦ σώματος καὶ διαφανείᾳ οὐκ ἀντιτύπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν καθαρὸν ἀέρα, προσέτι δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῷ πόρρω.
2.1.8τούτου δὴ μείναντος ἄνω τοῦ τοιούτου φωτὸς ἐν ᾧ τέτακται καθαροῦ ἐν καθαρωτάτῳ, τίς ἂν τρόπος ἀπορροῆς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἂν γένοιτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸ κάτω πέφυκεν ἀπορρεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις, οὐδ’ αὖ τί ἐστιν ἐκεῖ τῶν βιαζομένων ὠθεῖν πρὸς τὸ κάτω. πᾶν δὲ σῶμα μετὰ ψυχῆς ἄλλο καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, οἷον μόνον ἦν: τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ ἐκεῖ, οὐχ οἷον τὸ μόνον. τό τε γειτονοῦν εἴτε ἀὴρ εἴτε πῦρ εἴη, ἀὴρ μὲν τί ἂν ποιήσειε; πῦρ δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐναρμόσειε πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐφάψαιτο εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαι: τῇ ῥύμῃ τε γὰρ παραλλάξειεν ἂν πρὶν παθεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ἔλαττόν τε, ἰσχύον τε οὐκ ἴσα τοῖς ἐνθάδε. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι θερμῆναί ἐστι: δεῖ δὲ τὸ θερμανθησόμενον μὴ θερμὸν παῤ αὑτοῦ εἶναι. εἰ δέ τι φθαρήσεται παρὰ πυρός, θερμανθῆναι δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ θερμαίνεσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὐδὲν δεῖ τοίνυν ἄλλου σώματος τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἵνα μένῃ, οὐδ’ αὖ, ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ᾖ ἡ περιφορά: οὐ γάρ πω δέδεικται ἐπ’ εὐθείας οὖσα ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ φορά: ἢ γὰρ μένειν ἢ περιφέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς: αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι βιασθέντων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τροφῆς δεῖσθαι φατέον τὰ ἐκεῖ, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τῇδε περὶ ἐκείνων ἀποφαντέον οὔτε ψυχὴν τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν συνέχουσαν ἐχόντων οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον οὔτε αἰτίας οὔσης ἐκεῖ, δἰ ἣν τὰ τῇδε τρέφεται συγκρίματα ἀεὶ ῥέοντα, τήν τε μεταβολὴν τῶν τῇδε σωμάτων ἀφ̓ αὑτῶν μεταβάλλειν ἄλλης ἐπιστατούσης φύσεως αὐτοῖς, ἣ ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας οὐκ οἶδε κατέχειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, μιμεῖται δὲ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ γεννᾶν τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς φύσιν. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὡσαύτως πάντη, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά, εἴρηται.
2.2.1Διὰ τί κύκλῳ κινεῖται; ὅτι νοῦν μιμεῖται. καὶ τίνος ἡ κίνησις; ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος; ἢ ψυχῆς. τί οὖν; ὅτι ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ ἔστι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἀεὶ σπεύδει ἰέναι; ἢ ἔστιν ἐν αὑτῇ οὐ συνεχὴς οὖσα; ἢ φερομένη συμφέρει; ἀλλ’ ἔδει συμφέρουσαν μηκέτι φέρειν, ἀλλ’ ἐνηνοχέναι, τουτέστι στῆναι μᾶλλον ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ κύκλῳ. ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ στήσεται ἤ, εἰ κινεῖται, οὔτι γε τοπικῶς. πῶς οὖν τοπικῶς κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἄλλον τρόπον κινουμένη; ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲ τοπικὴ ἡ κύκλῳ, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ποία οὖν τις; εἰς αὑτὴν συναισθητικὴ καὶ συννοητικὴ καὶ ζωτικὴ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔξω οὐδ’ ἄλλοθι κατὰ τὸ πάντα δεῖν περιλαμβάνειν: τοῦ γὰρ ζῴου τὸ κύριον περιληπτικὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἕν. οὐ περιλήψεται δὲ ζωτικῶς, εἰ μένοι, οὐδὲ σώσει τὰ ἔνδον σῶμα ἔχον: καὶ γὰρ σώματος ζωὴ ἡ κίνησις. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοπική, ὡς δυνήσεται κινήσεται καὶ οὐχ ὡς ψυχὴ μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὡς σῶμα ἔμψυχον καὶ ὡς ζῷον: ὥστε εἶναι μικτὴν ἐκ σωματικῆς καὶ ψυχικῆς, τοῦ μὲν σώματος εὐθὺ φερομένου φύσει, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς κατεχούσης, ἐκ δ’ ἀμφοῖν γενομένην φερομένου τε καὶ μένοντος. εἰ δὲ σώματος ἡ κύκλῳ λέγοιτο, πῶς παντὸς εὐθυποροῦντος ὡς καὶ τοῦ πυρός; ἢ εὐθυπορεῖ, ἕως ἂν ἥκῃ εἰς τὸ οὗ τέτακται: ὡς γὰρ ἂν ταχθῇ, οὕτω δοκεῖ καὶ ἑστάναι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φέρεσθαι εἰς ὃ ἐτάχθη. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ μένει ἐλθόν; ἆρα, ὅτι ἡ φύσις τῷ πυρὶ ἐν κινήσει; εἰ οὖν μὴ κύκλῳ, σκεδασθήσεται ἐπ’ εὐθύ: δεῖ ἄρα κύκλῳ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προνοίας: μᾶλλον δ’ αὐτῷ παρὰ τῆς προνοίας: ὥστε, εἰ ἐκεῖ γένοιτο, κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἐξ αὑτοῦ. ἢ ἐφιέμενον τοῦ εὐθέος οὐκ ἔχον οὐκέτι τόπον ὥσπερ περιολισθάνον ἀνακάμπτει ἐν οἷς τόποις δύναται: οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τόπον μεθ̓ ἑαυτό: οὗτος γὰρ ἔσχατος. θεῖ οὖν ἐν ᾧ ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ τόπος, οὐχ ἵνα μένῃ ἐκεῖ γεγενημένον, ἀλλ’ ἵνα φέρηται. καὶ κύκλου δὲ τὸ μὲν κέντρον μένει κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περιφέρεια εἰ μένοι, κέντρον ἔσται μέγα. μᾶλλον οὖν ἔσται περὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ἔχοντι σώματι. οὕτω γὰρ συννεύσει πρὸς τὸ κέντρον, οὐ τῇ συνιζήσει — ἀπολεῖ γὰρ τὸν κύκλον — ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται, τῇ περιδινήσει: οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἀποπληρώσει τὴν ἔφεσιν. εἰ ψυχὴ δὲ περιάγοι, οὐ καμεῖται: οὐ γὰρ ἕλκει, οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν: ἡ γὰρ φύσις τὸ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς τῆς πάσης ταχθέν. ἔτι πανταχοῦ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη καὶ οὐ διειλημμένη ἡ τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ μέρος δίδωσι καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὡς δύναται, πανταχοῦ εἶναι: δύναται δὲ τῷ πάντα μετιέναι καὶ ἐπιπορεύεσθαι. ἔστη μὲν γάρ, εἴ που ἑστῶσα ἦν ἡ ψυχή, ἐλθὼν ἐκεῖ: νῦν δέ, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσά ἐστιν αὑτῆς, παντὸς ἐφίεται. τί οὖν; οὐδέποτε τεύξεται; ἢ οὕτως ἀεὶ τυγχάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἄγουσα ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ ἀεὶ ἄγειν ἀεὶ κινεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλαχοῦ κινοῦσα ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐπ’ εὐθὺ ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ ἄγουσα δίδωσιν αὐτῷ οὗ ἂν ἥκῃ ἐκεῖ ἔχειν αὐτήν. εἰ δὲ μένοι, ὡς ἐκεῖ οὔσης μόνον, οὗ ἕκαστον μένει, στήσεται. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐκεῖ μόνον ὁπουοῦν, πανταχοῦ οἰσθήσεται καὶ οὐκ ἔξω: κύκλῳ ἄρα.
2.2.2τὰ οὖν ἄλλα πῶς; ἢ οὐχ ὅλον ἕκαστον, μέρος δὲ καὶ κατεχόμενον μερικῷ τόπῳ. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὅλον καὶ οἷον τόπος καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει: αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν. πῶς οὖν ἄνθρωποι; ἤ, ὅσον παρα τοῦ παντός, μέρος, ὅσον δὲ αὐτοί, οἰκεῖον ὅλον. εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἔχει αὐτήν, τί δεῖ περιιέναι; ἢ ὅτι μὴ μόνον ἔχει. εἰ δὲ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς περὶ τὸ μέσον, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν κύκλῳ: μέσον δὲ οὐχ ὡσαύτως σώματος καὶ φύσεως ψυχῆς ληπτέον, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν μέσον, ἀφ̓ οὗ ἡ ἄλλη, τοπικῶς δὲ σώματος. ἀνάλογον οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μέσον: ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα μέσον δεῖ εἶναι, ὃ μόνως ἐστὶ μέσον σώματος σφαιρικοῦ: ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὑτό, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο. εἰ δὴ ψυχή ἐστι περιθέουσα τὸν θεόν, ἀμφαγαπάζεται καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτῇ ἔχει: ἐξήρτηται γὰρ αὐτοῦ πάντα. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς αὐτόν, περὶ αὐτόν. πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶσαι οὕτως; ἢ ἑκάστη ὅπου ἐστὶν οὕτως. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν οὕτως; ὅτι τὸ εὐθύπορον προσήρτηται καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα αἱ ὁρμαὶ καὶ τὸ σφαιροειδὲς ἡμῶν οὐκ εὔτροχον: γεηρὸν γάρ: ἐκεῖ δὲ συνέπεται λεπτὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον: διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ σταίη ἡντιναοῦν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς κινουμένης; ἴσως δὲ καὶ παῤ ἡμῖν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἐν πᾶσι, τὴν συνεῖναι βουλομένην ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτὸν δεῖ γίνεσθαι: οὐ γάρ πῃ. καὶ Πλάτων δὲ τοῖς ἄστροις οὐ μόνον τὴν μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου σφαιρικὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑκάστῳ δίδωσι τὴν περὶ τὸ κέντρον αὐτῶν: ἕκαστον γὰρ οὗ ἔστι περιειληφὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀγάλλεται οὐ λογισμῷ ἀλλὰ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις.
2.2.3ἔστω δὲ καὶ ὧδε: τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ μέν τις δύναμις ἡ ἐσχάτη ἀπὸ γῆς ἀρξαμένη καὶ δἰ ὅλου διαπλακεῖσά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκυῖα καὶ ἡ λόγον δοξαστικὸν δεχομένη πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις ἑαυτὴν ἔχει ἐποχουμένη καὶ τῇ προτέρᾳ καὶ δύναμιν διδοῦσα παῤ αὑτῆς εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ζωτικωτέραν. κινεῖται οὖν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περιεχούσης καὶ ἐφιδρυμένης παντὶ ὅσον αὐτῆς εἰς τὰς σφαίρας ἀνέδραμε. κύκλῳ οὖν ἐκείνης περιεχούσης συννεύουσα ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστροφὴ αὐτῆς περιάγει τὸ σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ ἐμπέπλεκται. ἑκάστου γὰρ μορίου κἂν ὁπωσοῦν κινηθέντος ἐν σφαίρᾳ, εἰ μένον κινοῖτο, ἔσεισεν ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ τῇ σφαίρᾳ κίνησις γίνεται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἡμετέρων τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλως κινουμένης, οἷον ἐν χαραῖς καὶ τῷ φανέντι ἀγαθῷ, τοῦ σώματος ἡ κίνησις καὶ τοπικὴ γίνεται. ἐκεῖ δὴ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γινομένη ψυχὴ καὶ αἰσθητικωτέρα γενομένη κινεῖται πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ σείει ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖ τοπικῶς τὸ σῶμα. ἥ τε αἰσθητικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω αὖ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν λαβοῦσα καὶ τὰ αὑτῆς ἡσθεῖσα διώκουσα αὐτὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ πρὸς τὸ πανταχοῦ συμφέρεται. ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὔπω κινεῖται: ἕστηκε γὰρ καὶ κινεῖται: περὶ αὑτὸν γάρ. οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῷ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἅμα καὶ ἕστηκεν.
2.3.1Ὅτι ἡ τῶν ἄστρων φορὰ σημαίνει περὶ ἕκαστον τὰ ἐσόμενα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὴ πάντα ποιεῖ, ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς δοξάζεται, εἴρηται μὲν πρότερον ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ πίστεις τινὰς παρείχετο ὁ λόγος, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ νῦν ἀκριβέστερον διὰ πλειόνων: οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε ἔχειν δοξάζειν. τοὺς δὴ πλανήτας φερομένους ποιεῖν λέγουσιν οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, πενίας καὶ πλούτους καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσους, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἴσχη καὶ κάλλη αὖ, καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετὰς καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων πράξεις καθ̓ ἕκαστα ἐπὶ καιρῶν ἑκάστων, ὥσπερ θυμουμένους εἰς ἀνθρώπους, ἐφ̓ οἷς μηδὲν αὐτοὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδικοῦσιν οὕτω παῤ αὐτῶν κατεσκευασμένοι, ὡς ἔχουσι: καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι οὐκ ἀγασθέντας τῶν λαμβανόντων, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὺς ἢ κακουμένους κατὰ τοὺς τόπους τῆς φορᾶς ἢ αὖ εὐπαθοῦντας καὶ αὖ ἄλλους αὐτοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις γιγνομένους ὅταν τε ἐπὶ κέντρων ὦσι καὶ ἀποκλίνοντας ἄλλους: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὲν κακοὺς αὐτῶν λέγοντες, τοὺς δ’ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, ὅμως καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς αὐτῶν λεγομένους ἀγαθὰ διδόναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς φαύλους γίνεσθαι: ἔτι δὲ ἀλλήλους ἰδόντας ποιεῖν ἕτερα, μὴ ἰδόντας δὲ ἄλλα, ὥσπερ οὐχ αὑτῶν ὄντας ἰδόντας μὲν ἄλλους, μὴ ἰδόντας δὲ ἑτέρους: καὶ τόνδε μὲν ἰδόντα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, εἰ δ’ ἄλλον ἴδοι, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: καὶ ἄλλως μὲν ὁρᾶν, εἰ κατὰ σχῆμα τόδε ἡ ὄψις, ἄλλως δέ, εἰ κατὰ τόδε: ὁμοῦ τε πάντων τὴν κρᾶσιν ἑτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑγρῶν διαφόρων τὸ κρᾶμα ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ μεμιγμένα. ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δοξαζόντων περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν ἐπισκοπουμένους προσήκει. ἀρχὴ δ’ ἂν εἴη προσήκουσα αὕτη:
2.3.2πότερα ἔμψυχα νομιστέον ἢ ἄψυχα ταῦτα τὰ φερόμενα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄψυχα, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ παρεχόμενα, εἰ δὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἄττα τῶν ἄστρων φήσομεν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐν τῇ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν φύσει στήσουσι τὴν δόσιν φορᾶς δηλονότι σωματικῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς γινομένης, ὡς μηδὲ πολλὴν τὴν παραλλαγὴν τῶν σωμάτων γίγνεσθαι τῆς τ̓ ἀπορροῆς ἑκάστων τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ δὴ ὁμοῦ εἰς ἓν ἐπὶ γῆς μιγνυμένων, ὡς μόνον κατὰ τοὺς τόπους τὰς διαφορὰς γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγύθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν πρὸς τὴν φοράν, διδόντος καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὡσαύτως. σοφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ γραμματικοὺς ἄλλους, τοὺς δὲ ῥήτορας, τοὺς δὲ κιθαριστὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἔτι δὲ πλουσίους καὶ πένητας, πῶς; καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα μὴ ἐκ σωμάτων κράσεως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ γίγνεσθαι; οἷον καὶ ἀδελφὸν τοιόνδε καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν γυναῖκά τε καὶ τὸ νῦν εὐτυχῆσαι καὶ στρατηγὸν καὶ βασιλέα γενέσθαι. εἰ δ’ ἔμψυχα ὄντα προαιρέσει ποιεῖ, τί παῤ ἡμῶν παθόντα κακὰ ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ ἑκόντα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν θείῳ τόπῳ ἱδρυμένα καὶ αὐτὰ θεῖα ὄντα; οὐδὲ γάρ, δἰ ἃ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται κακοί, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει, οὐδέ γε ὅλως γίνεται ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν ἢ εὐπαθούντων ἢ κακὰ πασχόντων.
2.3.3ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντες ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἠναγκασμένοι τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἠναγκασμένοι, τὰ αὐτὰ δήπουθεν ἐχρῆν ἅπαντας ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων καὶ σχημάτων γιγνομένους. νῦν δὲ τί διάφορον πέπονθεν ὅδε τόδε τὸ τμῆμα τοῦ τῶν ζῳδίων κύκλου παριὼν καὶ αὖ τόδε; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ζῳδίῳ γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ πλεῖστον ἀπέχων, καὶ καθ̓ ὁποῖον ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὤν. γελοῖον γὰρ καθ̓ἕκαστον ὧν τις παρέρχεται ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον γίγνεσθαι καὶ διδόναι ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα: ἀνατέλλων δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ κέντρου γεγονὼς καὶ ἀποκλίνας πῶς ἄλλος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοτὲ μὲν ἥδεται ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου ὤν, τοτὲ δὲ λυπεῖται ἀποκλίνας ἢ ἀργὸς γίνεται, οὐδ’ αὖ θυμοῦται ἀνατείλας ἄλλος, πραΰνεται δὲ ἀποκλίνας, εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποκλίνας ἀμείνων. ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ ἕκαστος καὶ ἐπίκεντρος ἄλλοις ἀποκλίνας ἄλλοις καὶ ἀποκλίνας ἑτέροις ἐπίκεντρος ἄλλοις: καὶ οὐ δήπου κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον χαίρει τε καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ θυμοῦται καὶ πρᾷός ἐστι. τὸ δὲ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν χαίρειν λέγειν δύνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἀνατολαῖς ὄντας, πῶς οὐκ ἄλογον; καὶ γὰρ οὕτω συμβαίνει ἅμα τε λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν. εἶτα διὰ τί ἡ ἐκείνων λύπη ἡμᾶς κακώσει; ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι οὐδ’ ἐπὶ καιροῦ χαίρειν αὐτοῖς δοτέον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τὸ ἵλεων ἔχειν χαίροντας ἐφ̓ οἷς ἀγαθοῖς ἔχουσι καὶ ἐφ̓ οἷς ὁρῶσι. βίος γὰρ ἑκάστου ἐφ̓ αὑτοῦ ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ εὖ: τὸ δὲ οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς οὐ κοινωνοῦσιν ἡμῖν ζῴοις κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ προηγούμενον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως, τὸ ἔργον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ ὥσπερ ὄρνισι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ σημαίνειν.
2.3.4κἀκεῖνο δὲ ἄλογον, τόνδε μὲν τόνδε ὁρῶντα χαίρειν, τόνδε δὲ τόνδε τοὐναντίον: τίς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔχθρα ἢ περὶ τίνων; διὰ τί δὲ τρίγωνος μὲν ὁρῶν ἄλλως, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ ἢ τετράγωνος ἄλλως; διὰ τί δὲ ὡδὶ μὲν ἐσχηματισμένος ὁρᾷ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἑξῆς ζῴδιον ἐγγυτέρω ὢν μᾶλλον οὐχ ὁρᾷ; ὅλως δὲ τίς καὶ ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τοῦ ποιεῖν ἃ λέγονται ποιεῖν; πῶς τε χωρὶς ἕκαστος καὶ ἔτι πῶς ὁμοῦ πάντες ἄλλο ἐκ πάντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ συνθέμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτω ποιοῦσιν εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ δόξαντα ὑφεὶς ἕκαστός τι τῶν ἀφ̓ αὑτοῦ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἄλλος ἐκώλυσε τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου δόσιν γενέσθαι βιασάμενος, οὐδ’ αὖ ὁ ἕτερος παρεχώρησε τῷ ἑτέρῳ πεισθεὶς αὐτῷ πράττειν. τὸ δὲ τόνδε μὲν χαίρειν ἐν τοῖς τοῦδε γενόμενον, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ἑτέρου γενόμενον, πῶς οὐχ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ὑποθέμενος δύο φιλοῦντας ἀλλήλους ἔπειτα λέγοι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον φιλεῖν τὸν ἕτερον, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ θάτερον μισεῖν θάτερον;
2.3.5λέγοντες δὲ ψυχρόν τινα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ἔτι πόρρω γινόμενον ἀφ̓ ἡμῶν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ κακὸν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς τιθέμενοι: καίτοι ἔδει ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ζῳδίοις ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι: καὶ ἐναντίους γινομένους τὸν ψυχρὸν τῷ θερμῷ δεινοὺς ἀμφοτέρους γίνεσθαι: καίτοι ἔδει κρᾶσιν εἶναι: καὶ τόνδε μὲν χαίρειν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι θερμαινόμενον, τόνδε δὲ τῇ νυκτὶ χαίρειν πυρώδη ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἡμέρας αὐτοῖς οὔσης, λέγω δὲ φωτός, ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβανομένου ὑπὸ νυκτὸς πολὺ ὑπεράνω τῆς σκιᾶς τῆς γῆς ὄντος. τὸ δὲ τὴν σελήνην πλησίφωτον μὲν οὖσαν ἀγαθὴν εἶναι τῷδε συνερχομενην, λείπουσαν δὲ κακήν, ἀνάπαλιν, εἴπερ δοτέον. πλήρης γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὑπεράνω ὄντι ἀφώτιστος ἂν εἴη τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ, λείπουσα δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκείνῳ πλησίφωτος: ὥστε τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἔδει λείπουσαν ἐκεῖνον μετὰ φωτὸς ὁρῶσαν. αὐτῇ μὲν οὖν ὅπως ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲ διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ἥμισυ ἀεὶ φωτιζομένῃ: τῷ δ’ ἴσως διαφέροι ἂν θερμαινομένῳ, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἀλλὰ θερμαίνοιτο ἄν, εἰ ἀφώτιστος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡ σελήνη εἴη: πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαθὴ οὖσα ἐν τῷ ἀφωτίστῳ πλήρης ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτόν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμας τῆς σελήνης ἀφώτιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, οὐ τὸ ἄνω λυπεῖ. οὐκ ἐπικουροῦντος δὲ ἐκείνου τῷ πόρρω χεῖρον εἶναι δοκεῖ: ὅταν δὲ πλήρης ᾖ, ἀρκεῖ τῷ κάτω, κἂν ἐκεῖνος πόρρωθεν ᾖ. πρὸς δὲ τὸν πυρώδη ἀφώτιστος οὖσα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἀγαθή: αὐταρκεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνου πυρωδεστέρου ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὄντος. τὰ δὲ ἰόντα ἐκεῖθεν σώματα ἐμψύχων ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμά, ψυχρὸν δὲ οὐδέν: μαρτυρεῖ δὲ ὁ τόπος. Δία δὲ ὃν λέγουσιν, εὔκρατος πυρί: καὶ ὁ Ἑῷος οὕτως: διὸ καὶ σύμφωνοι δοκοῦσιν ὁμοιότητι: πρὸς δὲ τὸν Πυρόεντα καλούμενον σύμφορος τῇ κράσει, πρὸς δὲ Κρόνον ἀλλότριος τῷ πόρρω: Ἑρμῆς δ’ ἀδιάφορος πρὸς ἅπαντας, ὡς δοκεῖ, ὁμοιούμενος. πάντες δὲ πρὸς το ὅλον σύμφοροι: ὥστε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως, ὡς τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρει, ὡς ἐφ̓ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ὁρᾶται. τούτου γὰρ χάριν μάλιστα, οἷον χολὴ καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐγγύς: καὶ γὰρ ἔδει καὶ θυμὸν ἐγείρειν καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλησίον μὴ ἐᾶν ὑβρίζειν. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔδει τινὸς τοιούτου καί τινος ἀηδοῦς πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ ἀνημμένου. τὰ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς εἶναι, συμπαθῆ δὲ πάντα τῷ ἀλόγῳ αὐτῶν εἶναι: οὕτω γὰρ ἓν καὶ μία ἁρμονία: ταῦτ̓ οὖν πῶς οὐ σημεῖα ἐξ ἀναλογίας εἴη ἄν;
2.3.6Ἄρεα δὲ τόνδε ἢ Ἀφροδίτην θεμένους μοιχείας ποιεῖν, εἰ ὡδὶ εἶεν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπων ἀκολασίας αὑτοὺς ἐμπιπλάντας ὧν πρὸς ἀλλήλους δέονται, πῶς οὐ πολλὴν ἀλογίαν ἔχει; καὶ τὴν μὲν θέαν αὐτοῖς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἰ οὑτωσὶ θεῷντο, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι, πέρας δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι, πῶς ἄν τις παραδέξαιτο; μυριάδων δὲ ζῴων ἀναριθμήτων γινομένων καὶ οὐσῶν ἑκάστῳ τελεῖν ἀεὶ τό τε δόξαν αὐτοῖς διδόναι, πλουτεῖν ποιεῖν, πένητας, ἀκολάστους, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἑκάστων αὐτοὺς τελεῖν, τίς αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ὁ βίος; ἢ πῶς δυνατὸν τοσαῦτα ποιεῖν; τὸ δὲ ἀναφορὰς ζῳδίων ἀναμένειν καὶ τότε τελεῖν, καὶ ὅσαις μοίραις ἀνατέλλει ἕκαστον, ἐνιαυτοὺς εἶναι τοσούτους τῆς ἀναφορᾶς, καὶ οἷον ἐπὶ δακτύλων τίθεσθαι, ὅτε ποιήσουσι, μὴ ἐξεῖναι δ’ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τούτων τῶν χρόνων, ὅλως δὲ μηδενὶ ἑνὶ τὸ κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως διδόναι. τούτοις δὲ τὰ πάντα διδόναι, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπιστατοῦντος ἑνός, ἀφ̓ οὗ διηρτῆσθαι τὸ πᾶν ἑκάστῳ διδόντος κατὰ φύσιν τὸ αὑτοῦ περαίνειν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὰ αὑτοῦ συντεταγμένον αὖ μετ’ αὐτοῦ, λύοντός ἐστι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντος κόσμου φύσιν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος καὶ αἰτίαν πρώτην ἐπὶ πάντα ἰοῦσαν.
2.3.7ἀλλ’ εἰ σημαίνουσιν οὗτοι τὰ ἐσόμενα, ὥσπερ φαμὲν πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα σημαντικὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐσομένων, τί ἂν τὸ ποιοῦν εἴη; καὶ ἡ τάξις πῶς; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσημαίνετο τεταγμένως μὴ ἑκάστων γινομένων. ἔστω τοίνυν ὥσπερ γράμματα ἐν οὐρανῷ γραφόμενα ἀεὶ ἢ γεγραμμένα καὶ κινούμενα, ποιοῦντα μέντοι ἔργον καὶ ἄλλο: ἐπακολουθείτω δὲ τῷδε ἡ παῤ αὐτῶν σημασία, ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐν ἑνὶ ζῴῳ παῤ ἄλλου μέρους ἄλλο ἄν τις μάθοι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἦθος ἄν τις γνοίη εἰς ὀφθαλμούς τινος ἰδὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο μέρος τοῦ σώματος καὶ κινδύνους καὶ σωτηρίας. καὶ οὖν μέρη μὲν ἐκεῖνα, μέρη δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς: ἄλλα οὖν ἄλλοις. μεστὰ δὲ πάντα σημείων καὶ σοφός τις ὁ μαθὼν ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο. πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη συνηθείᾳ γιγνόμενα γινώσκεται πᾶσι. τίς οὖν ἡ σύνταξις ἡ μία; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς ὄρνεις εὔλογον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, ἀφ̓ ὧν σημαινόμεθα ἕκαστα. συνηρτῆσθαι δὴ δεῖ ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντα, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν ἑνὶ τῶν καθ̓ ἕκαστα τοῦ εὖ εἰρομένου σύμπνοια μία, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῷ παντί: καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ἓν πολύζῳον ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέρη ἕν τι ἔργον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἕκαστα ἔργα ἕκαστον ἔχειν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα, ὅσον μὴ μόνον μέρη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλα καὶ μείζω. πρόεισι μὲν δὴ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς τὸ αὑτοῦ πρᾶττον, συμβάλλει δὲ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ: οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλλακται τοῦ ὅλου: καὶ δὴ καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει ὑπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλο αὖ προσῆλθε καὶ ἐλύπησεν ἢ ἧσε. πρόεισι δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ κατ’ ἐπιτυχίαν: καὶ γὰρ ἄλλο τι καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐφεξῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλο.
2.3.8καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴ τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ποιεῖν ὡρμημένη — ψυχὴ γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα λόγον — κἂν εὐθυποροῖ καὶ ταράττοιτο αὖ, καὶ ἕπεται τοῖς δρωμένοις ἐν τῷ παντὶ δίκη, εἴπερ μὴ λυθήσεται. μένει δ’ ἀεὶ ὀρθουμένου τοῦ ὅλου τάξει καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ κρατοῦντος: συνεργοῦντα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ὡς ἂν μόρια οὐ σμικρὰ ὄντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀριπρεπῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν ἐστί. σημαίνει μὲν οὖν πάντα, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ποιεῖ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅσα φανερῶς ποιεῖ. ἡμεῖς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔργα κατὰ φύσιν ποιοῦμεν, ἕως μὴ ἐσφάλημεν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τοῦ παντός: σφαλέντες δὲ ἔχομεν δίκην καὶ τὸ σφάλμα αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν χείρονι μοίρᾳ εἰς ὕστερον. πλοῦτοι μὲν οὖν καὶ πενίαι συντυχίᾳ τῶν ἔξω: ἀρεταὶ δὲ καὶ κακίαι πῶς; ἀρεταὶ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ψυχῆς, κακίαι δὲ συντυχίᾳ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰ ἔξω. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται.
2.3.9νῦν δὲ ἀναμνησθέντες τοῦ ἀτράκτου, ὃν τοῖς μὲν πρόπαλαι αἱ Μοῖραι ἐπικλώθουσι, Πλάτωνι δὲ ὁ ἄτρακτός ἐστι τό τε πλανώμενον καὶ τὸ ἀπλανὲς τῆς περιφορᾶς, καὶ αἱ Μοῖραι δὲ καὶ ἡ Ἀνάγκη μήτηρ οὖσα στρέφουσι καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἑκάστου ἐπικλώθουσι καὶ δἰ αὐτῆς εἶσιν εἰς γένεσιν τὰ γεννώμενα. ἐν δὲ Τιμαίῳ θεὸς μὲν ὁ ποιήσας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς δίδωσιν, οἱ δὲ φερόμενοι θεοὶ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πάθη, θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας αὖ, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλο εἶδος, ἀφ̓ οὗ τὰ παθήματα ταυτί. οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι συνδέουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἄστροις παῤ αὐτῶν ψυχὴν κομιζομένους καὶ ὑποτάττουσι τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνταῦθα ἰόντας: καὶ ἤθη τοίνυν παῤ αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἤθη πράξεις καὶ πάθη ἀπὸ ἕξεως παθητικῆς οὔσης: ὥστε τί λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς; ἢ ὅπερ ἐσμὲν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἡμεῖς, οἷς καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν παθῶν ἔδωκεν ἡ φύσις. καὶ γὰρ ὅμως ἐν τούτοις τοῖς κακοῖς διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ἀπειλημμένοις ἀδέσποτον ἀρετὴν θεὸς ἔδωκεν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσιν ἀρετῆς δεῖ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν κίνδυνος ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι ἀρετῆς οὐ παρούσης. διὸ καὶ φεύγειν ἐντεῦθεν δεῖ καὶ χωρίζειν αὑτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ μὴ τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι σῶμα ἐψυχωμένον, ἐν ᾧ κρατεῖ μᾶλλον ἡ σώματος φύσις ψυχῆς τι ἴχνος λαβοῦσα, ὡς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν κοινὴν μᾶλλον τοῦ σώματος εἶναι: πάντα γὰρ σωματικά, ὅσα ταύτης. τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας τῆς ἔξω ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω φορὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον, ὧν: οὐδεὶς κρατεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἢ προσχρῆται, ἵν’ ᾖ ἐκεῖνο καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ζῇ ἀναχωρήσας: ἢ ἔρημος ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς γενόμενος ζῇ ἐν εἱμαρμένῃ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰ ἄστρα αὐτῷ οὐ μόνον σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ γίνεται αὐτὸς οἷον μέρος καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέπεται, οὗ μέρος. διττὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὁ μὲν τὸ συναμφότερόν τι, ὁ δὲ αὐτός: καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τινος δεθείσης σώματι, ὁ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἡ μὴ ἐν σώματι, ἐλλάμπουσα δὲ ἴχνη τῇ ἐν σώματι: καὶ ἥλιος δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διττὰ οὕτω. καὶ τῇ μὲν ἑτέρᾳ ψυχῇ τῇ καθαρᾷ οὐδὲν φαῦλον δίδωσιν, ἃ δὲ γίνεται εἰς τὸ πᾶν παῤ αὐτῶν, καθ̓ ὃ μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ σῶμα ἐψυχωμένον, τὸ σῶμα μέρος μέρει δίδωσι προαιρέσεως τοῦ ἄστρου καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς ὄντως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον βλεπούσης. παρακολουθεῖ δ’ αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα, μᾶλλον δ’ οὐκ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς θερμότητος εἰς τὸ ὅλον ἰούσης, καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης εἰς ψυχὴν ἄλλην συγγενῆ οὖσαν: τὰ δὲ δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν μῖξιν. μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις, καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν χωριστὴν αὐτοῦ χωρίσειε, τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ μέγα. θεὸς μὲν οὖν ἐκείνης συναριθμουμένης, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν δαίμων, φησί, μέγας καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ δαιμόνια.
2.3.10εἰ δ’ οὕτω, τὰς σημασίας καὶ νῦν δοτέον τὰς δὲ ποιήσεις οὐ πάντως οὐδὲ τοῖς ὅλοις αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα τοῦ παντὸς πάθη, καὶ ὅσον τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῶν. καὶ ψυχῇ μὲν καὶ πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς γένεσιν δοτέον ἥκειν τι φερούσῃ παῤ αὑτῆς: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλθοι εἰς σῶμα μὴ μέγα τι παθητικὸν ἔχουσα. δοτέον δὲ καὶ τύχας εἰσιούσῃ τῷ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φορὰν εἰσιέναι. δοτέον δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν φορὰν ποιεῖσθαι συνεργοῦσαν καὶ ἀποπληροῦσαν παῤ αὑτῆς, ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν τὸ πᾶν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τάξιν μερῶν λαβόντος.
2.3.11χρὴ δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων ἰὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶσιν εἰς τοὺς λαβόντας, οἷον παῤ ἐκείνων ἔρχεται: οἷον εἰ πῦρ, ἀμυδρὸν τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ φιλιακὴ διάθεσις ἀσθενὴς γενομένη ἐν τῷ λαβόντι οὐ μάλα καλὴν τὴν φίλησιν εἰργάσατο, καὶ θυμὸς δὴ οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ τυχόντος, ὡς ἀνδρεῖον γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀκροχολίαν ἢ ἀθυμίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ τὸ τιμῆς ἐν ἔρωτι ὂν καὶ περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔχον τῶν δοκούντων καλῶν ἔφεσιν εἰργάσατο, καὶ νοῦ ἀπόρροια πανουργίαν: καὶ γὰρ ἡ πανουργία ἐθέλει νοῦς εἶναι τυχεῖν οὗ ἐφίεται οὐ δυνάμενος. γίνεται οὖν κακὰ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ οὐ τούτων ὄντων: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐλθόντα, καίτοι οὐκ ἐκεῖνα ὄντα, οὐ μένει οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἷα ἦλθε σώμασι μιγνύμενα καὶ ὕλῃ καὶ ἀλλήλοις.
2.3.12καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἰόντα εἰς ἓν συμπίπτει καὶ κομίζεται ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κράματος, ὥστε ὃ ἔστι καὶ ποῖόν τι γενέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἵππον ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἵππῳ τι δίδωσιν: ὁ γὰρ ἵππος ἐξ ἵππου καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος: συνεργὸς δὲ ἥλιος τῇ πλάσει: ὁ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γίνεται. ἀλλ’ ἔβλαψέ ποτε ἢ ὠφέλησε τὰ ἔξω: ὁμοίως γὰρ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον πολλάκις, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον συνέπεσεν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκβιβάζει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου: ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη κρατεῖ, οὐχ ἡ φύσις, ὡς μὴ τέλειον γενέσθαι ἡττωμένου τοῦ εἴδους.
2.3.13δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῆς φορᾶς γίνεται, τὰ δὲ οὔ, διαλαβεῖν καὶ διακρῖναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πόθεν ἕκαστα ὅλως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἥδε: ψυχῆς δὴ τὸ πᾶν τόδε διοικούσης κατὰ λόγον, οἷα δὴ καὶ ἐφ̓ ἑκάστου ζῴου ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀρχή, ἀφ̓ ἧς ἕκαστα τὰ τοῦ ζῴου μέρη καὶ πλάττεται καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συντέτακται, οὗ μέρη ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν προσιόντα, τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐναντία τῇ βουλήσει τῆς φύσεως, τὰ δὲ καὶ πρόσφορα: τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ πάντη ἅτε μέρη ὄντα αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα συντέτακται φύσιν μὲν λαβόντα ἣν ἔχει καὶ συμπληροῦντα τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὅμως ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὸν ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς βίον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντη ὄργανα καὶ οἷον ἐξωθούμενα ἔξω εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν: τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα, τὰ μὲν τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀορίστως ἔχει, ὡς ὑφ̓ ἅρμασιν ἵπποι πρὶν τὸν ἡνίοχον ἀφορίσαι αὐτοῖς τὸν δρόμον, ἅτε δὴ πληγῇ νεμόμενα: λογικοῦ δὲ ζῴου φύσις ἔχει παῤ ἑαυτῆς τὸν ἡνίοχον: καὶ ἐπιστήμονα μὲν ἔχουσα κατ’ ἰθὺ φέρεται μηδὲ ὡς ἔτυχε πολλάκις. ἄμφω δὲ εἴσω τοῦ παντὸς καὶ συντελοῦντα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον: καὶ τὰ μὲν μείζω αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν πλείονι τῇ ἀξίᾳ πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ζωὴν συντελεῖ τάξιν ποιητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ παθητικὴν ἔχοντα, τὰ δὲ πάσχοντα διατελεῖ μικρὰν δύναμιν πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔχοντα: τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων, πάσχοντα μὲν παῤ ἄλλων, ποιοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀρχὴν παῤ αὑτῶν εἰς πράξεις καὶ ποιήσεις ἔχοντα. καὶ γίνεται τὸ πᾶν ζωὴ παντελὴς τῶν μὲν ἀρίστων ἐνεργούντων τὰ ἄριστα, καθ̓ ὅσον τὸ ἄριστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ: ὃ δὴ καὶ τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι συντακτέον, ὥσπερ στρατιώτας στρατηγῷ, οἳ δὴ λέγονται καὶ ἕπεσθαι Διὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν τὴν νοητὴν ἱεμένῳ. τὰ δὲ ἥττονι τῇ φύσει κεχρημένα δεύτερα τοῦ παντός, οἷα καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς δεύτερα: τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀνὰ λόγον τοῖς ἐν ἡμῖν μέρεσιν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφ̓ ἡμῶν πάντα ἴσα. ζῷα μὲν οὖν πάντα κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ὅλον, τά τε ἐν οὐρανῷ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα εἰς τὸ ὅλον μεμέρισται, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν μερῶν, οὐδ’ εἰ μέγα, δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐργάσασθαι τῶν λόγων οὐδὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους γενομένων: ἀλλοίωσιν δὲ ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, χείρονός τε καὶ βελτίονος, ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκστῆσαί γε τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως δύναται. χεῖρον δὲ ἐργάζεται ἢ κατὰ σῶμα ἀσθένειαν διδὸν ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ συμπαθεῖ καὶ παῤ αὐτοῦ δοθείσῃ εἰς τὸ κάτω κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φαυλότητος αἴτιον γιγνόμενον ἢ σώματος κακῶς συντεθέντος ἐμπόδιον τὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνέργειαν δἰ αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι: οἷον οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμοσθείσης λύρας, ὡς δέξασθαι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἁρμονίας εἰς τὸ μουσικοὺς ἀποτελεῖν τοὺς φθόγγους.
2.3.14περὶ δὲ πενίας καὶ πλούτους καὶ δόξας καὶ ἀρχὰς πῶς; ἤ, εἰ μὲν παρὰ πατέρων οἱ πλοῦτοι, ἐσήμηναν τὸν πλούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ εὐγενῆ τὸν ἐκ τοιούτων διὰ τὸ γένος τὸ ἔνδοξον ἔχοντα ἐδήλωσαν μόνον: εἰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνδραγαθίας, εἰ σῶμα συνεργὸν γεγένηται, συμβάλλοιντο ἂν οἱ τὴν σώματος ἰσχὺν ἐργασάμενοι, γονεῖς μὲν πρῶτον, εἶτα, εἴ τις ἄρα τῶν τόπων παρέσχε τι, τὰ οὐράνια καὶ ἡ γῆ: εἰ δὲ ἄνευ σώματος ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτῇ μόνῃ δοτέον τὸ πλεῖστον καὶ ὅσα θεῖα παρὰ τῶν ἀμειψαμένων συνεβάλλετο. οἱ δὲ δόντες εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοί, εἰς ἀρετὴν ἀνακτέον καὶ οὕτω τὴν αἰτίαν: εἰ δὲ φαῦλοι, δικαίως δὲ δόντες, τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς βελτίστῳ ἐνεργήσαντι τοῦτο γεγονέναι. εἰ δὲ πονηρὸς ὁ πλουτήσας, τὴν μὲν πονηρίαν προηγουμένην καί τι τὸ αἴτιον τῆς πονηρίας, προσληπτέον δὲ καὶ τοὺς δόντας συναιτίους ὡσαύτως γενομένους. εἰ δ’ ἐκ πόνων, οἷον ἐκ γεωργίας, ἐπὶ τὸν γεωργόν, συνεργὸν δὲ τὸ περιέχον γεγενημένον. εἰ δὲ θησαυρὸν εὗρε, συμπεσεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντός: εἰ δέ, σημαίνεται: πάντως γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις πάντα: διὸ καὶ πάντως σημαίνεται. εἰ δ’ ἀπέβαλέ τις πλοῦτον, εἰ ἀφαιρεθείς, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀφελόμενον, κἀκεῖνον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρχήν: εἰ δ’ ἐν θαλάττῃ, ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεσόντα. τὸ δ’ ἔνδοξον ἢ δικαίως ἢ οὔ. εἰ οὖν δικαίως, ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς δοξάζουσι βέλτιον: εἰ δ’ οὐ δικαίως, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τιμώντων ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἀρχῆς δὲ πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: ἢ γὰρ προσηκόντως ἢ οὔ: καὶ θάτερον μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τῶν ἑλομένων, ἢ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν διαπραξάμενον ἑταίρων συστάσει καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως. περὶ δὲ γάμων ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ συντυχία καὶ σύμπτωσις ἐκ τῶν ὅλων. παίδων δὲ γενέσεις ἀκόλουθοι τούτοις, καὶ ἢ πέπλασται κατὰ λόγον ἐμποδίσαντος οὐδενός, ἢ χεῖρον ἔσχε γενομένου ἔνδον κωλύματός τινος, ἢ παῤ αὐτὴν τὴν κύουσαν, ἢ τοῦ περιέχοντος οὕτω διατεθέντος, ὡς ἀσυμμέτρως πρὸς τήνδε τὴν κύησιν ἐσχηκέναι
2.3.15ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πρὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δοὺς κλήρους καὶ προαιρέσεις συνεργοὺς ὕστερον δίδωσι τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀτράκτῳ, ὡς πάντως τὰ αἱρεθέντα συναποτελοῦντας: ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δαίμων συνεργὸς εἰς πλήρωσιν αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ οἱ κλῆροι τίνες; ἢ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἔχοντος οὕτως, ὡς τότε εἶχεν, ὅτε εἰσῄεσαν εἰς τὸ σῶμα, γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τόδε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῶνδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις γίνεσθαι καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὰ ἔξω. πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ γενόμενα καὶ οἷον συγκλωσθέντα διὰ τῆς μιᾶς τῶν λεγομένων Μοιρῶν δεδήλωται ἐπί τε ἑκάστων ἐπί τε τῶν ὅλων: ἡ δὲ Λάχεσις τοὺς κλήρους: καὶ τὰ συμπεσόντα τάδε πάντως ἀναγκαῖον τὴν Ἄτροπον ἐπάγειν. τῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν γίνονται τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τῶν ἔξω ὥσπερ γοητευθέντες καὶ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτοί: οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες τούτων καὶ ὑπεραίροντες οἷον τῇ κεφαλῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς ἀποσώζουσι τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ νομιστέον τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, οἷον, ὅ τι ἂν ἔξωθεν πάθῃ, ταύτην φύσιν ἴσχειν μόνην τῶν πάντων οἰκείαν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: ἀλλὰ χρὴ πολὺ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα, ἅτε ἀρχῆς λόγον ἔχουσαν, πολλὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις πρὸς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν: οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν τε οὐσίαν οὖσαν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸ εὖ κεκτῆσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν συναμφότερον ἐκ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοιόνδε καὶ ἔργα ἔχει τοιάδε: ψυχὴ δὲ εἴ τις χωρίζεται, χωριστὰ καὶ ἴδια ἐνεργεῖ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη οὐχ αὑτῆς τιθεμένη, ἅτε ἤδη ὁρῶσα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.
2.3.16ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μικτὸν καὶ τί τὸ μὴ καὶ τί τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ ἀχώριστον, ὅταν ἐν σώματι ᾖ, καὶ ὅλως τί τὸ ζῷον ἀρχὴν ἑτέραν ὕστερον λαβοῦσι ζητητέον: οὐ γὰρ ἅπαντες τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔσχον περὶ τούτου. νῦν δὲ ἔτι λέγωμεν πῶς τὸ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς διοικούσης τὸ πᾶν εἴπομεν. πότερον γὰρ ἕκαστα οἷον ἐπ’ εὐθείας ποιοῦσα, ἄνθρωπον, εἶτα ἵππον καὶ ἄλλο ζῷον καὶ δὴ καὶ θηρία, πῦρ δὲ καὶ γῆν πρότερον, εἶτα συμπεσόντα ταῦτα ἰδοῦσα καὶ φθείροντα ἄλληλα ἢ καὶ ὠφελοῦντα τὴν συμπλοκὴν τὴν ἐκ τούτων ἰδοῦσα μόνον καὶ τὰ ὕστερον συμβαίνοντα ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἔτι συμβαλλομένη πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον ζῴων γενέσεις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ποιοῦσα καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς δἰ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ συγχωροῦσα; ἢ αἰτίαν λέγοντες καὶ τῶν οὕτω γινομένων, ὅτι παῤ αὐτῆς γενόμενα τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐργάζεται; ἢ καὶ τὸ τόδε τι παθεῖν ἤ τι ποιῆσαι ἔχει ὁ λόγος οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ κατ’ ἐπιτυχίαν οὐδὲ τῶνδε γιγνομένων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως. ἆῤ οὖν τῶν λόγων αὐτὰ ποιούντων; ἢ ὄντων μὲν τῶν λόγων, οὐχ ὡς ποιούντων δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰδότων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς γεννητικοὺς ἐχούσης εἰδυίας τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνοντα αὐτῆς ἁπάντων: τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμπιπτόντων καὶ περιεστηκότων τὰ αὐτὰ πάντως προσήκει ἀποτελεῖσθαι: ἃ δὴ παραλαβοῦσα ἢ προιδοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐφεξῆς περαίνει καὶ συνείρει. προηγούμενα οὖν καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντα πάντως καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐφεξῆς προηγούμενα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων: ὅθεν ἴσως ἀεὶ χείρω τὰ ἐφεξῆς: οἷον ἄνδρες ἄλλοι πάλαι, νῦν δ’ ἄλλοι, τῷ μεταξὺ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀναγκαίῳ τῶν λόγων εἰκόντων τοῖς τῆς ὕλης παθήμασι. συνορῶσα οὖν ἀεὶ ἄλλα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα, καὶ παρακολουθοῦσα τοῖς τῶν αὐτῆς ἔργων παθήμασι τὸν βίον τοιοῦτον ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπήλλακται τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ φροντίδος τέλος ἐπιθεῖσα τῷ ποιήματι καὶ ὅπως ἕξει καλῶς καὶ εἰς ἀεὶ ἅπαξ μηχανησαμένη, οἷα δέ τις γεωργὸς σπείρας ἢ καὶ φυτεύσας ἀεὶ διορθοῦται, ὅσα χειμῶνες ἔβλαψαν ὑέτιοι ἢ κρυμῶν συνέχεια ἢ ἀνέμων ζάλαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, ἐκεῖνο δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι ἤδη ἔγνωσται ἢ καὶ κεῖται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰς κακίας τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν φήσομεν, καίτοι ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔνι ἁμαρτία οὐδὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδ’ ἡ φθορὰ τοῦ κατὰ τέχνην. ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθά τις ἐρεῖ μὴ εἶναι μηδὲν παρὰ φύσιν μηδὲ κακὸν τῷ ὅλῳ: ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον συγχωρήσεται. τί οὖν, εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸ χεῖρον συνεργόν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ πάντα καλὰ εἶναι; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία συντελεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων κόσμος: καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ̓ ἕκαστα ζῴων οὕτως: καὶ τὰ μὲν βελτίω ἀναγκάζει καὶ πλάττει ὁ λόγος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, δυνάμει κεῖται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις, οὐδὲν ἔτι δυναμένης ἐκείνης ποιεῖν οὐδ’ ἀνακινεῖν τοὺς λόγους ἤδη τῆς ὕλης τῷ σεισμῷ τῷ ἐκ τῶν προηγουμένων λόγων καὶ τὰ παῤ αὐτῆς ποιούσης χείρω, κρατουμένης δ’ αὖ οὐδὲν ἧττον πρὸς τὰ βελτίω: ὥστε ἓν ἐκ πάντων ἄλλως ἑκατέρως γινομένων καὶ ἄλλως αὖ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
2.3.17πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ νοήματα; ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει; ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ φυσικῶς ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν φυσικῶς οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ ὅρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ εἰδυῖα ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι, ὥσπερ κύκλος, ἄλλου ἐνδόντος εἰς τοῦτο τὸ ποιεῖν. εἰ τοῦτο, ποιήσει τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ τρέπειν τὴν ἔνυλον καὶ γεννητικὴν ψυχήν. τρέψει οὖν λογισαμένη αὕτη; ἀλλ’ εἰ λογισαμένη, ἀναφορὰν ἕξει. πότερον εἰς ἄλλο ἢ εἰς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ; ἀλλ’ εἰ εἰς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ, οὐδὲν δεῖ λογισμοῦ. οὐ γὰρ οὗτος τρέψει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχον τοὺς λόγους: τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ποιεῖν ἐν ψυχῇ δυνάμενον. κατ’ εἴδη ἄρα ποιεῖ. δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὴν παρὰ νοῦ ἔχουσαν διδόναι. νοῦς δὴ ψυχῇ δίδωσι τῇ τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴ δὲ παῤ αὑτῆς ἡ μετὰ νοῦν τῇ μετ’ αὐτὴν ἐλλάμπουσα καὶ τυποῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὡσπερεὶ ἐπιταχθεῖσα ἤδη ποιεῖ: ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνεμποδίστως, τὰ δὲ ἐμποδισθεῖσα. ἅτε δὴ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν λαβοῦσα καὶ λόγων οὐ τῶν πρώτων πληρωθεῖσα οὐ μόνον καθ̓ ἃ ἔλαβε ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ γένοιτο ἄν τι καὶ παῤ αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι χεῖρον: καὶ ζῷον μέν, ζῷον δὲ ἀτελέστερον καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὴν αὑτοῦ ζωήν, ἅτε χείριστον καὶ δύσκολον δὴ καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἐξ ὕλης χείρονος οἷον ὑποστάθμης τῶν προηγουμένων πικρᾶς καὶ πικρὰ ποιούσης: καὶ ταῦτα παρέξει καὶ αὐτὴ τῷ ὅλῳ.
2.3.18ἆῤ οὖν τὰ κακὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀναγκαῖα, ὅτι ἕπεται τοῖς προηγουμένοις; ἢ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἦν, ἀτελὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πᾶν. καὶ γὰρ χρείαν τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ πάντα παρέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ, οἷον τὰ τῶν ἰοβόλων, λανθάνει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ τί: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν κακίαν αὐτὴν ἔχειν πολλὰ χρήσιμα καὶ πολλῶν ποιητικὴν εἶναι καλῶν, οἷον κάλλους τεχνητοῦ παντός, καὶ κινεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν μὴ ἐῶσαν ἐπ’ ἀδείας εὕδειν. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, δἑ??ʼ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν θεωρεῖν μὲν τὰ ἄριστα ἀεὶ ἱεμένην πρὸς τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν θεόν, πληρουμένης δὲ αὐτῆς καὶ πεπληρωμένης οἷον ἀπομεστουμένης αὐτῆς τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἴνδαλμα καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ κάτω τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦτο εἶναι. ποιητὴς οὖν ἔσχατος οὗτος: ἐπὶ δ’ αὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρώτως πληρούμενον παρὰ νοῦ: ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ νοῦς δημιουργός, ὃς καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ μετ’ αὐτὸν δίδωσιν ὧν ἴχνη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ. εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἑστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένου. ἕως γὰρ ἂν ᾖ νοῦς καὶ ψυχή, ῥεύσονται οἱ λόγοι εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἥλιος, πάντα τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ φῶτα.
2.4.1Τὴν λεγομένη ὕλην ὑποκείμενόν τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν λέγοντες εἶναι κοινόν τινα τοῦτον λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς πάντες λέγουσιν, ὅσοι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθον τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, καὶ μέχρι τούτου τὴν αὐτὴν φέρονται: τίς δέ ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ὑποκειμένη φύσις καὶ πῶς δεκτικὴ καὶ τίνων, τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ζητήσαντες διέστησαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν σώματα μόνον τὰ ὄντα εἶναι θέμενοι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τούτοις μίαν τε τὴν ὕλην λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα οἷον πάθη ταύτης καί πως ἔχουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμῶσι καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν ἄγειν καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν τὴν ὕλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι. διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ ἄποιον αὐτὴν σῶμα λέγοντες καὶ μέγεθος δέ. οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον λέγουσι καὶ ταύτην οὐ μίαν τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοί, περὶ ἧς οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν, ἑτέραν μέντοι προτέραν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὑποβεβλημένην τοῖς ἐκεῖ εἴδεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις.
2.4.2διὸ πρότερον ζητητέον περὶ ταύτης εἰ ἔστι, καὶ τίς οὖσα τυγχάνει, καὶ πῶς ἔστιν. εἰ δὴ ἀόριστόν τι καὶ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ τῆς ὕλης εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀρίστοις οὖσιν οὐδὲν ἀόριστον οὐδὲ ἄμορφον, οὐδ’ ἂν ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἴη: καὶ εἰ ἁπλοῦν ἕκαστον, οὐδ’ ἂν δέοι ὕλης, ἵνα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλου τὸ σύνθετον: καὶ γινομένοις μὲν ὕλης δεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἕτερα ποιουμένοις, ἐφ̓ ὧν καὶ ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὕλη ἐνοήθη, μὴ γινομένοις δὲ οὔ. πόθεν δὲ ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὑπέστη; εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὑπό τινος: εἰ δὲ ἀίδιος, καὶ ἀρχαὶ πλείους καὶ κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰ πρῶτα. κἂν εἶδος δὲ προσέλθῃ, τὸ σύνθετον ἔσται σῶμα: ὥστε κἀκεῖ σῶμα.
2.4.3πρῶτον οὖν λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἀόριστον ἀτιμαστέον, οὐδὲ ὃ ἂν ἄμορφον ᾖ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπινοίᾳ, εἰ μέλλοι παρέχειν αὑτὸ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις: οἷόν τι καὶ ψυχὴ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ λόγον πέφυκε μορφουμένη παρὰ τούτων καὶ εἰς εἶδος βέλτιον ἀγομένη: ἔν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ σύνθετον ἑτέρως, οὐχ ὡς τὰ σώματα: ἐπεὶ καὶ λόγοι σύνθετοι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ σύνθετον ποιοῦσι τὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς εἶδος φύσιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, καὶ παῤ ἄλλου καὶ μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὕλη ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἴσχει, τῶν δὲ ἀιδίων ἡ αὐτὴ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. τάχα δ’ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ ἐνταῦθα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ παρὰ μέρος πάντα καὶ ἓν ἑκάστοτε. διὸ οὐδὲν ἐμμένει ἄλλου ἄλλο ἐξωθοῦντος: διὸ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, ἐκεῖ δ’ ἅμα πάντα: διὸ οὐκ ἔχει εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ, ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει πάντα. οὐδέποτ̓ οὖν ἄμορφος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἡ ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τρόπον ἑκατέρα. τὸ δὲ εἴτε ἀίδιος, εἴτε γενομένη, ἐπειδὰν ὅ τί ποτ̓ ἐστὶ λάβωμεν, δῆλον ἔσται.
2.4.4ὁ δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὑποθεμένοις τὸ νῦν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη — δέδεικται γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις — προίτω. εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἴδη, κοινὸν μέν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι: καὶ δὴ καὶ ἴδιον, ᾧ διαφέρει ἄλλο ἄλλου. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ χωρίζουσα ἡ οἰκεία ἐστὶ μορφή. εἰ δὲ μορφή, ἔστι καὶ τὸ μορφούμενον, περὶ ὃ ἡ διαφορά. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ὕλη ἡ τὴν μορφὴν δεχομένη καὶ ἀεί τι ὑποκείμενον. ἔτι εἰ κόσμος νοητὸς ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὗτος ἐκείνου, οὗτος δὲ σύνθετος καὶ ἐξ ὕλης, κἀκεῖ δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι. ἢ πῶς προσερεῖς κόσμον μὴ εἰς εἶδος ἰδών; πῶς δὲ εἶδος μὴ ἐφ̓ ᾧ τὸ εἶδος λαβών; ἀμερὲς μὲν γὰρ παντελῶς πάντη αὐτό, μεριστὸν δὲ ὁπωσοῦν. καὶ εἰ μὲν διασπασθέντα ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη, ἡ τομὴ καὶ ἡ διάσπασις ὕλης ἐστὶ πάθος: αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τμηθεῖσα: εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὂν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντα ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ μορφαὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντα: τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο τὸ πολλὰ ὂν νόησον ποικίλον καὶ πολύμορφον. οὐκοῦν ἄμορφον αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ ποικίλον: εἰ γὰρ τῷ νῷ ἀφέλοις τὴν ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ νοήματα, τὸ πρὸ τούτων ἄμορφον καὶ ἀόριστον καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.
2.4.5εἰ δ’ ὅτι ἀεὶ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοῦ, ἓν ἄμφω καὶ οὐχ ὕλη ἐκεῖ, οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα ἔσται τῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄνευ μορφῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ὅλον σῶμα, σύνθετον μὴν ὅμως. καὶ νοῦς εὑρίσκει τὸ διττόν: οὗτος γὰρ διαιρεῖ, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἁπλοῦν ἥκῃ μηκέτι αὐτὸ ἀναλύεσθαι δυνάμενον: ἕως δὲ δύναται, χωρεῖ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ βάθος. τὸ δὲ βάθος ἑκάστου ἡ ὕλη: διὸ καὶ σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, ὅτι τὸ φῶς λόγος καὶ ὁ νοῦς λόγος. διὸ τὸν ἐφ̓ ἑκάστου λόγον ὁρῶν τὸ κάτω ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς σκοτεινὸν ἡγεῖται, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς φωτοειδὴς ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς βαλὼν καὶ χρόας φῶτα ὄντα τὰ ὑπὸ τὰ χρώματα σκοτεινὰ καὶ ὑλικὰ εἶναι λέγει ʽκεκρυμμένα τοῖς χρώμασἰ. διάφορόν γε μὴν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τό τε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τό τε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχει διάφορός τε ἡ ὕλη, ὅσον καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπικείμενον ἀμφοῖν διάφορον: ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία λαβοῦσα τὸ ὡρισμένον αὐτὴ ζωὴν ὡρισμένην καὶ νοερὰν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ὡρισμένον μέν τι γίνεται, οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον. καὶ ἡ μορφὴ δὲ εἴδωλον: ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἴδωλον. ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ μορφὴ ἀληθινόν: ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. διὸ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, εἰ περὶ ἐκείνης ἔλεγον, ὀρθῶς ἔδει ὑπολαμβάνειν λέγειν: τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἐκεῖ οὐσία, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ νοουμένη καὶ ὅλη οὖσα πεφωτισμένη οὐσία. πότερα δὲ ἀίδιος ἡ νοητὴ ὁμοίως ζητητέον, ὡς ἄν τις καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ζητοῖ: γεννητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν,ἀγέννητα δέ, ὅτι μὴ χρόνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παῤ ἄλλου, οὐχ ὡς γινόμενα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐνταῦθα κόσμος, ἀλλὰ ὄντα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐκεῖ κόσμος. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἐκεῖ ἀεί, ἣ τὴν ὕλην ποιεῖ: ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὕλης αὕτη, ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη: διὸ καὶ αὕτη ἑτερότης ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ὁμοῦ ἐξέφυσαν κίνησις καὶ ἑτερότης: ἀόριστον δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, κἀκείνου πρὸς τὸ ὁρισθῆναι δεόμενα: ὁρίζεται δέ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστραφῇ: πρὶν δὲ ἀόριστον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ οὔπω ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἀφώτιστον ἐκείνου. εἰ γὰρ παῤ ἐκείνου τὸ φῶς, τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ φῶς, πρὶν δέξασθαι, φῶς οὐκ ἔχει ἀληθινόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὂν ἔχει, εἴπερ τὸ φῶς παῤ ἄλλου. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὕλης πλείω τῶν προσηκόντων παραγυμνωθέντα ταύτῃ.
2.4.6περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὑποδοχῆς ὧδε λεγέσθω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκείμενον εἶναι ἄλλο ὂν παῤ αὐτά, ἥ τε εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ τῶν στοιχείων δηλοῖ. οὐ γὰρ παντελὴς τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος ἡ φθορά: ἢ ἔσται τις οὐσία εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολλυμένη: οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ παντελῶς μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἐλήλυθεν, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν εἴδους μεταβολὴ ἐξ εἴδους ἑτέρου. μένει δὲ τὸ δεξάμενον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἀποβαλὸν θάτερον. τοῦτό τε οὖν δηλοῖ καὶ ὅλως ἡ φθορά: συνθέτου γάρ: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἕκαστον. ἥ τε ἐπαγωγὴ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον σύνθετον δεικνῦσα: καὶ ἡ ἀνάλυσις δέ: οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη εἰς τὸν χρυσόν, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς εἰς ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δὲ φθειρόμενον τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀπαιτεῖ. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ εἶδος εἶναι ἢ ὕλην πρώτην ἢ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους. ἀλλ’ εἶδος μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε: πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ ὕλης ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ μεγέθει; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη: φθείρεται γάρ. ἐξ ὕλης ἄρα καὶ εἴδους. καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀόριστον, ὅτι μὴ εἶδος.
2.4.7Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν ὕλῃ θέμενος ἀντιμαρτυροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν φθορὰν αὐτῶν. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸ μῖγμα ὕλην ποιῶν, οὐκ ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς πάντα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχειν λέγων ὃν εἰσάγει νοῦν ἀναιρεῖ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος διδόντα ποιῶν οὐδὲ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης ἀλλ’ ἅμα. ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ ἅμα. εἰ γὰρ μετέχει τὸ μῖγμα τοῦ εἶναι, πρότερον τὸ ὄν: εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὂν κἀκεῖνο ἄλλου ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δεήσει τρίτου. εἰ οὖν πρότερον ἀνάγκη τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τί ἔδει τὰ εἴδη κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι, εἶτα τὸν νοῦν διὰ πραγμάτων ἀνηνύτων διακρίνειν ἐξὸν ἀποίου οὔσης τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐκτεῖναι; τό τε πᾶν ἐν παντὶ εἶναι πῶς οὐκ ἀδύνατον; ὁ δὲ τὸ ἅπειρον ὑποθεὶς τί ποτε τοῦτο λεγέτω. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἄπειρον, ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτόν τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὔτε αὐτοάπειρον οὔτε ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ φύσει ὡς συμβεβηκὸς σώματί τινι, τὸ μὲν αὐτοάπειρον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ ὡς συμβεβηκός, ὅτι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν καθ̓ ἑαυτὸ ἄπειρον εἴη οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ὕλη, ἐστὶ δῆλον. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ αἱ ἄτομοι τάξιν ὕλης ἕξουσιν αἱ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ οὖσαι: τμητὸν γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα κατὰ τᾶν: καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ οἷόν τε ἄνευ νοῦ ἕκαστα καὶ ψυχῆς, ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀτόμων εἶναι, ἄλλην τε φύσιν παρὰ τὰς ἀτόμους ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων δημιουργεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τε: ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδεὶς δημιουργὸς ποιήσει τι ἐξ οὐχ ὕλης συνεχοῦς. καὶ μυρία ἂν λέγοιτο πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ εἴρηται: διὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν περιττὸν ἐν τούτοις.
2.4.8τίς οὖν ἡ μία αὕτη καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ἄποιος λεγομένη; καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, εἴπερ ἄποιος, δῆλον: ἢ ποιότητα ἕξει. λέγοντες δὲ πάντων αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὐ τινῶν μὲν ὕλην, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ εἶδος οὖσαν: οἷον τὸν πηλὸν ὕλην τῷ κεραμεύοντι, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐχ ὕλην: οὐ δὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα λέγοντες, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ προσάπτοιμεν, ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁρᾶται. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις ποιότησιν, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ θερμότησι καὶ ψυχρότησιν, οὐδὲ τὸ κοῦφον οὐδὲ τὸ βάρος, οὐ πυκνόν, οὐχ ἁραιόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ σχῆμα. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος: ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ μεγέθει, ἄλλο τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τὸ σχήματι, ἄλλο τὸ ἐσχηματισμένῳ. δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἕν τι τῇ αὑτῆς φύσει: οὕτω γὰρ πάντων ἔρημος. καὶ ὁ μορφὴν διδοὺς δώσει ἄλλην οὖσαν παῤ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ πάντα ἐκ τῶν ὄντων οἷον προσφέρων: ἢ δουλεύσει τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς καὶ ποιήσει οὐχ ἡλίκον θέλει, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἡ ὕλη βούλεται: τὸ δὲ συντροχάζειν τὴν βούλησιν τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς πλασματῶδες. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης τὸ ποιοῦν, ταύτῃ ἔσται ἡ ὕλη πάντη, ᾗ τὸ ποιοῦν θέλει, καὶ εὐάγωγος εἰς ἅπαντα: καὶ εἰς μέγεθος τοίνυν. μέγεθος δὲ εἰ ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν: ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον δύσεργος ἔσται. ἔπεισι τοίνυν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῇ πάντα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ φέρον: τὸ δὲ εἶδος πᾶν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν ἑκάστων μετὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὥρισται: ἄλλο γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἄλλο ὄρνιθος καὶ ὄρνιθος τοιουτουί. οὐ θαυμαστότερον δὲ τὸ ποσὸν τῇ ὕλῃ ἄλλο ἐπάγειν τοῦ ποιὸν αὐτῇ προστιθέναι, οὐδὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν λόγος, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ εἶδος καὶ μέτρον καὶ ἀριθμὸς ὄν.
2.4.9πῶς οὖν τις λήψεταί τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ μὴ μέγεθος ἔχει; ἢ πᾶν ὅπερ μὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ ποσῷ: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ταὐτόν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἕτερα τοῦ ποσοῦ. ὅλως δὲ πᾶσαν ἀσώματον φύσιν ἄποσον θετέον: ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ποσότης αὐτὴ οὐ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετασχὸν αὐτῆς: ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ποσότης. ὡς οὖν ἐγίνετό τι λευκὸν παρουσίᾳ λευκότητος, τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ χρώματα ποικίλα οὐκ ἦν ποικίλον χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ ποικίλος, εἰ βούλει, λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ τηλικόνδε οὐ τηλικόνδε, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πηλίκον ἢ ἡ πηλικότης ἢ ὁ λόγος τὸ ποιοῦν. προσελθοῦσα οὖν ἡ πηλικότης ἐξελίττει εἰς μέγεθος τὴν ὕλην; οὐδαμῶς: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ συνεσπείρατο: ἀλλ’ ἔδωκε μέγεθος τὸ οὐ πρότερον ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότητα τὴν οὐ πρότερον οὖσαν.
2.4.10τί οὖν νοήσω ἀμέγεθες ἐν ὕλῃ; τί δὲ νοήσεις ἄποιον ὁπωσοῦν; καὶ τίς ἡ νόησις καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ ἐπιβολή; ἢ ἀοριστία: εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, καὶ τῷ ἀορίστῳ τὸ ἀόριστον. λόγος μὲν οὖν γένοιτο ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου ὡρισμένος, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιβολὴ ἀόριστος. εἰ δ’ ἕκαστον λόγῳ καὶ νοήσει γινώσκεται — ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ μὲν λόγος λέγει, ἃ δὴ λέγει περὶ αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ βουλομένη εἶναι νόησις οὐ νόησις, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἄνοια μᾶλλον — νόθον ἂν εἴη τὸ φάντασμα αὐτῆς καὶ οὐ γνήσιον, ἐκ θατέρου οὐκ ἀληθοῦς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θατέρου λόγου συγκείμενον. καὶ τάχα εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁ Πλάτων νόθῳ λογισμῷ εἶπε ληπτὴν εἶναι. τίς οὖν ἡ ἀοριστία τῆς ψυχῆς; ἆρα παντελὴς ἄγνοια ὡς ἀπουσία; ἢ ἐν καταφάσει τινὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, καὶ οἷον ὀφθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος ὕλη ὂν παντὸς ἀοράτου χρώματος, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οἷον φῶς τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι ὁμοιοῦται τῇ ὄψει τῇ ἐν σκότῳ ταὐτόν πως γινομένῃ τότε τῷ ὃ οἷον ὁρᾷ. ἆῤ οὖν ὁρᾷ; ἢ οὕτως ὡς ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ ὡς ἄχροιαν καὶ ὡς ἀλαμπὲς καὶ προσέτι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος: εἰ δὲ μή, εἰδοποιήσει ἤδη. ὅταν οὖν μηδὲν νοῇ, οὐ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ψυχὴν πάθος; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν μὲν μηδὲν νοῇ, λέγει μηδέν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσχει οὐδέν: ὅταν δὲ τὴν ὕλην, οὕτω πάσχει πάθος οἷον τύπον τοῦ ἀμόρφου: ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεμορφωμένα καὶ τὰ μεμεγεθυσμένα νοῇ, ὡς σύνθετα νοεῖ: ὡς γὰρ κεχρωσμένα καὶ ὅλως πεποιωμένα. τὸ ὅλον οὖν νοεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω: καὶ ἐναργὴς μὲν ἡ νόησις ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν ἐπόντων, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τοῦ ἀμόρφου: οὐ γὰρ εἶδος. ὃ οὖν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ συνθέτῳ λαμβάνει μετὰ τῶν ἐπόντων ἀναλύσασα ἐκεῖνα καὶ χωρίσασα, ὃ καταλείπει ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο νοεῖ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινὸν καὶ νοεῖ οὐ νοοῦσα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔμεινεν οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη ἄμορφος, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασίν ἐστι μεμορφωμένη, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εὐθέως ἐπέβαλε τὸ εἶδος τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῇ ἀλγοῦσα τῷ ἀορίστῳ, οἷον φόβῳ τοῦ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχομένη ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐπιπολὺ ἑστάναι.
2.4.11καὶ ἔτι δεῖ τινος ἄλλου πρὸς σύστασιν σωμάτων μετὰ μέγεθος καὶ ποιότητας ἁπάσας; ἢ τοῦ ὑποδεξομένου πάντα. οὐκοῦν ὄγκου; εἰ δὲ ὄγκος, μέγεθος δήπου: εἰ δὲ ἀμέγεθες, οὐδ’ ὅπου δέξεται ἔχει. ἀμέγεθες δὲ ὂν τί ἂν συμβάλλοιτο, εἰ μήτε εἰς εἶδος καὶ τὸ ποιὸν μήτε εἰς τὴν διάστασιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ὃ δὴ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης δοκεῖ, ὅπου ἂν ᾖ, ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὰ σώματα; ὅλως δὲ ὥσπερ πράξεις καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ χρόνοι καὶ κινήσεις ὑποβολὴν ὕλης ἐν αὑτοῖς οὐκ ἔχοντα ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα ἀνάγκη ὕλην ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ὅλα ἕκαστα εἶναι ἅ ἐστι ποικιλώτερα ὄντα μίξει τῇ ἐκ πλειόνων εἰδῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχοντα: ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ ἀμέγεθες ὕλης ὄνομα κενὸν εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὑποδεχόμενον ὁτιοῦν: ὄγκον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ μέγεθος ἤδη αὐτῷ παρῇ: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα δεχομένη ὁμοῦ ἔχει πάντα: εἰ δὲ μέγεθος αὐτῇ συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, ἔσχεν ἂν ἕκαστα ἐν μεγέθει. ἡ δὲ ὕλη διὰ τοῦτο ἐν διαστήματι ἃ δέχεται λαμβάνει, ὅτι διαστήματός ἐστι δεκτική: ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μετὰ τοῦ μεγεθύνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἀντιπαραγόμενον ἴσχει τῷ ποσῷ καὶ συστελλομένου συσταλείη ἄν. εἰ δ’ ὅτι προυπάρχει τι μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑποκείμενον τῷ μορφοῦντι, κἀκεῖ ἀπαιτεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ ἡ τούτου: τὴν δ’ ἁπλῶς δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παῤ ἄλλου ἔχειν. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ὄγκον εἶναι τὸ δεξόμενον τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ τῷ γενέσθαι ὄγκον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποιότητα δέχεσθαι καὶ φάντασμα μὲν ἔχειν ὄγκου εἰς ἐπιτηδειότητα τούτου ὥσπερ πρώτην, κενὸν δὲ ὄγκον. ὅθεν τινὲς ταὐτὸν τῷ κενῷ τὴν ὕλην εἰρήκασι. φάντασμα δὲ ὄγκου λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι, ὅταν τῇ ὕλῃ προσομιλῇ, εἰς ἀοριστίαν χεῖ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε περιγράφουσα οὔτε εἰς σημεῖον ἰέναι δυναμένη: ἤδη γὰρ ὁρίζει. διὸ οὔτε μέγα λεκτέον χωρὶς οὔτε σμικρὸν αὖ, ἀλλὰ μέγα καὶ σμικρόν: καὶ οὕτως ὄγκος καὶ ἀμέγεθες οὕτως, ὅτι ὕλη ὄγκου καὶ συστελλόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέγα οἷον ὄγκον διατρέχει: καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία αὐτῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄγκος, ὑποδοχὴ μεγέθους ἐν αὐτῇ: ἐν δὲ φαντασίᾳ ἐκείνως. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀμεγέθων ὅσα εἴδη ὥρισται ἕκαστον: ὥστε οὐδαμῇ ἔννοια ὄγκου: ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος οὖσα καὶ μήπω στᾶσα παῤ αὑτῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶδος φερομένη δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε καὶ πάντη εὐάγωγος οὖσα πολλή τε γίνεται τῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀγωγῇ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἔσχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φύσιν ὄγκου.
2.4.12συμβάλλεται οὖν τὰ μεγέθη τοῖς σώμασι: τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν σωμάτων ἐν μεγέθεσι. περὶ δὲ μέγεθος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἢ περὶ τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένον: εἰ γὰρ περὶ μέγεθος, οὐ περὶ ὕλην, ὁμοίως ἂν ἀμεγέθη καὶ ἀνυπόστατα ἦν ἢ λόγοι μόνοι ἂν ἦσαν — οὗτοι δὲ περὶ ψυχήν — καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σώματα. δεῖ οὖν ἐνταῦθα περὶ ἕν τι τὰ πολλά: τοῦτο δὲ μεμεγεθυσμένον: τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὅσα μίγνυται τῷ ὕλην ἔχειν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔρχεται καὶ οὐ δεῖται ἄλλου του περὶ ὅ, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν μιγνυμένων ἥκει φέρον τὴν αὑτοῦ ὕλην. δεῖται δ’ ὅμως καὶ ἑνός τινος τοῦ δεξομένου ἢ ἀγγείου ἢ τόπου: ὁ δὲ τόπος ὕστερος τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν δέοιτο τὰ σώματα ὕλης. οὐδέ, ὅτι αἱ ποιήσεις καὶ αἱ πράξεις ἄυλοι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σώματα: σύνθετα γὰρ τὰ σώματα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις οὔ. καὶ τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ ὕλη ὅταν πράττωσι τὸ ὑποκείμενον δίδωσι μένουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς δὲ τὸ πράττειν οὐχ αὑτὴν δίδωσιν: οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ πράττοντες τοῦτο ζητοῦσι. καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἄλλη πρᾶξις εἰς ἄλλην, ἵνα ἂν ἦν καὶ αὐταῖς ὕλη, ἀλλ’ ὁ πράττων ἐπ’ ἄλλην μεταβάλλει πρᾶξιν ἐξ ἄλλης: ὥστε ὕλην αὐτὸν εἶναι ταῖς πράξεσιν. ἔστι τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τῇ ποιότητι καὶ τῷ μεγέθει: ὥστε καὶ τοῖς σώμασι: καὶ οὐ κενὸν ὄνομα, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι ὑποκείμενον κἂν ἀόρατον κἂν ἀμέγεθες ὑπάρχῃ. ἢ οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰς ποιότητας φήσομεν οὐδὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγοιτο ἂν οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον λαμβανόμενον. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔστι καίπερ ἀμυδρῶς ὂν ἕκαστον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὕλη, κἂν μὴ ἐναργὴς ὑπάρχῃ αἱρετὴ οὖσα οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: οὔτε γὰρ ὄμμασιν, ἄχρους γάρ: οὔτε ἀκοῇ, οὐ γὰρ ψόφος: οὐδεὲ χυμοί, διὸ οὐδὲ ῥῖνες οὐδὲ γλῶσσα αἱροῦσιν. ἆῤ οὖν ἁφῇ; ἢ οὔ, ὅτι μηδὲ σῶμα: σώματος γὰρ ἡ ἁφή, ὅτι ἢ πυκνοῦ ἢ ἁραιοῦ, μαλακοῦ σκληροῦ, ὑγροῦ ξηροῦ: τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλην: ἀλλὰ λογισμῷ οὐκ ἐκ νοῦ, ἀλλὰ κενῷ: διὸ καὶ νόθος, ὡς εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ σωματότης περὶ αὐτήν: εἰ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ σωματότης, ἕτερος αὐτῆς: αὕτη οὖν ἄλλο: εἰ δ’ ἤδη ποιήσασα καὶ οἷον κραθεῖσα, σῶμα φανερῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐχ ὕλη μόνον.
2.4.13εἰ δὲ ποιότης τὸ ὑποκείμενον κοινή τις οὖσα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν στοιχείων, πρῶτον μὲν τίς αὕτη λεκτέον. ἔπειτα πῶς ποιότης ὑποκείμενον ἔσται; πῶς δὲ ἐν ἀμεγέθει ποιὸν θεωρηθήσεται μὴ ἔχον ὕλην μηδὲ μέγεθος; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν ὡρισμένη ἡ ποιότης, πῶς ὕλη; εἰ δ’ ἀόριστόν τι, οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ ζητουμένη ὕλη. τί οὖν κωλύει ἄποιον μὲν εἶναι τῷ τῶν ἄλλων μηδεμιᾶς τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει μετέχειν, αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ μηδεμιᾶς μετέχειν ποιὰν εἶναι ἰδιότητα πάντως τινὰ ἔχουσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσαν, οἷον στέρησίν τινα ἐκείνων; καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐστερημένος ποιός: οἷον ὁ τυφλός. εἰ οὖν στέρησις τούτων περὶ αὐτήν, πῶς οὐ ποιά; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅλως στέρησις περὶ αὐτήν, ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἴ γε δὴ καὶ στέρησις ποιόν τι. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα λέγων τί ἄλλο ἢ ποιὰ καὶ ποιότητας πάντα ποιεῖ; ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποσότης ποιότης ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ οὐσία δέ. εἰ δὲ ποιόν, πρόσεστι ποιότης. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ μὴ ποιὸν ποιὸν ποιεῖν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἕτερον, ποιόν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοετερότης, οὐδ’ ὣς ποιόν: ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἡ ποιότης ποιά: εἰ δ’ ἕτερον μόνον, οὐχ ἑαυτῇ, ἀλλ’ ἑτερότητι ἕτερον καὶ ταυτότητι ταὐτόν. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιόν, ἀλλ’ ἐρημία ποιότητος ἢ ἄλλου, ὡς ἡ ἀψοφία ψόφου ἢ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου: ἄρσις γὰρ ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἐν καταφάσει. ἥ τε ἰδιότης τῆς ὕλης οὐ μορφή: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ποιὰ εἶναι μηδ’ εἶδός τι ἔχειν: ἄτοπον δή, ὅτι μὴ ποιά, ποιὰν λέγειν καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ, ὅτι ἀμέγεθες, αὐτῷ τούτῳ μέγεθος ἔχειν. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἰδιότης αὐτῆς οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ οὐ πρόσκειται ἡ ἰδιότης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτῶν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐ μόνον ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ καί τι ἕκαστον ὡς εἶδος, αὕτη δὲ πρεπόντως ἂν λέγοιτο μόνον ἄλλο: τάχα δὲ ἄλλα, ἵνα μὴ τῷ ἄλλο ἑνικῶς ὁρίσῃς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλα τὸ ἀόριστον ἐνδείξῃ
2.4.14ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον, πότερα στέρησις, ἢ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ στέρησις. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἓν ἄμφω, λόγῳ δὲ δύο, δίκαιος ἦν διδάσκειν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἑκατέρου ὅντινα δεῖ ἀποδιδόναι, τῆς μὲν ὕλης ὃς ὁριεῖται αὐτὴν οὐδὲν προσαπτόμενος τῆς στερήσεως, τῆς τε αὖ στερήσεως ὡσαύτως. ἢ γὰρ οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἢ θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ μόνον ὁποτερονοῦν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερον χωρὶς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιζητεῖ οὐδέτερον, δύο ἔσται ἄμφω καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕτερον στερήσεως, κἂν συμβεβήκῃ αὐτῇ ἡ στέρησις. δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ δυνάμει ἐνορᾶσθαι θάτερον. εἰ δ’ ὡς ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ καὶ τὸ σιμόν, καὶ οὕτω διπλοῦν ἑκάτερον καὶ δύο. εἰ δὲ ὡς τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ θερμότης, ἐν μὲν τῷ πυρὶ τῆς θερμότητος οὔσης, ἐν δὲ τῇ θερμότητι οὐ λαμβανομένου τοῦ πυρός, καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὕτω στέρησις, ὡς τὸ πῦρ θερμόν, οἷον εἶδος αὐτῆς ἔσται ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο, ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι. καὶ οὐδ’ οὕτως ἕν. ἆρα οὖν οὕτως ἓν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, δύο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τῆς στερήσεως οὐ σημαινούσης τι παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ οἷον ἀπόφασις ἡ στέρησις τῶν ὄντων: ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι οὐκ ὄν, οὐ γὰρ προστίθησιν ἡ ἀπόφασις, ἀλλά φησιν οὐκ εἶναι: καὶ οὕτω στέρησις ὡς οὐκ ὄν; εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν, ὅτι μὴ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὄν τι, ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι, ὁ μὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἁπτόμενος, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα σχέσιν δηλῶν. ἢ ὁ μὲν τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὁ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως εἰ τὸ ἀόριστον αὐτῆς δηλοῖ, τάχα ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῆς ἐφάπτοιτο: πλὴν ἕν γε ἑκατέρως τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, λόγῳ δὲ δύο. εἰ μέντοι τῷ ἀορίστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀποίῳ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ταὐτόν, πῶς ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι;
2.4.15πάλιν οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἐπ ʼ ἄλλῃ φύσει καὶ πῶς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰ στέρησις συμβέβηκεν. εἰ δὴ ὅσα μὲν ἀριθμοὶ καὶ λόγοι ἀπειρίας ἔξω — ὅροι γὰρ καὶ τάξεις καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρὰ τούτων, τάττει δὲ ταῦτα οὐ τὸ τεταγμένον οὐδὲ τάξις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τὸ ταττόμενον παρὰ τὸ τάττον, τάττει δὲ τὸ πέρας καὶ ὅρος καὶ λόγος — ἀνάγκη τὸ ταττόμενον καὶ ὁριζόμενον τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι. τάττεται δὲ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὅσα δὲ μὴ ὕλη τῷ μετέχειν ἢ ὕλης λόγον ἔχειν: ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὴν ὕλην τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρον, ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῇ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμβαῖνόν τῳ δεῖ λόγον εἶναι: τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐ λόγος: ἔπειτα τίνι ὄντι τὸ ἄπειρον συμβήσεται; πέρατι καὶ πεπερασμένῳ. ἀλλ’ οὐ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ πέρας ἡ ὕλη. καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον δὲ προσελθὸν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν: οὐ τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἄπειρον: αὐτὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ εἴη ἂν γεννηθὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπειρίας ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ἀεί, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; ἢ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. καὶ τί διαφέρει; ὡς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ εἴδωλον. ἐλαττόνως οὖν ἄπειρον τοῦτο; ἢ μᾶλλον: ὅσῳ γὰρ εἴδωλον πεφευγὸς τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία ἐν τῷ ἧττον ὁρισθέντι μᾶλλον: τὸ γὰρ ἧττον ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ κακῷ. τὸ ἐκεῖ οὖν μᾶλλον ὂν εἴδωλόν πως ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἧττον ὄν, ὅσῳ πέφευγε τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές, εἰς δὲ εἰδώλου κατερρύη φύσιν, ἀληθεστέρως ἄπειρον. τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι; ἢ ὅπου λόγος καὶ ὕλη ἄλλο ἑκάτερον, ὅπου δὲ ὕλη μόνον ἢ ταὐτὸν λεκτέον ἢ ὅλως, ὃ καὶ βέλτιον, οὐκ εἶναι ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι: λόγος γὰρ ἔσται, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, ἵν’ ᾖ ἄπειρον. ἄπειρον μὲν δὴ παῤ αὑτῆς τὴν ὕλην λεκτέον ἀντιτάξει τῇ πρὸς τὸν λόγον. καὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὤν ἐστι λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀντιτεταγμένην τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσαν λεκτέον ἄπειρον.
2.4.16ἆῤ οὖν καὶ ἑτερότητι ταὐτόν; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μορίῳ ἑτερότητος ἀντιταττομένῳ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα κυρίως, ἃ δὴ λόγοι. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὕτως τι ὂν καὶ στερήσει ταὐτόν, εἰ ἡ στέρησις ἀντίθεσις πρὸς τὰ ἐν λόγῳ ὄντα. οὔκουν φθαρήσεται ἡ στέρησις προσελθόντος τοῦ οὗ στέρησις; οὐδαμῶς: ὑποδοχὴ γὰρ ἕξεως οὐχ ἕξις, ἀλλὰ στέρησις, καὶ πέρατος οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καθ̓ ὅσον ἄπειρον. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν προσελθὸν τὸ πέρας καὶ ταῦτα οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀπείρου; ἢ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἄπειρον, ἀνῄρει ἄν: νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σώζει αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ εἶναι: ὃ γὰρ πέφυκεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ τελείωσιν ἄγει, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄσπαρτον, ὅταν σπείρηται: καὶ ὅταν τὸ θῆλυ ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος κυῇ, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θηλύνεται: τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ ἔστι μᾶλλον γίνεται. ἆῤ οὖν καὶ κακὸν ἡ ὕλη μεταλαμβάνουσα ἀγαθοῦ; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐδεήθη: οὐ γὰρ εἶχε. καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν ἂν δέηταί τινος, τὸ δ’ ἔχῃ, μέσον ἂν ἴσως γίνοιτο ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, εἰ ἰσάζοι πως ἐπ’ ἄμφω: ὃ δ’ ἂν μηδὲν ἔχῃ ἅτε ἐν πενίᾳ ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ πενία ὄν, ἀνάγκη κακὸν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ πλούτου πενία τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἰσχύος, ἀλλὰ πενία μὲν φρονήσεως, πενία δὲ ἀρετῆς, κάλλους, μορφῆς, εἴδους, ποιοῦ. πῶς οὖν οὐ δυσειδές; πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη αἰσχρόν; πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη κακόν; ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἐκεῖ ὄν: τὸ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐπέκεινα ὄντος. ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὄν. οὐκ ὂν ἄρα αὐτὴ ἕτερον ὂν πρὸς τῷ καλῷ τοῦ ὄντος.
2.5.1Λέγεται τὸ μὲν δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι: λέγεται δέ τι καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. σκεπτέον οὖν τί τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τί τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ ἕτερον ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι; ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει, δῆλον: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς, σκεπτέον, ἢ εἰ ἐκεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον: καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἀεί, κἂν ἀεί, εἰ οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι εἰς ἐνέργειαν τῷ τὸν χρόνον ἐξείργεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει πρῶτον λεκτέον, εἰ δὴ τὸ δυνάμει δεῖ μὴ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει μηδενὸς εἶναι. οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός: εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ μηδ’ ἔμελλε μηδὲν ἔσεσθαι μεθ̓ ὃ ἦν μηδ’ ἐνεδέχετό τι γενέσθαι, ἦν ἂν ὃ ἦν μόνον. ὃ δὲ ἦν ἤδη παρῆν καὶ οὐκ ἔμελλε: τί οὖν ἠδύνατο ἄλλο μετὰ τὸ παρὸν αὐτό; οὐ τοίνυν ἦν ἂν δυνάμει. δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ δυνάμει τι ὂν ἄλλο ἤδη τῷ τι καὶ ἄλλο μεθ̓ αὑτὸ δύνασθαι, ἤτοι μένον μετὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖν ἢ παρέχον αὑτὸ ἐκείνῳ ὃ δύναται φθαρὲν αὐτό, δυνάμει λέγεσθαι: ἄλλως γὰρ δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός, ἄλλως τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ πῦρ. τοιοῦτον δὴ ὂν τὸ δυνάμει ἆρα καὶ δύναμις λέγοιτο ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἐσόμενον, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς δύναμις τοῦ ἀνδριάντος; ἤ, εἰ μὲν ἡ δύναμις κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβάνοιτο, οὐδαμῶς: οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβανομένη λέγοιτο ἂν δυνάμει. εἰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν, εἴη ἂν καὶ δύναμις τὸ δυνάμει. βέλτιον δὲ καὶ σαφέστερον τὸ μὲν δυνάμει πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν λέγειν. τὸ μὲν δὴ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ ὑποκείμενόν τι πάθεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ εἴδεσιν, ἃ μέλλει δέχεσθαι καὶ πέφυκεν ἢ καὶ σπεύδει ἑλεῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω καὶ λυμαντικὰ αὐτῶν, ὧν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ἄλλο.
2.5.2περὶ δὲ τῆς ὕλης σκεπτέον, εἰ ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ πρὸς ἃ μορφοῦται, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ὅλως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ λέγομεν δυνάμει λαβόντα τὸ εἶδος καὶ μένοντα αὐτὰ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεται, ἢ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος λεχθήσεται ἀντιτιθεμένου μόνον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ κατηγορουμένου κατ’ ἐκείνου, καθ̓ οὗ τὸ δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ἐλέγετο. εἰ δὴ οὕτως, οὐ τὸ δυνάμει γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος πρότερον ἐγένετο τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὕστερον. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη: τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ. καὶ τοῦτο μέν, εἰ ἑτέρα γίγνοιτο οὐσία, οἷον ἐκ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάς. ἄλλη γὰρ οὐσία ὡς τὸ συναμφότερον ὁ ἀνδριάς: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅλως οὐ μενόντων φανερόν, ὡς τὸ δυνάμει παντάπασιν ἕτερον ἦν: ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὁ δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται, ἐνταῦθα τὸ δυνάμει πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό; ὁ γὰρ δυνάμει Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ σοφός. ἆρα οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ἐπιστήμων; δυνάμει γὰρ ἦν ἐπιστήμων. ἢ ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀμαθὴς ἐπιστήμων; οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἀμαθὴς δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων, ἀλλὰ συμβεβήκει αὐτῷ ἀμαθεῖ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καθ̓ ἑαυτὴν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσα τὸ δυνάμει ἦν ᾗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων. ἔτι οὖν σώζει τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ὁ δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἤδη γραμματικὸς ὤν. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον: ἐκεῖ μὲν δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐχούσης τὸ εἶδος. εἰ οὖν ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ συναμφότερον, ὁ ἀνδριάς, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τί ἂν λέγοιτο; ἢ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καθ̓ ἣν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μόνον δυνάμει, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος λέγειν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλην ἐνέργειαν τάχα κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιμεν, τὴν ἀντίθετον τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ἐπαγούσῃ ἐνέργειαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχει παῤ ἄλλου, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ὃ δύναται παῤ αὐτῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια: οἷον ἕξις καὶ ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν λεγομένη ἐνέργεια, ἀνδρεία καὶ τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν μὲν οὖν οὕτως.
2.5.3οὗ δ’ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προείρηται, νῦν λεκτέον, ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς πῶς ποτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται καὶ εἰ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον ἢ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον καὶ πάντα καὶ εἰ τὸ δυνάμει κἀκεῖ. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὕλη ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾗ τὸ δυνάμει, μήτε τι μέλλει τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὃ μὴ ἤδη ἔστι, μηδέ τι μεταβάλλον εἰς ἄλλο ἢ μένον ἕτερόν τι γεννᾷ ἢ ἐξιστάμενον ἑαυτοῦ ἔδωκεν ἄλλῳ ἀνθ̓ αὑτοῦ εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι πάντα ὄντως, τῶν ὄντων καὶ αἰῶνα, οὐ χρόνον ἐχόντων. εἴ τις οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν τοὺς τιθεμένους κἀκεῖ ὕλην ἔροιτο, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἐκεῖ — καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλ’ ἔσται ἐφ̓ ἑκάστου τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος, τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον — τί ἐροῦσιν; ἢ καὶ τὸ ὡς ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος ὂν πρὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη ὕλη. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ δυνάμει; ἢ οὔ: εἶδος γὰρ ἦν αὐτῆς καὶ οὐκ εἰς ὕστερον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὐ χωρίζεται δὲ ἀλλ’ ἢ λόγῳ, καὶ οὕτως ὕλην ἔχον, ὡς διπλοῦν νοούμενον, ἄμφω δὲ μία φύσις: οἷον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα ἄυλον εἶναι. περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς πῶς ἐροῦμεν; δυνάμει γὰρ ζῷον, ὅταν μήπω, μέλλῃ δέ, καὶ μουσικὴ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα γίνεται οὐκ ἀεὶ οὖσα: ὥστε καὶ ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει. ἢ οὐ δυνάμει ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ δύναμις ἡ ψυχὴ τούτων. τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ πῶς ἐκεῖ; ἆρα ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀπείληφεν; ἢ ὅτι εἶδος ἕκαστον καὶ τέλειον ὃ ἔστι. νοῦς γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ οἷόν τε νοεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοεῖν — ἄλλου γὰρ ἂν προτέρου τοῦ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως δέοιτο — ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν. τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει βούλεται ἑτέρου ἐπελθόντος εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγεσθαι, ἵνα ἐνεργείᾳ γίγνηταί τι, ὃ δ’ αὐτὸ παῤ αὑτοῦ τὸ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη. πάντα οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργείᾳ: ἔχει γὰρ ἃ δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ παῤ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀεί: καὶ ψυχὴ δὴ οὕτως ἡ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ. καὶ ἡ ἐν ὕλῃ δὲ ἄλλη ἐνεργείᾳ: οἷον ἡ φυτική: ἐνεργείᾳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη ὃ ἔστιν. ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν πάντα, καὶ οὕτως ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα; ἢ πῶς; εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἄγρυπνος εἶναι καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ ἀρίστη, αἱ κάλλισται ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ ἐνέργειαι. καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωαὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθῶς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ.
2.5.4τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα δυνάμει τί ἐστιν, ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἤδη ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει εἶναι λέγεται: περὶ δὲ τῆς λεγομένης εἶναι ὕλης, ἣν πάντα δυνάμει λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα, πῶς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι; ἢ γὰρ οὐ πάντα τὰ ὄντα δυνάμει ἂν εἴη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων, ἀνάγκη μηδ’ ὂν αὐτὴν εἶναι. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ τι εἴη μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων οὖσα; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τούτων, ἃ γίνεται ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, ἄλλο δέ τι οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι, εἴπερ μηδὲ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ. εἰ μὲν δὴ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ, ταῦτα δὲ ὄντα, μὴ ὂν ἂν εἴη. οὐ μὲν δὴ ἀνείδεόν τι φανταζομένη εἶδος ἂν εἴη; οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ’ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἂν ἀριθμηθείη. μὴ ὂν ἄρα καὶ ταύτῃ ἔσται. ἐπ’ ἄμφω ἄρα μὴ ὂν οὖσα καὶ πλειόνως μὴ ὂν ἔσται. εἰ δὴ πέφευγε μὲν τὴν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων φύσιν, οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐφικέσθαι οὐδὲ τῶν ψευδῶς λεγομένων εἶναι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἴνδαλμα λόγου ἐστὶν ὡς ταῦτα, ἐν τίνι τῷ εἶναι ἂν ἁλοίη; εἰ δὲ ἐν μηδενὶ τῷ εἶναι, τί ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴη;
2.5.5πῶς οὖν λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς; πῶς δὲ τῶν ὄντων ὕλη; ἢ ὅτι δυνάμει. οὔκουν, ὅτι δυνάμει, ἤδη ἔστι καθὸ μέλλει, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελλόμενον: οἷον τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀναβάλλεται, ὃ ἔσται. τὸ τοίνυν δυνάμει οὔ τι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει πάντα: μηδὲν δὲ ὂν καθ̓ αὑτό, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἔστιν ὕλη ὄν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐχ ὕλη ἔσται: οὐ πάντη οὖν ὕλη, ἀλλὰ οἷον ὁ χαλκός. εἴη ἂν οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος, οἷον κίνησις: αὕτη γὰρ καὶ ἐποχεῖται τῷ ὄντι οἷον ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα, ἡ δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐκριφεῖσα καὶ πάντη χωρισθεῖσα καὶ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτὴν οὐ δυναμένη, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν: μὴ ὂν δὲ ἦν: οὕτως ἀεὶ ἔχουσα. οὔτε δὲ ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνεργείᾳ τι ἀποστᾶσα πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὔτε ἐγένετο: ἃ γὰρ ὑποδῦναι ἠθέλησεν, οὐδὲ χρωσθῆναι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δεδύνηται, ἀλλὰ μένουσα πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει οὖσα πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τῶν δ’ ὄντων ἤδη παυσαμένων ἐκείνων φανεῖσα ὑπό τε τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν γενομένων καταληφθεῖσα ἔσχατον καὶ τούτων κατέστη. ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν καταληφθεῖσα ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὐδετέρων ἂν εἴη, δυνάμει δὲ μόνον ἐγκαταλέλειπται εἶναι ἀσθενές τι καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἴδωλον μορφοῦσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον. οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴδωλον: οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀληθινῶς ψεῦδος: τοῦτο δὲ ὄντως μὴ ὄν. εἰ οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ ὄν, μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὄντως ἄρα μὴ ὄν. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι. εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκβεβηκὸς τοῦ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἔχῃ τὸ εἶναι, ἐπείπερ τοῖς ψευδῶς οὖσιν, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν, ἀφεῖλες αὐτῶν ἥντινα εἶχον οὐσίαν, καὶ τοῖς δυνάμει τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν εἰσαγαγὼν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀπολώλεκας τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἐν δυνάμει ἦν. εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνώλεθρον τὴν ὕλην τηρεῖν, ὕλην αὐτὴν δεῖ τηρεῖν: δεῖ ἄρα δυνάμει, ὡς ἔοικεν,εἶναι λέγειν μόνον, ἵνα ᾖ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐξελεγκτέον.
2.6.1Ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἕτερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὂν ἀπηρημωμένον τῶν ἄλλων, ἡ δὲ οὐσία τὸ ὂν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, κινήσεως, στάσεως, ταὐτοῦ, ἑτέρου, καὶ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα ἐκείνης; τὸ οὖν ὅλον οὐσία, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐκείνων τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τι. κίνησις μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν: οὐσία δὴ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ἢ συμπληρωτικὸν οὐσίας; ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ οὐσία καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ πάντα οὐσία. πῶς οὖν οὐ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; ἢ ἐκεῖ, ὅτι ἓν πάντα, ἐνθάδε δὲ διαληφθέντων τῶν εἰδώλων τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο: ὥσπερ ἐν μὲν τῷ σπέρματι ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον πάντα καὶ οὐ χεὶρ χωρὶς καὶ χωρὶς κεφαλή, ἐνθάδε δὲ χωρίζεται ἀλλήλων: εἴδωλα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τὰς οὖν ποιότητας ἐκεῖ φήσομεν οὐσίας διαφορὰς περὶ οὐσίαν οὔσας ἢ περὶ ὄν, διαφορὰς δὲ ποιούσας ἑτέρας οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ ὅλως οὐσίας; ἢ οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν τῇδε ποιοτήτων, ὧν αἱ μὲν διαφοραὶ οὐσιῶν, ὡς τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ τετράπουν, αἱ δὲ οὐ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον ποιότητες λέγονται. καίτοι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ διαφορὰ γίνεται συμπληροῦσα καὶ οὐ διαφορὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν, σημβεβηκὸς δέ: οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν μὲν κύκνῳ ἢ ψιμμυθίῳ συμπληροῦν, ἐν δὲ σοὶ συμβεβηκός. ἢ τὸ λευκὸν τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμπληροῦν καὶ οὐ ποιότης, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ποιόν. ἢ διαιρετέον τὸ ποιόν, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσιῶδες ἰδιότης τις οὖσα τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ μόνον ποιόν, καθ̓ ὃ ποιὰ οὐσία, τοῦ ποιοῦ οὐ διαλλαγὴν εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ποιοῦντος οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ οὔσης ἤδη καὶ πεπληρωμένης διάθεσίν τινα ἔξωθεν ποιοῦντος καὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος προσθήκην, εἴτε περὶ ψυχὴν εἴτε περὶ σῶμα γίνοιτο. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμμυθίου συμπληρωτικὸν εἴη αὐτοῦ; ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κύκνου οὐ συμπληρωτικόν: γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐ λευκός: ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμμυθίου. καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς δὲ ἡ θερμότης. ἀλλ’ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν πυρότητα τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμμυθίου τὸ ἀνάλογον; ἀλλ’ ὅμως τοῦ ὁρωμένου πυρὸς πυρότης ἢ θερμότης συμπληροῦσα καὶ ἡ λευκότης ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. αἱ αὐταὶ τοίνυν συμπληρώσουσι καὶ οὐ ποιότητες, καὶ οὐ συμπληρώσουσι καὶ ποιότητες: καὶ ἄτοπον ἐν μὲν οἷς συμπληροῦσι λέγειν ἄλλο εἶναι, ἐν δὲ οἷς μὴ ἄλλο, τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οὔσης. ἀλλ’ ἄρα τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς ποιήσαντας αὐτὰ οὐσιώδεις ὅλους, τὰ δὲ ἀποτελέσματα ἔχειν ἤδη τὰ ἐκεῖ τὶ τὰ δ’ ἐνταῦθα ποιά, οὐ τί. ὅθεν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ τὶ ἀπολισθαίνοντας ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸ ποιὸν καταφερομένους. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ λέγομεν εἰς τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορῶντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι οὐσίαν, ἃ δὲ νῦν βλέπομεν, εἰς ἃ καὶ ἀφορῶντες λέγομεν, ἀπάγειν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ τὶ καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι τὸ ποιόν: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εὐλόγως, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς πάθη. ὅθεν κἀκεῖνο, πῶς ἐξ οὐκ οὐσιῶν οὐσία. ἐλέγετο μὲν οὖν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ γινόμενον εἶναι τοῖς ἐξ ὧν: νῦν δὲ λέγειν δεῖ, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ γενόμενον οὐσία. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκεῖ ἣν ἐλέγομεν οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐκ οὐσίας λέγομεν; τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν φήσομεν ἐκεῖ κυριώτερον καὶ ἀμιγέστερον ἔχουσαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι οὐσίαν ὡς ἐν διαφοραῖς τοῦ ὄντος, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ προσθήκης ἐνεργειῶν λεγομένην οὐσίαν, τελείωσιν μὲν δοκοῦσαν εἶναι ἐκείνου, τάχα δ’ ἐνδεεστέραν τῇ προσθήκῃ καὶ τῷ οὐχ ἁπλῷ, ἀλλ’ ἤδη ἀφισταμένην τούτου.
2.6.2ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ποιότητος σκεπτέον τί ὅλως: τάχα γὰρ γνωσθὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶ μᾶλλον παύσει τὰς ἀπορίας. πρῶτον οὗν ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ θετέον ὁτὲ μὲν ποιὸν μόνον, ὁτὲ δὲ συμπληροῦν οὐσίαν, οὐ δυσχεράναντας ποιὸν οὐ συμπληρωτικὸν οὐσίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ποιᾶς μᾶλλον οὐσίας. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τῆς ποιᾶς οὐσίας τὴν οὐσίαν πρὸ τοῦ ποιὰν εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι. τί οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς πρὸ τῆς ποιᾶς οὐσίας ἡ οὐσία; ἆρα τὸ σῶμα; τὸ σῶμα τοίνυν οὐσία ἔσται, τὸ δὲ πῦρ σῶμα θερμὸν καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλ’ οὕτω τὸ θερμὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὡς καὶ ἐν σοὶ τὸ σιμόν. ἀφαιρεθείσης τοίνυν θερμότητος καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ κούφου, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ ποιὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν καταλείπεται καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐσία. ἀλλ’ οὐ δοκεῖ: τὸ γὰρ εἶδος μᾶλλον οὐσία. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος ποιότης. ἢ οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ λόγος τὸ εἶδος. τὰ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τί ἐστιν; οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ τὸ καῖον: τοῦτο δὲ ποιόν. εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὸ καίειν ἐνέργειαν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου: καὶ τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ τὸ λευκαίνειν τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιήσεις: ὥστε τὴν ποιότητα οὐχ ἕξομεν ὅπου καταλείψομεν. ἢ ταύτας μὲν οὐ λεκτέον ποιότητας, ὅσαι λέγονται συμπληροῦν οὐσίας, εἴπερ ἐνέργειαι αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν οὐσιωδῶν ἰοῦσαι, ἃ δέ ἐστιν ἔξωθεν πάσης οὐσίας οὐ πῂ μὲν ποιότητες, ἄλλοις δὲ οὐ ποιότητες φανταζόμεναι, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσαι, οἷον καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι καὶ αἴσχη καὶ κάλλη καὶ ὑγίειαι καὶ οὕτως ἐσχηματίσθαι. καὶ τρίγωνον μὲν καὶ τετράγωνον καθ̓ αὑτὸ οὐ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ τετριγωνίσθαι ᾗ μεμόρφωται ποιὸν λεκτέον, καὶ οὐ τὴν τριγωνότητα, ἀλλὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν: καὶ τὰς τέχνας δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιτηδειότητας: ὥστε εἶναι τὴν ποιότητα διάθεσίν τινα ἐπὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἤδη οὔσαις εἴτε ἐπακτὴν εἴτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνοῦσαν, ἣ εἰ μὴ συνῆν, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον εἶχεν ἂν ἡ οὐσία. ταύτην δὲ καὶ εὐκίνητον καὶ δυσκίνητον εἶναι: ὡς διττὸν εἶναι εἶδος, τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον, τὸ δὲ ἔμμονον αὐτῆς.
2.6.3τὸ οὖν λευκὸν τὸ ἐπὶ σοὶ θετέον οὐ ποιότητα, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαν δηλονότι ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς τοῦ λευκαίνειν, κἀκεῖ πάσας τὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας ἐνεργείας τὸ ποιὸν λαβούσας παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας δόξης τῷ ἰδιώτητα εἶναι ἑκάστην οἷον διοριζούσας τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα ἐχούσας. τί οὖν διοίσει ποιότης ἡ ἐκεῖ; ἐνέργειαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται. ἢ ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τί ἐστι δηλοῦσιν οὐδὲ ἐναλλαγὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲ χαρακτῆρα, ἀλλ’ ὅσον μόνον τὴν λεγομένην ποιότητα ἐκεῖ ἐνέργειαν οὖσαν: ὥστε τὸ μέν, ὅταν ἰδιότητα οὐσίας ἔχῃ, δῆλον αὐτόθεν ὡς οὐ ποιόν, ὅταν δὲ χωρίσῃ ὁ λόγος τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφελών, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λαβὼν καὶ γεννήσας ἄλλο, ἐγέννησε ποιὸν οἷον μέρος οὐσίας λαβὼν τὸ ἐπιπολῆς φανὲν αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τὴν θερμότητα τῷ σύμφυτον εἶναι τῷ πυρὶ εἶδός τι εἶναι τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἐνέργειαν καὶ οὐ ποιότητα αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὖ ἄλλως ποιότητα μόνην ἐν ἄλλῳ ληφθεῖσαν οὐκέτι μορφὴν οὐσίας οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ ἴχνος μόνον καὶ σκιὰν καὶ εἰκόνα ἀπολιποῦσαν αὑτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, ἧς ἡ ἐνέργεια, ποιότητα εἶναι. ὅσα οὖν συμβέβηκε καὶ μὴ ἐνέργειαι καὶ εἴδη οὐσιῶν μορφάς τινας παρεχόμενα, ποιὰ ταῦτα: οἷον καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἄλλαι τῶν ὑποκειμένων λεκτέαι ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ ἀρχέτυπα αὐτῶν, ἐν οἷς πρώτως ἐστίν, ἐνεργείας ἐκείνων. καὶ οὐ γίνεται ταὐτὸ ποιότης καὶ οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπηρημωμένον οὐσίας ποιόν, τὸ δὲ σὺν ταύτῃ ἢ εἶδος ἢ ἐνέργεια: οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ μένον καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκπεσὸν τοῦ εἶδος καὶ ἐνέργεια εἶναι. ὃ μέντοι μηδέποτε εἶδος ἄλλου, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀεί, καθαρῶς ποιότης καὶ μόνον τοῦτο.
2.7.1Περὶ τῆς δἰ ὅλων λεγομένης τῶν σωμάτων κράσεως ἐπισκεπτέον. ἆρα ἐνδέχεται ὅλον δἰ ὅλου ὑγρὸν ὑγρῷ συμμιχθὲν ἑκάτερον δἰ ἑκατέρου ἢ θάτερον διὰ θατέρου χωρεῖν; διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁποτερωσοῦν, εἰ γίγνοιτο. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῇ παραθέσει διδόντες ὡς μιγνύντες μᾶλλον ἢ κιρνάντες ἐατέοι, εἴπερ δεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν ὁμοιομερὲς τὸ πᾶν ποιεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος τὸ σμικρότατον ἐκ τῶν κεκρᾶσθαι λεγομένων εἶναι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰς ποιότητας μόνας κιρνάντες τὴν δὲ ὕλην παρατιθέντες ἑκατέρου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἐπάγοντες τὰς παῤ ἑκατέρου ποιότητας πιθανοὶ ἂν εἶεν τῷ διαβάλλειν τὴν δἰ ὅλων κρᾶσιν τῷ τε εἰς τομὰς τὰ μεγέθη συμβαίνειν τῶν ὄγκων ἰέναι, εἰ μηδὲν διάλειμμα μηδετέρῳ τῶν σωμάτων γίγνοιτο, εἰ συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ διαίρεσις τῷ κατὰ πᾶν τὴν διάδυσιν γίνεσθαι θατέρῳ εἰς θάτερον, καὶ δή, ὅταν τὰ κραθέντα μείζω τόπον κατέχῃ ἢ θάτερον καὶ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον συνελθόντα τὸν ἑκατέρου τόπον. καίτοι, εἰ δἰ ὅλου ὅλον ἦν διεληλυθός, τὸν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔδει, φασί, μένειν τὸν αὐτόν, εἰς ὃ θάτερον ἐνεβλήθη. οὗ δὲ μὴ μείζων ὁ τόπος γίνεται, ἀέρος τινὰς ἐξόδους αἰτιῶνται, ἀνθ̓ ὧν ἐσέδυ θάτερον. καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ μείζονι πῶς ἂν ἐκταθὲν δἰ ὅλου χωρήσειε; καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα λέγουσιν. οἱ δ’ αὖ τὴν δἰ ὅλων κρᾶσιν εἰσάγοντες τέμνεσθαι μὲν καὶ μὴ εἰς τομὰς ἀναλίσκεσθαι λέγειν ἂν δύναιντο καὶ δἰ ὅλων τῆς κράσεως γιγνομένης: ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἱδρῶτας οὐ τοῦ σώματος τομὰς ποιεῖν οὐδ’ αὖ κατατετρῆσθαι φήσουσι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις λέγοι μηδὲν κωλύειν τὴν φύσιν οὕτω πεποιηκέναι τοῦ διιέναι τοὺς ἱδρῶτας χάριν, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν, ὅταν λεπτὰ ᾖ καὶ συνεχῆ, ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὑγρὸν δἰ ὅλου δεῦον αὐτὰ καὶ διάρρεον ἐπὶ θάτερα: ἀλλὰ σωμάτων ὄντων πῶς οἷόν τε τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι; ὡς διιέναι μὴ τέμνοντα ἐπινοῆσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον: τέμνοντα δὲ κατὰ πᾶν ἀναιρήσει ἄλληλα δηλονότι. τὰς δὲ αὔξας ὅταν λέγωσι μὴ γίγνεσθαι πολλαχοῦ, διδόασι τοῖς ἑτέροις ἀέρων ἐξόδους αἰτιᾶσθαι. πρός τε τὴν τῶν τόπων αὔξησιν χαλεπῶς μέν, ὅμως δὲ τί κωλύει λέγειν συνεισφερομένου ἑκατέρου σώματος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὴν αὔξην γίνεσθαι; μὴ γὰρ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ποιότητος ἄλλο εἶδος μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οὕτω καὶ μέγεθος ἄλλο: οὗ δὴ τὸ μῖγμα ποιεῖ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν μέγεθος. ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθ̓ ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἱ ἕτεροι λέγοιεν, ὡς, εἰ μὲν ἡ ὕλη τῇ ὕλῃ παράκειται καὶ ὁ ὄγκος τῷ ὄγκῳ, ᾧ. σύνεστι τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ ἡμέτερον ἂν λέγοιτε: εἰ δὲ δἰ ὅλου καὶ ἡ ὕλη μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ πρώτως μεγέθους, οὐχ οὕτως ἂν γένοιτο ὡς γραμμὴ γραμμῇ ἐφεξῆς ἂν κέοιτο κατὰ τὰ πέρατα τοῖς σημείοις ἑαυτῶν συνάψασαι, οὗ δὴ αὔξη ἂν γίνοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνως ὡς ἂν γραμμὴ γραμμῇ ἐφαρμοσθείη, ὥστε αὔξην μὴ γίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ μεγίστου τὸ μικρότατον χωρεῖ, ἐφ̓ ὧν φανερὸν ὅτι κίρναται. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων ἔξεστι λέγειν μὴ εἰς πᾶν φθάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ̓ ὧν γε φανερῶς συμβαίνει, οὐ λέγοιτ̓ ἄν. καὶ λέγοντες ἐκτάσεις τῶν ὄγκων, οὐ σφόδρα πιθανὰ λέγοιεν ἂν εἰς τοσοῦτον τὸν σμικρότατον ὄγκον ἐκτείνοντες: οὐδὲ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες τὸ σῶμα μέγεθος αὐτῷ πλέον διδόασιν, ὥσπερ εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γίγνοιτο.
2.7.2τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ ζητητέον, τί συμβαίνει, ὅταν ὅσπερ ἦν ὄγκος ὕδατος ἀὴρ γίγνηται, πῶς τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ: νῦν δὲ τὰ μὲν εἰρήσθω πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων παῤ ἑκατέρων λεγομένων. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῶν σκοπῶμεν, τί χρὴ λέγειν περὶ τούτου, τίς δόξα σύμφωνος τοῖς λεγομένοις ἢ καὶ τίς ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς νῦν λεγομένας φανεῖται; ὅταν τοίνυν διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ῥέῃ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ ἡ βίβλος ἐκστάζῃ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ὕδωρ, πῶς οὐ τὸ πᾶν ὑδάτινον σῶμα δίεισι δἰ αὐτῆς; ἢ καὶ ὅταν μὴ ῥέῃ, πῶς συνάψομεν τὴν ὕλην τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τῷ ὄγκῳ, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας μόνας ἐν συγκράσει ποιησόμεθα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξω τῆς βίβλου ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος ὕλη παρακείσεται οὐδ’ αὖ ἔν τισι διαστήμασιν αὐτῆς: πᾶσα γὰρ ὑγρά ἐστι καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὕλη κενὴ ὑδατίνης ποιότητος. εἰ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἡ ὕλη μετὰ τῆς ποιότητος, πανταχοῦ τῆς βίβλου τὸ ὕδωρ. ἢ οὐ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος ποιότης. ἀλλὰ ποῦ ὄντος τοῦ ὕδατος; πῶς οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ὄγκος; ἢ ἐξέτεινε τὴν βίβλον τὸ προστεθέν: ἔλαβε γὰρ μέγεθος παρὰ τοῦ εἰσελθόντος. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔλαβε, προσετέθη τις ὄγκος: εἰ δὲ προσετέθη, οὐ κατεπόθη ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, δεῖ οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι. ἢ τί κωλύει, ὥσπερ δίδωσι τῆς ποιότητος καὶ λαμβάνει σῶμα θάτερον παρὰ θατέρου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγέθους; ποιότης μὲν γὰρ ποιότητι συνελθοῦσα οὐκ ἐκείνη οὖσα, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἄλλης, ἐν τῷ μετ’ ἄλλης εἶναι οὐ καθαρὰ οὖσα οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἐκείνη, ἀλλ’ ἠμαύρωται: μέγεθος δὲ συνελθὸν ἄλλῳ μεγέθει οὐκ ἀφανίζεται. τὸ δὲ σῶμα χωροῦν διὰ σώματος πάντως τομὰς ποιεῖν πῶς λέγεται, ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις: ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς ποιότητας διὰ τῶν σωμάτων χωρεῖν λέγομεν καὶ οὐ τομὰς ποιεῖν. ἢ ὅτι ἀσώματοι. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ ὕλη καὶ αὐτὴ ἀσώματος, διὰ τί τῆς ὕλης ἀσωμάτου οὔσης καὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων, εἰ τοιαῦται εἶεν ὡς ὀλίγαι εἶναι, οὐ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διίασι; μὴ διιέναι δὲ τὰ στερεά, ὅτι τοιαύτας ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ὡς κωλυθῆναι διιέναι, ἢ πολλὰς ὁμοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖν τοῦτο; εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ποιοτήτων τὸ πυκνὸν λεγόμενον σῶμα ποιεῖ, τὸ πλῆθος ἂν εἴη αἴτιον: εἰ δὲ πυκνότης ἰδία ποιότης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν λέγουσι σωματότητα, ἡ ἰδία ποιότης: ὥστε οὐχ ᾗ ποιότητες τὴν μῖξιν ποιήσονται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ τοιαίδε, οὐδ’ αὖ ἡ ὕλη ᾗ ὕλη οὐ μιχθήσεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ μετὰ τοιᾶσδε ποιότητος, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ μέγεθος οἰκεῖον οὐκ ἔχει ἀλλ’ ἢ μὴ ἀποβαλοῦσα τὸ μέγεθος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔστω καὶ οὕτω διηπορημένα.
2.7.3ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμνήσθημεν σωματότητος, ἐπισκεπτέον, πότερα ἡ σωματότης ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων σὺν ὕλῃ συγκείμενον ἢ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος τις, ὃς ἐγγενόμενος τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ποιοτήτων σὺν ὕλῃ συγκείμενον, ταὐτὸ ἂν εἴη ἡ σωματότης. καὶ εἰ λόγος δὲ εἴη, ὃς προσελθὼν ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα, δηλονότι ὁ λόγος ἐμπεριλαβὼν ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ἁπάσας. δεῖ δὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, εἰ μή ἐστιν ἄλλως ὥσπερ ὁρισμὸς δηλωτικὸς τοῦ τί ἔστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ λόγος ποιῶν πρᾶγμα, μὴ τὴν ὕλην συμπεριειληφέναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὕλην εἶναι καὶ ἐγγενόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ εἶναι μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὕλην καὶ λόγον ἐνόντα, αὐτὸν δὲ εἶδος ὄντα ἄνευ ὕλης ψιλὸν θεωρεῖσθαι, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀχώριστος αὐτὸς ᾖ. ὁ γὰρ χωριστὸς ἄλλος, ὁ ἐν νῷ: ἐν νῷ δέ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς νοῦς. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄλλοθι.
2.8.1Ἆρα τὰ πόρρω φαίνεται ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἀφεστηκότα ὀλίγον δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μεταξύ, τὰ δὲ ἐγγύθεν ἡλίκα ἐστὶ φαίνεται, καὶ ὅσην ἔχει τὴν ἀπόστασιν; ἐλάττω μὲν δοκεῖ τοῖς ὁρῶσι τὰ πόρρω, ὅτι συναιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἐθέλει καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς κόρης τὸ φῶς — καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πόρρω ἡ ὕλη ᾖ τοῦ ὁρωμένου, τόσῳ τὸ εἶδος οἷον μεμονωμένον ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τοῦ πηλίκου εἴδους καὶ αὖ τοῦ ποιοῦ, ὡς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἀφικνεῖσθαι μόνον: ἢ καί, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἐν διεξόδῳ καὶ ἐπελεύσει καθ̓ ἕκαστον μέρος ὅσον ἐστὶν αἰσθανόμεθα — παρεῖναι οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ πλησίον εἶναι, ἵνα γνωσθῇ ὅσον: ἢ καί, ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρᾶται τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χρώματος πρώτως θεωρουμένου. πλησίον μὲν οὖν ὅσον κέχρωσται γινώσκεται, πόρρω δὲ ὅτι κέχρωσται, τὰ δὲ μέρη κατὰ ποσὸν συνδιαιρούμενα οὐκ ἀκριβῆ δίδωσι τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ διάγνωσιν: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτὰ ἀμυδρὰ προσέρχεται. τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ φωναί, ἐλάττω, ὅσῳ ἂν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν ἀμυδρὸν ἴῃ; εἶδος γὰρ κἀκεῖ ἡ ἀκοὴ ζητεῖ, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνεται. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, εἰ τὸ μέγεθος κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τίνι γὰρ πρώτως τὸ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ μέγεθος, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τῇ ἁφῇ τὸ ὁρώμενον; ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν μέγεθος ἡ ἀκοὴ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ σφόδρα, ὡς καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τὸ σφόδρα τοῦ γλυκέος κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τὸ δὲ κυρίως μέγεθος φωνῆς τὸ ἐφ̓ ὅσον: τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα σημήνειεν ἄν, οὐκ ἀκριβῶς δέ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σφόδρα ἑκάστῳ τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ εἰς πλῆθος εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν τόπον, ὃν ἐπέσχεν. ἀλλ’ οὐ σμικρὰ τὰ χρώματα, ἀλλὰ ἀμυδρά, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη σμικρά. ἢ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις κοινὸν τὸ ἧττόν ἐστι. χρῶμα μὲν οὖν τὸ ἧττον ἀμυδρόν, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ ἧττον σμικρόν, καὶ ἑπόμενον τῷ χρώματι τὸ μέγεθος ἀνὰ λόγον ἠλάττωται. σαφέστερον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ποικίλων γίνεται τὸ πάθος: οἷον ὀρῶν ἐχόντων πολλὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ δένδρων πλῆθος καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, ὧν ἕκαστον, εἰ μὲν ὁρῷτο, δίδωσιν ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἑκάστων μετρεῖν τὸ ὅλον: τοῦ δὲ εἴδους καθ̓ ἕκαστον οὐκ ἰόντος ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ καθ̓ ἕκαστον ὄψις μετροῦσα τὸ ὑποκείμενον μέγεθος τὸ πᾶν ὅσον ἐστὶ γινώσκειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πλησίον, ὅταν ποικίλα ᾖ ἀθρόως τε γίνηται ἡ ἐπιβολὴ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ὁρῷτο, ἐλάττω ἂν φανείη κατὰ λόγον, ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστον κλαπῇ ἐν τῇ θέᾳ: ὅταν δὲ πάντα ὀφθῇ, ἀκριβῶς μετρηθέντα ὅσα ἐστὶ γινώσκεται. ὅσα δὲ τῶν μεγεθῶν ὁμοειδῆ ὁμοιόχροα ὄντα, ψεύδεται καὶ ταῦτα τὸ ποσὸς αὐτῆς οὐ κατὰ μέρος πάνυ τι μετρεῖν δυναμένης τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι ἀπολισθάνει κατὰ μέρος μετροῦσα, ὅτι μὴ ἔχει ἵστασθαι καθ̓ ἕκαστον μέρος τῇ διαφορᾷ. ἐγγύθεν δὲ τὸ πόρρω, ὅτι τὸ μεταξὺ συναιρεῖται ὅσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλησίον ὅσον ἐστὶν οὐ λανθάνει διὰ τὰ αὐτά: οὐ διεξοδεύουσα δὲ τὸ πόρρω τοῦ διαστήματος οἷόν ἐστι κατ’ εἶδος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο οὐδ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ κατὰ μέγεθος εἰπεῖν.
2.8.2τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὄψεως γωνίας ἐλάττους εἴρηται μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λέγων ἔλαττον φαίνεσθαι ἐλάττονι γωνίᾳ καταλείπει τὴν ὄψιν ἔξωθέν τι ὁρῶσαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὂν ἔξωθεν ὅλως, οἷον ἀέρα. ὅταν οὖν μηδὲν καταλείπῃ τῷ πολὺ εἶναι τὸ ὄρος, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἰσάζῃ καὶ μηκέτι ἄλλο οἷόν τε ᾖ αὐτῇ ὁρᾶν, ἅτε τοῦ διαστήματος αὐτῆς συναρμόσαντος τῷ ὁρωμένῳ, ἢ καὶ ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ ὁρώμενον ἐφ̓ ἑκάτερα τὴν τῆς ὄφεως προσβολήν, τί ἄν τις ἐνταῦθα λέγοι ἐλάττονος μὲν ἢ ἔστι πολλῷ φαινομένου τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, πάσῃ δὲ τῇ ὄψει ὁρωμένου; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ θεωροῖ, ἀναμφισβητήτως μάθοι ἄν τις. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡμισφαίριον οὐκ ἄν τις ὁρᾶν μιᾷ προσβολῇ δύναιτο, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χυθῆναι ἡ ὄψις μέχρις αὐτοῦ ἐκτεινομένη. ἀλλ’ εἴ τις βούλεται, δεδόσθω. εἰ οὖν πᾶσα μὲν περιέλαβε πᾶν, πολλαπλάσιον δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ φαινομένου ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, τοῦ ἔλαττον πολλῷ ἢ ἔστι φαίνεσθαι πῶς ἂν ἐλάττωσιν γωνίας αἰτιῷτο;
2.9.1Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις ἁπλῆ καὶ πρώτη, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ οὐ πρῶτον οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλ’ ἕν τι, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς λεγομένου ἡ φύσις ἡ αὐτή: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο, εἶτα ἀγαθόν: ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν τἀγαθόν, τὴν αὐτὴν δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ μίαν λέγειν οὐ κατηγοροῦντας ἐκείνης οὐδέν, δηλοῦντας δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οἷόν τε. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον δὲ οὕτως, ὅτι ἁπλούστατον, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πλειόνων: οὕτω γὰρ ἀναρτήσεται εἰς τὰ εξ ὧν: καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ παῤ ἄλλου. εἰ οὖν μηδὲ παῤ ἄλλου μηδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδὲ σύνθεσις μηδεμία, ἀνάγκη μηδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ εἶναι. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ̓ ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προστησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν πρώτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν: αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν: μήτε πλείω τούτων τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω. εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταὐτὸν φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον: ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἐδείχθη πολλαχῇ. λοιπὸν δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τῶν τριῶν τούτων. τίνες ἂν οὖν εἶεν φύσεις παῤ αὐτάς; τῆς τε γὰρ λεχθείσης οὕτως ἔχειν ἀρχῆς πάντων οὐδεὶς ἂν εὕροι ἁπλουστέραν οὐδὲ ἐπαναβεβηκυῖαν ἡντινοῦν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν μὲν δυνάμει, τὴν δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ φήσουσι: γελοῖον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσι καὶ ἀύλοις τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ διαιρουμένους φύσεις ποιεῖσθαι πλείους. ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα: οὐδ’ ἐπινοεῖν τὸν μέν τινα νοῦν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τινί, τὸν δὲ οἷον κινούμενον. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἡσυχία νοῦ καὶ τίς κίνησις καὶ προφορὰ ἂν εἴη ἢ τίς ἀργία καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τί ἔργον; ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἔστι νοῦς ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἑστώσῃ: κίνησις δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς ἤδη ἔργον καὶ λόγος ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς ψυχὴν ψυχὴν νοερὰν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἄλλην τινὰ μεταξὺ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο πλείους νοῦς ποιεῖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁ δὲ νοεῖ ὅτι νοεῖ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλο τὸ ἐν τούτοις νοεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὖν μία προσβολὴ οὐκ ἀναίσθητος τῶν ἐνεργημάτων ἑαυτῆς: γελοῖον γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ νοῦ τοῦτο ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ πάντως γε ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται τῷ ὅσπερ ἐνόει ὁ νοῶν ὅτι νοεῖ. εἰ δὲ. μή, ὁ μὲν ἔσται νοῶν μόνον, ὁ δὲ ὅτι νοεῖ νοῶν ἄλλου ὄντος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νενοηκότος. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπινοίᾳ φήσουσι, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ὑποστάσεων ἀποστήσονται: ἔπειτα δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ καὶ αἱ ἐπίνοιαι χώραν ἔχουσι λαβεῖν νοῦν νοοῦντα μόνον, μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα δὲ ἑαυτῷ ὅτι νοεῖ: ὃ καὶ ἐφ̓ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εἰ γίγνοιτο τῶν ἀεὶ ἐπιστατούντων ταῖς ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς διανοήσεσιν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως σπουδαῖοι εἶμεν, αἰτίαν ἂν ἀφροσύνης ἔχοιμεν. ὅταν δὲ δὴ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσιν αὑτὸν νοῇ καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν ᾖ τὸ νοητὸν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ᾖ καὶ τὸ νοητόν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν: ὁρῶν δὲ ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀνοηταίνοντα, ἀλλὰ νοοῦντα ὁρᾷ. ὥστε ἐν τῷ πρώτως νοεῖν ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ ὡς ἓν ὄν: καὶ οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἐκεῖ διπλοῦν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῶν εἴη, ὅπερ ἔστι, τίς χώρα τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῇ χωριζούσῃ τὸ νοεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἑτέραν ἐπίνοιάν τις τρίτην ἐπεισάγοι ἐπὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῇ λεγούσῃ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ, τὴν λέγουσαν νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ ὅτι νοεῖ, ἔτι μᾶλλον καταφανὲς τὸ ἄτοπον. καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον οὕτω; τὸν δὲ λόγον ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ποιῇ, εἶτα ἀπὸ τούτου γίνεσθαι ἐν ψυχῇ ἄλλον ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μεταξὺ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ ᾖ οὗτος, ἀποστερήσει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ κομιεῖται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ἄλλου τοῦ μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον: καὶ εἴδωλον λόγου, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγον ἕξει, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ εἰδήσει νοῦν οὐδ’ ὅλως νοήσει.
2.9.2οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε πλείω τούτων οὔτε ἐπινοίας περιττὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἃς οὐ δέχονται, θετέον, ἀλλ’ ἕνα νοῦν τὸν αὐτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀκλινῆ πανταχῇ, μιμούμενον τὸν πατέρα καθ̓ ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτῷ. ψυχῆς δὲ ἡμῶν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνοις, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ τούτων: φύσεως γὰρ οὔσης μιᾶς ἐν δυνάμεσι πλείοσιν ὁτὲ μὲν τὴν πᾶσαν συμφέρεσθαι τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτῆς καθελκυσθὲν συνεφελκύσασθαι τὸ μέσον: τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἦν θέμις καθελκύσαι. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι μὴ ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὅπου ψυχὴ μείνασα, ἡ μὴ μέρος μηδὲ ἧς ἡμεῖς ἔτι μέρος, ἔδωκε τῷ παντὶ σώματι αὐτῷ τε ἔχειν ὅσον δύναται παῤ αὐτῆς ἔχειν, μένει τε ἀπραγμόνως αὐτὴ οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας διοικοῦσα οὐδέ τι διορθουμένη, ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θέᾳ κατακοσμοῦσα δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ. ὅσον γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῇ ἐστι, τόσῳ καλλίων καὶ δυνατωτέρα: κἀκεῖθεν ἔχουσα δίδωσι τῷ μετ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐλλάμπουσα ἀεὶ ἀεὶ ἐλλάμπεται.
2.9.3ἀεὶ οὖν ἐλλαμπομένη καὶ διηνεκὲς ἔχουσα τὸ φῶς δίδωσιν εἰς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέχεται καὶ ἄρδεται τούτῳ τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ἀπολαύει τοῦ ζῆν καθ̓ ὅσον δύναται: ὥσπερ εἰ πυρὸς ἐν μέσῳ που κειμένου ἀλεαίνοιντο οἷς οἷόν τε. καίτοι τὸ πῦρ ἐστιν ἐν μέτρῳ: ὅταν δὲ δυνάμεις μὴ μετρηθεῖσαι μὴ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὦσιν ἀνῃρημέναι, πῶς οἷόν τε εἶναι μέν, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνειν; ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον τὸ αὑτοῦ διδόναι καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, ἢ ὁ νοῦς οὐ νοῦς, ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ μὴ τοῦτο, εἰ μή τι μετὰ τὸ πρώτως ζῶν ζῴη καὶ δευτέρως ἕως ἔστι τὸ πρώτως. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἐφεξῆς εἶναι πάντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀεί, γενητὰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ παῤ ἄλλων εἶναι. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται: οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἅ: ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔχει εἰς ὅ, οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται. εἰ δέ τις εἰς ὕλην λέγοι, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν ὕλην; εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ὕλην φήσει, τίς ἦν ἀνάγκη, φήσομεν, γενέσθαι; εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φήσουσι παρακολουθεῖν, καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη. εἰ δὲ μόνη καταλειφθήσεται, οὐ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένῳ τὰ θεῖα ἔσται καὶ οἷον ἀποτετειχισμένα: εἰ δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἐλλαμφθήσεται.
2.9.4εἰ δὲ οἷον πτερορρυήσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν φήσουσι πεποιηκέναι, οὐχ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς τοῦτο πάσχει: εἰ δὲ σφαλεῖσαν αὐτοὶ φήσουσι, τοῦ σφάλματος λεγέτωσαν τὴν αἰτίαν. πότε δὲ ἐσφάλη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀιδίου, μένει κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον ἐσφαλμένη: εἰ δὲ ἤρξατο, διὰ τί οὐ πρὸ τοῦ; ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ νεῦσαί φαμεν τὴν ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ νεῦσαι. εἰ δὲ ἔνευσε, τῷ ἐπιλελῆσθαι δηλονότι τῶν ἐκεῖ: εἰ δὲ ἐπελάθετο, πῶς δημιουργεῖ; πόθεν γὰρ ποιεῖ ἢ ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐκεῖ; εἰ δὲ ἐκείνων μεμνημένη ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔνευσεν. οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ ἀμυδρῶς ἔχει, οὐ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ἀμυδρῶς ἴδῃ. διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἐθέλησεν ἔχουσα ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ἐπανελθεῖν; τί γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἐλογίζετο γενέσθαι ἐκ τοῦ κοσμοποιῆσαι; γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ ἵνα τιμῷτο, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα. ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ διανοίᾳ ἐποίει καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ποιοῦσα ἦν, πῶς ἂν κόσμον τόνδε ἐποίησε; πότε δὲ καὶ φθερεῖ αὐτόν; εἰ γὰρ μετέγνω, τί ἀναμένει; εἰ δὲ οὔπω, οὐκ ἂν μεταγνοίη ἔτι ἤδη εἰθισμένη καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ προσφιλεστέρα γενομένη. εἰ δὲ τὰς καθ̓ ἕκαστον ψυχὰς ἀναμένει, ἤδη ἔδει μηκέτι ἐλθεῖν εἰς γένεσιν πάλαι πειραθείσας ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ γενέσει τῶν τῇδε κακῶν: ὥστε ἤδη ἂν ἐπέλιπον ἰοῦσαι. οὐδὲ τὸ κακῶς γεγονέναι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον δοτέον τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ δυσχερῆ: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀξίωμα μεῖζόν ἐστι περιτιθέντων αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰκόνα ἐκείνου. ἢ τίς ἂν ἐγένετο ἄλλη καλλίων εἰκὼν ἐκείνου; τί γὰρ ἄλλο πῦρ βελτίων εἰκὼν τοῦ ἐκεῖ πυρὸς παρὰ τὸ ἐνταῦθα πῦρ; ἢ τίς γῆ ἄλλη παρὰ ταύτην μετὰ τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν; τίς δὲ σφαῖρα ἀκριβεστέρα ἢ εὐτακτοτέρα τῇ φορᾷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκεῖ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ νοητοῦ περιοχὴν ἐν αὑτῷ; ἄλλος δὲ ἥλιος μετ’ ἐκεῖνον πρὸ τούτου τοῦ ὁρωμένου τίς;
2.9.5ἀλλ’ ἄλογον αὐτοὺς μὲν σῶμα ἔχοντας, οἷον ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπας καὶ ὀργὰς τὴν παῤ αὐτοῖς δύναμιν μὴ ἀτιμάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγειν ἐξεῖναι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ ταύτης ἀπαθεστέραν ἐν τάξει μᾶλλον καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοιώσει μᾶλλον οὖσαν, οὐδὲ φρόνησιν ἔχειν ἀμείνονα ἡμῶν τῶν ἄρτι γενομένων καὶ διὰ τοσούτων κωλυομένων τῶν ἀπατώντων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐλθεῖν: οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν αὑτῶν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ θείαν λέγειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φαυλοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄστρα μὴ τῆς ἀθανάτου κεκοινωνηκέναι ἐκ πολλῷ καλλιόνων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ὄντα, ὁρῶντας ἐκεῖ μὲν τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ εὔσχημον καὶ εὔτακτον καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἐνταῦθα περὶ γῆν ἀταξίαν αὐτοὺς αἰτιωμένους: ὥσπερ τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς τὸν χείρω τόπον ἐπίτηδες ἑλομένης, παραχωρῆσαι δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος τῇ θνητῇ ψυχῇ ἑλομένης. ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἡ παρεισαγωγὴ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἑτέρας ψυχῆς ταύτης, ἣν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων συνιστᾶσι: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ζωὴν ἡντινοῦν ἔχοι ἡ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σύστασις; ἡ γὰρ τούτων κρᾶσις ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ μικτὸν ποιεῖ, ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ μῖγμα ἐκ τούτων. πῶς δὲ συνοχὴ τῶν τεσσάρων ὑστέρα γενομένη ἐξ αὐτῶν; ὅταν δὲ προστιθῶσι καὶ ἀντίληψιν αὐτῇ καὶ βούλευσιν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τί ἄν τις εἶποι; ἀλλ’ οὐ τιμῶντες ταύτην τὴν δημιουργίαν οὐδὲ τήνδε τὴν γῆν καινὴν αὑτοῖς φασι γῆν γεγονέναι, εἰς ἣν δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπελεύσονται: τοῦτο δὲ λόγον εἶναι κόσμου. καίτοι τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι ἐν παραδείγματι κόσμου, ὃν μισοῦσι; πόθεν δὲ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦτο; τοῦτο γὰρ κατ’ αὐτοὺς νενευκότος ἤδη πρὸς τὰ τῇδε τοῦ τὸ παράδειγμα πεποιηκότος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ποιήσαντι πολλὴ φροντὶς τοῦ κόσμον μετὰ τὸν κόσμον τὸν νοητὸν ὃν ἔχει ἄλλον ποιῆσαι — καίτοι τί ἔδει; — ἢ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦδε ἐποίησεν ἢ μετὰ τὸν κόσμον. καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου, ἵνα τί; ἵνα φυλάξωνται αἱ ψυχαί. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐφυλάξαντο, ὥστε μάτην ἐγένετο; εἰ δὲ μετὰ τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου λαβὼν ἀποσυλήσας τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶδος, ἤρκει ἡ πεῖρα ταῖς πειραθείσαις ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὸ φυλάξασθαι. εἰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς λαβεῖν ἀξιοῦσι τοῦ κόσμου τὸ εἶδος, τί τὸ καινὸν τοῦ λόγου;
2.9.6τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ὑποστάσεις τί χρὴ λέγειν ἃς εἰσάγουσι, παροικήσεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους καὶ μετανοίας; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς ταῦτα λέγουσι πάθη, ὅταν ἐν μετανοίᾳ ᾖ, καὶ ἀντιτύπους, ὅταν οἷον εἰκόνας τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτά πω τὰ ὄντα θεωρῇ, κενολογούντων ἐστὶν εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ἰδίας αἱρέσεως: ὡς γὰρ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἑλληνικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενοι ταῦτα σκευωροῦνται εἰδότων σαφῶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἀτύφως λεγόντων ἀναβάσεις ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ εἰς θέαν ἀληθεστέραν μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον προιούσας. ὅλως γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἴληπται, τὰ δέ, ὅσα καινοτομοῦσιν, ἵνα ἰδίαν φιλοσοφίαν θῶνται, ταῦτα ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας εὕρηται. ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ δίκαι καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ οἱ ἐν ᾅδου καὶ αἱ μετενσωματώσεις ἐκεῖθεν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν δὲ πλῆθος ποιῆσαι, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἄλλον καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ λεχθέντων εἴληπται: εἰπόντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ʽᾗπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὃ ἔστι ζῷον καθορᾷ, τοσαύτας καὶ τόδε ὁ ποιῶν τὸ πᾶν διενοήθη σχεῖν.ʼ οἱ δὲ οὐ συνέντες τὸν μὲν ἔλαβον ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἕτερον παῤ αὐτὸν θεωροῦντα, τὸν δὲ διανοούμενον — πολλάκις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ διανοουμένου ψυχή ἐστιν ἡ δημιουργοῦσα — καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τοῦτον οἴονται εἶναι τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀφεστηκότες τοῦ εἰδέναι τίς ὁ δημιουργός. καὶ ὅλως τὸν τρόπον τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καταψεύδονται αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἕλκουσι τὰς δόξας τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν κατανενοηκότες, ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν μή. καὶ πλῆθος νοητῶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἐξευρηκέναι δόξειν οἴονται αὐτῷ τῷ πλήθει τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν τῇ αἰσθητῇ καὶ ἐλάττονι εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἄγοντες, δέον ἐκεῖ τὸ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀλίγον εἰς ἀριθμὸν διώκειν καὶ τῷ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πάντα ἀποδιδόντας ἀπηλλάχθαι ἐκείνου τῶν πάντων ὄντος καὶ νοῦ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα καλὰ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην φύσιν. ψυχῆς δὲ εἶδος τρίτον: διαφορὰς δὲ ψυχῶν ἐν πάθεσιν ἢ ἐν φύσει ἰχνεύειν μηδὲν τοὺς θείους ἄνδρας διασύροντας, ἀλλ’ εὐμενῶς δεχομένους τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς παλαιοτέρων καὶ ἃ καλῶς λέγουσι παῤ ἐκείνων λαμβάνοντας, ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν, νοητὸν κόσμον, θεὸν τὸν πρῶτον, τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν δεῖν φεύγειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁμιλίαν, τὸν χωρισμὸν τὸν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἐκ γενέσεως φεύγειν εἰς οὐσίαν: ταῦτα γὰρ κείμενα παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι σαφῶς οὑτωσὶ λέγοντες καλῶς ποιοῦσιν. οἷς δὲ θέλουσι διαφωνεῖν φθόνος οὐδεὶς λεγόντων: οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ τοὺς Ἕλληνας διασύρειν καὶ ὑβρίζειν τὰ αὑτῶν ἐν συστάσει παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ παῤ αὐτῶν δεικνύναι ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα, ὅσα ἴδια αὐτοῖς ἔδοξε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων δόξαν λέγειν, εὐμενῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως αὐτὰς τὰς δόξας τιθέντας αὐτῶν καὶ οἷς ἐναντιοῦνται δικαίως, πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς βλέποντας, οὐ τὴν εὐδοκίμησιν θηρωμένους ἐκ τοῦ ἄνδρας κεκριμένους ἐκ παλαιοῦ οὐ παρὰ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ψέγειν, λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐκείνων ἀμείνους εἶναι. ἐπεὶ τά γε εἰρημένα τοῖς παλαιοῖς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν πολλῷ ἀμείνω καὶ πεπαιδευμένως εἴρηται καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπατωμένοις τὴν ἐπιθέουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπάτην ῥᾳδίως γνωσθήσεται, τά τε ὕστερον τούτοις παῤ ἐκείνων ληφθέντα, προσθήκας δέ τινας οὐδὲν προσηκούσας εἰληφότα, ἔν τε οἷς ἐναντιοῦσθαι θέλουσι γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς εἰσάγοντες παντελεῖς καὶ μεμφόμενοι τῷδε τῷ παντὶ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰτιώμενοι καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ψέγοντες καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγοντες τὸν δημιουργὸν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη διδόντες, ἅπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐν μέρει.
2.9.7ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ἤρξατο οὔτε παύσεται, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀεὶ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, ἕως ἂν ἐκεῖνα ᾖ, εἴρηται. τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ κοινωνίαν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πρὸ αὐτῶν εἴρηται ὡς οὐκ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ: τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας καὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λαμβάνειν ὅμοιον, ὡς εἴ τις τὸ τῶν χυτρέων ἢ χαλκέων λαβὼν γένος ἐν πόλει εὖ οἰκουμένῃ τὴν ἅπασαν ψέγοι. δεῖ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς ὅλης ὅπως διοικεῖ, ὅτι μὴ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος μηδὲ ἐνδεδεμένη. πρὸς γὰρ αὖ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς, αἳ μυρίαι εἴρηνται ἐν ἄλλοις, κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἔδει, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος δεδέμεθα ἤδη δεσμοῦ γεγενημένου. ἐν γὰρ τῇ πάσῃ ψυχῇ ἡ τοῦ αώματος φύσις δεδεμένη ἤδη συνδεῖ ὃ ἂν περιλάβῃ: σὐτὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν δέοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δεδεμένων: ἄρχει γὰρ ἐκείνη. διὸ καὶ ἀπαθὴς πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐ κύριοι: τὸ γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον τὸ ὑπεράνω ἀκέραιον μένει καὶ οὐκ ἐμποδίζεται, ὅσον δὲ αὐτῆς δίδωσι τῷ σώματι ζωὴν οὐδὲν παῤ αὐτοῦ προσλαμβάνει. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄλλου πάθημα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δέχεται, αὐτὸ δ’ αὖ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτι τὸ αὑτοῦ δίδωσιν οἰκείαν ζωὴν ἔχοντι: οἷον εἰ ἐγκεντρισθέν τι εἴη ἐν ἄλλῳ, παθόντος μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ συμπέπονθεν, αὐτὸ δὲ ξηρανθὲν εἴασεν ἐκεῖνο τὴν αὐτοῦ ζωὴν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἀποσβεννυμένου τοῦ ἐν σοὶ πυρὸς τὸ ὅλον πῦρ ἀπέσβη: ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ εἰ τὸ πᾶν πῦρ ἀπόλοιτο, πάθοι ἄν τι ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ σώματος σύστασις, καὶ εἰ οἷόν τε εἴη διὰ τῶν λοιπῶν κόσμον τινὰ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν μέλοι τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ἐκεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἡ σύστασις ὁμοίως τῷ παντὶ καὶ ζῴῳ ἑκάστῳ: ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ οἷον ἐπιθεῖ κελεύσασα μένειν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὡς ὑπεκφεύγοντα εἰς τὴν τάξιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δέδεται δεσμῷ δευτέρῳ: ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει ὅποι φύγῃ. οὔτε οὖν ἐντὸς δεῖ κατέχειν οὔτε ἔξωθεν πιέζουσαν εἰς τὸ εἴσω ὠθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου ἠθέλησεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις μένει. ἐὰν δέ πού τι αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν κινηθῇ, οἷς οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, ταῦτα πάσχει, αὐτὰ δὲ καλῶς φέρεται ὡς τοῦ ὅλου: τὰ δὲ φθείρεται οὐ δυνάμενα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου τάξιν φέρειν, οἷον εἰ χοροῦ μεγάλου ἐν τάξει φερομένου ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πορείᾳ αὐτοῦ χελώνη ληφθεῖσα πατοῖτο οὐ δυνηθεῖσα φυγεῖν τὴν τάξιν τοῦ χοροῦ: εἰ μέντοι μετ’ ἐκείνης τάξειεν ἑαυτήν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπὸ τούτου οὐδὲ αὐτὴ πάθοι.
2.9.8τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἐποίησε κόσμον ταὐτὸν τῷ διὰ τί ἔστι ψυχὴ καὶ διὰ τί ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐποίησεν. ὃ πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὴν λαμβανόντων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀεί: ἔπειτα οἴονται τραπέντα ἔκ τινος εἴς τι καὶ μεταβαλόντα αἴτιον τῆς δημιουργίας γεγονέναι. διδακτέον οὖν αὐτούς, εἰ εὐγνωμόνως ἀνέχοιντο, τίς ἡ φύσις τούτων, ὡς αὐτοὺς παύσασθαι τῆς εἰς τὰ τίμια λοιδορίας, ἣν εὐχερῶς ποιοῦνται ἀντὶ πολλῆς προσηκόντως ἂν γενομένης εὐλαβείας. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν ὀρθῶς ἄν τις μέμψαιτο πρῶτον μὲν ἐνδεικνυμένην τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως τὸ μέγεθος. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως εἰς τὸ ζῆν παρελήλυθεν, ὡς μὴ ζωὴν ἀδιάρθρωτον ἔχειν — ὁποῖα τὰ σμικρότερα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἃ τῇ πολλῇ ζωῇ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀεὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ̓ ἡμέραν γεννᾶται — ἀλλ’ ἔστι συνεχὴς καὶ ἐναργὴς καὶ πολλὴ καὶ πανταχοῦ ζωὴ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ἐνδεικνυμένη, πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις ἄγαλμα ἐναργὲς καὶ καλὸν τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν εἴποι; εἰ δὲ μιμούμενον μή ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἂν ἔτι μιμούμενον. τὸ δὲ ἀνομοίως μεμιμῆσθαι ψεῦδος: οὐδὲν γὰρ παραλέλειπται ὧν οἷόν τε ἦν καλὴν εἰκόνα φυσικὴν ἔχειν. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν γὰρ ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας καὶ ἐπιτεχνήσεως τὸ μίμημα: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ἔσχατον τὸ νοητὸν εἶναι. εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν ἔδει διττήν, τὴν μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὴν δὲ εἰς ἄλλο. ἔδει οὖν εἶναί τι μετ’ αὐτό: ἐκείνου γὰρ μόνου οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κάτω, ὃ τῶν πάντων ἀδυνατώτατόν ἐστι. δύναμις δὲ θαυμαστὴ ἐκεῖ θεῖ: ὥστε καὶ εἰργάσατο. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἄλλος κόσμος οὐκ ἔστι τούτου ἀμείνων, τίς οὗτος; εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη εἷναι, ἄλλος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὸ μίμημα ἀποσώζων ἐκείνου. γῆ μὲν δὴ πᾶσα ζῴων ποικίλων πλήρης καὶ ἀθανάτων καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ μεστὰ πάντα: ἄστρα δὲ τά τε ἐν ταῖς ὑποκάτω σφαίραις τά τε ἐν τῷ ἀνωτάτω διὰ τί οὖ θεοὶ ἐν τάξει φερόμενα καὶ κόσμῳ περιιόντα; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἀρετὴν ἕξουσιν ἢ τί κώλυμα πρὸς κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς αὐτοῖς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐκεῖ, ἅπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ κακούς, οὐδ’ ἡ τοῦ σώματος κακία ἐνοχλουμένη καὶ ἐνοχλοῦσα. διὰ τί δὲ οὐ συνιᾶσιν ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν νῷ λαμβάνουσι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς νοητοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ’ ἡμῖν σοφία βελτίων ἔσται τῶν ἐκεῖ; ταῦτα τίς ἂν μὴ ἔκφρων γεγενημένος ἀνάσχοιτο; ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰ μὲν βιασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἦλθον, πῶς βελτίους αἱ βιασθεῖσαι; ἐν γὰρ ψυχαῖς τὸ κρατῆσαν κρεῖττον. εἰ δὲ ἑκοῦσαι, τί μέμφεσθε εἰς ὃν ἑκοῦσαι ἤλθετε διδόντος καὶ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, εἴ τις μὴ ἀρέσκοιτο; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἐξεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σοφίαν ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄντας βιοῦν κατ’ ἐκεῖνα, πῶς οὐ μαρτυρεῖ ἐξηρτῆσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ;
2.9.9πλούτους δὲ καὶ πενίας εἴ τις μέμφοιτο καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἴσον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἅπασι, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, ὡς ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἴσον οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐδέ τι νομίζει τοὺς πολλὰ κεκτημένους πλέον ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τοὺς δυναστεύοντας τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιαύτην σπουδὴν ἄλλους ἐᾷ ἔχειν, καὶ καταμεμάθηκεν ὡς διττὸς ὁ ἐνθάδε βίος, ὁ μὲν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὁ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον καὶ ἄνω, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρωπικωτέροις διττὸς αὖ ὢν ὁ μὲν μεμνημένος ἀρετῆς μετίσχων ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ὄχλος οἷον χειροτέχνης τῶν πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις. εἰ δὲ φονεύει τις ἢ ἡττᾶται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπὸ ἀδυναμίας, τί θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἁμαρτίας εἶναι οὐ νῷ, ἀλλὰ ψυχαῖς ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀνήβοις; εἰ δὲ γυμνάσιον εἴη νικώντων καὶ ἡττωμένων, πῶς οὐ καὶ ταύτῃ καλῶς ἔχει; εἰ δ’ ἀδικῇ, τί δεινὸν τῷ ἀθανάτῳ; καὶ εἰ φονεύῃ, ἔχεις ὃ θέλεις. εἰ δὲ ἤδη μέμφῃ πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἔχεις. ὁμολογεῖται δὲ καὶ δίκας εἶναι ἐνθάδε καὶ κολάσεις. πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔχει μέμφεσθαι πόλει διδούσῃ ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἀξίαν; οὗ καὶ ἀρετὴ τετίμηται, καὶ κακία τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀτιμίαν ἔχει, καὶ θεῶν οὐ μόνον ἀγάλματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄνωθεν ἐφορῶντες, οἳ ῥηιδίως αἰτίας, φησίν, ἀποφεύξονται πρὸς ἀνθρώπων, πάντα ἄγοντες τάξει ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος μοῖραν ἑκάστῳ τὴν προσήκουσαν διδόντες κατὰ ἀμοιβὰς βίων τοῖς προυπηργμένοις ἀκόλουθον: ἣν ὁ ἀγνοῶν προπετέστερος ἀνθρώπων περὶ πραγμάτων θείων ἀγροικιζόμενος. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γενέσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὑτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι; οὕτω γὰρ οὔπω ἄριστος: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς τούς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας κἀκεῖ βλέποντας, πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην: ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ἐφ̓ ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τῶν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένους: οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τοῦτό ἐστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων ὃς ἔστι πολλοὺς ποιῇ πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους καὶ δἰ ἐκεῖνον καὶ παῤ ἐκείνου ὄντας. καὶ ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὅδε δἰ ἐκεῖνον ἔστι κἀκεῖ βλέπει καὶ πᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου προφητεύει ἀνθρώποις καὶ χρῶσιν ἃ ἐκείνοις φίλα. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτό εἰσιν, ὃ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει. εἰ δ’ ὑπερορᾶν θέλεις καὶ σεμνύνεις σαυτὸν ὡς οὐ χείρων, πρῶτον μέν, ὅσῳ τις ἄριστος, πρὸς πάντας εὐμενῶς ἔχει καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους: ἔπειτα σεμνύνειν δεῖ εἰς μέτρον μετὰ οὐκ ἀγροικίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἰόντα, ἐφ̓ ὅσον ἡ φύσις δύναται ἡμῶν ἀνιέναι, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις νομίζειν εἶναι χώραν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ μὴ αὑτὸν μόνον μετ’ ἐκεῖνον τάξαντα ὥσπερ ὀνείρασι πέτεσθαι ἀποστεροῦντα ἑαυτὸν καθ̓ ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατὸν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου θεῷ γενέσθαι: δύναται δὲ εἰς ὅσον νοῦς ἄγει: τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πεσεῖν. πείθονται δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἀνόητοι τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν λόγων ἐξαίφνης ἀκούοντες ὡς σὺ ἔσῃ βελτίων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν: πολλὴ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ αὐθάδεια, καὶ ὁ πρότερον ταπεινὸς καὶ μέτριος καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀνὴρ εἰ ἀκούσειε: σὺ εἶ θεοῦ παῖς, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι, οὓς ἐθαύμαζες, οὐ θεῶν παῖδες οὐδὲ θεῖα ἃ τιμῶσιν ἐκ πατέρων λαβόντες, σὺ δὲ κρείττων καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐδὲν πονήσας εἶτα καὶ συνεπηχοῦσιν ἄλλοι. οἷον εἰ ἐν πλείστοις ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδὼς πήχεων χιλίων εἶναι ἀκούοι, τί ἂν ἢ χιλιόπηχυς εἶναι νομίζοι, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους πενταπήχεις εἰ πενταπήχεις εἶναι ἀκούοι, μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας; εἶτ̓ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑμῶν προνοεῖ ὁ θεός, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου παντὸς ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ τί ἀμελεῖ; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν οὐδὲ θέμις αὐτῷ, πρὸς τὸ κάτω καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς βλέπων διὰ τί: οὐκ ἔξω βλέπει καὶ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον δὲ βλέπει ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔξω, ἵνα μὴ τὸν κόσμον ἐφορᾷ, οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς βλέπει. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν δέονται αὐτοῦ: ἀλλ’ ὁ κόσμος δεῖται καὶ οἶδε τὴν τάξιν αὑτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅπως ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὅπως ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἀνδρῶν οἳ ἂν θεῷ ὦσι φίλοι, πρᾴως μὲν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ κόσμου φέροντες, εἴ τι ἐκ τῆς τῶν πάντων φορᾶς ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει: οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἑκάστῳ καταθύμιον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν δεῖ βλέπειν: τιμῶν δὲ ἑκάστους κατ’ ἀξίαν, σπεύδων δ’ ἀεὶ οὗ πάντα σπεύδει τὰ δυνάμενα — πολλὰ δὲ ἔστι τὰ σπεύδοντα ἐκεῖ, καὶ τὰ μὲν τυγχάνοντα μακάρια, τὰ δὲ ὡς δυνατὸν ἔχει τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτοῖς μοῖραν — οὐχ αὑτῷ μόνῳ διδοὺς τὸ δύνασθαι: οὐ γάρ, εἰ ἐπαγγέλλοιτο ἔχειν, ὃ λέγει τις ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ καὶ εἰδότες, ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσι, λέγουσιν ἔχειν καὶ οἴονται ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ μόνοι ἔχειν, ὃ αὐτοὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν.
2.9.10πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἄν τις ἐξετάζων ἀφθονίαν ἔχοι ἂν καθ̓ ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνὺς ὡς ἔχει. αἰδὼς γάρ τις ἡμᾶς ἔχει πρός τινας τῶν φίλων, οἳ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐντυχόντες πρότερον ἢ ἡμῖν φίλοι γενέσθαι οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ μένουσι. καίτοι αὐτοὶ οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἐθέλοντες δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἀξιοπίστως ἢ καὶ οἰόμενοι τὰ αὑτῶν οὕτως ἔχειν λέγειν ἃ δὴ λέγουσιν: ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίμους, οὐ πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες — πλέον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν γίγνοιτο πρὸς τὸ πείθειν αὐτούς — ἵνα μὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐνοχλοῖντο οὐκ ἀποδείξεις κομιζόντων — πῶς γάρ; — ἀλλ’ ἀπαυθαδιζομένων, ταῦτα εἰρήκαμεν ἄλλου ὄντος τρόπου, καθ̓ ὃν ἄν τις γράφων ἠμύνατο τοὺς διασύρειν τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ θείων ἀνδρῶν καλῶς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐχομένως εἰρημένα τολμῶντας. ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν ἐατέον ἐξετάζειν: καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ταῦτα ἀκριβῶς λαβοῦσι τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα ἔσται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅπως ἔχει εἰδέναι: ἐκεῖνο δὲ εἰπόντα ἐατέον τὸν λόγον, ὃ δὴ καὶ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν ἀτοπίᾳ, εἰ δεῖ ἀτοπίαν τοῦτο λέγειν. ψυχὴν γὰρ εἰπόντες νεῦσαι κάτω καὶ σοφίαν τινά, εἴτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρξάσης, εἴτε τῇ τοιαύτῃ αἰτίας γενομένης σοφίας, εἴτε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν θέλοντες εἶναι, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ψυχὰς συγκατεληλυθέναι λέγοντες καὶ μέλη τῆς σοφίας ταύτας μὲν ἐνδῦναι λέγουσι σώματα, οἷον τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἧς δὲ χάριν καὶ αὐταὶ κατῆλθον, ἐκείνην λέγουσι πάλιν αὖ μὴ κατελθεῖν, οἷον μὴ νεῦσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐλλάμψαι μόνον τὸ σκότος, εἶτ̓ ἐκεῖθεν εἴδωλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ γεγονέναι. εἶτα τοῦ εἰδώλου εἴδωλον πλάσαντες ἐνταῦθά που δἰ ὕλης ἢ ὑλότητος ἢ ὅ τι ὀνομάζειν θέλουσι, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο λέγοντες, καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὀνόματα εἰπόντες οὗ λέγουσιν εἰς ἐπισκότησιν, τὸν λεγόμενον παῤ αὐτοῖς, δημιουργὸν γεννῶσι καὶ ἀποστάντα τῆς μητρὸς ποιήσαντες τὸν κόσμον παῤ αὐτοῦ ἄγουσιν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα εἰδώλων, ἵνα σφόδρα λοιδορήσηται ὁ τοῦτο γράψας.
2.9.11πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, εἰ μὴ κατῆλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἐνέλαμψε τὸ σκότος, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο νενευκέναι; οὐ γάρ, εἴ τι παῤ αὐτῆς ἔρρευσεν οἷον φῶς, ἤδη νενευκέναι αὐτὴν λέγειν προσήκει: εἰ μή που τὸ μὲν ἔκειτό που ἐν τῷ κάτω, ἡ δὲ ἦλθε τοπικῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγγὺς γενομένη ἐνέλαμψεν. εἰ δ’ ἐφ̓ αὑτῆς μένουσα ἐνέλαμψε μηδὲν εἰς τοῦτο ἐργασαμένη, διὰ τί μόνη αὐτὴ ἐνέλαμψεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ δυνατώτερα αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν; εἰ δὲ τῷ λογισμὸν λαβεῖν αὐτὴ κόσμου ἠδυνήθη ἐλλάμψαι ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, διὰ τί οὐχ ἅμα ἐλλάμψασα καὶ κόσμον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἔμεινε τὴν τῶν εἰδώλων γένεσιν; ἔπειτα καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ὁ τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ γῆ αὐτοῖς ἡ ξένη λεγομένη γενομένη ὑπὸ τῶν μειζόνων, ὡς λέγουσιν αὐτοί, οὐ κατήγαγεν εἰς νεῦσιν τοὺς ποιήσαντας. ἔπειτα πῶς ἡ ὕλη φωτισθεῖσα εἴδωλα ψυχικὰ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐ σωμάτων φύσιν; ψυχῆς δὲ εἴδωλον οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο σκότους ἢ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, εἰ γίνεται, παρακολουθοῖ ἂν τῷ ποιήσαντι καὶ συνηρτημένον ἔσται. ἔπειτα πότερον οὐσία τοῦτο ἤ, ὥς φασιν, ἐννόημα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία, τίς ἡ διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀφ̓ οὗ; εἰ δ’ ἄλλο εἶδος ψυχῆς, εἰ ἐκείνη λογική, τάχα ἂν φυτικὴ καὶ γεννητικὴ αὕτη: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ἔτι, ἵνα τιμῷτο, καὶ πῶς δἰ ἀλαζονείαν καὶ τόλμαν ἐποίει; καὶ ὅλως τὸ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ λογίζεσθαι ἀνῄρηται. τί δ’ ἔτι ἔδει ἐμποιεῖν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδώλου τὸν ποιήσαντα; εἰ δ’ ἐννόημα, πρῶτον τὸ ὄνομα ἐπισημαντέον ὅθεν: ἔπειτα πῶς ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἐννοήματι δώσει τὸ ποιεῖν; ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πλάσματι πῶς ἡ ποίησις; ἢ ποιῆσαι τουτὶ μὲν πρῶτον, ἄλλο δὲ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας λέγοντες. διὰ τί δὲ πρῶτον πῦρ;
2.9.12καὶ ἄρτι γενόμενον πῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ; ἢ μνήμῃ ὧν εἶδεν; ἀλλ’ ὅλως οὐκ ἦν, ἵνα ἂν καὶ εἶδεν, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ, ἣν διδόασιν αὐτῷ. εἶτα πῶς οὐ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοὺς μὲν οὐκ εἴδωλα ψυχῶν ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἀλλ’ ἀληθινὰς ψυχάς, μόλις καὶ ἀγαπητῶς ἕνα ἢ δύο αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου κινηθῆναι καὶ ἐλθόντας εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μόλις ἀναπόλησιν λαβεῖν ὧν ποτε εἶδον, τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἄρτι γενόμενον ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἐκεῖνα, ἢ καὶ τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ, εἴδωλον ὑλικόν, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἐκεῖνα καὶ κόσμου λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν ἐκ κόσμου ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ μαθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο; πόθεν δὴ καὶ πρῶτον πῦρ ποιῆσαι οἰηθέντα δεῖν τοῦτο πρῶτον; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν ἐνθυμηθεὶς πῦρ, διὰ τί ἐνθυμηθεὶς κόσμον — πρῶτον γὰρ ἔδει ἐνθυμηθῆναι τὸ ὅλον — οὐ κόσμον ἀθρόως ἐποίει; ἐμπεριείχετο γὰρ κἀκεῖνα ἐν τῇ ἐνθυμήσει. φυσικώτερον γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς αἱ τέχναι ἐποίει: ὕστεραι γὰρ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου αἱ τέχναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος γινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φύσεων οὐ πρῶτον πῦρ, εἶθ̓ ἕκαστον, εἶτα φύρασις τούτων, ἀλλὰ περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφὴ τυποῦσα ἐπὶ τοῖς καταμηνίοις παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ κἀκεῖ ἡ ὕλη περιεγράφετο τύπῳ κόσμου, ἐν ᾧ τύπῳ καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα; ἀλλ’ ἴσως αὐτοὶ οὕτω κόσμον ἐποίησαν ἂν ὡς ἀληθεστέρᾳ ψυχῇ χρώμενοι, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἠγνόει ποιῆσαι. καίτοι προιδεῖν καὶ μέγεθος οὐρανοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοσοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ λόξωσιν τῶν ζῳδίων καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὴν φορὰν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὕτως, ὡς ἔχειν εἰπεῖν αἰτίας δἰ ἃς οὕτως, οὐκ εἰδώλου ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων τῆς δυνάμεως ἐλθούσης: ὃ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄκοντες ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἡ γὰρ ἔλλαμψις ἡ εἰς τὸ σκότος ἐξετασθεῖσα ποιήσει ὁμολογεῖν τὰς ἀληθεῖς τοῦ κόσμου αἰτίας. τί γὰρ ἐλλάμπειν ἔδει, εἰ μὴ πάντως ἔδει; ἢ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἀνάγκη. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, ἀεὶ οὕτως: εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἔσται τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὰ κακὰ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦδε, καὶ οὐχ ὁ κόσμος αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀκεῖ τούτῳ, καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν, ἀλλὰ παῤ αὐτῆς ἐνταῦθα: καὶ ἥξει ὁ λόγος ἀναφέρων τὸν κόσμον ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα. εἰ δὲ δή, καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὅθεν ἐφάνη. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἡ νεύσασα ἤδη ὂν τὸ σκότος, φασίν, εἶδε καὶ κατέλαμψε. πόθεν οὖν τοῦτο; εἰ δ’ αὐτὴν φήσουσι ποιῆσαι νεύσασαν, οὐκ ἦν δηλονότι ὅπου ἂν ἔνευσεν, οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ σκότος αἴτιον τῆς νεύσεως, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις. τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν ταῖς προηγησαμέναις ἀνάγκαις: ὥστε ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἡ αἰτία.
2.9.13ὁ ἄρα μεμφόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει οὐκ οἶδεν ὅ τι ποιεῖ, οὐδ’ ὅποι τὸ θράσος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο χωρεῖ. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τάξιν ἐφεξῆς πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ ἀεὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, καὶ ὡς οὐ λοιδορητέον τοῖς χείροσι τῶν πρώτων, ἀλλὰ πρᾴως συγχωρητέον τῇ πάντων φύσει αὐτὸν θέοντα πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα παυσάμενον τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν φοβερῶν, ὡς οἴονται, ἐν ταῖς τοῦ κόσμου σφαίραις, αἳ δὴ πάντα μείλιχα τεύχουσιν αὐτοῖς: τί γὰρ φοβερὸν ἔχουσιν αὗται, ὡς φοβοῦσι τοὺς ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ πεπαιδευμένης ἀνηκόους καὶ ἐμμελοῦς γνώσεως; οὐ γάρ, εἰ πύρινα τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν, φοβεῖσθαι δεῖ συμμέτρως πρὸς τὸ πᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἔχοντα, εἰς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν βλέπειν, αἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ δήπουθεν ἀξιοῦσι τίμιοι εἶναι. καίτοι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφέροντα συμπράττοντα καὶ συνενεργοῦντα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις, ἃ οὐκ ἂν οὐ γένοιτό ποτε ἔστ̓ ἂν ᾖ τὰ πρῶτα, συμπληροῦντα δὲ τὸ πᾶν καὶ μεγάλα μέρη ὄντα τοῦ παντός. εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωποι τίμιόν τι παῤ ἄλλα ζῷα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ταῦτα οὐ τυραννίδος ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ κόσμον καὶ τάξιν παρέχοντα. ἃ δὲ λέγεται γίνεσθαι παῤ αὐτῶν σημεῖα νομίζειν τῶν ἐσομένων εἶναι, γίνεσθαι δὲ τὰ γινόμενα διάφορα καὶ τύχαις — οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ταὐτὰ περὶ ἑκάστους συμβαίνειν — καὶ καιροῖς γενέσεων καὶ τόποις πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκόσι καὶ διαθέσεσι ψυχῶν. καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον πάλιν ἀγαθοὺς πάντας, οὐδ’ ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, μέμφεσθαι προχείρως προσήκει πάλιν ἀξιοῦσι μηδὲν διαφέρειν ταῦτα ἐκείνων, τό τε κακὸν μὴ νομίζειν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἐνδεέστερον εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότερον: οἷον εἴ τις τὴν φύσιν κακὸν λέγοι, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι μὴ λόγος. εἰ δὲ μή, κἀκεῖ τὰ κακὰ ἀναγκασθήσονται λέγειν εἶναι: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ψυχὴ χεῖρον νοῦ καὶ οὗτος ἄλλου ἔλαττον.
2.9.14μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλως ποιοῦσιν οὐκ ἀκήρατα τὰ ἐκεῖ. ὅταν γὰρ ἐπαοιδὰς γράφωσιν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα λέγοντες, οὐ μόνον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω, τί ποιοῦσιν ἢ γοητείας καὶ θέλξεις καὶ πείσεις λέγουσι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπακούειν καὶ ἄγεσθαι, εἴ τις ἡμῶν τεχνικώτερος εἰπεῖν ταδὶ καὶ οὑτωσὶ μέλη καὶ ἤχους καὶ προσπνεύσεις καὶ σιγμοὺς τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐκεῖ μαγεύειν γέγραπται. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται τοῦτο λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πῶς φωναῖς τὰ ἀσώματα; ὥστε οἷς σεμνοτέρους αὑτῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι, τούτοις λελήθασιν αὑτοὺς τὸ σεμνὸν ἐκείνων ἀφαιρούμενοι. καθαίρεσθαι δὲ νόσων λέγοντες αὑτοὺς λέγοντες μὲν ἂν σωφροσύνῃ καὶ κοσμίᾳ διαίτῃ ἔλεγον ἂν ὀρθῶς, καθάπερ οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι: νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὖ φρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐχ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσιν ἢ καμάτοις ἢ πλησμοναῖς ἢ ἐνδείαις ἢ σήψεσι καὶ ὅλως μεταβολαῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἔνδοθεν λαβούσαις. δηλοῦς δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπεῖαι αὐτῶν. γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος διεχώρησε κάτω εἰς τὸ ἔξω τὸ νόσημα καὶ αἵματος ἀφῃρημένου, καὶ ἔνδεια δὲ ἰάσατο, ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀθρόως ἐξελθόντος, ἢ μένοντος ἔνδον. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἔτι μένοντος, πῶς ἔνδον ὄντος οὐ νοσεῖ ἔτι; εἰ δὲ ἐξελήλυθε, διὰ τί; τί γὰρ αὐτὸ πέπονθεν; ἢ ὅτι ἐτρέφετο ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου. ἦν ἄρα ἡ νόσος ἑτέρα οὖσα τοῦ δαίμονος. ἔπειτα, εἰ οὐδενὸς ὄντος αἰτίου εἴσεισι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ νοσεῖ; εἰ δὲ γενομένου αἰτίου, τί δεῖ τοῦ δαίμονος πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν; τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τὸν πυρετὸν αὔταρκές ἐστιν ἐργάσασθαι. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἅμα τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθέως ὥσπερ παρυποστῆναι τῷ αἰτίῳ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἕτοιμον ὄν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅπως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅτου χάριν, δῆλον: τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἧττον καὶ τούτων τῶν δαιμονίων ἐμνήσθημεν. τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὑμῖν καταλείπω ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν ἐκεῖνο πανταχοῦ, ὡς τὸ μὲν παῤ ἡμῶν εἶδος φιλοσοφίας μεταδιωκόμενον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ἤθους μετὰ τοῦ φρονεῖν καθαρῶς ἐνδείκνυται, τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ τὸ αὔθαδες μεταδιώκουσαν, τὸ θαρραλέον μετὰ λόγου καὶ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας πολλῆς καὶ εὐλαβείας καὶ πλείστης περιωπῆς ἔχουσαν: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῷ τοιούτῳ παραβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντιώτατα κατεσκευάσθαι διὰ πάντων, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πλέον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν ἡμῖν ἂν πρέποι.
2.9.15ἐκεῖνο δὲ μάλιστα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς, τί ποτε ποιοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀκουόντων καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καταφρονεῖν πεισθέντων. δυεῖν γὰρ οὐσῶν αἱρέσεων τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ τέλους, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς ἡδονὴν: τὴν τοῦ σώματος τέλος τιθεμένης, ἑτέρας δὲ τῆς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱρουμένης, οἷς καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ εἰς θεὸν ἀνήρτηται ἡ ὄρεξις — πῶς δέ, ἐν ἄλλοις θεωρητέον — ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, ὅπερ ἦν λοιπόν, τοῦτο διώκειν παρακελεύεται: ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἔτι νεανικώτερον τὸν τῆς προνοίας κύριον καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρόνοιαν μεμψάμενος καὶ πάντας νόμους τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἀνηυρημένην τό τε σωφρονεῖν τοῦτο ἐν γέλωτι θέμενος, ἵνα μηδὲν καλὸν ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὀφθείη ὑπάρχον, ἀνεῖλε τὸ σωφρονεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἔμφυτον δικαιοσύνην τὴν τελειουμένην ἐκ λόγου καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ὅλως καθ̓ ἃ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο. ὥστε αὐτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὑτοὺς καὶ τὸ οὐ κοινὸν πρὸς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸ τῆς χρείας μόνον, εἰ μή τις τῇ φύσει τῇ αὑτοῦ κρείττων εἴη τῶν λόγων τούτων: τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς καλόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι, ὅ ποτε μεταδιώξουσι. καίτοι ἐχρῆν τοὺς ἤδη ἐγνωκότας ἐντεῦθεν διώκειν, διώκοντας δὲ πρῶτα κατορθοῦν ταῦτα ἐκ θείας φύσεως ἥκοντας: ἐκείνης γὰρ τῆς φύσεως καλὸν ἐπαίειν τῆς τὴν ἡδονὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀτιμαζούσης. οἷς δὲ ἀρετῆς μὴ μέτεστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν τὸ παράπαν κινηθέντες πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τόδε τὸ μηδένα λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς πεποιῆσθαι, ἐκλελοιπέναι δὲ παντάπασι τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον, καὶ μήτε τί ἐστιν εἰπεῖν μήτε πόσα μήτε ὅσα τεθεώρηται πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν λόγοις, μήτε ἐξ ὧν περιέσται καὶ κτήσεται, μήτε ὡς θεραπεύεται ψυχὴ μήτε ὡς καθαίρεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εἰπεῖν ʽβλέπε πρὸς θεόν̓ προὔργου τι ἐργάζεται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ πῶς βλέψει διδάξῃ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, εἴποι τις ἄν, βλέπειν καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπέχεσθαι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ εἶναι μεμνημένον μὲν ὀνόματος τοῦ θεός, συνεχόμενον δὲ ἅπασι πάθεσι, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν πειρώμενον ἐξαιρεῖν; ἀρετὴ μὲν οὖν εἰς τέλος προιοῦσα καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγενομένη μετὰ φρονήσεως θεὸν δείκνυσιν: ἄνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς θεὸς λεγόμενος ὄνομά ἐστιν.
2.9.16οὐδ’ αὖ τῷ καταφρονῆσαι κόσμου καὶ θεῶν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι γενέσθαι. καὶ γὰρ πᾶς κακὸς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καταφρονήσειεν ἂν θεῶν, καὶ μὴ πρότερόν τις κακὸς καταφρονήσας, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ πάντα κακὸς εἴη, αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἂν γεγονὼς εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς νοητοὺς λεγομένη αὐτοῖς τιμὴ ἀσυμπαθὴς ἂν γένοιτο: ὁ γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν ἔχων καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς πᾶν οὗ φιλεῖ ἀσπάζεται καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὧν τὸν πατέρα ἀγαπᾷ: ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα πατρὸς ἐκείνου. ψυχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις καὶ νοεραὶ καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ συναφεῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ ἡμῶν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀποτμηθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐκείνου ἦν; πῶς δὲ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοί; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ πρότερον: νῦν δέ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν ἐκείνοις καταφρονοῦντες μηδὲ ἐκεῖνα ἴσασιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ λόγῳ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πρόνοιαν μὴ διικνεῖσθαι εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἢ εἰς ὁτιοῦν, πῶς εὐσεβές; πῶς δὲ καὶ σύμφωνον ἑαυτοῖς λέγουσι; λέγουσι γὰρ αὑτῶν προνοεῖν αὖ μόνον. πότερα δὲ ἐκεῖ γενομένων ἢ καὶ ἐνθάδε ὄντων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ, πῶς ἦλθον; εἰ δὲ ἐνθάδε, πῶς ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε; πῶς δὲ οὐ καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐνθάδε; πόθεν γὰρ γνώσεται, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε; πῶς δέ, ὅτι ἐνθάδε ὄντες οὐκ ἐπελάθοντο αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐγένοντο κακοί; εἰ δὲ γινώσκει τοὺς μὴ γενομένους κακούς, καὶ τοὺς γενομένους γινώσκει, ἵνα διακρίνῃ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων αὐτούς. πᾶσιν οὖν παρέσται καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε, ὅστις ὁ τρόπος: ὥστε καὶ μεθέξει αὐτοῦ ὁ κόσμος. εἰ δὲ ἄπεστι τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὑμῶν ἀπέσται, καὶ οὐδ’ ἂν ἔχοιτέ τι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ τῶν μετ’ αὐτόν. ἀλλ’ εἴτε ὑμῖν πρόνοιά τις ἔρχεται ἐκεῖθεν, εἴτε ὅ τι βούλεσθε, ἀλλ’ ὅ γε κόσμος ἐκεῖθεν ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται οὐδ’ ἀπολειφθήσεται. πολὺ γὰρ μᾶλλον τῶν ὅλων ἢ τῶν μερῶν ἡ πρόνοια καὶ ἡ μέθεξις κἀκείνης τῆς ψυχῆς πολὺ μᾶλλον: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμφρόνως εἶναι. τίς γὰρ οὕτω τεταγμένος ἢ ἔμφρων τῶν ὑπερφρονούντων ἀφρόνως, ὡς τὸ πᾶν; ἢ παραβάλλειν καὶ γελοῖον καὶ πολλὴν τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἔχει, καὶ ὅ γε μὴ τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα παραβάλλων οὐκ ἔξω ἂν τοῦ ἀσεβεῖν γένοιτο, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τούτων ἔμφρονος, ἀλλὰ τυφλοῦ τινος καὶ παντάπασιν οὔτε αἴσθησιν οὔτε νοῦν ἔχοντος καὶ πόρρω τοῦ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ἰδεῖν ὄντος, ὃς τοῦτον οὐ βλέπει. τίς γὰρ ἂν μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴη, ὃς τὴν ἐν νοητῷ ἁρμονίαν ἰδὼν οὐ κινήσεται τῆς ἐν φθόγγοις αἰσθητοῖς ἀκούων; ἢ τίς γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν ἔμπειρος, ὃς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἀνάλογον καὶ τεταγμένον ἰδὼν δἰ ὀμμάτων οὐχ ἡσθήσεται; εἴπερ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὰ αὐτὰ βλέπουσιν οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς οἱ δἰ ὀμμάτων τὰ τῆς τέχνης βλέποντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες μίμημα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τοῦ ἐν νοήσει κειμένου οἷον θορυβοῦνται καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἔρχονται τοῦ ἀληθοῦς: ἐξ οὗ δὴ πάθους καὶ κινοῦνται οἱ ἔρωτες. ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἰδὼν κάλλος ἐν προσώπῳ εὖ μεμιμημένον φέρεται ἐκεῖ, ἀργὸς δέ τις οὕτως ἔσται τὴν γνώμην καὶ εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο κινήσεται, ὥστε ὁρῶν σύμπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ κάλλη, σύμπασαν δὲ συμμετρίαν καὶ τὴν μεγάλην εὐταξίαν ταύτην καὶ τὸ ἐμφαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις εἶδος καὶ πόρρωθεν οὖσιν οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμηθήσεται, καὶ σέβας αὐτὸν λαμβάνει, οἷα ἀφ̓ οἵων; οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ταῦτα κατενόησεν, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα εἶδεν.
2.9.17καίτοι, εἰ καὶ μισεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπῄει τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, διότι ἀκηκόασι Πλάτωνος πολλὰ μεμψαμένου τῷ σώματι οἷα ἐμπόδια παρέχει τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν εἰπεῖν χείρονα, ἐχρῆν ταύτην περιελόντας τῇ διανοίᾳ ἰδεῖν τὸ λοιπόν, σφαῖραν νοητὴν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ κόσμῳ εἶδος ἐμπεριέχουσαν, ψυχὰς ἐν τάξει, ἄνευ τῶν σωμάτων μέγεθος δούσας καὶ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς διάστασιν προαγαγούσας, ὡς τῷ μεγέθει τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ἀμερεῖ τῷ τοῦ παραδείγματος εἰς δύναμιν ἐξισωθῆναι: τὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μέγα ἐν δυνάμει ἐνταῦθα ἐν ὄγκῳ. καὶ εἴτε κινουμένην ταύτην τὴν σφαῖραν ἐβούλοντο νοεῖν περιαγομένην ὑπὸ θεοῦ δυνάμεως ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος τῆς πάσης ἔχοντος, εἴτε ἑστῶσαν ὡς οὔπω καὶ ἄλλο τι διοικοῦσαν, καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν εἰς ἔννοιαν τῆς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ψυχῆς διοικούσης. ἐνθέντας δὲ ἤδη καὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν παθούσης, δούσης δὲ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι μὴ θέμις φθόνον ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι, ἔχειν, εἴ τι δύναται λαμβάνειν ἕκαστα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς διανοεῖσθαι κατὰ κόσμου τοσοῦτον διδόντας τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ δυνάμεως, ὅσῳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν οὐ καλὴν οὖσαν ἐποίησεν ὅσον ἦν αὐτῇ καλλύνεσθαι μετέχειν κάλλους: ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τὰς ψυχὰς θείας οὔσας κινεῖ. εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτοὶ φαῖεν μὴ κινεῖσθαι, μηδὲ διαφόρως αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ὁρᾶν σώματα: ἀλλ’ οὕτως οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐδὲ καλὰ μαθήματα: οὐδὲ θεωρίας τοίνυν: οὐδὲ θεὸν τοίνυν. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὰ πρῶτα ταῦτα. εἰ οὖν μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα: μετ’ ἐκεῖνα τοίνυν ταῦτα καλά. ἀλλ’ ὅταν λέγωσι καταφρονεῖν τοῦ τῇδε κάλλους, καλῶς ἂν ποιοῖεν τοῦ ἐν παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶ καταφρονοῦντες, ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀκολασίαν ἡττᾶσθαι. ἀλλ’ εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν σεμνύνοιντο, εἰ αἰσχροῦ καταφρονοῖεν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καταφρονοῦσι πρότερον εἰπόντες καλὸν κακῶς διατεθέντες: ἔπειτα, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν κάλλος ἐπὶ μέρει καὶ ὅλῳ καὶ πᾶσι καὶ παντί: εἶθ̓ ὅτι ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλη καὶ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐν μέρει, οἷα δαιμόνων, ὡς θαυμάσαι τὸν πεποιηκότα καὶ πιστεῦσαι, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀμήχανον τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐχόμενον τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα, μὴ λοιδορούμενον δὲ τούτοις: καὶ εἰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἔνδον καλά, σύμφωνα ἀλλήλοις εἶναι λέγειν: εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔνδον φαῦλα, τοῖς βελτίοσιν ἠλαττῶσθαι. μήποτε δὲ οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄντως τι καλὸν ὂν τὰ ἔξω αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὰ ἔνδον: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἔξω πᾶν καλὸν κρατήσαντός ἐστι τοῦ ἔνδον. οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι καλοὶ τἄνδον αἰσχροὶ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἔξω κάλλος ἔχουσιν. εἰ δέ τις φήσει ἑωρακέναι καλοὺς ὄντως ὄντας, αἰσχροὺς δὲ τἄνδον, οἶμαι μὲν αὐτὸν μὴ ἑωρακέναι, ἀλλ’ ἄλλους εἶναι νομίζειν τοὺς καλούς: εἰ δ’ ἄρα, τὸ αἰσχρὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπίκτητον εἶναι καλοῖς τὴν φύσιν οὖσι: πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνθάδε τὰ κωλύματα εἶναι ἐλθεῖν εἰς τέλος. τῷ δὲ παντὶ καλῷ ὄντι τί ἐμπόδιον ἦν εἶναι καλῷ καὶ τἄνδον; καὶ μὴν οἷς μὴ τὸ τέλειον ἀπέδωκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡ φύσις, τούτοις τάχ̓ ἂν οὐκ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τέλος γένοιτο, ὥστε καὶ φαύλοις ἐνδέχεσθαι γενέσθαι, τῷ δὲ παντὶ οὐκ ἦν ποτε παιδὶ ὣς ἀτελεῖ εἶναι οὐδὲ προσεγίνετο αὐτῷ προιόντι τι καὶ προσετίθετο εἰς σῶμα. πόθεν γάρ; πάντα γὰρ εἶχεν. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰς ψυχὴν πλάσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ δ’ ἄρα τοῦτό τις αὐτοῖς χαρίσαιτο, ἀλλ’ οὐ κακόν τι.
2.9.18ἀλλ’ ἴσως φήσουσιν ἐκείνους μὲν τοὺς λόγους φεύγειν τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν πόρρωθεν μισοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ ἡμετέρους κατέχειν τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς αὐτῷ. τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δύο οἶκον καλὸν τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκούντων, τοῦ μὲν ψέγοντος τὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα καὶ μένοντος οὐχ ἧττον ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ψέγοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιήσαντα τεχνικώτατα πεποιηκέναι λέγοντος, τὸν δὲ χρόνον ἀναμένοντος ἕως ἂν ἥκῃ, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαλλάξεται, οὗ μηκέτι οἴκου δεήσοιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφώτερος εἶναι οἴοιτο καὶ ἑτοιμότερος ἐξελθεῖν, ὅτι οἶδε λέγειν ἐκ λίθων ἀψύχων τοὺς τοίχους καὶ ξύλων συνεστάναι καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖν τῆς ἀληθινῆς οἰκήσεως, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τῷ μὴ φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα διαφέρει, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ ποιεῖ ταῦτα δυσχεραίνων ἀλλ’ ἀγαπῶν ἡσυχῇ τὸ κάλλος τῶν λίθων. δεῖ δὲ μένειν μὲν ἐν οἴκοις σῶμα ἔχοντας κατασκευασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀγαθῆς πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ δημιουργεῖν ἀπόνως ἐχούσης. ἢ ἀδελφοὺς μὲν καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους ἀξιοῦσι προσεννέπειν, ἥλιον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἀπαξιοῦσιν ἀδελφοὺς λέγειν οὐδὲ τὴν κόσμου ψυχὴν στόματι μαινομένῳ; φαύλους μὲν οὖν ὄντας οὐ θεμιτὸν εἰς συγγένειαν συνάπτειν, ἀγαθοὺς δὲ γενομένους καὶ μὴ σώματα ὄντας, ἀλλὰ ψυχὰς ἐν σώμασι καὶ οὕτως οἰκεῖν δυναμένους ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἐγγυτάτω εἶναι οἰκήσεως ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἐν σώματι τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ κρούειν, μηδὲ ὑπακούειν τοῖς ἔξωθεν προσπίπτουσιν ἡδέσιν ἢ ὁρωμένοις, μηδ’ εἴ τι σκληρόν, ταράττεσθαι. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐ πλήττεται: οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ὑπὸ τοῦ: ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐνθάδε ὄντες ἀρετῇ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπωθοίμεθ̓ ἂν ἤδη ὑπὸ μεγέθους γνώμης τὰς μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰς δὲ οὐδὲ πληττούσας ὑπὸ ἰσχύος γενομένας. ἐγγὺς δὲ γενόμενοι τοῦ ἀπλήκτου μιμοίμεθ̓ ἂν τὴν τοῦ σύμπαντος ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων, εἰς ἐγγύτητα δὲ ὁμοιότητος ἐλθόντες σπεύδοιμεν ἂν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἐν θέᾳ καὶ ἡμῖν εἴη ἅτε καλῶς καὶ αὐτοῖς παρεσκευασμένοις φύσεσι καὶ ἐπιμελείαις: τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει. οὐδέ, εἰ μόνοι λέγοιεν θεωρεῖν δύνασθαι, πλέον ἂν θεωρεῖν αὐτοῖς γίγνοιτο, οὐδ’ ὅτι αὑτοῖς φασιν εἶναι ἐξελθεῖν ἀποθανοῦσι, τοῖς δὲ μή, ἀεὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν κοσμοῦσιν: ἀπειρίᾳ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἔξω ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο ἂν λέγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ὃν τρόπον ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται ἡ ὅλη τοῦ ἀψύχου. ἔξεστιν οὖν καὶ μὴ φιλοσωματεῖν καὶ καθαροῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ θανάτου καταφρονεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀμείνω εἰδέναι κἀκεῖνα διώκειν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δυναμένοις διώκειν καὶ διώκουσιν ἀεὶ μὴ φθονεῖν ὡς οὐ διώκουσι, μηδὲ ταὐτὸ πάσχειν τοῖς οἰομένοις τὰ ἄστρα μὴ θεῖν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις ἑστάναι αὐτὰ λέγει. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ οἴονται τὰ ἔξω βλέπειν τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἔξωθεν οὖσαν.
3.1.1Ἅπαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι κατ’ αἰτίας γίνεται καὶ ἔστι, ἢ ἄνευ αἰτίας ἄμφω: ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ αἰτίας, τὰ δὲ μετ’ αἰτίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις: ἢ τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα μετ’ αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ ὄντα τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν μετ’ αἰτίας, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ αἰτίας, ἢ οὐδὲν μετ’ αἰτίας: ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ὄντα μετ’ αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μετ’ αἰτίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀιδίων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἰς ἄλλα αἴτια ἀνάγειν οὐχ οἷόν τε πρῶτα ὄντα: ὅσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἤρτηται, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι ἐχέτω. τάς τε ἐνεργείας ἑκάστων ἀποδιδούς τις ἐπὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναγέτω: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν, τὸ τοιάνδε ἐνέργειαν ἀποδιδόναι. περὶ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ ὄντων μὲν ἀεί, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ποιουμένων ἀεὶ κατ’ αἰτίας ἅπαντα λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀναίτιον οὐ παραδεκτέον, οὔτε παρεγκλίσεσι κεναῖς χώραν διδόντα οὔτε κινήσει σωμάτων τῇ ἐξαίφνης, ἣ οὐδενὸς προηγησαμένου ὑπέστη, οὔτε ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ ἐμπλήκτῳ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος αὐτὴν εἰς τό τι πρᾶξαι ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐποίει. ἢ αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ μείζων ἄν τις ἔχοι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη τῷ μὴ αὑτῆς εἶναι, φέρεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας φορὰς ἀβουλήτους τε καὶ ἀναιτίους οὔσας. ἢ γὰρ τὸ βουλητόν — τοῦτο δὲ ἢ ἔξω ἢ εἴσω — ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητὸν ἐκίνησεν: ἤ, εἰ μηδὲν ὀρεκτὸν ἐκίνησεν, οὐδ’ ἂν ὅλως ἐκινήθη. γιγνομένων δὲ πάντων κατ’ αἰτίας τὰς μὲν προσεχεῖς ἑκάστῳ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν καὶ εἰς ταύτας ἀνάγειν: οἷον τοῦ βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγορὰν τὸ οἰηθῆναι δεῖν τινα ἰδεῖν ἢ χρέος ἀπολαβεῖν καὶ ὅλως τὸ τάδε ἢ τάδε ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁρμῆσαι, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ φανῆναι ἑκάστῳ ταδὶ ποιεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας ἀνάγειν ἔστιν, οἷον τοῦ ὑγιάσαι αἰτία ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρός. καὶ τοῦ πλουτῆσαι θησαυρὸς εὑρεθεὶς ἢ δόσις παρά του ἢ ἐκ πόνων ἢ τέχνης χρηματίσασθαι, καὶ τοῦ τέκνου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ εἴ τι συνεργὸν ἔξωθεν εἰς παιδοποιίαν ἄλλο παῤ ἄλλου ἧκον. οἷον σιτία τοιάδε ἢ καὶ ὀλίγῳ προσώτερα εὔροια εἰς παιδοποιίαν ἢ γυνὴ ἐπιτήδειος εἰς τόκους. καὶ ὅλως εἰς φύσιν.
3.1.2μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐλθόντα ἀναπαύσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω μὴ ἐθελῆσαι χωρεῖν ῥᾳθύμου ἴσως καὶ οὐ κατακούοντος τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αἴτια ἀνιόντων. διὰ τί γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν γενομένων, οἷον τῆς σελήνης φανείσης, ὁ μὲν ἥρπασεν, ὁ δὲ οὔ; καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡκόντων ὁ μὲν ἐνόσησεν, ὁ δὲ οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν πλούσιος, ὁ δὲ πένης ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων. καὶ τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη διάφορα καὶ τύχαι ἐπὶ τὰ πόρρω ἀξιοῦσιν ἰέναι: καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ οὐχ ἱστάμενοι οἱ μὲν ἀρχὰς σωματικὰς θέμενοι, οἷον ἀτόμους, τῇ τούτων φορᾷ καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ συμπλοκαῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕκαστα ποιοῦντες καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ γίνεσθαι, ᾗ ἐκεῖνα συνέστη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάσχει, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις ταύτῃ ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖναι ποιῶσιν, ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὄντα εἰσάγουσι. κἂν ἄλλα δέ τις σώματα ἀρχὰς διδῷ καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, τῇ παρὰ τούτων ἀνάγκῃ δουλεύειν ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες ἀπ’ αὐτῆς κατάγουσι πάντα, διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν καὶ ταύτην οὐ μόνον κινοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι αὐτὴν οὖσαν, καὶ πάντα οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας διανοήσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνης ἰέναι κινημάτων, οἷον ζῴου μορίων κινουμένων ἑκάστων οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονοῦντος ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων. ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν περιέχουσαν καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσαν τῇ κινήσει καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄστρων πλανωμένων τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν σχέσεσι καὶ σχηματισμοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ τούτων προρρήσεως πιστούμενοι, ἕκαστα ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῦσι. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἀεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα ἀνιέναι δἰ αὐτῶν γενόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γενόμενα δουλεύειν τε τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα, ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγοι, εἱμαρμένην ἕτερον τρόπον εἰσάγων φανεῖται. διττοὺς δὲ ἄν τις θέμενος καὶ τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ̓ ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. λεχθήσεται δὲ περὶ τούτων. νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πρώτους ἰτέον τῷ λόγῳ: εἶτ̓ ἐφεξῆς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκεπτέον.
3.1.3σώμασι μὲν οὖν ἐπιτρέψαι τὰ πάντα εἴτε ἀτόμοις εἴτε τοῖς στοιχείοις καλουμένοις καὶ τῇ ἐκ τούτων ἀτάκτῳ φορᾷ τάξιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡγουμένην γεννᾶν ἀμφοτέρως μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδυνατώτερον δέ, εἰ οἷόν τε λέγειν, τὸ ἐξ ἀτόμων. καὶ περὶ τούτων πολλοὶ εἴρηνται λόγοι ἀληθεῖς. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θεῖτό τις τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον οὔτε τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνάγκην οὔτε τὴν ἄλλως εἱμαρμένην ἕπεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι. αὗται τοίνυν κινήσονται τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ κάτω — ἔστω γάρ τι κάτω — τὴν δ’ ἐκ πλαγίων, ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλαι κατὰ ἄλλα. οὐδὲν δὴ τακτῶς, τάξεώς γε οὐκ οὔσης, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον τοῦτο, ὅτε γέγονε, πάντως. ὥστε οὔτε πρόρρησις οὔτε μαντικὴ τὸ παράπαν ἂν εἴη, οὔτε εἴ τις ἐκ τέχνης — πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτάκτοις τέχνη; — οὔτε εἴ τις ἐξ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἐπιπνοίας: δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡρισμένον τὸ μέλλον εἶναι. καὶ σώμασι μὲν ἔσται παρὰ τῶν ἀτόμων πάσχειν πληττομένοις, ἅπερ ἂν ἐκεῖναι φέρωσιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης: τὰ δὲ δὴ ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη τίσι κινήσεσι τῶν ἀτόμων ἀναθήσει τις; ποία γὰρ πληγὴ ἢ κάτω φερομένης ἢ ὁπουοῦν προσκρουούσης ἐν λογισμοῖς τοιοῖσδε ἢ ὁρμαῖς τοιαῖσδε, ἢ ὅλως ἐν λογισμοῖς ἢ ὁρμαῖς ἢ νοήσεσι, ποιήσει ἀναγκαίαις εἶναι ἢ ὅλως εἶναι; ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐναντιῶται ψυχὴ τοῖς τοῦ σώματος παθήμασι; κατὰ ποίας δὲ φορὰς ἀτόμων ὁ μὲν γεωμετρικὸς ἀναγκασθήσεται εἶναι, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ἐπισκέψεται, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἔσται; ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον καὶ τὸ ζῴοις εἶναι ἀπολεῖται φερομένων ᾗ τὰ σώματα ἄγει ὠθοῦντα ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ ἄψυχα σώματα. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα σώματα αἴτια τῶν πάντων τιθεμένους καὶ ὅτι θερμαίνειν μὲν καὶ ψύχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ φθείρειν δὲ τὰ ἀσθενέστερα δύναται ταῦτα, ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα ψυχὴ ἐργάζεται παρὰ τούτων ἂν γίνοιτο, ἀλλ’ ἀφ̓ ἑτέρας δεῖ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς ἰέναι.
3.1.4ἀλλ’ ἆρα μία τις ψυχὴ διὰ παντὸς διήκουσα περαίνει τὰ πάντα ἑκάστου ταύτῃ κινουμένου ὡς μέρους, ᾗ τὸ ὅλον ἄγει, φερομένων δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν αἰτίων ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη τὴν τούτων ἐφεξῆς συνέχειαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν εἱμαρμένην; οἷον εἰ φυτοῦ ἐκ ῥίζης τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πάντα διήκουσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκὴν ποίησίν τε καὶ πεῖσιν διοίκησιν μίαν καὶ οἷον εἱμαρμένην τοῦ φυτοῦ τις εἶναι λέγοι. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εἱμαρμένης αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τὸν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀναιρεῖ. ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν κινουμένοις ἄλογον τὸ καθ̓ εἱμαρμένην λέγειν κινεῖσθαι — οὐ γὰρ αλλο μὲν τὸ ἐνδεδωκὸς τὴν κίνησιν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ παραδεξάμενον καὶ παῤ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁρμῇ κεχρημένον, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ κινῆσαν τὸ σκέλος — τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἓν ἔσται τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παῤ ἄλλου κατ’ αἰτίας τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἐφ̓ ἕτερον ἐχούσας, οὐ δὴ ἀληθὲς κατ’ αἰτίας τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἓν ἔσται τὰ πάντα. ὥστε οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς οὔτε τι ἡμέτερον ἔργον: οὐδὲ λογιζόμεθα αὐτοί, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου λογισμὸς τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλεύματα: οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ πόδες λακτίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς διὰ μερῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλάς τε καὶ αἰσχρὰς πράξεις παῤ ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τὴν γοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθέναι.
3.1.5ἀλλ’ ἴσως μὲν οὐχ οὕτως ἕκαστα περαίνεται, ἡ δὲ φορὰ διοικοῦσα πάντα καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄστρων κίνησις οὕτως ἕκαστα τίθησιν, ὡς ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσεως ἔχῃ μεσουρανήσεσι καὶ ἀνατολαῖς, δύσεσί τε καὶ παραβολαῖς. ἀπὸ τούτων γοῦν μαντευόμενοι προλέγουσι περί τε τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐσομένων περί τε ἑκάστου, ὅπως τε τύχης καὶ διανοίας οὐχ ἥκιστα ἕξει. ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων συμπαθείας αὐξόμενά τε καὶ μειούμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα παῤ αὐτῶν πάσχοντα, τούς τε τόπους τοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι κατά τε τὴν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σχέσιν καὶ προς ἥλιον μάλιστα: ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τοῖς τόποις οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ χρόας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἐπιτηδεύματά τε καὶ ἤθη. κυρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πάντων φορά. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκείνοις ἀνατίθησι τὰ ἡμέτερα, βουλὰς καὶ πάθη, κακίας τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδὲν διδοὺς λίθοις φερομένοις καταλείπει εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι παῤ αὑτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν φύσεως ἔργον. ἀλλὰ χρὴ διδόναι μὲν τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῖν, ἥκειν δὲ εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα ἤδη ὄντα καὶ οἰκεῖα ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἄττα, καὶ διαιρούμενον, τίνα μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐργαζόμεθα, τίνα δὲ πάσχομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάντα ἐκείνοις ἀνατιθέναι: καὶ ἰέναι μὲν παρὰ τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς ἡμᾶς οἷον θερμότητας ἢ ψύξεις ἐν τῇ κράσει, ἰέναι δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν γονέων: τοῖς γοῦν γονεῦσιν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καί τινα τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοίων ὄντων τοῖς εἴδεσι παρὰ τοὺς τόπους ἔν γε τοῖς ἤθεσι πλείστη παραλλαγὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἐνορᾶται, ὡς ἂν ἀπ’ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς τῶν τοιούτων ἰόντων. αἵ τε πρὸς τὰς κράσεις τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐναντιώσεις καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρεπόντως λέγοιντο ἄν. εἰ δ’ ὅτι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν ἰδόντες περὶ ἑκάστων λέγουσι τὰ γιγνόμενα, παῤ ἐκείνων ποιεῖσθαι τεκμαίρονται, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ οἱ ὄρνεις ποιητικοὶ ὧν σημαίνουσιν εἶεν καὶ πάντα, εἰς ἃ βλέποντες οἱ μάντεις προλέγουσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε ἀκριβέστερον ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο περὶ τούτων. ἅ τις ἂν ἰδὼν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν, ἣν εἶχον ὅτε ἕκαστος ἐγίνετο, προείπῃ, ταῦτά φασι καὶ γίνεσθαι παῤ αὐτῶν οὐ σημαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιούντων. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ εὐγενείας λέγωσιν ὡς ἐξ ἐνδόξων τῶν πατέρων καὶ μητέρων, πῶς ἔνι ποιεῖσθαι λέγειν ταῦτα, ἃ προυπάρχει περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς πρὶν σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτην τῶν ἄστρων, ἀφ̓ ἧς προλέγουσι; καὶ μὴν καὶ γονέων τύχας ἀπὀ τῶν παίδων τῆς γενέσεως καὶ παίδων διαθέσεις οἷαι ἔσονται καὶ ὁποίαις συνέσονται τύχαις ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων περὶ τῶν οὔπω γεγονότων λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν θανάτους καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνάπαλίν τε ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνα. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἡ ἐπὶ ἑκάστου σχέσις τῶν ἄστρων ποιοῖ, ἃ ἤδη ἐκ πατέρων οὕτως ἕξειν λέγεται; ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερα ἔσται τὰ ποιοῦντα, ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνα ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης ἡ ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι πρὸς τοὺς γονέας οἴκοθέν φασι καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος ἰέναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ φορᾶς ἄστρων. εὔλογόν τε κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ ἄλλα ἅμα ζῷά τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἅμα γίνεσθαι: οἷς ἅπασιν ἐχρῆν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷς ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις. πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν ἀνθρώπους, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων;
3.1.6ἀλλὰ γὰρ γίγνεται μὲν ἕκαστα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις, ἵππος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἵππου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιόσδε, ὅτι ἐκ τοιοῦδε: ἔστω δὲ συνεργὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ συγχωροῦσα τὸ πολὺ τοῖς γινομένοις: ἔστωσαν δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ σωματικῶς διδόντες, θερμότητας καὶ ψύξεις καὶ σωμάτων κράσεις ἐπακολουθούσας. πῶς οὖν τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα οὐ δοκεῖ κράσει σωμάτων δουλεύειν, οἷον γραμματικός τις καὶ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κυβευτικὸς καὶ τῶνδέ τις εὑρετής; πονηρία δὲ ἤθους παῤ ἀστέρων θεῶν ὄντων πῶς ἂν δοθείη; καὶ ὅλως ὅσα λέγονται διδόναι κακὰ κακούμενοι, ὅτι δύνουσι καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ γῆν φέρονται, ὥσπερ διάφορόν τι πασχόντων, εἰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δύνοιεν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ σφαίρας οὐρανίας φερομένων καὶ πρὸς τὴν γῆν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχόντων σχέσιν. οὐδὲ λεκτέον, ὡς ἄλλος ἄλλον ἰδὼν τῶν θεῶν κατ’ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην στάσιν χείρων ἢ κρείττων γίνεται: ὥστε εὐπαθοῦντας μὲν ἡμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν, κακοῦν δέ, εἰ τἀναντία: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χρείαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον: ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὁ ὄρνις, σημαίνειν ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις.
3.1.7λοιπὸν δὲ ἰδεῖν τὴν ἐπιπλέκουσαν καὶ οἷον συνείρουσαν ἀλλήλοις πάντα καὶ τό πως ἐφ̓ ἑκάστου ἐπιφέρουσαν ἀρχὴν τιθεμένην μίαν, ἀφ̓ ἧς πάντα κατὰ λόγους σπερματικοὺς περαίνεται. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐγγὺς ἐκείνης τῆς πᾶσαν καὶ σχέσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἡμετέραν τε καὶ πᾶσαν πάντων ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἥκειν λεγούσης, εἰ καὶ βούλεταί τι ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκάστοις χαρίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ παῤ ἡμῶν ποιεῖν τι. ἔχει μέντοι τὴν πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκην, καὶ πάντων εἰλημμένων τῶν αἰτίων οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον μὴ οὐ γίγνεσθαι: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ κωλῦσον ἢ ἄλλως γενέσθαι ποιῆσον, εἰ πάντα εἴληπται ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὄντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ὡρμημένα ἡμῖν οὐδὲν καταλείψει, ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὠθῇ. αἵ τε γὰρ φαντασίαι τοῖς προηγησαμένοις αἵ τε ὁρμαὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἔσονται, ὄνομά τε μόνον τὸ ἐφ̓ ἡμῖν ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ὁρμῶμεν ἡμεῖς, ταύτῃ τι πλέον ἔσται τῆς ὁρμῆς κατ’ ἐκεῖνα γενομένης: τοιοῦτόν τε τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔσται, οἷον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τὸ τῶν νηπίων καθ̓ ὁρμὰς τυφλὰς ἰόντων καὶ τὸ τῶν μαινομένων: ὁρμῶσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι: καὶ νὴ Δία αἱ πυρὸς ὁρμαὶ καὶ πάντων ὅσα δουλεύοντα τῇ αὑτῶν κατασκευῇ φέρεται κατὰ ταύτην. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πάντες ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς ταύτης ἄλλας αἰτίας ζητοῦντες οὐχ ἵστανται ὡς ἐπ’ ἀρχῆς ταύτης.
3.1.8τίς οὖν ἄλλη αἰτία παρὰ ταύτας ἐπελθοῦσα ἀναίτιόν τε οὐδὲν καταλείψει ἀκολουθίαν τε τηρήσει καὶ τάξιν ἡμᾶς τέ τι εἶναι συγχωρήσει προρρήσεις τε καὶ μαντείας οὐκ ἀναιρήσει; ψυχὴν δὴ δεῖ ἀρχὴν οὖσαν ἄλλην ἐπεισφέροντας εἰς τὰ ὄντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστου μετὰ ταύτης, ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐ σμικρᾶς οὔσης, πλέκειν τὰ πάντα, οὐ γιγνομένης καὶ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ σπερμάτων, ἀλλὰ πρωτουργοῦ αἰτίας οὔσης. ἄνευ μὲν οὖν σώματος οὖσα κυριωτάτη τε αὑτῆς καὶ ἐλευθέρα καὶ κοσμικῆς αἰτίας ἔξω: ἐνεχθεῖσα δὲ εἰς σῶμα οὐκέτι πάντα κυρία, ὡς ἂν μεθ̓ ἑτέρων ταχθεῖσα. τύχαι δὲ τὰ κύκλῳ πάντα, οἷς συνέπεσεν ἐλθοῦσα εἰς μέσον, τὰ πολλὰ ἤγαγον, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν διὰ ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ κρατοῦσαν αὐτὴν ταῦτα ὅπῃ ἐθέλει ἄγειν. πλείω δὲ κρατεῖ ἡ ἀμείνων, ἐλάττω δὲ ἡ χείρων. ἡ γὰρ κράσει σώματός τι ἐνδιδοῦσα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι ἠνάγκασται ἢ πενίαις ταπεινὴ ἢ πλούτοις χαῦνος ἢ δυνάμεσι τύραννος. ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀντέσχεν, ἡ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἠλλοίωσεν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἠλλοιώθη, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἑτεροιῶσαι, τοῖς δὲ συγχωρῆσαι μὴ μετὰ κάκης.
3.1.9ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ὅσα προαιρέσει καὶ τύχαις κραθέντα γίνεται: τί γὰρ ἂν ἔτι καὶ ἄλλο εἴη; πάντων δὲ ληφθέντων τῶν αἰτίων πάντα πάντως γίνεται: ἐν τοῖς ἔξωθεν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ τῆς φορᾶς συντελεῖται. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀλλοιωθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχὴ πράττῃ τι καὶ ὁρμᾷ οἷον τυφλῇ τῇ φορᾷ χρωμένη, οὐχὶ ἑκούσιον τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐδὲ τὴν διάθεσιν λεκτέον: καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ παῤ αὑτῆς χείρων οὖσα οὐκ ὀρθαῖς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ ἡγεμονούσαις ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ᾖ χρωμένη. λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμόνα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἔχουσα ὁρμᾷ, ταύτην μόνην τὴν ὁρμὴν φατέον εἶναι ἐφ̓ ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἦλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἔνδοθεν ἀπὸ καθαρᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πρώτης ἡγουμένης καὶ κυρίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ πλάνην ἐξ ἀγνοίας παθούσης ἢ ἧτταν ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἳ προσελθοῦσαι ἄγουσι καὶ ἕλκουσι καὶ οὐκέτι ἔργα ἐῶσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα παῤ ἡμῶν.
3.1.10τέλος δή φησιν ὁ λόγος πάντα μὲν σημαίνεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι κατ’ αἰτίας μέν, διττὰς δὲ ταύτας: καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δἰ ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς κύκλῳ. πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθὸν παῤ αὑτῶν πράττειν ὅσα πράττουσι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐμποδιζομένας τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν, πάσχειν τε μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν μὴ φρονεῖν ἄλλα αἴτια εἶναι: καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως ὀρθὸν καθ̓ εἱμαρμένην λέγειν πράττειν, οἷς γε καὶ δοκεῖ ἔξωθεν τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἴτιον εἶναι: τὰ δὲ ἄριστα παῤ ἡμῶν. ταύτης γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τῆς φύσεως ἐσμέν, ὅταν μόνοι ὦμεν: καὶ τούς γε σπουδαίους καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, καθ̓ ὅσον ἄν ἀναπνεύσωσι συγχωρηθέντες τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν λαβόντας τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅταν φρονῶσι, μόνον δὲ οὐ κωλυθέντας.
3.2.1Τὸ μὲν τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ διδόναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ σύστασιν ὡς ἄλογον καὶ ἀνδρὸς οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε αἴσθησιν κεκτημένου, δῆλόν που καὶ πρὸ λόγου καὶ πολλοὶ ἱκανοὶ καταβέβληνται δεικνύντες τοῦτο λόγοι: τὸ δὲ τίς ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἕκαστα καὶ πεποιῆσθαι, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐνίων ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινομένων ἀπορεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς προνοίας συμβαίνει, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπῆλθε μηδὲ εἶναι εἰπεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ κακοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐστι γεγενημένος ὁ κόσμος, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸν λόγον λαβόντας. πρόνοιαν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἐφ̓ ἑκάστῳ, ἥ ἐστι λόγος πρὸ ἔργου ὅπως δεῖ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι τι τῶν δεόντων πραχθῆναι ἢ ὅπως τι εἴη ἢ μὴ εἴη ἡμῖν, ἀφείσθω: ἣν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς λέγομεν πρόνοιαν εἶναι, ταύτην ὑποθέμενοι τὰ ἑξῆς συνάπτωμεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπό τινος χρόνου πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα τὸν κόσμον ἐλέγομεν γεγονέναι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐτιθέμεθα, οἵαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, προόρασίν τινα καὶ λογισμὸν θεοῦ, ὡς ἂν γένοιτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἄριστα κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἴη. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ οὔποτε μὴ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδέ φαμεν παρεῖναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ ἀκολούθως λέγοιμεν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι τὸ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτὸ εἶναι, καὶ νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον ὄντα, ἀλλ’ ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος καὶ αἴτιος τούτου ἀρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος τούτου ὄντος καὶ δἰ ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεί, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον: ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθινὸς καὶ πρῶτος, οὐ διαστὰς ἀφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ἀσθενὴς τῷ μερισμῷ οὐδὲ ἐλλιπὴς οὐδὲ τοῖς μέρεσι γενόμενος ἅτε ἑκάστου μὴ ἀποσπασθέντος τοῦ ὅλου: ἀλλ’ ἡ πᾶσα ζωὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ἐν ἑνὶ ζῶσα καὶ νοοῦσα ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸ μέρος παρέχεται ὅλον καὶ πᾶν αὐτῷ φίλον οὐ χωρισθὲν ἄλλο ἀπ’ ἄλλου οὐδὲ ἕτερον γεγενημένον μόνον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεξενωμένον: ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἀδικεῖ ἄλλο ἄλλο οὐδ’ ἂν ᾖ ἐναντίον. πανταχοῦ δὲ ὂν ἓν καὶ τέλειον ὁπουοῦν ἕστηκέ τε καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν οὐκ ἔχει: οὐδὲ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο. τίνος γὰρ ἂν ἕνεκα ποιοῖ ἐλλεῖπον οὐδενί; τί δ’ ἂν λόγος λόγον ἐργάσαιτο ἢ νοῦς νοῦν ἄλλον; ἀλλὰ τὸ δἰ αὑτοῦ δύνασθαί τι ποιεῖν ἦν ἄρα οὐκ εὖ ἔχοντος πάντη, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ ποιοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου, καθ̓ ὅ τι καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστι: τοῖς δὲ πάντη μακαρίοις ἐν αὑτοῖς ἑστάναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὅπερ εἰσί, μόνον ἀρκεῖ, τὸ δὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἑαυτοὺς ἐξ αὑτῶν παρακινοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω μακάριον κἀκεῖνο, ὡς ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιεῖν μεγάλα αὖ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτοῦ μένειν οὐ σμικρὰ ποιεῖν.
3.2.2ὑφίσταται γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἑνὸς κόσμος οὗτος οὐχ εἷς ἀληθῶς: πολυς γοῦν καὶ εἰς πλῆθος μεμερισμένος καὶ ἄλλο ἀπ’ ἄλλου ἀφεστηκὸς καὶ ἀλλότριον γεγενημένον καὶ οὐκέτι φιλία μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔχθρα τῇ διαστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλλείψει ἐξ ἀνάγκης πολέμιον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ αὑτῷ το μέρος, ἀλλὰ σωζόμενον τῷ ἄλλῳ πολέμιόν ἐστιν ὑφ̓ οὗ σώζεται: γέγονε δὲ οὐ λογισμῷ τοῦ δεῖν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ φύσεως δευτέρας ἀνάγκῃ: οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο οἷον ἔσχατον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. πρῶτον γὰρ ἦν καὶ πολλὴν δύναμιν ἔχον καὶ πᾶσαν: καὶ ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἄνευ τοῦ ζητεῖν ποιῆσαι. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν αὐτόθεν οὐκ εἶχεν, εἰ ἐζήτει, οὐδ’ ἂν ἦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ ἦν οἷον τεχνίτης ἀφ̓ αὑτοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ἐπακτόν, ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν λαβὼν τοῦτο. νοῦς τοίνυν δούς τι ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ὕλην ἀτρεμὴς καὶ ἥσυχος τὰ πάντα εἰργάζετο: τοῦτο δὲ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥυείς. τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορρεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ παρὼν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι νοῦς. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντων καὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδενὶ μαχομένου οὐδὲ διαφερομένου οὐδὲ ἐμποδίου ὄντος, γίνεταί τι ἤδη ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἀλλαχοῦ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμποδίσειεν ἂν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἀπαναλώσειεν ἄλλο ἄλλο, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν καὶ διέστη καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν ἐγένετο φίλα καὶ προσηνῆ, τὰ δὲ ἐχθρὰ καὶ πολέμια, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑκόντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄκοντα ἀλλήλοις ἐλυμήνατο καὶ φθειρόμενα θάτερα γένεσιν ἀλλήλοις εἰργάσατο καὶ μίαν ἐφ̓ αὑτοῖς τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ὅμως ἁρμονίαν ἐνεστήσατο φθεγγομένων μὲν ἑκάστων τὰ αὑτῶν, τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ πᾶν τόδε οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον νοῦ καὶ λόγου. διὸ καὶ ἐδεήθη ἁρμονίας συνελθόντος νοῦ καὶ ἀνάγκης, τῆς μὲν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἑλκούσης καὶ εἰς ἀλογίαν φερούσης ἅτε οὔσης ἀλόγου, ἄρχοντος δὲ νοῦ ὅμως ἀνάγκης. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοητὸς μόνον λόγος, καὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄλλος μόνον λόγος: εἰ δέ τι ἐγένετο ἄλλο, ἔδει ἔλαττον ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ λόγον, μηδ’ αὖ ὕλην εἶναι: ἄκοσμον γάρ: μικτὸν ἄρα. καὶ εἰς ἃ μὲν λήγει ὕλη καὶ λόγος, ὅθεν δὲ ἄρχεται ψυχὴ ἐφεστῶσα τῷ μεμιγμένῳ, ἣν οὐ κακοπαθεῖν δεῖ νομίζειν ῥᾷστα διοικοῦσαν τόδε τὸ πᾶν τῇ οἷον παρουσίᾳ.
3.2.3καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότως οὐδὲ τούτῳ μέμψαιτο ὡς οὐ καλῷ ἢ τῶν μετὰ σώματος οὐκ ἀρίστῳ, οὐδ’ αὖ τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ αἰτιάσαιτο πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐκ λογισμοῦ γενομένου, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀμείνονος γεννώσης κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον ἑαυτῇ: ἔπειτα οὐδ’ εἰ λογισμὸς εἴη ὁ ποιήσας, αἰσχυνεῖται τῷ ποιηθέντι: ὅλον γάρ τι ἐποίησε πάγκαλον καὶ αὔταρκες καὶ φίλον αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὑτοῦ τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡς αὑτῷ προσφόροις. ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας: τά τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, τό τε ὅλον σκοπούμενον μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα σμικρὰ βλέπειν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου, ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντος, οἷον εἰ παντὸς ζῴου τρίχα ἢ τῶν χαμαὶ δάκτυλον ἀμελήσας τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον, δαιμονίαν τινὰ ὄψιν, βλέποι, ἢ νὴ Δία τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀφεὶς τὸ εὐτελέστατον λαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸ ὅλον γένος παρείς, οἷον τὸ ἀνθρώπου, Θερσίτην εἰς μέσον ἄγοι. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ γενόμενον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ σύμπας, τοῦτον θεωρῶν τάχ̓ ἂν ἀκούσαις παῤ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐμὲ πεποίηκε θεὸς κἀγὼ ἐκεῖθεν ἐγενόμην τέλειος ἐκ πάντων ζῴων καὶ ἱκανὸς ἐμαυτῷ καὶ αὐτάρκης οὐδενὸς δεόμενος, ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα καὶ συμπάντων τῶν γεννητῶν φύσις καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ δαιμόνων δῆμοι καὶ ψυχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀρετῇ εὐδαίμονες. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γῆ μὲν κεκόσμηται φυτοῖς τε πᾶσι καὶ ζῴοις παντοδαποῖς καὶ μέχρι θαλάττης ψυχῆς ἦλθε δύναμις, ἀὴρ δὲ πᾶς καὶ αἰθὴρ καὶ οὐρανὸς σύμπας ψυχῆς ἄμοιρος, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ ψυχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι, ἄστροις ζῆν διδοῦσαι καὶ τῇ εὐτάκτῳ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀιδίῳ περιφορᾷ νοῦ μιμήσει κύκλῳ φερομένῃ ἐμφρόνως περὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεί: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω ζητεῖ. πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐφίεται μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τυγχάνει δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα: ἐξήρτηται γὰρ πᾶς μὲν οὐρανὸς ἐκείνου, πᾶσα δὲ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ καὶ οἱ ἐν μέρεσιν ἐμοῖς θεοί, καὶ τὰ ζῷα δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ εἴ τι ἄψυχον δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐν ἐμοί. καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν δοκεῖ μόνον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἤδη λόγον ἔχει, τὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ζωήν. οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἴσα ἀπαιτεῖν δεῖ τοῖς μὴ ἴσοις: οὐδὲ γὰρ δακτύλων τὸ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμῶν τοῦτο, δακτύλου δὲ ἄλλο, τὸ εἶναι οἶμαι δακτύλῳ καὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχειν.
3.2.4πῦρ δὲ εἰ ὑπὸ ὕδατος σβέννυται καὶ ἕτερον ὑπὸ πυρὸς φθείρεται, μὴ θαυμάσῃς. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν, οὐδ’ ἀχθὲν ὑφ̓ αὑτοῦ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐφθάρη, καὶ ἦλθε δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ’ ἄλλου φθορᾶς, καὶ ἡ φθορὰ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἄν, εἰ οὕτω, δεινὸν φέροι, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ φθαρέντος πυρὸς πῦρ ἄλλο. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ οὐρανῷ ἕκαστον μένει, ἐν δὲ τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ πᾶν μὲν ἀεὶ ζῇ καὶ ὅσα τίμια καὶ κύρια μέρη, αἱ δὲ ἀμείβουσαι ψυχαὶ σώματα ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλῳ εἴδει γίγνονται, καὶ ὅταν δὲ δύνηται, ἔξω γενέσεως στᾶσα ψυχὴ μετὰ τῆς πάσης ἐστὶ ψυχῆς. σώματα δὲ ζῇ κατ’ εἶδος καὶ καθ̓ ὅλα ἕκαστα, εἴπερ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ζῷα ἔσται καὶ τραφήσεται: ζωὴ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένη, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος. ἔδει δὲ κίνησιν ἐξ ἀκινησίας εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὑτῇ ζωῆς τὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς γεγονέναι ἄλλην, οἷον ἐμπνέουσαν καὶ οὐκ ἀτρεμοῦσαν ζωὴν ἀναπνοὴν τῆς ἠρεμούσης οὖσαν. ζῴων δὲ εἰς ἄλληλα ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ ἐπιθέσεις καὶ φθοραί: οὐ γὰρ ἀίδια ἐγένετο. ἐγένετο δέ, ὅτι λόγος πᾶσαν ὕλην κατελάμβανε καὶ εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ πάντα ὄντων αὐτῶν ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω οὐρανῷ: πόθεν γὰρ ἂν ἦλθε μὴ ὄντων ἐκεῖ; ἀνθρώπων δὲ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀδικίαι ἔχοιεν μὲν ἂν αἰτίαν ἔφεσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀδυναμίᾳ δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν σφαλλόμενοι ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους τρέπονται. ἴσχουσι δὲ ἀδικοῦντες δίκας κακυνόμενοί τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐνεργείαις κακίας ταττόμενοί τε εἰς τόπον χείρονα: οὐ γὰρ μήποτε ἐκφύγῃ μηδὲν τὸ ταχθὲν ἐν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς νόμῳ. ἔστι δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν τάξις οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀνομίαν νόμος, ὥς τις οἴεται, ἵνα γένοιτο ἐκεῖνα διὰ τὰ χείρω καὶ ἵνα φαίνοιτο, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἐπακτὸν οὖσαν: καὶ ὅτι τάξις ἀταξία καὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὅτι λόγος παρανομία καὶ ἄνοια οὐ τῶν βελτιόνων τὰ χείρω πεποιηκότων, ἀλλὰ τῶν δέχεσθαι δεομένων τὰ ἀμείνω φύσει τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἢ συντυχίᾳ καὶ κωλύσει ἄλλων δέξασθαι οὐ δεδυνημένων. τὸ γὰρ ἐπακτῷ χρώμενον τάξει τούτου ἂν οὐ τύχοι ἢ δἰ αὑτὸ παῤ αὑτοῦ ἢ δἰ ἄλλο παῤ ἄλλου: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων πάσχει καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ἱεμένων. τὰ δὲ δἰ αὑτὰ ἔχοντα κίνησιν αὐτεξούσιον ζῷα ῥέποι ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὰ βελτίω, ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω. τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω τροπὴν παρὰ τοῦ ζητεῖν ἴσως οὐκ ἄξιον: ὀλίγη γὰρ τροπὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς γενομένη προιοῦσα ταύτῃ πλέον καὶ μεῖζον τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον ἀεὶ ποιεῖ: καὶ σῶμα δὲ σύνεστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπιθυμία: καὶ παροφθὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ μὴ ἀναληφθὲν αὐτίκα καὶ αἵρεσιν εἰς ὅ τις ἐξέπεσεν εἰργάσατο. ἕπεταί γε μὴν δίκη: καὶ οὐκ ἄδικον τοιόνδε γενόμενον ἀκόλουθα πάσχειν τῇ διαθέσει, οὐδ’ ἀπαιτητέον τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια. οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ μόνοι εὐδαίμονες: διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ εὐδαίμονες.
3.2.5εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἔξεστιν εὐδαίμοσιν εἶναι, εἴ τινες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀδυναμίας οὐ δυνηθείσας καλῶς ἐναγωνίσασθαι, οὗ δὴ ἆθλα ἀρετῆς πρόκειται. καὶ μὴ θείους δὲ γενομένους θεῖον βίον μὴ ἔχειν τί δεινόν; πενίαι δὲ καὶ νόσοι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς οὐδέν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς σύμφορα: καὶ ἀνάγκη νοσεῖν σώματα ἔχουσι. καὶ οὐκ ἀχρεῖα δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα παντάπασιν εἰς σύνταξιν καὶ συμπλήρωσιν τοῦ ὅλου. ὡς γὰρ φθαρέντων τινῶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κατεχρήσατο τοῖς φθαρεῖσιν εἰς γένεσιν ἄλλων — οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῇ ἐκφεύγει τὸ ὑπὸ τούτου καταλαμβάνεσθαι — οὕτω καὶ κακωθέντος σώματος καὶ μαλακισθείσης δὲ ψυχῆς τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πασχούσης τὰ νόσοις καὶ κακίᾳ καταληφθέντα ὑπεβλήθη ἄλλῳ εἱρμῷ καὶ ἄλλῃ τάξει. καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκε τοῖς παθοῦσιν, οἷον πενία καὶ νόσος, ἡ δὲ κακία εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη. καὶ γὰρ ἐγρηγορότας ἐποίησε καὶ νοῦν καὶ σύνεσιν ἐγείρει πονηρίας ὁδοῖς ἀντιταττομένων, καὶ μανθάνειν δὲ ποιεῖ οἷον ἀγαθὸν ἀρετὴ παραθέσει κακῶν ὧν οἱ πονηροὶ ἔχουσι. καὶ οὐ γέγονε τὰ κακὰ διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ὅτι χρῆται καὶ αὐτοῖς εἰς δέον, ἐπείπερ ἐγένετο, εἴρηται. τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης, καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀμόρφοις γενομένοις εἰς ἑτέρας μορφὰς χρῆσθαι ἱκανὴν εἶναι. ὅλως δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θετέον: ἀνάγκη δὲ ἔλλειψιν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. τὸ οὖν ἄλλο, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕτερον ἀγαθοῦ ὂν ποιεῖ τὴν ἔλλειψιν: τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἦν. διὸ οὐδὲ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά, ὅτι τε ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐλάττω πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἕτερά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐκεῖθεν λαβόντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ γενόμενα τῷ πόρρω.
3.2.6τὸ δὲ παῤ ἀξίαν, ὅταν ἀγαθοὶ κακὰ ἔχωσι, φαῦλοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ’ αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγεται: ἀλλὰ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τούτῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πονηρῷ; πῶς γὰρ καλὸν νέμειν οὕτως; ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οὐ ποιεῖ προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ κακοῦ τοῦ ἐν φαύλοις, τί διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως; ὥσπερ οὐδέ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καλὸς τὸ σῶμα, ὁ δὲ αἰσχρός. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐκείνως ἂν ἦν, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι: προνοίας δὲ ἀρίστης ἐκεῖνο ἦν. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δεσπότας εἶναι καὶ ἄρχοντας τῶν πόλεων τοὺς κακούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς δούλους εἶναι, οὐ πρέποντα ἦν, οὐδ’. εἰ προσθήκην ταῦτα μὴ φέρει εἰς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ κτῆσιν. καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἀνομώτατα ἂν πράξειεν ἄρχων πονηρός: καὶ κρατοῦσι δὲ ἐν πολέμοις οἱ κακοὶ καὶ παντοῖα αἰσχρὰ δρῶσιν αἰχμαλώτους λαβόντες. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, ὅπως προνοίας οὔσης γίνεται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν ὁτιοῦν μέλλοντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μέρη ὀρθῶς ἔχει τάττειν ἐν δέοντι αὐτῷ καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἔμψυχα ᾖ καὶ ζωὴν ἔχῃ καὶ λογικὰ ᾖ, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς τοῦτο εἶναι, τὸ μηδενὸς ἠμεληκέναι. εἰ οὖν φαμεν ἐκ νοῦ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἠρτῆσθαι καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα ἐληλυθέναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ δεικνύναι, ὅπῃ ἕκαστα τούτων καλῶς ἔχει.
3.2.7πρῶτον τοίνυν ληπτέον, ὡς τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ ζητοῦντας χρὴ μὴ πάντη ἀπαιτεῖν ἀλλ’ ὅσον τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ ἔχει, μηδ’ ἐν δευτέροις ζητεῖν τὰ πρῶτα, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ σῶμα ἔχει, συγχωρεῖν καὶ παρὰ τούτου ἰέναι τι εἰς τὸ πᾶν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ὅσον ἠδύνατο δέξασθαι τὸ μῖγμα, εἰ μηδὲν τούτου ἐλλείπει: οἷον, εἴ τις ἐσκόπει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν αἰσθητὸν ὅστις κάλλιστος, οὐκ ἂν δήπου τῷ ἐν νῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἠξίωσε τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἀποδεδέχθαι τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ ὅμως ἐν σαρξὶ καὶ νεύροις καὶ ὀστέοις ὄντα κατέλαβε τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα καλλῦναι καὶ τὸν λόγον δυνηθῆναι ἐπανελθεῖν τῇ ὕλῃ. ταῦτα τοίνυν ὑποθέμενον χρὴ προιέναι τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα: τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἐν τούτοις τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἂν εὕροιμεν τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, παῤ οὗ ὑπέστη τὸ πᾶν τόδε. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔργα ψυχῶν, ἃ δὴ ἐν αὐταῖς ἵσταται ταῖς ἐργαζομέναις τὰ χείρω, οἷον ὅσα κακαὶ ψυχαὶ ἄλλας ἔβλαψαν καὶ ὅσα ἀλλήλας αἱ κακαί, εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦ κακὰς ὅλως αὐτὰς εἶναι τὸ προνοοῦν αἰτιῷτο, οὐκ ἀπαιτεῖν λόγον οὐδὲ εὐθύνας προσήκει αἰτίαν ἑλομένῃ διδόντας: εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς κινήσεις οἰκείας ἔχειν καὶ ὅτι οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ζῷα ἤδη, καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οὔσας ὅ εἰσιν ἀκόλουθον βίον ἔχειν: οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅτι κόσμος ἦν, ἐληλύθασιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ κόσμου τὸ κόσμου εἶναι εἶχον καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ὑφιστάναι καὶ διοικεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ὅστις ὁ τρόπος, εἴτε ἐφεστῶσαι καὶ διδοῦσαί τι παῤ αὑτῶν εἴτε κατιοῦσαι εἴτε αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δ’ οὕτως: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ νῦν περὶ τούτων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι, ὅπως πότ̓ ἂν ᾖ, τήν γε πρόνοιαν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐ μεμπτέον. ἀλλ’ ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τὴν παράθεσιν τῶν κακῶν τις θεωρῇ, πένητας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ πλεονεκτοῦντας ἐν οἷς ἔχειν δεῖ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας τοὺς χείρους καὶ κρατοῦντας καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τὰς πόλεις; ἆῤ οὖν, ὅτι μὴ μέχρι γῆς φθάνει; ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων γινομένων λόγῳ μαρτύριον τοῦτο καὶ μέχρι γῆς ἰέναι: καὶ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ λόγου καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ζωῆς μεταλαμβάνει. ἀλλὰ φθάνουσα οὐ κρατεῖ. ἀλλὰ ζῴου ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ὅμοιον ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις κεφαλὴν μὲν ἀνθρώπου καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ λόγου γίγνεσθαι λέγοι κρατοῦντος, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄλλαις ἀναθείη αἰτίαις, τύχαις ἢ ἀνάγκαις, καὶ φαῦλα διὰ τοῦτο ἢ δἰ ἀδυναμίαν φύσεως γεγονέναι. ἀλλ’ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτε εὐσεβὲς ἐνδόντας τὸ μὴ καλῶς ταῦτα ἔχειν καταμέμφεσθαι τῷ ποιήματι.
3.2.8λοιπὸν δὴ ζητεῖν ὅπῃ καλῶς ταῦτα, καὶ ὡς τάξεως μετέχει, ἢ ὅπῃ μὴ κακῶς. παντὸς δὴ ζῴου τὰ μὲν ἄνω, πρόσωπον καὶ κεφαλή, καλλίω, τὰ δὲ μέσα καὶ κάτω οὐκ ἴσα: ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω, ἄνω δὲ οὐρανὸς καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοί: καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ κόσμου θεοὶ καὶ οὐρανὸς πᾶς κύκλῳ, γῆ δὲ οἷα κέντρον καὶ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν ἄστρων. θαυμάζεται δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικία, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὸ τίμιον εἶναι ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος σοφωτέρου. τὸ δὲ κεῖται ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων καὶ ῥέπει ἐπ’ ἄμφω καὶ ὁμοιοῦνται οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οἱ δὲ μεταξύ εἰσιν, οἱ πολλοί. οἱ δὴ κακυνθέντες εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς ζῴων ἀλόγων καὶ θηρίων ἰέναι ἕλκουσι τοὺς μέσους καὶ βιάζονται: οἱ δὲ βελτίους μέν εἰσι τῶν βιαζομένων, κρατοῦνταί γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν χειρόνων ᾗ εἰσι χείρους καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδὲ παρεσκεύασαν αὑτοὺς μὴ παθεῖν. εἰ οὖν παῖδες ἀσκήσαντες μὲν τὰ σώματα, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ὑπ’ ἀπαιδευσίας τούτων χείρους γινόμενοι ἐν πάλῃ κρατοῖεν τῶν μήτε τὰ σώματα μήτε τὰς ψυχὰς πεπαιδευμένων καὶ τὰ σιτία αὐτῶν ἁρπάζοιεν καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτῶν τὰ ἁβρὰ λαμβάνοιεν, τί ἂν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ γέλως εἴη; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ὀρθὸν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην συγχωρεῖν ταῦτα μὲν πάσχειν ἐκείνους δίκην ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς διδόντας, εἰ ἀποδεδειγμένων γυμνασίων αὐτοῖς οἱ δ’ ὑπ’ ἀργίας καὶ τοῦ ζῆν μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως περιεῖδον ἑαυτοὺς ἄρνας καταπιανθέντας λύκων ἁρπαγὰς εἶναι; τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ποιοῦσι πρώτη μὲν δίκη τὸ λύκοις εἶναι καὶ κακοδαίμοσιν ἀνθρώποις: εἶτα αὐτοῖς καὶ κεῖται ἃ παθεῖν χρεὼν τοὺς τοιούτους: οὐ γὰρ ἔστη ἐνταῦθα κακοῖς γενομένοις ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀεὶ προτέροις ἕπεται ὅσα κατὰ λόγον καὶ φύσιν, χείρω τοῖς χείροσι, τοῖς δὲ ἀμείνοσι τὰ ἀμείνω. ἀλλ’ οὐ παλαίστρα τὰ τοιαῦτα: παιδιὰ γὰρ ἐκεῖ. ἔδει γὰρ μειζόνων τῶν παίδων μετὰ ἀνοίας ἀμφοτέρων γινομένων ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ζώννυσθαι ἤδη καὶ ὅπλα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ θέα καλλίων ἢ κατὰ πάλας γυμνάζοντι: νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν ἄοπλοι, οἱ δὲ ὁπλισθέντες κρατοῦσιν. ἔνθα οὐ θεὸν ἔδει ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπολέμων αὐτὸν μάχεσθαι: σώζεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ πολέμων φησὶ δεῖν ὁ νόμος ἀνδριζομένους, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὐχομένους: οὐδὲ γὰρ κομίζεσθαι καρποὺς εὐχομένους, ἀλλὰ γῆς ἐπιμελουμένους, οὐδέ γε ὑγιαίνειν μὴ ὑγιείας ἐπιμελουμένους: οὐδ’ ἀγανακτεῖν δεῖ, εἰ τοῖς φαύλοις πλείους γίνοιντο καρποὶ ἢ ὅλως αὐτοῖς γεωργοῦσιν ἢ ἄμεινον. ἔπειτα γελοῖον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον γνώμῃ τῇ ἑαυτῶν πράττειν, κἂν μὴ ταύτῃ πράττωσιν, ᾗ θεοῖς φίλα, σώζεσθαι δὲ μόνον παρὰ θεῶν οὐδὲ ταῦτα ποιήσαντας, δἰ ὧν κελεύουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ θεοὶ σώζεσθαι. καὶ τοίνυν οἱ θάνατοι αὐτοῖς βελτίους ἢ τὸ οὕτως ξῶντας εἶναι, ὅπως ζῆν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νόμοι: ὥστε τῶν ἐναντίων γιγνομένων, εἰρήνης ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ κακίαις πάσαις φυλαττομένης, ἀμελῶς ἂν ἔσχε τὰ τῆς προνοίας ἐώσης κρατεῖν οὕτως τὰ χείρω. ἄρχουσι δὲ οἱ κακοὶ ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρίᾳ: τοῦτο γὰρ δίκαιον, καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο.
3.2.9οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτως τὴν πρόνοιαν εἶναι δεῖ, ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι: πάντα δὲ οὔσης προνοίας καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη: τίνος γὰρ ἂν ἔτι εἴη; ἀλλὰ μόνον ἂν εἴη τὸ θεῖον. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔστι: καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐχ ἵνα ἀνέλῃ τὸ ἄλλο, ἀλλ’ ἐπιόν τῳ, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ, ἦν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ πρόνοια τηροῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα: τοῦτο δέ ἐστι νόμῳ προνοίας ζῶντα, ὃ δή ἐστι πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει. λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι καὶ κεῖσθαι καὶ ἐσύστερον, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία. κακοὺς δὲ γενομένους ἀξιοῦν ἄλλους αὐτῶν σωτῆρας εἶναι ἑαυτοὺς προεμένους οὐ θεμιτὸν εὐχὴν ποιουμένων: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ θεοὺς αὐτῶν ἄρχειν τὰ καθέκαστα ἀφέντας τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οὐδέ γε τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀγαθούς, ἄλλον βίον ζῶντας τὸν ἀρχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀμείνω, τούτους αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας εἶναι: ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐπεμελήθησάν ποτε, ὅπως ἄρχοντες ἀγαθοὶ γένοιντο τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως αὐτοὶ εἶεν ἐπιμελούμενοι, ἀλλὰ φθονοῦσιν, ἐάν τις ἀγαθὸς παῤ αὑτοῦ φύηται: ἐπεὶ πλείους ἂν ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοί, εἰ τούτους ἐποιοῦντο προστάτας. γενόμενον τοίνυν ζῷον οὐκ ἄριστον, ἀλλὰ μέσην τάξιν ἔχον καὶ ἑλόμενον, ὅμως ἐν ᾧ κεῖται τόπῳ ὑπὸ προνοίας οὐκ ἐώμενον ἀπολέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀναφερόμενον ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω παντοίαις μηχαναῖς, αἷς τὸ θεῖον χρῆται ἐπικρατεστέραν ἀρετὴν ποιοῦν, οὐκ ἀπώλεσε τὸ λογικὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἄκρως, ἐστὶ καὶ σοφίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ τέχνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, τῆς γοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕκαστοι — καὶ οὓς ἀδικοῦσι δὲ οἴονται δικαίως ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἶναι γὰρ ἀξίους — οὕτω καλόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ποίημα, ὅσον δύναται καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ συνυφανθὲν εἰς τὸ πᾶν μοῖραν ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅσα ἐπὶ γῆς βελτίονα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα ἐλάττω ζῷα αὐτοῦ κόσμον γῇ φέροντα μέμφεται οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων. γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις μέμφοιτο, ὅτι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δάκνοι, ὡς δέον αὐτοὺς ζῆν κοιμωμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι: καὶ αἱ μὲν πρόδηλοι παῤ αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαι, τὰς δὲ οὐ φανερὰς ἀνεῦρε πολλὰς ὁ χρόνος: ὥστε μηδὲν αὐτοῖς μάτην μηδὲ ἀνθρώποις εἶναι. γελοῖον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄγρια πολλὰ αὐτῶν μέμφεσθαι γινομένων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀγρίων: εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπίστευκεν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστοῦντα ἀμύνεται, τί θαυμαστόν ἐστιν;
3.2.10ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄνθρωποι ἄκοντές εἰσι κακοὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐχ ἑκόντες, οὔτ’ ἄν τις τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας αἰτιάσαιτο, οὔτε τοὺς πάσχοντας ὡς δἰ αὑτοὺς ταῦτα πάσχοντας. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτω κακοὺς γίνεσθαι εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς φορᾶς εἴτε τῆς ἀρχῆς διδούσης τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐντεῦθεν, φυσικῶς οὕτως. εἰ δὲ δὴ ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἄδικα οὕτως; ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκοντες, ὅτι ἁμαρτία ἀκούσιον: τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πράττοντας παῤ αὑτῶν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν: ἢ οὐδ’ ἂν ὅλως ἥμαρτον μὴ αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ὄντες. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι πάντως. τὸ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς οὐχ ὥστε μηδὲν ἐφ̓ ἡμῖν εἶναι: καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔξωθεν τὸ πᾶν, οὕτως ἂν ἦν, ὡς αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐβούλοντο: ὥστε οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐναντία ἐτίθεντο ἄνθρωποι οὐδ’ ἂν ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. νῦν δὲ παῤ αὐτῶν τοῦτο. ἀρχῆς δὲ δοθείσης τὸ ἐφεξῆς περαίνεται συμπαραλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τῶν ὅσαι εἰσὶν ἀρχαί: ἀρχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι. κινοῦνται γοῦν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ οἰκείᾳ φύσει καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη αὐτεξούσιος.
3.2.11πότερα δὲ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις οὕτως ἕκαστα καὶ ἀκολουθίαις καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατὸν καλῶς; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖ ἄρχων καὶ οὕτω βούλεται καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα κακὰ αὐτὸς κατὰ λόγον ποιεῖ οὐ βουλόμενος πάντα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιοῖ: οὕτως οὐδ’ ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζετο, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεούς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας, δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ: ἢ εἴ τις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκέτης καί τις ἄγροικος καὶ φαύλως φθεγγόμενος: τὸ δὲ οὐ καλόν ἐστιν, εἴ τις τοὺς χείρους ἐξέλοι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συμπληρούμενον.
3.2.12εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐναρμόσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ὕλην ταῦτα εἰργάσατο τοῦτο ὢν οἷός ἐστιν, ἀνόμοιος τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἐκ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ὤν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γενόμενον οὕτω γενόμενον οὐκ ἂν σχοίη κάλλιον ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο. ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐκ πάντων ὁμοίων καὶ παραπλησίων οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος οὐ μεμπτὸς πάντα ὄντος κατὰ μέρος ἕκαστον ἄλλως. εἰ δὲ ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλα εἰσήγαγεν, οἷνον φυχάς, καὶ ἐβιάσατο παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐναρμόσας τῷ ποιήματι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον πολλάς, πῶς ὀρθῶς; ἀλλὰ φατέον καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οἷον μέρη αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ χείρους ποιοῦντα ἐναρμόττειν, ἀλλ’ ὅπου προσῆκον αὐταῖς καταχωρίζειν κατ’ ἀξίαν.
3.2.13ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτέ φησι βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν τάττειν τὴν ἀξίαν καὶ μετατιθέναι ἐκ δεσποτῶν τῶν πρόσθεν δούλους ποιοῦντα, εἰ ἐγένοντο κακοὶ δεσπόται, καὶ ὅτι σύμφορον αὐτοῖς οὕτω, καὶ εἰ κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο πλούτῳ πένητας, καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθοῖς οὐκ ἀσύμφορον πένησιν εἶναι, καὶ φονεύσαντας ἀδίκως φονευθῆναι ἀδίκως μὲν τῷ ποιήσαντι, αὐτῷ δὲ δικαίως τῷ παθόντι, καὶ τὸν πεισόμενον συναγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ ποιῆσαι,: ἃ παθεῖν ἐχρῆν ἐκεῖνον. μὴ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν δοῦλον μηδὲ αἰχμάλωτον ὡς ἔτυχε μηδὲ ὑβρισθῆναι εἰς σῶμα εἰκῇ, ἀλλὰ ἦν ποτε ταῦτα ποιήσας, ἃ νῦν ἐστι πάσχων: καὶ μητέρα τις ἀνελὼν ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀναιρεθήσεται γενόμενος γυνή, καὶ βιασάμενος γυναῖκα γυνὴ ἔσται, ἵνα βιασθῇ. ὅθεν καὶ θεία φήμη Ἀδράστεια: αὕτη γὰρ ἡ διάταξις Ἀδράστεια ὄντως καὶ ὄντως Δίκη καὶ σοφία θαυμαστή. τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ δεῖ τοιαύτην τινὰ εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ἀεὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐν τῷ παντί, ὡς εἰς ἅπαν χωρεῖ καὶ ὅ τι μικρότατον, καὶ ἡ τέχνη θαυμαστὴ οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς θείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπενόησε καταφρονῆσαι ὡς μικρῶν τὴν πρόνοιαν: οἵα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τυχοῦσι ζῴοις ἡ ποικίλη θαυματουργία καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῶν φυτῶν ἐν καρποῖς καὶ ἔτι φύλλοις εὐειδὲς καὶ τὸ ῥᾷστα εὐανθὲς καὶ ῥαδινὸν καὶ ποικίλον, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πεποίηται ἅπαξ καὶ ἐπαύσατο, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ποιεῖται τῶν ὑπεράνω φερομένων κατὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὡσαύτως. μετατίθεται τοίνυν τὰ μετατιθέμενα οὐκ εἰκῇ μετατιθέμενα οὐδ’ ἄλλα σχήματα λαμβάνοντα, ἀλλ’ ὡς καλόν, καὶ ὡς πρέποι ἂν δυνάμεσι θείαις ποιεῖν. ποιεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε: πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν: οὐσία δὲ αὐτοῦ, ἣ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἴη;
3.2.14ἔχει τοίνυν ἡ διάταξις οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν, ὡς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω δὲ εἶναι, ὡς, εἴ τις ἄριστα δύναιτο λογισμῷ χρῆσθαι, θαυμάσαι, ὅτι μὴ ἂν ἄλλως εὗρε λογισμὸς ποιῆσαι, ὁποῖόν τι γινώσκεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ̓ ἕκαστα φύσεσι γινόμενον εἰς ἀεὶ νοερώτερον ἢ κατὰ λογισμοῦ διάταξιν. ἐφ̓ ἑκάστου μὲν οὖν τῶν γινομένων ἀεὶ γενῶν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸν ποιοῦντα λόγον, εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἕκαστον οὕτω γεγονέναι χρῆναι, ὡς τὰ μὴ γεγονότα, ἀίδια δέ, ἔν τε νοητοῖς ἔν τε αἰσθητοῖς ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, προσθήκην αἰτῶν ἀγαθοῦ πλείονα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ δοθὲν ἑκάστῳ εἶδος αὔταρκες ἡγούμενος, οἷον τῷδε, ὅτι μὴ κέρατα, οὐ σκοπούμενος, ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἦν λόγον μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔδει ἐν τῷ μείζονι τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὰ μέρη καὶ οὐκ ἴσα δυνατὸν εἶναι: ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μέρη. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνω πᾶν πάντα, τὸ δὲ κάτω οὐ πάντα ἕκαστον. καὶ ἄνθρωπος δὴ καθ̓ ὅσον μέρος ἕκαστος οὐ πᾶς. εἰ δέ που ἐν μέρεσί τισι καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ οὐ μέρος, τούτῳ κἀκεῖνο πᾶν. ὁ δὴ καθ̓ ἕκαστα ᾗ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαιτητέος τέλειος εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς ἄκρον: ἤδη γὰρ οὐκέτ̓ ἂν μέρος. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος κοσμηθὲν εἰς μείζονα ἀξίαν ἐφθόνηται: καὶ γὰρ κάλλιον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ κοσμηθὲν ἀξίᾳ μείζονι. καὶ γὰρ γίνεται τοιοῦτον ἀφομοιωθὲν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ οἷον συγχωρηθὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ συνταχθὲν οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπου τόπον ἐκλάμπῃ τι ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷον καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον οὐρανὸν τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ ἡ ἐντεῦθεν ἀντίληψις οἷον ἀγάλματος μεγάλου καὶ καλοῦ ᾖ εἴτε ἐμψύχου εἴτε καὶ τέχνῃ Ἡφαίστου γενομένου, καὶ ὦσι μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπιστίλβοντες ἀστέρες καὶ ἐν τοῖς στήθεσι δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ ᾗ ἔμελλεν ἐπιτρέψειν ἄστρων θέσις κειμένων.
3.2.15τὰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστα αὐτὰ ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῶν θεωρούμενα οὕτως: ἡ συμπλοκὴ δὲ ἡ τούτων γεννηθέντων καὶ ἀεὶ γεννωμένων ἔχοι ἂν τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ ἀπορίαν κατὰ τε τὴν ἀλληλοφαγίαν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλλήλους ἐπιθέσεις, καὶ ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ μήποτε παῦλαν οὐδ’ ἀνοχὴν λάβῃ, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ λόγος πεποίηκεν οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ ούτω λέγεται καλῶς ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνος ὁ λόγος βοηθεῖ, ὡς καλῶς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔχει καὶ αἰτία ὕλη οὕτως ἐχόντων, ὡς ἐλαττόνως ἔχειν, καὶ ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν τὰ κακὰ ἀπολέσθαι, εἴπερ οὕτως ἐχρῆν ἔχειν, καὶ καλῶς οὕτω, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ὕλη παρελθοῦσα κρατεῖ, ἀλλὰ παρήχθη, ἵνα οὕτω, μᾶλλον δὲ ᾖ καὶ αὐτὴ αἰτίᾳ λόγου οὕτως. ἀρχὴ οὖν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος καὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατ’ αὐτὸν καὶ συνταττόμενα ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει πάντως οὕτως. τίς οὖν ἡ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ ἀκηρύκτου ἐν ζῴοις καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνάγκη; ἢ ἀλληλοφαγίαι μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀμοιβαὶ ζῴων οὖσαι οὐ δυναμένων, οὐδ’ εἴ τις μὴ κτιννύοι αὐτά, οὕτω μένειν εἰς ἀεί. εἰ δὲ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν οὕτως ἀπελθεῖν ἔδει, ὡς ἄλλοις γενέσθαι χρείαν παῤ αὐτῶν, τί φθονεῖν ἔδει; τί δ’ εἰ βρωθέντα ἄλλα ἐφύετο; οἷον εἰ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ὁ πεφονευμένος ἀλλαξάμενος τὸ σχῆμα ἀναλαβὼν πάλιν εἰσίοι ἄλλο πρόσωπον, ἀλλ’ οὐ τέθνηκεν ἀληθῶς οὗτος. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἀλλαγή ἐστι σώματος, ὥσπερ ἐσθῆτος ἐκεῖ, ἢ καὶ παντελὴς ἀπόθεσις σώματος, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἔξοδος ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς παντελὴς οὔποτε εἰς ὕστερον πάλιν ἥξοντος ἐναγωνίσασθαι, τί ἂν δεινὸν εἴη ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν ζῴων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ πολὺ βελτίων οὖσα τοῦ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὰ γενέσθαι; ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἐρημία ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔσης ἀδυναμία: νῦν δὲ πολλὴ οὖσα ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζωὴ πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ ποικίλλει ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται μὴ ποιοῦσα ἀεὶ καλὰ καὶ εὐειδῆ ζῶντα παίγνια. ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους ὅπλα θνητῶν ὄντων ἐν τάξει εὐσχήμονι μαχομένων, οἷα ἐν πυρρίχαις παίζοντες ἐργάζονται, δηλοῦσι τάς τε ἀνθρωπίνας σπουδὰς απάσας παιδιὰς οὔσας τούς τε θανάτους μηνύουσιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν εἶναι, ἀποθνήσκειν δὲ ἐν πολέμοις καὶ ἐν μάχαις ὀλίγον προλαβόντας τοῦ γινομένου ἐν γήρᾳ θᾶττον ἀπιόντας καὶ πάλιν ἰόντας. εἰ δ’ ἀφαιροῖντο ζῶντες χρημάτων, γινώσκοιεν ἂν μηδὲ πρότερον αὑτῶν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἁρπάζουσιν αὐτοῖς γελοίαν εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν ἀφαιρουμένων αὐτοὺς ἄλλων: ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀφαιρεθεῖσι χεῖρον γίνεσθαι τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν κτῆσιν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς σκηναῖς, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τοὺς φόνους θεᾶσθαι καὶ πάντας θανάτους καὶ πόλεων ἁλώσεις καὶ ἁρπαγάς, μεταθέσεις πάντα καὶ μετασχηματίσεις καὶ θρήνων καὶ οἰμωγῶν ὑποκρίσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκάστων οὐχ ἡ ἔνδον ψυχή, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιὰ καὶ οἰμώζει καὶ ὀδύρεται καὶ πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν σκηνῇ τῇ ὅλῃ γῇ πολλαχοῦ σκηνὰς ποιησαμένων. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα ἀνθρώπου τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνα ζῆν εἰδότος καὶ ἐν δακρύοις καὶ σπουδαίοις ὅτι παίζων ἐστὶν ἠγνοηκότος. μόνῳ γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ σπουδαστέον ἐν σπουδαίοις τοῖς ἔργοις, ὁ δ’ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος παίγνιον. σπουδάζεται δὲ καὶ τὰ παίγνια τοῖς σπουδάζειν οὐκ εἰδόσι καὶ αὐτοῖς οὖσι παιγνίοις. εἰ δέ τις συμπαίζων αὐτοῖς σπουδαῖος τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθοι, ἴστω παραπεσὼν παίδων παιδιᾷ τὸ περὶ αὑτὸν ἀποθέμενος πρόσωπον. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ παίζοι Σωκράτης, παίζει τῷ ἔξω Σωκράτει. δεῖ δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τεκμήρια τοῦ κακὰ εἶναι τὸ δακρύειν καὶ θρηνεῖν τίθεσθαι, ὅτι δὴ καὶ παῖδες ἐπὶ οὐ κακοῖς καὶ δακρύουσι καὶ ὀδύρονται.
3.2.16ἀλλ’ εἰ καλῶς ταῦτα λέγεται, πῶς ἂν ἔτι πονηρία; ποῦ δ’ ἀδικία; ἁμαρτία δὲ ποῦ; πῶς γὰρ ἔστι καλῶς γινομένων ἁπάντων ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς ποιοῦντας; κακοδαίμονες δὲ πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἁμαρτάνοιεν μηδ’ ἀδικοῖεν; πῶς δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν φήσομεν εἶναι τῶν γινομένων, ἁπάντων τῶν δρωμένων κατὰ φύσιν ὄντων; πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀσέβειά τις εἴη τοιούτου ὄντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ποιουμένου; οἷον εἴ τις ἐν δράματι λοιδορούμενον ποιητὴς ὑποκριτὴν ποιήσαιτο καὶ κατατρέχοντα τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ δράματος. πάλιν οὖν σαφέστερον λέγωμεν τίς ὁ λόγος καὶ ὡς εἰκότως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν. ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος — τετολμήσθω γάρ: τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ τύχοιμεν — ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς οὐδ’ αὐτονοῦς οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος, ἠρτημένος: δὲ ἐκείνης καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ζωὴν λόγον τινὰ ἡσυχῇ ἔχουσαν. πᾶσα δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη: ἐνέργεια δὲ οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, κἂν μὴ αἴσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῇ. οἷς γοῦν ἂν παρῇ καὶ μετάσχῃ ὁπωσοῦν ὁτιοῦν, εὐθὺς λελόγωται, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μεμόρφωται, ὡς τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν μορφοῦν δυναμένης καὶ κινούσης οὕτως, ὡς μορφοῦν. ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνική, ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος κινούμενος εἴη: ὁ γὰρ ὀρχηστὴς τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πως οὔσης. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω τοῦ οἵαν δεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡντινοῦν ζωὴν ἡγεῖσθαι ἕνεκα. ἥκων τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ζωῆς μιᾶς πλήρους ὄντος ἑκατέρου οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ζωὴ μία οὔτε νοῦς τις εἷς οὔτε ἑκασταχοῦ πλήρης οὐδὲ διδοὺς ἑαυτὸν οἷς δίδωσιν ὅλον τε καὶ πάντα. ἀντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη. γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον οὕτως ἕν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἷς ὁ τοῦ δράματος ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πολλὰς μάχας. τὸ μὲν οὖν δρᾶμα τὰ μεμαχημένα οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἄγει σύμφωνον οἷον διήγησιν τὴν πᾶσαν τῶν μαχομένων ποιούμενον: ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου ἡ τῶν διαστάτων μάχη: ὥστε μᾶλλον ἄν τις τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε καὶ ζητήσειε διὰ τί τὰ μαχόμενα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὀξὺ καὶ βαρὺ ποιοῦσι λόγοι καὶ συνίασιν εἰς ἓν ὄντες ἁρμονίας λόγοι εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἄλλον λόγον μείζονα, ὄντες ἐλάττους αὐτοὶ καὶ μέρη, ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, καὶ δὴ πτερωτὸν ἄπτερον, ὑπόπουν ἄπουν, λογικὸν ἄλογον, πάντα δὲ ζῴου ἑνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος μέρη καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογεῖ ἑαυτῷ τῶν μερῶν πολλαχοῦ μαχομένων, κατὰ λόγον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον λόγον ἐξ ἐναντίων λόγων εἶναι ἕνα τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῷ καὶ οἷον οὐσίαν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐναντιώσεως φερούσης. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πολὺς ἦν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἦν πᾶς, οὐδ’ ἂν λόγος: λόγος δὲ ὢν διάφορός τε πρὸς αὑτόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ μάλιστα διαφορὰ ἐναντίωσίς ἐστιν: ὥστε εἰ ἕτερον ὅλως, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ποιεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα ἕτερον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἧττον ἕτερον ποιήσει: ὥστε ἄκρως ἕτερον ποιῶν καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιήσει ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τέλειος ἔσται, οὐκ εἰ διάφορα μόνον, ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ἐναντία ποιεῖ εἶναι ἑαυτόν.
3.2.17ὢν δὴ τοιοῦτος οἷος καὶ πάντως ποιεῖ, πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ ποιούμενα ποιήσει ἐναντία, ὅσῳ καὶ διέστηκε μᾶλλον: καὶ ἧττον ἓν ὁ κόσμος ὁ αἰσθητὸς ἢ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ πολὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης μᾶλλον καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἔφεσις μᾶλλον ἑκάστῳ καὶ ὁ ἔρως τοῦ εἰς ἓν μᾶλλον. φθείρει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐρῶντα τὰ ἐρώμενα πολλάκις εἰς τὸ αὑτῶν ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα, ὅταν φθαρτὰ ᾖ, καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἕλκει εἰς αὐτὸ ὃ δύναται. οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί, ὥσπερ παρὰ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ὀρχουμένου τὰ ἐναντία: καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι μέρος ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν φήσομεν, καὶ οὕτω καλῶς ἔχειν. καίτοι οὐδὲ κακοὶ ἔτι. ἢ τὸ μὲν κακοὺς εἶναι οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον ὅτι μὴ παῤ αὑτῶν τοιοῦτοι. ἀλλ’ ἴσως συγγνώμη τοῖς κακοῖς: εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς συγγνώμης καὶ μὴ ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ: ποιεῖ δὲ ὁ λόγος μηδὲ συγγνώμονας ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι. ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ μὲν μέρος αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πονηρός, καὶ πλείω μέρη ὁ πονηρός, ὥσπερ ἐν δράμασι τὰ μὲν τάττει αὐτοῖς ὁ ποιητής, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται οὖσιν ἤδη: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πρωταγωνιστὴν οὐδὲ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ διδοὺς ἑκάστῳ τοὺς προσήκοντας λόγους ἤδη ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ εἰς ὃ τετάχθαι δέον: οὕτω τοι καὶ ἔστι τόπος ἑκάστῳ ὁ μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ τῷ κακῷ πρέπων. ἑκάτερος οὖν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ λόγον εἰς ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸν πρέποντα χωρεῖ τὸν τόπον ἔχων, ὃν εἵλετο. εἶτα φθέγγεται καὶ ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀσεβεῖς λόγους καὶ ἔργα ʽποιῶν̓, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία: ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δράματος τοιοῦτοι οἱ ὑποκριταὶ διδόντες ἑαυτοὺς τῷ δράματι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις δράμασιν ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς ἔδωκε τοὺς λόγους, οἱ δὲ ἔχουσι παῤ αὑτῶν καὶ ἐξ αὑτῶν τό τε καλῶς καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἕκαστος — ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἔργον αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὰς ῥήσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀληθεστέρῳ ποιήματι, ὅ τι μιμοῦνται κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι ποιητικὴν ἔχοντες φύσιν, ψυχὴ μὲν ὑποκρίνεται, ἃ δ’ ὑποκρίνεται λαβοῦσα παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ οἱ τῇδε ὑποκριταὶ τὰ προσωπεῖα, τὴν ἐσθῆτα, τοὺς κροκωτοὺς καὶ τὰ ῥάκη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ αὐτὴ τὰς τύχας οὐ λαβοῦσα εἰκῇ: κατὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ αὗται: καὶ ἐναρμοσαμένη ταύτας σύμφωνος γίνεται καὶ συνέταξεν ἑαυτὴν τῷ δράματι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ παντί: εἶτα οἷον φθέγγεται τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἂν ψυχὴ κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἑαυτῆς ποιήσειεν, ὥσπερ τινὰ ᾠδήν. καὶ ὡς ὁ φθόγγος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα παῤ αὑτοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἢ κόσμον προσέθηκεν, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, εἰς τὸ ποίημα ἢ προσθεὶς τὴν αὑτοῦ τῆς φωνῆς κάκην οὐκ ἐποίησε μὲν τὸ δρᾶμα ἕτερον ἢ οἷον ἦν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀσχήμων ἐφάνη, ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς τοῦ δράματος ἀπέπεμψε κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀτιμάσας καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ποιῶν ἀγαθοῦ κριτοῦ, τὸν δὲ ἤγαγεν εἰς μείζους τιμὰς καί, εἰ ἔχοι, ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω δράματα, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον, εἴ που εἶχε χείρονα, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἰσελθοῦσα εἰς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ποίημα καὶ μέρος ἑαυτὴν ποιησαμένη τοῦ δράματος εἰς ὑπόκρισιν τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ κακῶς εἰσενεγκαμένη παῤ αὑτῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ εἰσόδῳ συνταχθεῖσα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα χωρὶς ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὑτῆς λαβοῦσα δίκας τε καὶ τιμὰς αὖ ἔχει. πρόσεστι δέ τι τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς ἅτε ἐν μείζονι τόπῳ ἢ κατὰ σκηνῆς μέτρον ὑποκρινομένοις καὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ παντὸς τούτου ποιοῦντος κυρίους καὶ δυνάμεως οὔσης μείζονος ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰέναι εἴδη τόπων τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁρίζουσι τῷ συνεπιλαμβάνειν καὶ αὐτοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ ἀτιμίαις ἁρμόζοντος ἑκάστου τόπου τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ὡς συμφωνεῖν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς λόγῳ ἐναρμοζομένου κατὰ δίκην ἑκάστου τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς δεξομένοις, ὥσπερ χορδῆς ἑκάστης εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ προσήκοντα τόπον ταττομένης κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ φθέγγεσθαι, ὁποῖόν ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ καλόν, εἰ ἕκαστος οὗ δεῖ τετάξεται φθεγγόμενος κακὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ ταρτάρῳ: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ καλὸν τὸ οὕτω φθέγγεσθαι: καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο καλὸν οὐκ, εἰ λίθος εἴη ἕκαστος, ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸν φθόγγον τὸν αὑτοῦ εἰσφερόμενος συντελοῖ εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ζωὴν καὶ αὐτὸς φωνῶν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ χείρω καὶ ἀτελεστέραν: ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν σύριγγι φωνὴ μία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλάττων τις οὖσα καὶ ἀμυδρὰ πρὸς ἁρμονίαν τῆς πάσης σύριγγος συντελεῖ, ὅτι μεμέρισται ἡ ἁρμονία εἰς οὐκ ἴσα μέρη καὶ ἄνισοι μὲν οἱ φθόγγοι πάντες, ὁ δὲ τέλειος εἷς ἐκ πάντων. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ πᾶς εἷς, μεμέρισται δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἴσα: ὅθεν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς διάφοροι τόποι, βελτίους καὶ χείρους, καὶ ψυχαὶ οὐκ ἴσαι ἐναρμόττουσιν οὕτω τοῖς οὐκ ἴσοις καὶ οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀνομοίους καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὐ τὰς αὐτάς, ἀλλ’ ἀνίσους οὔσας καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς τρόπους ἐχούσας, οἷον κατὰ σύριγγος ἤ τινος ἄλλου ὀργάνου ἀνομοιότητας, ἐν τόποις τε πρὸς ἀλλήλας διαφέρουσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ̓ ἕκαστον τόπον τὰ αὑτῶν συμφώνως καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ φθεγγομένας. καὶ τὸ κακῶς αὐταῖς ἐν καλῷ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν κείσεται καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ παντὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον φθόγγος ἐλάττων. ἀλλ’ οὐ χεῖρον πεποίηκε τὸ ὅλον οὕτω φθεγγομένη, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ δήμιος πονηρὸς ὢν χείρω πεποίηκε τὴν εὐνομουμένην πόλιν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἄλλῃ χρῆσθαι εἰκόνι. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τούτου ἐν πόλει, ʽδεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου τοιούτου πολλάκις,ʼ καὶ καλῶς καὶ οὗτος κεῖται.
3.2.18χείρους δὲ καὶ βελτίους ψυχαὶ αἱ μὲν καὶ δἰ ἄλλας αἰτίας, αἱ δὲ οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ πᾶσαι ἴσαι: ἀνὰ λόγον γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ λόγῳ μέρη οὐκ ἴσα, ἐπείπερ διέστησαν. χρὴ δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τὰ τρίτα καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ μέρεσι ψυχήν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ καὶ ὧδε λεκτέον: πολλὰ γὰρ ἐπιποθεῖ εἰς σαφήνειαν ὁ λόγος. μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ ἐπεισάγειν τοιούτους ὑποκριτάς, οἳ ἄλλο τι φθέγξονται ἢ τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀτελοῦς παῤ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δράματος ὄντος αὐτοὶ ἀποπληροῦντες τὸ ἐλλεῖπον καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος διὰ μέσου κενοὺς ποιήσαντος τόπους, ὡς τῶν ὑποκριτῶν οὐχ ὑποκριτῶν ἐσομένων, ἀλλὰ μέρους τοῦ ποιητοῦ, καὶ προειδότος ἃ φθέγξονται, ἵν’ οὕτω τὰ λοιπὰ συνείρειν καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς οἷός τε ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα τοῖς κακοῖς τῶν ἔργων λόγοι καὶ κατὰ λόγον: οἷον ἐκ μοιχείας καὶ αἰχμαλώτου ἀγωγῆς παῖδες κατὰ φύσιν βελτίους καὶ ἄνδρες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ πόλεις ἄλλαι ἀμείνους τῶν πεπορθημένων ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν πονηρῶν. εἰ οὖν ἄτοπος ἡ εἰσαγωγὴ τῶν ψυχῶν, αἳ δὴ τὰ πονηρά, αἱ δὲ τὰ χρηστὰ ἐργάσονται — ἀποστερήσομεν γὰρ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν χρηστῶν ἀφαιροῦντες αὐτοῦ τὰ πονηρά — τί κωλύει καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἔργα μέρη ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ τοῦ δράματος ἐκεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ παντὶ λόγου, καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὥστε εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκριτῶν οὕτω παῤ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ὅσῳ τελειότερον τοῦτο τὸ δρᾶμα καὶ πάντα παῤ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὸ κακὸν ποιῆσαι ἵνα τί; καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν τῷ παντὶ αἱ θειότεραι, ἀλλὰ μέρη λόγου πᾶσαι: καὶ ἢ οἱ λόγοι πάντες ψυχαί, ἢ διὰ τί οἱ μὲν ψυχαί, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μόνον τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς τινος ὄντος;
3.3.1Τί τοίνυν δοκεῖ περὶ τούτων; ἢ καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ λόγος περιείληφεν ὁ πᾶς, οὗ μέρη καὶ ταῦτα: οὐ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς λόγος γεννᾷ ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ὁ πᾶς ἐστι μετὰ τούτων. ψυχῆς γάρ τινος πάσης ἐνέργεια οἱ λόγοι, τῶν δὲ μερῶν τὰ μέρη: μιᾶς δὲ διάφορα ἐχούσης μέρη ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἔσχατα ὄντα γεννήματα. σύμφωνοι δὲ αἵ τε ψυχαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τά τε ἔργα: σύμφωνα δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἐναντίων. ἐκ γὰρ ἑνός τινος ὁρμηθέντα πάντα εἰς ἓν συνέρχεται φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ, ὥστε καὶ διάφορα ἐκφύντα καὶ ἐναντία γενόμενα τῷ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι συνέλκεται ὅμως εἰς σύνταξιν μίαν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ̓ ἑκάστων ζῴων: οἷον ἓν ἵππων γένος, κἂν μάχωνται κἂν δάκνωσιν ἀλλήλους κἂν φιλονεικῶσι κἂν ζήλῳ θυμῶνται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καθ̓ ἓν γένη ὡσαύτως: καὶ δὴ οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπους θετέον. συναπτέον τοίνυν αὖ πάλιν πάντα τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα εἰς ἓν τὸ ζῴων γένος: εἶτα καὶ τὰ μὴ ζῷα κατ’ εἴδη αὖ: εἶτα εἰς ἓν τὸ μὴ ζῷον: εἶτα ὁμοῦ, εἰ βούλει, εἰς τὸ εἶναι: εἶτα εἰς τὸ παρέχον τὸ εἶναι. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐκδήσας κατάβαινε διαιρῶν καὶ σκιδνάμενον τὸ ἓν ὁρῶν τῷ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ ὁμοῦ περιλαμβάνειν ἐν συντάξει μιᾷ, ὡς διακεκριμένον ἓν εἶναι ζῷον πολὺ ἑκάστου πράττοντος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅλῳ ὅμως ὄντος, οἷον πυρὸς μὲν καίοντος, ἵππου δὲ τὰ ἵππου ἔργα: ἄνθρωποι δὲ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ᾗ πεφύκασι καὶ διάφορα οἱ διάφοροι. καὶ ἕπεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τῷ ζῆν τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς.
3.3.2αἱ δὲ συντυχίαι οὐ κύριαι τοῦ εὖ, ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὗται συμφώνως τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴασιν ἀκολουθίᾳ ἐμπλακεῖσαι. συμπλέκει δὲ πάντα τὸ ἡγούμενον συμφερομένων τῶν ἐφ̓ ἑκάτερα κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίαις ἡγουμένου μὲν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, συμπνεόντων δὲ τῶν συντεταγμένων. ἐτάχθη δὲ τὸ πᾶν προνοίᾳ στρατηγικῇ ὁρώσῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἃ δεῖ παρεῖναι, σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅπλα πάντα καὶ μηχανήματα, καὶ ὅσα ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπλεκομένων προεώραται, ἵνα τὸ ἐκ τούτων συμβαῖνον ἔχῃ χώραν τοῦ τεθῆναι εὖ, καὶ ἐλήλυθε πάντα τρόπον τινὰ εὐμήχανον παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, καίτοι ἔξωθεν ἦν ὅσα ἔμελλον δράσειν οἱ ἐναντίοι οὐδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν κἀκείνου ἄρχειν τοῦ στρατοπέδου. εἰ δὲ δὴ ὁ μέγας ηγεμὼν εἴη, ὑφ̓ ᾧ πάντα, τί ἂν ἀσύντακτον, τί δὲ οὐκ ἂν συνηρμοσμένον εἴη;
3.3.3καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐγὼ κύριος τοῦ τάδε ἑλέσθαι ἢ τάδε, ἀλλὰ αἱρέσει συντέτακται, ὅτι μὴ ἐπεισόδιον τὸ σὸν τῷ παντί, ἀλλ’ ἠρίθμησαι ὁ τοιόσδε. ἀλλὰ πόθεν ὁ τοιόσδε; ἔστι δὲ δύο, ἃ ὁ λόγος ζητεῖ, τὸ μέν, εἰ ἐπὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα, εἴ τις ἐστίν, ἀνενεγκεῖν δεῖ τοῦ ποιοῦ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἑκάστου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον αὐτό, ἢ ὅλως οὐκ αἰτιατέον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ φυτῶν γενέσεως, ὅτι μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἢ ἐπὶ ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσι: ταὐτὸν γὰρ τοῦτο τῷ διὰ τί ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ὅπερ θεοί: διὰ τί γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οὔτε αὐτὰ οὔτε τὸν ποιήσαντα εὐλόγως αἰτιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ κρεῖττον ἢ τοῦτο; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἐδύνατο τοῦτο κάλλιον εἶναι, εἰ μὲν παῤ αὑτοῦ προστιθέντος τι εἰς τὸ κρεῖττον, αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἑαυτῷ ὁ μὴ ποιήσας: εἰ δὲ μὴ παῤ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔδει ἔξωθεν προσεῖναι παρὰ τοῦ γεννητοῦ, ἄτοπος ὁ τὸ πλέον ἀπαιτῶν τοῦ δοθέντος, ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἀπαιτοῖ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν. δεῖ γὰρ οὐ ζητεῖν, εἰ ἔλαττον ἄλλου, ἀλλ’ εἰ ὡς αὐτὸ αὐτάρκως: οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἴσα ἔδει. ἆῤ οὖν μετρήσαντος αὐτοῦ προαιρέσει τοῦ μὴ δεῖν πάντα ἴσα; οὐδαμῶς: ἀλλ’ οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν εἶχε γενέσθαι. ἀκόλουθος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ψυχῇ ἄλλῃ, ἀκόλουθος δὲ ψυχὴ αὕτη νῷ, νοῦς δὲ οὐ τούτων τι ἕν, ἀλλὰ πάντα: τὰ δὲ πάντα πολλά: πολλὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἔμελλεν εἶναι. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ζῷα οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ψυχῶν ἐλαττώσεις, οἷον ἐξιτήλων ἤδη προιόντων. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου λόγος, κἂν ἔμψυχος ᾖ, ἑτέρα ψυχή, οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἀφ̓ ἧς ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὗτος ἐλάττων δὴ γίνεται σπεύδων εἰς ὕλην καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερον. σκόπει δὴ ὅσον ἀφέστηκε τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ὅμως ἐστὶ θαῦμα. οὐ τοίνυν, εἰ τοιοῦτον τὸ γενόμενον, καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον: ἔστι γὰρ παντὸς κρεῖττον τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἔξω αἰτίας καὶ μᾶλλον θαυμάσαι, ὅτι ἔδωκέ τι μεθ̓ αὑτὸ καὶ τὰ ἴχνη αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πλέον ἔδωκεν ἢ ὅσον ἔχουσι κτήσασθαι, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀποδεκτέον: ὥστε κινδυνεύειν τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς γενομένους ἰέναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας μειζόνως ἔχειν.
3.3.4ἁπλοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου — λέγω δὲ ἁπλοῦ ὡς τοῦτο ὃ πεποίηται μόνον ὄντος καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος — ἀπῆν ἂν αἰτία ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων. νῦν δὲ ἄνθρωπος μόνον ἐν ψόγῳ ὁ κακὸς καὶ τοῦτο ἴσως εὐλόγως. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὃ πεποίηταί ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ἐλευθέραν οὐκ ἔξω τῆς προνοίας οὖσαν οὐδὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὅλου: οὐ γὰρ ἀπήρτηται ἐκεῖνα τούτων, ἀλλ’ ἐπιλάμπει τὰ κρείττω τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἡ τελεία πρόνοια τοῦτο: καὶ λόγος ὁ μὲν ποιητικός, ὁ δὲ συνάπτων τὰ κρείττω τοῖς γενομένοις, κἀκεῖνα πρόνοια ἡ ἄνωθεν, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄνω, ὁ ἕτερος λόγος συνημμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ γίνεται ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πᾶν πλέγμα καὶ πρόνοια ἡ πᾶσα. ἀρχὴν μὲν οὖν ἔχουσιν ἄλλην ἄνθρωποι, οὐ πάντες δὲ πᾶσιν οἷς ἔχουσι χρῶνται, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, οἱ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ἢ ταῖς ἑτέραις ταῖς χείροσι χρῶνται. πάρεισι δὲ κἀκεῖναι οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσαι εἰς αὐτούς, οὔτοι γε αὐταὶ ἀργοῦσαι: πράττει γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλ’ εἰς τούτους οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσιν αἰτίᾳ τίνος, εἴποι τις ἄν, παροῦσαι; ἢ οὐ πάρεισι. καίτοι πάντη φαμὲν παρεῖναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἔρημον. ἢ οὐ τούτοις, ἐν οἷς μὴ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐνεργεῖ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ εἰς πάντας, εἴπερ μέρη καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐκ αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων. ἆῤ οὖν οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων οὐ μόνον ἥδε; ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐ μόνη; ἐφ̓ ὧν δὲ μόνη καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὸ ζῆν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὅσον ἀνάγκη. εἴτε γὰρ ἡ σύστασις τοιαύτη, ὡς οἷον εἰς θολερὸν ἐμβάλλειν, εἴτε ἐπιθυμίαι κρατοῦσιν, ὅμως ἀνάγκη λέγειν ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ αἴτιον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν δόξει οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ ἡ ὕλη, οὐχ ὁ λόγος κρατήσει, εἶτα τὸ ὑποκείμένον ὡς πέπλασται. ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου γενόμενον καὶ ὂν κατὰ τὸν λόγον: ὥστε οὐχ ἡ ὕλη κρατήσει, εἶτα ἡ πλάσις. καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν προτέραν βιοτὴν ἂν ἀνάγοι τις, οἷον γινομένου ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἀμυδροῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου: οἷον ψυχῆς ἀσθενεστέρας γενομένης, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐκλάμψει. καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ λεγέσθω ἔχειν καὶ τὸν λόγον αὖ ἐν αὑτῷ τῆς ὕλης, ἣν αὑτῷ ἐργάσεται ποιώσας καθ̓ αὑτὸν τὴν ὕλην ἢ σύμφωνον εὑρών. οὐ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βοὸς λόγος ἐπ’ ἄλλης ἢ βοὸς ὕλης: ὅθεν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά φησιν εἰσκρίνεσθαι οἷον ἄλλης τῆς ψυχῆς γενομένης καὶ ἑτεροιωθέντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα γένηται ψυχὴ βοός, ἣ πρότερον ἦν ἄνθρωπος: ὥστε κατὰ δίκην ὁ χείρων. ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ τί ὁ χείρων ἐγένετο καὶ πῶς ἐσφάλη; ἢ πολλάκις εἴρηται ὡς οὐ πρῶτα πάντα, ἀλλ’ ὅσα δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα ἐλάττω τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἔχει, καὶ σμικρὰ ῥοπὴ ἀρκεῖ εἰς ἔκβασιν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ. καὶ ἡ συμπλοκὴ δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλου ὥσπερ τις σύγκρασίς ἐστιν ἑτέρου ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γενομένου, καὶ οὐκ ὄντος ἠλάττωσεν, ἀλλὰ ἐγένετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαττον τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγένετο κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἔλαττον, καί, εἰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον πάσχει, πάσχει τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. καὶ εἰς τὰ προβεβιωμένα δὲ ἀναπέμπειν δεῖ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς κἀκεῖθεν ἠρτημένων τῶν ἐφεξῆς.
3.3.5γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ πρόνοια ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος κατιοῦσα ἄνωθεν οὐκ ἴση οἷον κατ’ ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἄλλη ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζῴου ἑνὸς εἰς ἔσχατον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρτημένου ἑκάστου τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος, τοῦ μὲν βελτίονος τὸ βέλτιον τῆς ἐνεργείας, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἤδη, ἐνεργοῦντός τε αὐτοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος τὰ ὅσα αὐτῷ οἰκεῖα παθήματα πρὸς αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν σύνταξιν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλο. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὑτωσὶ πληγέντα οὕτως ἐφθέγξατο τὰ φωνήεντα, τὰ δὲ σιωπῇ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται τὰ ἀκόλουθα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων ἁπάντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων μία τοῦ ζῴου οἷον φωνὴ καὶ ζωὴ καὶ βίος. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μόρια διάφορα ὄντα καὶ διάφορον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα: ἄλλο γὰρ ποιοῦσι πόδες, ὀφθαλμοὶ δ’ ἄλλο, διάνοια δὲ ἄλλο καὶ νοῦς ἄλλο. ἓν δὲ ἐκ πάντων καὶ πρόνοια μία: εἱμαρμένη δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἀρξαμένη, τὸ δὲ ὑπεράνω πρόνοια μόνον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ πάντα λόγος καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον: νοῦς γὰρ καὶ ψυχὴ καθαρά: τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ὅσον μὲν ἔρχεται ἐκεῖθεν πρόνοια καὶ ὅσον ἐν ψυχῇ καθαρᾷ καὶ ὅσον ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ ζῷα. ἔρχεται δὲ μεριζόμενος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἴσα ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἴσα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ζῴῳ ἑκάστῳ. τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀκόλουθα μὲν τὰ δρώμενα καὶ προνοίᾳ ἑπόμενα, εἴ τις δρῴη θεοῖς φίλα: ἦν γὰρ θεοφιλὴς ὁ λόγος ὁ προνοίας. συνείρεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων, πεποίηται δὲ οὐ προνοίᾳ, ἀλλὰ γενόμενα ἢ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ἢ παρὰ ὁτουοῦν ἢ ζῴου ἢ ἀψύχου ʽτὰ γενόμενἀ, εἴ τι ἐφεξῆς τούτοις χρηστόν, πάλιν κατείληπται προνοίᾳ, ὡς πανταχοῦ ἀρετὴν κρατεῖν καὶ μετατιθεμένων καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχανόντων τῶν ἡμαρτημένων, οἷον εἰ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι ὑγιείας δοθείσης κατὰ πρόνοιαν τοῦ ζῴου γενομένης τομῆς ἢ ὅλως τραύματος πάλιν ἐφεξῆς ὁ λόγος ὁ διοικῶν συνάπτοι καὶ συνάγοι καὶ ἰῷτο καὶ διορθοῖτο τὸ πονῆσαν. ὥστε τὰ κακὰ ἑπόμενα εἶναι, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δέ: καὶ γὰρ παῤ ἡμῶν κατ’ αἰτίας οὐχ ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας ἠναγκασμένων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν συναψάντων μὲν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας καὶ ἀπὸ προνοίας ἔργοις, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς συνεῖραι κατὰ βούλησιν ἐκείνης οὐ δυνηθέντων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραξάντων ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ μηδ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόνοιαν πεπραχότος ἢ πεποιηκότος τι ἐν ἡμῖν πάθος. οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πᾶν προσελθὸν παντί, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο: οἷον καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης κάλλος πρὸς μὲν τὸν Πάριν ἄλλο εἰργάζετο, Ἰδομενεὺς δὲ ἔπαθεν οὐ τὸ αὐτό: καὶ ἀκόλαστος ἀκολάστῳ, καλὸς καλῷ συμπεσὼν ἄλλο, ὁ δὲ σώφρων καλὸς ἄλλο πρὸς σώφρονα τοιοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἀκόλαστον ἄλλο ὁ αὐτός, ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλο. καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ ἀκολάστου τὸ πραχθὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ προνοίας οὔτε κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔργον οὐχ ὑπὸ προνοίας μέν, ὅτι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ πρόνοιαν δέ: σύμφωνον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὃ ὑγιεινῶς πράξειεν ἄν τις αὐτὸς πράξας κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ ἰατροῦ. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς παρὰ τῆς τέχνης ἐδίδου εἴς τε τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἴς τε τὸ κάμνον. ὃ δ’ ἄν τις μὴ ὑγιεινῶς ποιῇ, αὐτός τε ποιεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τοῦ ἰατροῦ εἰργάσατο.
3.3.6πόθεν οὖν καὶ τὰ χείρω μάντεις προλέγουσι καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν ὁρῶντες πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις μαντείαις προλέγουσι καὶ ταῦτα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ συμπεπλέχθαι πάντα τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὴν ὕλην: οἷον ἐπὶ ζῴου συνθέτου ὄντος ὁ τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον θεωρῶν καὶ τὸ μεμορφωμένον θεωρεῖ. οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ζῷον νοητὸν καὶ ζῷον σύνθετον θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ λόγον ζῴου ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ μορφοῦντα τὰ χείρω. ζῴου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα θεωρῶν θεωρεῖ ἅμα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἔστι καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν τὴν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ: τέταται δὴ ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα. τὰ δέ ἐστι καὶ ζῷα καὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν καὶ διαθέσεις κρατηθεῖσαι λόγῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ μεμιγμέναι: μεμιγμένα οὖν θεωρεῖ καὶ διηνεκῶς μιγνύμενα καὶ διακρίνειν μὲν αὐτὸς οὐ δύναται πρόνοιαν καὶ τὸ κατὰ πρόνοιαν χωρὶς καὶ αὖ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὅσα δίδωσιν εἰς τὸ γινόμενον παῤ αὑτοῦ. ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ σοφοῦ τινος καὶ θείου: ἢ θεὸς ἂν ἔχοι, φαίη τις ἄν, τοῦτο τὸ γέρας. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ μάντεως τὸ διότι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅτι μόνον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἀνάγνωσις φυσικῶν γραμμάτων καὶ τάξιν δηλούντων καὶ οὐδαμοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄτακτον ἀποκλινόντων, μᾶλλον δὲ καταμαρτυρούσης τῆς φορᾶς καὶ εἰς φῶς ἀγούσης καὶ πρὶν παῤ αὐτων φανῆναι, οἷος ἕκαστος καὶ ὅσα. συμφέρεται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις κἀκεῖνα τούτοις συντελοῦντα ἅμα πρὸς σύστασιν καὶ ἀιδιότητα κόσμου, ἀναλογίᾳ δὲ σημαίνοντα τὰ ἄλλα τῷ τετηρηκότι: ἐπεὶ και αἱ ἄλλαι μαντικαὶ τῷ ἀναλόγῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἔδει ἀπηρτῆσθαι ἀλλήλων τὰ πάντα, ὡμοιῶσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀμηγέπῃ. καὶ τοῦτ̓ ἂν ἴσως εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς συνέχει τὰ πάντα ἀναλογία. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀναλογία, ὥστε καὶ τὸ χεῖρον πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ὡς τὸ βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ὡς ὄμμα πρὸς ὄμμα καὶ ποῦς πρὸς πόδα, θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον, καί, εἰ βούλει, ὡς ἀρετὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ κακία πρὸς ἀδικίαν: εἰ τοίνυν ἀναλογία ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ προειπεῖν ἔνι: καὶ εἰ ποεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνα εἰς ταῦτα, οὕτω ποιεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἐν παντὶ ζῴῳ εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ὡς θάτερον γεννᾷ θάτερον: ἅμα γὰρ γεννᾶται: ἀλλ’ ὡς ᾗ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ πάσχει τὸ πρόσφορον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῦτο: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λόγος εἷς.
3.3.7καὶ ὅτι δὲ τὰ βελτίω, καὶ τὰ χείρω. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τι χεῖρον ἐν πολυειδεῖ μὴ ὄντος βελτίονος, ἢ πῶς τὸ βέλτιον μὴ χείρονος; ὥστε οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ βελτίονι, ἀλλὰ ἀποδεκτέον τὸ βέλτιον, ὅτι ἔδωκεν ἑαυτοῦ τῷ χείρονι. ὅλως δὲ οἱ ἀναιρεῖν ἀξιοῦντες τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀναιροῦσι πρόνοιαν αὐτήν. τίνος γὰρ ἔσται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὑτῆς οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ἄνω πρόνοιαν ὀνομάζοντες πρὸς τὸ κάτω λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα ἀρχή, ἐν ᾗ ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ὅλον πάντα. πρόεισι δὲ ἤδη ἐκ ταύτης ἕκαστα μενούσης ἐκείνης ἔνδον οἷον ἐκ ῥίζης μιᾶς ἑστώσης αὐτῆς ἐν αὑτῇ: τὰ δὲ ἐξήνθησεν εἰς πλῆθος μεμερισμένον εἴδωλον ἕκαστον ἐκείνου φέρον, ἄλλο δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐγίγνετο καὶ ἦν τὰ μὲν πλησίον τῆς ῥίζης, τὰ δὲ προιόντα εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἐσχίζετο καὶ μέχρις οἷον κλάδων καὶ ἄκρων καὶ καρπῶν καὶ φύλλων: καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔμενεν ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ἐγίνετο ἀεί, οἱ καρποὶ καὶ τὰ φύλλα, καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀεὶ εἶχε τοὺς τῶν ἐπάνω λόγους ἐν αὑτοῖς οἷον μικρὰ δένδρα βουληθέντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ἐγέννησε πρὶν φθαρῆναι, τὸ ἐγγὺς ἐγέννα μόνον. τὰ δὲ διάκενα οἷον τῶν κλάδων ἐπληροῦτο αὖ ἐκ τῆς ῥίζης καὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλον τρόπον πεφυκότων, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἔπασχε τὰ ἄκρα τῶν κλάδων, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πλησίον οἴεσθαι τὸ πάθος ἰέναι μόνον: τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὖ τὸ μὲν ἔπασχε, τὸ δὲ ἐποίει, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ ἀνήρτητο καὶ αὐτή. πόρρωθεν μὲν γὰρ ἐλθόντα ἄλλα τὰ ποιοῦντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον εἰ ἀδελφοὶ δρῷέν τι ἀλλήλους ὅμοιοι γενόμενοι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρμηθέντες πεποιηκότων.
3.4.1Τῶν μὲν αἱ ὑποστάσεις γίνονται μενόντων ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ἐλέγετο γεννᾶν καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ φύσιν καὶ μέχρι φυτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα, οὐ κρατεῖ δὲ μέρος οὖσα: ὅταν δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς γένηται, αὕτη κρατεῖ οἷον μόνη γενομένη. αὕτη μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν γεννᾷ, ἢ γεννᾷ πάντη ἕτερον αὑτῆς: οὐκέτι γὰρ ζωὴ μετὰ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὸ γεννώμενον ἄζων. τί οὖν; ἤ, ὥσπερ πᾶν, ὅσον πρὸ τούτου ἐγεννᾶτο, ἀμόρφωτον ἐγεννᾶτο, εἰδοποιεῖτο δὲ τῷ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν οἷον ἐκτρεφόμενον, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννηθὲν οὐ ψυχῆς ἔτι εἶδος, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ζῇ, ἀλλ’ ἀοριστίαν εἶναι παντελῆ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κἂν τοῖς προτέροις η ἀοριστία, ἀλλ’ ἐν εἴδει: οὐ γὰρ πάντη ἀόριστον, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν αὐτοῦ: τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντη. τελειούμενον δὲ γίνεται σῶμα μορφὴν λαβὸν τὴν τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει πρόσφορον, ὑποδοχὴ τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ ἐκθρέψαντος, καὶ μόνον τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ἔσχατον τῶν ἄνω ἐν ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ κάτω
3.4.2καὶ τὸ ʽψυχὴ πᾶσα ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχοὐ ἐπὶ ταύτης μάλιστα: αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι ἄλλως. ʽπάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν̓ ἢ ἐν αἰσθητικῷ εἴδει ἢ ἐν λογικῷ ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φυτικῷ. τὸ γὰρ κρατοῦν αὐτῆς μόριον τὸ ἑαυτῷ πρόσφορον ποιεῖ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀργεῖ: ἔξω γάρ. ἐν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ κρατεῖ τὰ χείρω, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν: οὐδέ γε τὸ κρεῖττον ἀεί: ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα χώραν τινὰ ἔχοντα. διὸ καὶ ὡς αἰσθητικοί: ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὄργανα αἰσθήσεως: καὶ πολλὰ ὡς φυτά ἔστι γὰρ σῶμα αὐξόμενον καὶ γεννῶν: ὥστε πάντα συνεργεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ ὅλον εἶδος ἄνθρωπος. ἐξελθοῦσα δέ, ὅτι περ ἐπλεόνασε, τοῦτο γίνεται. διὸ φεύγειν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἐπακολουθοῦντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἰδώλοις, μηδὲ εἰς τὴν φυτικὴν ἐπακολουθοῦντες τῇ ἐφέσει τοῦ γεννᾶν καὶ ἐδωδῶν λιχνείαις, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ θεόν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐτήρησαν, πάλιν ἄνθρωποι: ὅσοι δὲ αἰσθήσει μόνον ἔζησαν, ζῷα. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν αἰσθήσει μετὰ θυμοῦ, τὰ ἄγρια, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ ἐν τούτοις τὸ διάφορον τῶν τοιούτων ποιεῖ: ὅσοι δὲ μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονῆς τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος, τὰ ἀκόλαστα τῶν ζῴων καὶ γαστρίμαργα. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ αἰσθήσει μετὰ τούτων, ἀλλὰ νωθείᾳ αἰσθήσεως μετ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ φυτά: μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο ἢ μάλιστα ἐνήργει τὸ φυτικόν, καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς μελέτη δενδρωθῆναι. τοὺς δὲ φιλομούσους μέν, καθαρίους δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰς τὰ ᾠδικά: τοὺς δὲ ἀλόγως βασιλέας εἰς ἀετούς, εἰ μὴ ἄλλη κακία παρείη: μετεωρολόγους δὲ ἄνευ φρονήσεως εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀεὶ αἰρομένους εἰς ὄρνεις μετεώρους ταῖς πτήσεσιν. ὁ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν τηρήσας ἄνθρωπος: ὁ δὲ ἧττον ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς μετέχων πολιτικὸν ζῷον, μέλιττα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
3.4.3τίς οὖν δαίμων; ὁ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. τίς δὲ θεός; ἢ ὁ ἐνταῦθα: τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργῆσαν τοῦτο ἕκαστον ἄγει, ἅτε καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγούμενον. ἆῤ οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφέστηκεν ἀργοῦν, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ τὸ μετ’ αὐτό. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐνεργοῦν ᾗ αἰσθητικοί, ὁ δαίμων τὸ λογικόν: εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶμεν, ὁ δαίμων τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἐφεστὼς ἀργὸς συγχωρῶν τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ. ὀρθῶς οὖν λέγεται ἡμᾶς αἱρήσεσθαι. τὸν γὰρ ὑπερκείμενον κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν αἱρούμεθα. διὰ τί οὖν αὐτὸς ἄγει; ἢ τὸν βιοτεύσαντα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ἄγειν, ὅτε ἔζη, παυσάμενον δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἄλλῳ παραχωρεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τεθνηκότα τὴν αὑτοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ζωήν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐθέλει ἄγειν καὶ κρατήσας ζῇ αὐτὸς ἄλλον καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων δαίμονα: εἰ δὲ βαρύνοιτο τῇ ῥώσει τοῦ χείρονος ἤθους, ἔχει ἐκεῖνος τὴν δίκην. ταύτῃ καὶ ὁ κακὸς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον βρίσαντος πρὸς τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος ἐν τῇ ζωῇ εἰς βίον θήρειον. εἰ δὲ ἕπεσθαι δύναιτο τῷ δαίμονι τῷ ἄνω αὑτοῦ, ἄνω γίνεται κατ’ ἐκεῖνον ζῶν καὶ ἐφ̓ ὃ ἄγεται κρεῖττον μέρος αὑτοῦ ἐν προστασίᾳ θέμενος καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον ἄλλον ἕως ἄνω. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πολλὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω αὖ μέχρι πάσης ζωῆς καὶ ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός, τοῖς μὲν κάτω συνάπτοντες τῷδε, τοῖς δὲ ἄνω τῷ νοητῷ, καὶ μένομεν τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ παντὶ νοητῷ ἄνω, τῷ δὲ ἐσχάτῳ αὐτοῦ πεπεδήμεθα τῷ κάτω οἷον ἀπόρροιαν ἀπ’ ἐκείνου διδόντες εἰς τὸ κάτω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνέργειαν, ἐκείνου οὐκ ἐλαττουμένου.
3.4.4ἆῤ οὖν ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι τοῦτο; ἢ οὔ: ἐὰν γὰρ στραφῶμεν συνεπιστρέφεται καὶ τοῦτο. τί οὖν ἡ τοῦ παντός; ἀποστήσεται καὶ τὸ αὐτῆς μέρος στραφείσης; ἢ οὐδὲ συνένευσε τῷ μέρει αὑτῆς τῷ ἐσχάτῳ: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦλθεν οὐδὲ κατῆλθεν, ἀλλὰ μενούσης προσάπτεται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἷον καταλάμπεται οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦν οὐδὲ παρέχον μερίμνας ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ τοῦ κόσμου κειμένου. τί οὖν; οὐκ αἰσθάνεταί τινα αἴσθησιν; ʽὅρασιν οὐκ ἔχεἰ, φησίν, ὅτι μηδὲ ὀφθαλμούς: οὐδὲ ὦτα οὐδὲ ῥῖνας δηλονότι οὐδὲ γλῶτταν. τί οὖν; συναίσθησιν ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; ἢ ὁμοίως κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων ἠρέμησις. οὐδὲ ἡδονή. πάρεστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν οὐ παρὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ὡσαύτως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν ἄλλοις: νῦν δὲ ὅσον ἐφήπτετο ἡ ἀπορία αὐτοῦ εἴρηται.
3.4.5ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐκεῖ αἱρεῖται τὸν δαίμονα καὶ τὸν βίον, πῶς ἔτι τινὸς κύριοι; ἢ καὶ ἡ αἵρεσις ἐκεῖ ἡ λεγομένη τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς προαίρεσιν καὶ διάθεσιν καθόλου καὶ πανταχοῦ αἰνίττεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ ἡ προαίρεσις τῆς ψυχῆς κυρία καὶ τοῦτο κρατεῖ, ὃ ἂν πρόχειρον ἔχῃ μέρος ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, οὐκέτι τὸ σῶμα αἴτιον οὐδενὸς κακοῦ αὐτῇ: εἰ γὰρ προτερεῖ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὃ εἵλετο, καὶ ʽτὸν δαίμονἀ, φησίν, ʽοὐκ ἀλλάττεταἰ, οὔτε ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐνταῦθα γίνεται οὔτε ὁ φαῦλος. ἆῤ οὖν δυνάμει ἔστιν ἑκάτερος, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ γίνεται; τί οὖν, εἰ φαύλου σώματος ὁ τὸ ἦθος σπουδαῖος τύχοι, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία; ἢ δύναται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκατέρας ἑκάτερα τὰ σώματα παρέχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἔξωθεν τύχαι τὴν ὅλην προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἐκβιβάζουσιν. ὅταν δὲ λέγηται, ὡς πρῶτον οἱ κλῆροι, εἶτα τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς τύχαις, καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων τοὺς βίους κατὰ τὰ ἤθη αἱροῦνται, τὸ κύριον μᾶλλον δίδωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς διατιθείσαις τὰ δοθέντα πρὸς τὰ αὑτῶν ἤθη. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ δαίμων οὗτος οὐ παντάπασιν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ οὕτως, ὡς μὴ συνδεδεμένος οὐδ’ ἐνεργῶν, ἡμέτερος δὲ ὡς ψυχῆς πέρι εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἡμέτερος δέ, ὡς ἄνθρωποι τοιοίδε τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ζωὴν ἔχοντες, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ: ἃ εἰ μὲν οὕτω ληφθείη, οὐδεμίαν ἕξει μάχην σχόντα ἄν τινα ἀσυμφωνίαν, εἰ ἄλλως ὁ δαίμων ληφθείη. τὸ δὲ ʽἀποπληρωτὴν ὧν τις εἵλετὀ καὶ αὐτὸ σύμφωνον. οὔτε γὰρ πολὺ κατωτέρω ἐᾷ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ὑπερκαθήμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἐνεργεῖ μόνον τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτόν, οὔτε ὑπεράνω αὑτοῦ οὔτε εἰς ἴσον: οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο γενέσθαι ἢ ᾗ ἔστιν.
3.4.6τίς οὖν ὁ σπουδαῖος; ἢ ὁ τῷ βελτίονι ἐνεργῶν. ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σπουδαῖος συνεργοῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὸν δαίμονα ἔχων; νοῦς γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τούτῳ. ἢ οὖν δαίμων αὐτὸς ἢ κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ δαίμων τούτῳ θεός. ἆῤ οὖν καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν, εἰ τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν δαίμων αὐτῷ; διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἢ διὰ τὸν θόρυβον τὸν ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως. ὑπάρχει δὲ ὅμως καὶ πρὸ λόγου ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἔνδοθεν ὀρεγομένη τῶν αὑτῆς. πάντως οὖν κατορθοῖ; ἢ οὐ πάντως, εἴπερ οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ διαθέσεως ἔχει, ὡς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τοιοῖσδε τοιάδε οὖσα τοιοῦτον ἔχειν βίον καὶ τοιαύτην προαίρεσιν. ὁ μέντοι δαίμων οὗτος, ὃν λέγομεν, ἀγαγὼν λέγεται εἰς ᾅδου οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς μένειν, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἕληται πάλιν. πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πῶς; τὸ δὴ ἀγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν τὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἐλθεῖν μετὰ τὴν ἀπογένεσιν, ὃ εἶχε πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως: εἶτα ὥσπερ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕστερον γενέσεως χρόνον ταῖς κολαζομέναις πάρεστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ βίος αὐταῖς, ἀλλὰ δίκη. τί δέ; ταῖς εἰς θήρεια σώματα εἰσιούσαις ἔλαττον; ἢ δαίμων ἢ πονηρός γε ἢ εὐήθης. ταῖς δὲ ἄνω; ἢ τῶν ἄνω αἱ μὲν ἐν αἰσθητῷ, αἱ δὲ ἔξω. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἢ ἐν ἡλίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῶν πλανωμένων, αἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ ἑκάστη καθὸ λογικῶς ἐνήργησεν ἐνταῦθα: χρὴ γὰρ οἴεσθαι καὶ κόσμον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν μὴ μόνον νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς κόσμου ὁμοειδῆ διάθεσιν: νενεμημένης οὖν κἀκείνης εἴς τε τὴν ἀπλανῆ καὶ τὰς πλανωμένας κατὰ δυνάμεις διαφόρους ὁμοειδεῖς ταύταις ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ τὰς παῤ ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι παῤ ἑκάστης καὶ ἀπαλλαγείσας ἐκεῖ γίνεσθαι πρὸς ἄστρον τὸ σύμφωνον τῷ ἐνεργήσοντι καὶ ζήσαντι ἤθει καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοιούτῳ θεῷ καὶ δαίμονί γε ἢ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χρήσεσθαι ἢ τῷ ὑπὲρ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν: σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο βέλτιον: τὰς δὴ ἔξω γενομένας τὴν δαιμονίαν φύσιν ὑπερβεβηκέναι καὶ πᾶσαν εἱμαρμένην γενέσεως καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὁρατῷ, ἕως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, συνανενεχθείσης καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ φιλογενέσεως οὐσίας, ἣν εἴ τις λέγοι ταύτην εἶναι τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένην μεριστὴν συμπληθύνουσαν ἑαυτὴν καὶ συμμερίζουσαν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὀρθῶς λέξει. μερίζεται δὲ οὐ μεγέθει: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλον καὶ πάλιν ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἀεὶ πολλὰ γεννᾶται ταύτης μεριζομένης οὕτως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν φυτῶν: περὶ τὰ σώματα γὰρ καὶ αὕτη μεριστή. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν μενουσα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς: ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπελθοῦσα πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν ἔδωκεν, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνῃρημένοις φυτοῖς ἢ ἐν ζῴοις ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐκ σήψεως πολλῶν ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννηθέντων. συνενεργεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν. πάλιν δὲ ἐὰν ἴῃ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνταῦθα, ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ ἄλλον ἔχει δαίμονα κατὰ τὴν ζωήν, ἣν ποιήσεται. ἐπιβαίνει οὖν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δαίμονος ὥσπερ σκάφους τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς πρῶτον, εἶτα παραλαβοῦσα ἡ τοῦ ἀτράκτου λεγομένη φύσις κατέταξεν ὥσπερ ἐν νηὶ εἴς τινα ἕδραν τύχης. περιαγούσης δὲ τῆς περιφορᾶς ὥσπερ πνεύματος τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς νεὼς καθήμενον ἢ καὶ φερόμενον πολλαὶ καὶ ποικίλαι γίνονται καὶ θέαι καὶ μεταθέσεις καὶ συμπτώματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νηὶ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ σάλου τῆς νεὼς ἢ παῤ αὑτοῦ κινηθέντος ὁρμῇ οἰκείᾳ, ἣν ἂν σχοίη τῷ ἐπὶ νεὼς εἶναι παρὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς πᾶς κινεῖται ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐνεργεῖ. γίνεται οὖν διάφορα διαφόροις ἢ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ διαφόρων προσπεσόντων, ἢ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄλλοις, κἂν διάφορα τὰ προσπεσόντα: τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ εἱμαρμένη.
3.5.1Περὶ ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ ὁ μὲν θεός τις ἢ δαίμων, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πάθος, καὶ ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον, ἐπισκέψασθαι ἄξιον τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοίας ἐπιόντας, καὶ ὅσαι ὲν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐγένοντο περὶ τούτων, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα ὑπολαμβάνει ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, ὃς δὴ καὶ πολλὰ πολλαχῇ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ ἔρωτος ἔγραψεν: ὃς δὴ οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγινόμενόν τι πάθος εἴρηκεν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δαίμονά φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ γενέσεως αὐτοῦ διεξῆλθεν, ὅπως καὶ ὅθεν ἐστὶ γεγενημένος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πάθους οὗ τὸν ἔρωτα αἰτιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγγίνεται ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐφιεμέναις καλῷ τινι συμπλακῆναι, καὶ ὡς ἡ ἔφεσις αὕτη ἡ μέν ἐστι παρὰ σωφρόνων αὐτῷ τῷ κάλλει οἰκειωθέντων, ἡ δὲ καὶ τελευτᾶν ἐθέλει εἰς αἰσχροῦ τινος πρᾶξιν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπου: ὅθεν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἑκάτερος τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπισκοπεῖν διὰ φιλοσοφίας προσήκει. ἀρχην δὲ εἴ τις θεῖτο τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κάλλους πρότερον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ συγγένειαν καὶ οἰκειότητος ἄλογον σύνεσιν, τυγχάνοι ἄν, οἶμαι, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τῆς αἰτίας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐναντίον καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ θεῷ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπουσα ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον βλέπει, ὃ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ συστοιχίᾳ: τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον αἰσχρὸν καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας συστοιχίας. τῇ δὲ φύσει γένεσις ἐκεῖθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ. ὅτῳ δέ τις ἄγαται καὶ ἔστι συγγενής, τούτου ᾠκείωται καὶ πρὸς τὰς εἰκόνας. εἰ δέ τις ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνέλοι, ὅπῃ τὸ πάθος γίνεται καὶ δἰ ἃς αἰτίας οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν οὐδ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν διὰ μῖξιν ἐρώτων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τίκτειν βούλονται ἐν τῷ καλῷ: ἐπείπερ ἄτοπον βουλομένην τὴν φύσιν καλὰ ποιεῖν ἐν αἰσχρῷ γεννᾶν βούλεσθαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τῇδε γεννᾶν κινουμένοις ἀρκεῖ τὸ τῇδε καλὸν ἔχειν, ὅπερ πάρεστιν ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ σώμασιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον αὐτοῖς τοῦ καὶ τοῦδε ἐρᾶν. καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μὲν ἐκείνου ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐλθοῦσιν ἀγαπᾶται τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών, μὴ ἀναμνησθεῖσι δὲ ὑπ’ ἀγνοίας τοῦ πάθους ἀληθὲς τοῦτο φαντάζεται: καὶ σώφροσι μὲν οὖσιν ἀναμάρτητος ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῇδε καλὸν οἰκείωσις, ἡ δὲ πρὸς μῖξιν ἔκπτωσις ἁμαρτία. καὶ ὅτῳ μὲν καθαρὸς ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔρως ἀγαπητὸν τὸ κάλλος μόνον εἴτε ἀναμνησθέντι εἴτε καὶ μή, ὅτῳ δὲ μέμικται καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ὡς ἐν θνητῷ ἐπιθυμία, οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀειγενεῖ καὶ ἀιδίῳ τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἰὼν σπείρει καὶ γεννᾷ ἐν καλῷ, σπείρων μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἐν καλῷ δὲ διὰ συγγένειαν τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον συγγενὲς τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἡ ἀίδιος φύσις τὸ πρώτως τοιοῦτον καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα πάντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν ἐθέλον μᾶλλον αὐταρκέστερον τῷ καλῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐφιέμενον ποιῆσαι καλόν τε ἐθέλει ποιεῖν ὑπ’ ἐνδείας καὶ οὐκ αὔταρκες καί, εἴπερ ποιήσει τοιοῦτον, οἴεται, εἰ ἐν καλῷ γεννήσεται. οἳ δ’ ἂν ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐθέλωσι γεννᾶν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν πορείας ποιησάμενοι τὰς ἀρχὰς γενόμενοι παράφοροι ἐκ ταύτης οἷον ὁδοῦ ὀλισθήσαντες κεῖνται πεσόντες οὔτε ἔρωτα γνόντες ἐφ̓ ὃ ἦγεν αὐτοὺς οὔτε ἔφεσιν γεννήσεως οὔτε χρῆσιν κάλλους εἰκόνος οὔτε ὅ τι ἐστὶ κάλλος αὐτό. ἀλλ’ οὖν οἵ τε σωμάτων καλῶν οὐ διὰ μῖξιν ἐρῶντες, ὅτι καλά ἐστιν ἐρῶσιν, οἵ τε τὸν λεγόμενον μικτὸν ἔρωτα, γυναικῶν μέν, ἵνα καὶ τὸ ἀεί. μὴ τοιούτων δὲ σφαλλόμενοι σωφρονοῦσι μὲν ἄμφω: οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὸ τῇδε κάλλος σέβουσιν ἀρκούμενοι, οἱ δὲ κἀκεῖνο, ὅσοι ἀνεμνήσθησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀτιμάζουσιν οὐδὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν καὶ ἀποτέλεσμά τι ὂν ἐκείνου καὶ παίγνιον. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸ καλὸν αἰσχροῦ ἄνευ, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ καλὸν εἰς αἰσχρὸν πεσόντες: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις ἔχει εἰς κακὸν τὴν ἔκπτωσιν πολλάκις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ παθήματα.
3.5.2περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὃν θεὸν τίθενται οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολόγοι καὶ Πλάτων πολλαχοῦ Ἀφροδίτης Ἔρωτα λέγων καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ εἶναι καλῶν τε ἔφορον παίδων εἶναι καὶ κινητικὸν τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος, ἢ καὶ ἐπαύξειν τὴν ἤδη γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ ὁρμήν, περὶ τούτου μάλιστα φιλοσοφητέον: καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅσα ἐν Συμποσίῳ εἴρηται παραληπτέον, ἐν οἷς οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης φησὶν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Πόρου. ἔοικε δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀπαιτήσειν τι εἰπεῖν, εἴτ̓ οὖν ἐξ ἐκείνης εἴτε μετ’ ἐκείνης γεγονέναι λέγεται ὁ Ἔρως. πρῶτον οὖν τίς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη; εἶτα πῶς ἢ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ σὺν αὐτῇ ἢ τίνα τρόπον ἔχει τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς τε ἅμα καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ. λέγομεν δὴ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι διττήν, τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν Οὐρανοῦ λέγοντες εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, τὴν τῶν τῇδε ἐφαπτομένην γάμων: ἀμήτορα δὲ ἐκείνην καὶ ἐπέκεινα γάμων, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ γάμοι. τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου μείνασαν ἄνω, ὡς μηδὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν μήτε ἐθελήσασαν μήτε δυναμένην, μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν — ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ᾐνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι — ἣν δὴ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσαν καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ̓ ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν. τὸ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐκ νοῦ πεφυκὸς καθαρὸν καὶ αὐτό, ἅτε ἰσχύον καθ̓ ἑαυτὸ τῷ ἐγγύθεν, ἅτε καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης αὐτῇ καὶ τῆς ἱδρύσεως πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν ἱκανὸν ὂν κατέχειν ἄνω. ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐκπέσοι ψυχὴ νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον. ἐφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ ἤ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκειώθη καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα Ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἄμφω ἐκεῖ βλέπουσι, καὶ ἡ γειναμένη καὶ ὁ καλὸς Ἔρως ὁ γεγεννημένος ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχουσα τῷ μεταξὺ ὥσπερ ποθοῦντος καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὁ τοῦ ποθοῦντος παρέχων μὲν τῷ ἐρῶντι δἰ αὑτοῦ τὸ ὁρᾶν τὸ ποθούμενον, προτρέχων δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνῳ παρασχεῖν τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δἰ ὀργάνου δύναμιν αὐτὸς πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος, πρότερος μέν, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐνστηρίζειν μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὅραμα, αὐτὸν δὲ καρποῦσθαι τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτὸν παραθέουσαν.
3.5.3ὑπόστασιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσίας ἐλάττω μὲν τῆς ποιησαμένης, οὖσαν δὲ ὅμως, ἀπιστεῖν οὐ προσήκει. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη οὐσία ἦν γενομένη ἐξ ἐνεργείας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ ζῶσα καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ὁρώσης, ὃ πρώτη ἦν οὐσία, καὶ σφόδρα ὁρώσης. καὶ πρῶτον ἦν ὅραμα αὐτῇ τοῦτο καὶ ἑώρα ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν αὑτῆς καὶ ἔχαιρεν ὁρῶσα, καὶ τὸ ὅραμα τοιοῦτον ἦν, ὡς μὴ πάρεργον τὴν θέαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ ὁρῶν, ὡς τῇ οἷον ἡδονῇ καὶ τάσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σφοδρότητι τῆς θέας γεννῆσαί τι παῤ αὑτῆς ἄξιον αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὁράματος. ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνως περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οἷον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὄμμα πληρωθέν, οἷον μετ’ εἰδώλου ὅρασις, Ἔρως ἐγένετο τάχα που καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον αὐτῷ γεγενημένης, ὅτι ἐξ ὁράσεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει: ἐπεὶ τό γε πάθος ἀπὸ τούτου ἔχοι ἂν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, εἴπερ πρότερον οὐσία μὴ οὐσίας καὶ τό γε πάθος ἐρᾶν λέγεται, καὶ εἴπερ ἔρως αὐτὸν ἔχει τοῦδε: ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο ἔρως. ὁ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἄνω ψυχῆς Ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ὁρῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνω, ἅτε ὀπαδὸς ὢν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ παῤ ἐκείνης γεγενημένος καὶ θεῶν ἀρκούμενος θέᾳ. χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τὸν Οὐρανὸν χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα οὐρανίαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἴπομεν: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν λέγοντες τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄριστον εἶναι χωριστὸν ὅμως τιθέμεθα αὐτὸ εἶναι: μόνον ἐκεῖ ἔστω, οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀκήρατος. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν εἶναι ἔδει, ὑπέστη μετὰ ταύτης ἤδη καὶ ὁ ἄλλος Ἔρως ὄμμα καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀρέξεως καὶ αὐτὸς γεγενημένος. τοῦ δὲ κόσμου οὖσα ἡ. Ἀφροδίτη αὕτη καὶ οὐ μόνον ψυχὴ οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς ψυχὴ καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ Ἔρωτα ἐγεννήσατο ἐφαπτόμενον ἤδη καὶ αὐτὸν γάμων καί, καθ̓ ὅσον ἐφάπτεται καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ὀρέξεως τῆς ἄνω, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινοῦντα καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ᾗ συντέτακται ἀναστρέφοντα, καθ̓ ὅσον καὶ αὐτὴ εἰς μνήμην ἐκείνων πέφυκεν ἰέναι. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἡ μεμιγμένη καὶ ἥ τινος γενομένη: ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης.
3.5.4ἆῤ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστη ψυχὴ ἔχει ἔρωτα τοιοῦτον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει; ἢ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἕξει καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποστάντα τὸν ἔρωτα, ἡ δὲ ἑκάστου ἡμῶν οὔ: πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἅπασι; καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἔρως οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὅν φασιν ἑκάστῳ συνέπεσθαι, ὁ αὑτοῦ ἑκάστου ἔρως. οὗτος γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ ἐμποιῶν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ὀριγνωμένης ἀνάλογον ἑκάστης πρὸς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα γεννώσης εἴς τε ἀξίαν καὶ πρὸς οὐσίαν. ἐχέτω δὴ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ὅλον, αἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τὸν αὑτῆς ἑκάστη. καθ̓ ὅσον δὲ ἑκάστη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἔχει οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἐμπεριεχομένη δέ, ὡς εἶναι πάσας μίαν, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πάντα ἂν ἔχοι: συνεῖναι δ’ αὖ καὶ τὸν ἐν μέρει τῇ ἐν μέρει καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ τὸν μέγαν ἐκεῖνον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τῷ παντὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλοὺς αὖ τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι φαινόμενον πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὗ ἂν θέλῃ σχηματιζόμενον μέρεσιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φανταζόμενον, εἰ θέλοι. οἴεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ’ ἔρωτος, ῥυείσας ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης τινὸς ὅλης, ἐν μέρει πολλὰς ἐκείνης ἐξηρτημένας μετὰ ἰδίων ἐρώτων, εἴπερ ψυχὴ μήτηρ ἔρωτος, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ ψυχή, ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης. ἄγων τοίνυν ἑκάστην οὗτος ὁ ἔρως πρὸς τὴν ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὁ μὲν τῆς ἄνω θεὸς ἂν εἴη, ὃς ἀεὶ ψυχὴν ἐκείνῳ συνάπτει, δαίμων δ’ ὁ τῆς μεμιγμένης.